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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the political parties in Iran between
1941 and 1947, with particular emphasis on the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat of Azerbaijan, an autonomous movement, supported
popularly and caused by the historical circumstances of Riza
Shah's dictatorship (1921-1941) and subsequent central
government pressure which culminated in the rejection by the
Majlis of Pishavari's credentials. Despite increasing
governmental pressure the movement became self-governing and
was supported by the Soviet Union though opposed by America
and Britain, which opposition ultimately aided its downfall,
though not before a considerable number of beneficial reforms
had been carried out in the province.
This field has been hitherto unexplored due to the need
to know Azari Turkish, Persian and English, and because in
the Pahlavi period investigation was difficult, materials scarce
and interviews very dangerous. Only after the fall of the Shah
has there been the chance to undertake original work and
publish conclusions.
Chapter 1, a background sketch, discusses the emergence
of parties from anjumans, the coup d'etat of 1921 and the
subsequent dictatorship of Riza Shah, his reforms and his
relations with Russia and the West. His close links with
Germany meant an unavoidable involvement in World War II.
Chapter 2 describes the parties which filled the power vacuum
on the abdication of Riza Shah; this general view indicates the
prevalent political atmosphere and structure. Chapter 3 examines
the Tudeh Party which was the most important at this time: its
origins, platform, involvement with Trades Unions and ultimate
failure. Chapter 4 describes the background to the Azerbaijan
movement: its causes, formation, central government opposition
and initial successes. Chapter 5 is devoted entirely to the
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reforms and achievements of the movement of which there were
many considering the shortness of the period. Chapter 6 deals
with the international reaction, the role of the United Nations,
and that of the then Prime Minister, Qavam, who concluded
agreements with the Firqa-yi Dimukrat leaders and the USSR.
The successful pressure from the West and the U.S. on the
central government to crush the movement and the international
agreement between America and the USSR, are analysed.
Finally, the causes of failure of the movement and the
subsequent ban on political parties are described.
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Azerbaijan has always been a revolutionary province. She
has always suffered from neglect and discrimination and
remained sadly under-developed despite enjoying rich natural
resources. As not only an Azeri, but an Azeri with 'a strong
interest in politics, I have been intrigued by the causes of
such a state.
From early childhood, I was continually warned not to
discuss the Firqa-yi Dimukrat movement and its leader
Pishavari, as I would be breaking the law. Yet privately I
was aware that many relatives were involved deeply with the
movement and in talking to them about the leaders and events
I began to build an understanding of this aspect of the Azeri
historical consciousness.
However my efforts to study this problem more deeply were
made more difficult by the paucity of materials, utterly out of
proportion to the complexity and importance of the subject.
What little there was consisted of charges against Pishavari,
alleging treachery, adventurism and crude separatism.
I was naturally puzzled by the contradiction between my
childhood understanding of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat as a
worthwhile, reforming movement, and the official, written
claims condemning the episode. I wanted to establish the truth.
What frightens so many people about this movement? Was it a
good or bad thing for Azerbaijan? What was the reason for the
central government's sensitivity? What factors contributed to
the course of events that we understand took place?
Briefly, then, the fact of having so many surviving
leaders of the movement amongst my own relatives encouraged
me to take the opportunity to discover with their help just
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what this movement meant, why it achieved such a degree of
popularity and success in its year of existence, and exactly
why it suffered opposition from the government, conservative
forces and influential Western powers.
This thesis owes its value to the efforts of these relatives
and their families and their friends who assisted me. In the
absence of written materials their information made this thesis
possible. Of the many to whom I am indebted, I can here name
only the most important: B. Khandagh (father, member of Youth
Movement); K. Javadiyan (uncle, a Colonel in the Central
Government forces which invaded Azerbaijan); S. Sharif! (close
family friend, army colonel and Pishavari's military adviser);
A. Purl (cousin, leader of the Tabriz local committee); R.
Rasul! (cousin, Minister of Commerce and Industry); Mrs. S.
Akhunduf (grandmother); Mrs. Naqshina (aunt, active member
of local committee); Mrs. Riza'i (aunt, member of Women's
Movement within the Firqa-yi Dimukrat); and finally S. Javid
(friend, Minister of Interior), who is an eminent and careful
scholar of the movement but was prevented from making public
his work by the restrictions of the Pahlavi dynasty. Since the
Revolution of 1979, he has been able to begin publishing his
research and has most generously allowed me the use of his
findings and materials. And to the many others who are too
numerous to mention by name, I record warm thanks.
Although these interviews were the primary source,
another important part of my material was the collection of
contemporary newspapers which provided a great deal of
information. Amongst these were various radical publications
including the newspaper of the movement (Azarbayjan) and the
publications of the Hizb-i Tuda, including Rahbar and Mardum.
I have also made use of foreign newspapers, e.g. The Times.
Consequently I am indebted to the National Library of Iran in
Tehran which facilitated my reading these newspapers, and in
particular made microfilms for my use. I must also record my
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thanks to the Public Records Office in London for supplying
Foreign Office material: the staff there were more than helpful
and gave full and admirable consideration to the particular
needs associated with my blindness. A similar weight of
gratitude is felt towards the staff of the British Museum. Most
of all, I am particularly grateful to the University of
Edinburgh Main Library and its staff who provided me with
access to a microfilm machine and gave me help with my
peculiar needs and difficulties.
These thanks would indeed be incomplete without
mentioning at some length the efforts and interest shown by
friends and mentors within the Department of Middle Eastern
Studies of this University. The first mention must of course be
of Dr. Sabri-Tabrizi, my supervisor during this research, who
has been generous with ideas and comments. Another academic
who took a special and very welcome interest in this work, is
Dr. McDonald, also of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies,
who kindly concerned himself with some of the difficulties of
this work.
A number of students, known collectively as 'the readers' ,
performed stoic and immeasurable service as my eyes during
the last few years. It is quite obvious that my entire research
was dependent upon their cheerful willingness and considerable
efforts. Included amongst these assistants, and friends, are:
Paul Wilson, Amanda Chandler, Therese Vogt, Shahida Khan,
Manizha Bayani, Peter Barr, Furugh Radsa'id, Sakina Ahmad-
dust, Simon Hayden and Gulnar Javadi.
My aunt in Iran, Mrs. Vajiha Naqshina, overcame many
problems which threatened the completion of this dissertation.
In particular she spent much time and considerable energy in
overcoming the administrative difficulties of transferring funds
from Iran. Without her labours, I could not have survived in
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Edinburgh.
The funds necessary to finance my studies were met by my
parents to whom I record affectionate thanks.
The heroic and patient efforts of Jenny Maisels, my typist,
must be congratulated and her help acknowledged. Jenny
struggled bravely and successfully with many unfamiliar words
and names in the text, and has come through victorious and,
I hope, unscathed.
I extend my sincerest and deepest thanks to both Hilary
Le Cornu and Marjory Anne MacLean, who gave me their
valuable time and company in writing and completing this
article. Their extraordinarily selfless attitudes and consistent
dedication to another's work fully deserves recognition at this
point.
Needless to say, the ideas included in this thesis are
entirely my own, and none of the above persons are responsible
either for their accuracy of their plausibility.
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INTRODUCTION
The nature of the material resources used in this
research has a crucial bearing on the value and reliability of
academic work in this particular field. The critique offered
here of preceding scholars hinges upon the limitations of their
sources, and the contribution 1 hope to have made in this area
depends upon a fuller and deeper exploration of all available
literature and of previously unutilised oral information.
In order to justify and clarify this claim we may first
distinguish three categories of written material. The first of
these may be termed the traditionally popular sources, which,
like those of any discipline, are over-used and tend to be
misunderstood if they are not used in conjunction with more
fundamental and searching exploration. The first of six types
amongst these sources is the Iranian newspaper press. This
varies between extremes of incredible anti- Firqa-yi Dimukrat
criticism and fanatical pro-Azerbaijani exaggeration and I have
attemtpted to maintain a policy of judicious balance between
the two. Similar drawbacks exist with the reports of
Parliamentary proceedings, where the conflicts of personal
ideologies obscure the true development of identifiable policies.
Thirdly, the Western press of Britain and the United States was
biased, understandably enough, against anything suspected of
Russian support; such sources have their advantages factually
but do not help us critically. Similarly, the documents of the
British Public Records Office and U.S. Foreign Relations show
this fear in practice, as information was not collected locally
their only advantage is contemporariness and we must
proceed cautiously in relation to them. Fifthly, Memoirs of
Western protagonists are liberally laced with misleading
patriotism and no unbiased account can be easily extracted
from such sources. Finally, the books and articles, as will be
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all too clear in the course of this critique, copy each other
and lack the experience of time or place, with hardly more
than scanty reference to, and indeed understanding of, the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat movement.
The second collection of sources which, ideally, the
researcher would consult, are the Russian documents relating
to the affair. This opportunity to see both sides of the crisis
is denied us by the official unavailability of these writings,
a reticence which frustrates in part the enquirer's pretentions
to prejudice-free investigation.
And so we come to the third class of sources, and the
area in which this research seeks to extend thinking beyond
previous understanding. In particular, the newspapers of the
province, particularly Azerbaijan itself, are a primary source
of illuminating knowledge and provided that the undoubted
manipulation of their accounts for propaganda purposes is
cautiously abstracted, they are indispensable documents.
Exactly the same must be said for the much-maligned writings
of contemporary figures. As an Azerbaijani myself, I have had
the advantage of being able to utilise material in Azari and,
even more importantly, have been able to make extensive use
of impressions and information gathered from interviews with
key characters in these events. These interviews are the main
means by which the present research has been able to make a
radically new contribution to our knowledge and understanding
of the subject.
The problems outlined above have threatened to confound
research into even the most central issues in this thesis; in
particular investigation into the democratic movement in
Azerbaijan has been bedevilled by the arguably slanderous
attacks of previous writers who claimed that the movement was
separatist, Russian-backed and Communist-atheist.
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Firstly, the question of separatism must be disposed of.
Despite a meticulous investigation of all the documents from the
beginning of this period (September 3rd onwards), including
newspaper articles and reports of action taken, no indication
has emerged of any move towards, or desire for, separation
from Iran. As Lenczowski points out, "no evidence supports the
assumption that the Firqeh Demokrat Party wanted the
separation of Azerbaijan from Iran".1 Indeed, reference is
constantly made to the integrity, independence and freedom of
Iran.
However, writers such as Chubin and Zabih label the
movements in Azerbaijan and Khuzistan as 'separatist regimes',
suggesting even that the Red Army was reluctant to support the
'separatist movement'.2 Razi attributes to 'the separatist
movements of the North' the motive for the formation of the
Dimukrat-i Iran Party.3 Doenecke* claims that "the separatist
Azerbaijan regime was backed by the pro-Communist Tudeh
Party", while Courtois explains that latterly "separatist chiefs
fled to the USSR".5
Other writers go still farther and claim that Azerbaijan
was separated from Iran at this stage. Qasimi says, for
instance, that "Pishevari, with fighting and killing people,
destroyed the independence and integrity of Iran, and
separated Azerbaijan".5
In reality, at the most basic level Azerbaijan's
background is that of a province which was constantly
1. Lenczowski, "The Communist Movement in Iran", HEJ, vol.1, 1947.
2. Chubin and Zabih, Foreign Relations in Iran, 1974, p.36.
3. Razi, "Genesis of Party in Iran", Iranian Studies, vol.Ill, 2, 1970.
4. Doenecke, "Iran's Role in Cold War Revisionism", p.98.
5. Courtois, "The Tudeh Party", p.18.
6. A Qasimi, Tarikhcha-yi Jabha-yi Milli, p.10.
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struggling for the independence, integrity and freedom of the
whole of Iran. In no way, therefore, could it consider
separation from Iran or annexation to another country (i.e. the
Soviet Union). Documentation to substantiate this is readily
available. The first part of the September 3rd declaration
called for the integrity and freedom of an independent Iran;
a survey of all the issues of Azarbayjan shows no sentiments
but those which are an encouragement to strive for Iran's
security - Iran's interests come first throughout. An unbiased
and careful study of the meetings of the Committee, Congress
and Parliament reveals no indication, implicit or explicit, that
this was a separatist movement. The point is clearly made by
the fact that Pishavari did not appoint a War Minister or
Foreign Minister in the Cabinet announced on December 12th,
that Azerbaijan did not consider itself an independent state.
The historians and reporters who oppose the point of view
here expounded, and insist that the obligatory use of Turkish as
the official language in government and education constituted
separatism are misguided, for the right to use the local
language is a fundamental human right. It is equally
unreasonable to describe as 'separatist' the placing of
Azerbaijanis in official posts because they had to understand
the language used and the problems arising from this. This
was demonstrated during the government suppression, when
many people were arrested. One case involved a mistaken
capital sentence passed upon a prisoner whose file was
misunderstood and whose interview was useless because of a
total language barrier. It was only by chance that an interest
was taken in the case, so that an interpreter was brought in
and the mistake quickly rectified: this was a common
occurrence in Azerbaijan.1
An example of a historian who talks of a 'puppet
1. Iskandari, personal interview; he was the person who realised the error.
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government' is W.M. Partin in his thesis United States-Iranian
Relations 1945-7. Partin concentrates mainly on the Azerbaijan
problem, but his work suffers from the one-sided approach of
the author, who bases himself upon Western sources hostile to
the movement and is influenced by the attitude of the Central
Government, which was the bitterest enemy of the movement. As
a matter of acceptable academic practice, Partin ought to have
given consideration to the material published by the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat. Instead his thesis is replete with comments such as
"Officials in Washington viewed the establishment of these
Soviet-sponsored regimes with concern".1
Another Western commentator was Robert Rossow Jr., who
was in charge of the U.S. Consulate in Tabriz from December
1945 to June 1946 and who therefore witnessed first-hand the
enthusiastic support given to the movement. Despite such an
advantage, Rossow too appears to be predisposed against
gaining a clear view of the truth, and also presents a
distorted account: "The rebellion was of course successful and
in December 1945 the 'Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan'
was established, a Russian puppet independent of all control
of the Iranian government in Tabriz".2
The 'puppet' claim must meet this decisive challenge: how
could this imported foreign 'puppet' gain such astonishing
support? Consider the increase in support between the first
declaration of September 3rd and the general election to the
National parliament. In Tabriz alone, 23,991 votes were polled
in three days, a very substantial number for that time. Crowds
rendered the pavements impassable by throwing flowers, sweets
and fruit. Where did such a 'puppet' government find this
sort of support? From the Soviet Union? A correspondent from
Iran-i Ma, returning from this incident, and being questioned
1. Op. cit.;, p.93.
2. Rossow, "The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946", MEJ, 10, 1956.
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on the government's influence, answered that something
certainly existed. The Fida'is could not spring up from the
earth as quickly as that. Iskandarl, a member of the Tudeh,
expressed this very clearly. "We are often accused of being
Russia's puppet, but this is completely false. We are merely
realists. The Tudeh will accept aid from any nation that
encourages and supports progressive elements working for the
benefit of Iran's population: but it will oppose any attempt to
dominate the country."1
It is undeniable that Soviet pressure did assist the
creation of the movement, simply because it prevented the
central government from crushing the movement as it had the
Khiyabani movement of 1920, or the Lahuti movement which
followed. It is also certainly true that after the withdrawal of
the Soviets, the Western-backed Iranian government crushed the
movement, killing over 30,000 Azerbaijanis. However, to claim
that the Soviet withdrawal resulted in the complete collapse of
the movement is a gross distortion of the situation.2
Pisyan wrote on the Firqa-yi Dimukrat soon after the
collapse of the National Government. Studying this work, one
soon realises that throughout he calls them adventurers, rebels
and traitors, but fails to look at these real achievements, true
aims or the reaction they popularly evinced. Denying their
reforms he says, "All the Firqa-yi Dimukrat left behind was
grief and orphans and an abiding hatred of the Soviet Union".3
In his confusion he goes further and simultaneously
condemns Russia for her ineptitude in failing to communise her small
neighbour or gain the Northern Oil Concessions, but praises
1. Lenczowski, "The Communist Movement in Iran", MEJ, 1 (1947), p.34. N.B. the Tudeh
and Democratic Parties had amalgamated at this time.
2. See Chapter 6.
3. Pisyan, Marg Bud Bazgasht ham Bud, Teheran, 1947.
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her saying the blame should be attached not to Russia but to
the traitors in her military who were subsequently executed.
Further, in his praise of the achievements of the Iranian Army
he described the difficulty of crushing the heavily armed
Azerbaijani force, a force which history in fact tells us was
surrounded immediately and defenceless, since the Russians had
removed Azerbaijan's heavier weaponry upon their preceding
retreat.
Pisyan misleads his reader over the reception received by
the Iranian Army. The many locals who, he says, avenged
themselves upon members of the Firqa—yi Dimukrat and the
Fida'is are popularly understood to have been Iranian soldiers
in civilian attire, and the gifts showered upon the victorious
redeemers by grateful Azerbaijani citizens turn out probably to
have been the spoils of looting and violence carried out by the
Iranian troops.
Another writer, A. Mustawfi,1 who was governor of
Azerbaijan in 1940, harboured a resentment of democratic
sympathisers in general and a hatred of Azerbaijanis in
particular, and this showed in his discriminatory attitude
towards Azerbaijan (see Chapter 4). He subsequently produced
three volumes in which again the Azerbaijanis were accused of
treachery, adventurism and rebellion. With a mocking style of
political writing he unsubtly disguises the reforms and
achievements of the National Government. The reception enjoyed
by Pishavari on arriving for negotiations in Teheran is
re-interpreted as a bribed set-up by the Tudeh Party who
wished to draw the attention of Moscow Radio and ultimately to
encourage separatism and foreign intervention, and in general
he has a condemning attitude towards the Soviet Union and the
Bolshevik Revolution.
1. Mustawfi, A., Tarikh-i IjtimaCj va Idari-yi Dawra-yi Qajariyya, pp.421-2.
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A. Qasimi takes a very similar line of argument but
takes an even more extreme view, claiming that by suppression
and violence, Pishavari effectively separated Azerbaijan from
Iran. "The Eirqa-yi Dimukrat came into existence because of
foreign interference and disappeared the same way".1 And
Dadashzada states that Pishavarl assisted the Jangal movement
in the cause of communism and upon its failure, decided to
create the Firqa-yi Dimukrat in order to separate from Iran.2
All the historians, including those sympathetic to the
movement, as well as the media in the West and in Iran,
described the movement as 'Communist', strongly suggesting
that all its members were irreligious, perhaps anti-religion.
Later historians, too, described them as Communists. However,
a glance at the members of the National Parliament shows that
almost all of them were devout Muslims; no assumptions as to
the nature of the movement as a whole can be made from the
fact that Pishavari happened to be a Communist. Two factors
indicate that this was not an irreligious movement. Firstly,
the precedent established by the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan
had demonstrated that such an approach could not work, and
no-one was so ignorant as to repeat the attempt. Secondly,
Biriya, the Minister of Education, for example, kept a Qu'ran
in his pocket. A very religious anthem was also commonly sung
in schools:
Oh God, who has created us from nothing, put your
blessing upon us. Guide us in straight paths and
right actions by your divine power. Enable us to
acquire knowledge, and grant us the wisdom of
science and art, in order to save our fatherland.
Protect and support our land; give us knowledge, a
pure heart and good health. Bless us by your
grace.3
1. Qasimi, A., Tarikhcha-yi Jabha-yi Hilli—yi Iran, Teheran, n.d.
2. Dadashzada, G.B., Zarraha-yi Nifaq, Teheran, n.d., p.88.
3. Azari Fulklur ?a(jifalari, nos. 10-11, compiled by Dr. S. Javid, p.4, 1981.
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All of this evidence reveals that the movement was in
fact trying to provide true Islamic doctrine, which in certain
respects resembles Communist principles. It is sheer ignorance
of the facts, however, to assume that the movement was derived
from Communism.
The false propaganda of the historians, press and media
made a deep impression upon the following generation, whose
knowledge of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat consisted of: (1) the damage
done to the independence and integrity of Iran; (2) the
separatist nature of the movement; and (3) the victory of the
brave young Shah to prevent total separation. This view was
intensified by the military parades annually on 12th December,
the anniversary of the 'rescue* of Azerbaijan from the
Russians, and by the commonly insulting disrespect shown to
Pfshavari. Many questions have not been asked: Who really
was Plshavarl? What did he do? With what social circumstances
did he have to work? How did he react against conservatives,
imperialists and the monarchy? What effect did he have on the
political life of Iran? Why did he fail? These are the







This chapter will be divided into three sections, dealing
with the origin and development of the party system's
beginnings. Since this area has been covered by others, our
main concern here will simply be to give a resume presenting
the background to our main subject. Hence most of the material
used is from secondary sources with a limited number of primary
sources, related to the period 1900-41.
Our first section covers the nature of the party as a
general phenomenon, in order to set our discussion of the
background to the development of parties in Iran in a
comprehensible context. The party system within Iran had its
origins in a series of prototype parties - the dawra, Band,
Parti Bazi - which subsequently developed into the more
structured anjuman, during the Constitutional Revolution.
The second section concentrates upon the revolutionary
movements formed - in Gilan, Azerbaijan, Khorasan
- primarily to fight foreign intervention in Iran and for an
end to Iranian tyrannical rule which oppressed its people.
These aims banded groups together and thus furthered the
development of the party system within the country: the first
organised party, the Communist Party of Persia, was formed in
1920.
The final section deals with the political upheavals
associated with the rise to power and establishment of Riza
Shah. In 1921, following his coup d'etat which put him in
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power, Riza Khan encouraged the party system to develop. Upon
his accession to the throne, however, Riza Shah began to see
the parties as a serious and dangerous threat to his power,
and began a campaign of suppression against them and trade-
unions. All parties were banned or crushed, and Riza Shah
passed a bill prohibiting any Communist membership; as a
result, most parties either vanished or went underground for
the whole period 1925-41. With the abdication of Riza Shah, the
restrictions were lifted, and an immediate mushrooming of
parties occurred in reaction to the cessation of suppression.
These supported many different causes: friendship with various
foreign powers, nationalism, socialism, etc.; the biggest and
most influential throughout Iran remained the Tudeh Party.
Political Parties:
The English term 'party' describes a structure which is
both a social organisation1 and a polity - a minature political
system with its own hierarchy. The party exhibits distinctive
patterns of power distribution, since as a decision-making
body, it involves itself with a representative process, an
electoral system, and further subprocesses for recruiting
leaders, defining goals, and resolving internal conflicts. It
thus shares the characteristics common to most social groups,
while at the same time possessing its own distinctive
characteristics. These can be summarised with four tentative
constructs:2
a) The party is a 'clientele-oriented structure: the open,
informal, personalised nature of the party system is in
contrast with that of the bureaucratic model.




b) it operates as a structural system that seeks to
translate or convert social and economic interests directly
into political power.
c) its power structure is hierarchical, although not
necessarily oligarchic.
d) it has a leadership that is well-organised, self-
conscious, self-perpetuating, congruent, conspiring, and
with a high turnover rate at all levels of the hierarchy.
The nature of the party structure is governed by three
main factors: it is heavily influenced by environmental
pressures - socio-economic conditions and political history; by
the 'political subculture', i.e. the normative and operational
codes adhered to in the power process; and by the time factor,
for the characteristics of a party structure normally evolve
gradually over time, with room allowed for change or
reorientation at critical points along the way.
The party system itself manifests itself in three main
types: the single-party, two-party systems, or a multi-party
structure.
The two-party is closely associated with the Anglo-Saxon
world, although it is neither universal among such countries
nor exclusive to them - two-party systems have existed also in Turkey
and some Latin American countries, and gradual evolution
towards such a system is becoming apparent in parts of
Continental Europe. The two-party system is not monolithic
within itself, a fact illustrated clearly in a comparison
between the British and American patterns. In Britain, the
party structure is usually highly centralised, particularly in
the Labour Party. In the United States, on the other hand,
there exists little organisation beyond that of the State, and
the power of national leaders and committees is strictly
regulated and controlled.
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One of the possible causal factors in the formation of the
earlier British and American parties is considered to be
corruption within society.1
A typology of the multi-party system is somewhat difficult
to establish, for the number of parties involved may range
from three to a theoretical infinity, while there is an equally
extensive variation within each of the parties individually. The
tripartite system of France or Belgium, for example, show no
common features, and there is little similarity between the
quadri-partite systems of Scandinavia and Switzerland.2
The single-party system has usually been regarded as a
new political structure that developed in the twentieth century,
exemplified by the former regimes in Germany and Italy, and
the present Soviet government. This view is maintained,
despite the fact that dictatorships - either a one-man or one-
party rule - have been known throughout recorded history. The
one-party system conforms closely to the needs of a
dictatorship, yet it has its role in a democratic framework.
The close resemblance between the French and Russian
Communist parties illustrates that structurally there can be
little difference between their forms, although the single-party
system might be either left or right wing.
There is no clear line of demarcation between parties in
single- or multi-party systems as regards their internal
organisation: the one derives from, and often remains close to,
the other.3 The other two systems as a whole nevertheless
require independent analysis.*
1. Ostrogorski, M.I., in Duverger, M., Political Parties, Ion. 1964, p.21.
2. Ibid., p.229.
3. Duverger, op. cit., p.255.
4. Ibid., p.257.
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The party in a single party system aims to create new
elites while creating and fashioning political leaders capable
of governing with tight control since the masses themselves do
not have the potential for governing themselves. The major
difficulty inherent in such a systems belongs to the fact that
the country's leaders become isolated from the masses.1
Two main types of single-party system exist - Fascist and
Communist, and these possess a clear doctrinal differentiation.2
Communist parties have been defined as "the tools of the
proletariat to overthrow the authority of the middle classes",
and Fascist parties as "the tools of the middle classes to
retain their power, and prevent it falling into the hands of
the proletariat".3 These definitions are socially inadequate,
however. Both types of party begin by making revolutionary
statements. Under Fascism, however, these change to a
fundamental conservatism, which undertakes only minor reforms,
and seeks to retain power for the middle classes; while
Communism on the other hand, is driven by a continuing
revolutionary energy that seeks to build socialism, increase
production, and bring about modernisation.
A typology of single-party systems should also be able
to account for
^ some single parties which are neither
ideologically nor organisationally truly totalitarian - such as
the Republican People's Party which ruled in Turkey between
1923 and 1946.* The case of Iran, however, differed in several
respects.
Iran's political system was simultaneously feudal and
patrimonial, while its ideological legitimation was provided





through Islam and tradition. No political parties as such
appeared to lead the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, as had
happened in Turkey, for example.1 The political system was
modified, however, through Iran's contact with European
culture. Although traditional and modern systems inevitably
overlap as adaptation takes place, the outstanding features of
modern political institutions exist in the constitution,
parliament and electoral process. These contrast with the
traditionalist emphasis on monarchy, and, when tradition is
incorporated into the modern institution, the adoption of some
of the modern nationalist goals, such as reform, modernisation
and industrialisation, and can graft new authoritarian
techniques on to the old ways of absolutism.2
Here again, Iran's political development is divergent,
since it is connected with the causes of the Constitutional
Revolution, and with the creation of the Majlis. Thus in Iran,
two political groupings, the Democrats and the Moderates can
lay some claim to the label 'party'.3
We must, however, before considering these parties, refer
to the political prototypes that preceded the parties proper,
and upon which the latter were grouped. These include: parti,*
band, dawra, fraksiyun, and anjuman.
Parti Bazi - a term that refers to individual petitioning
of bureaucracy, military or security organisations, in order to
achieve a stated aim.*
Band - a collaboration of like-minded thinkers in a
mutually supportive, though informally organised political
1. Cottam, op. cit., 'Political Party Development in Iran', Iranian Studies, vol.
, 3, 1968.
2. Razi, op. cit., p.60.
3. Binder, L., Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society, Toronto 1964, p. 206.
4. Razi, op. cit., p.60.
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group, usually named after one of its leading members, or
Q
families (e.g. Band-i Mas udian). Some of these cells were
formed into minor parties, or fraksiyuns, but they were more
commonly the antecedents of the political anjuman.
Dawra - a more stable party prototype. It comprised a
small group of friends or relatives, numbering around 15, who
met weekly or bi-weekly in members' homes or at some
designated place. Such groups were not mutually exclusive, but
allowed for informal political discussion and co-operation,
particularly during periods of political repression. The Dawra
anticipated the anjuman, and also entered the common
vocabulary as a legislative term after World War II.1 The
system through which Iranian politicians communicated with
their 'constituents' paralleled its primary source of information
- the bazaar rumour. But whereas the Dawra was an upper
class social habit, its members deriving primarily from the
upper middle classes, the Dawra system referred to a
structurally amorphous, indeterminate, and peculiarly Iranian
mode of political activity.2
Each Dawra member generally participated and was active
in at least 2 or 3 other Dawras, and this allowed for rapid yet
discreet transmission of the matters under discussion. These in
turn fed into the bazaar rumour, which conveyed information
to associates, and to customers, thus linking the elite with the
population as a whole.
The Dawra system is deeply rooted in Iranian history,
and the celebrated Khanigahs, for example, represent a type
of continuous or permanent Dawra, comprising Darvish and Sufi
leaders.3 Dawras could easily turn into political action groups,
1. Bill, J., Politics of Iran, 1972, Bell & Howell, Ca. USA, p.44.
2. Miller, W.A., "Political Organisation in Iran: From Oowra to Political Party",
MEJ 1969, vol.23, p.154.
3. Bill, J., "Plasticity of Informal Politics: The Case of Iran", ME J, vol. 27 , 1973,
p.131.
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as in recent years, and the Khanigahs are known, too, for
their political element. Moreover, Dawras in the form of
Faramushkhanas (Freemason groups) frequently engaged in
informal or clandestine activities that resulted in direct
political influence.1
Whereas Freemasonry appears to have anticipated the
formation of radical and liberal parties in Europe, especially
in France and Belgium,2 the Dawra represents only one side of
the "politics of informality" in Iran.
Fraksiyun - again deriving from the French, refers to the
parliamentary faction system in Iran. Fraksiyuns varied in the
cohesion and stability of their membership. Most were temporary
groupings during one Majlis session, others were of longer
duration. Some were associated with political parties outside
the Majlis, and important political decisions have been made
in fraksiyuns which Rizazada-yi Shafaq3 has termed ' Shikasta-
bastaha' (those who shatter and regroup), because of their
undefined, fragmented nature. Shafaq also refers to a system
of "factions without parties", in which groups do not have
"any permanence or durability and live their short lives
haphazardly". This is not always the case, however, and
Fraksiyun-ism may have a lasting result, as both Ibrahimiyan*
and Makki5 point out.
Anjuman® - the most structured and significant party
1. Ra1 in, E., FaramusMJiana va-faramusiyan dar Iran, Teheran 1969, pp.219-220.
2. Algar, H., 'An Introduction to the History of Freemasonry in Iran1, ME Studies
6, 1970, p.281.
3. Rizazada-yi Shafaq, Khatirat-i Majlis va Dimukrasi-Chist, Teheran 1955, pp.58—
61. ~
4. Abrahajniyan, E., 'Factionalism in Iran', ME Studies 14, vol.1, p.51.
5. .Makki, H., Tarikh-i Inqiiab-i Mashrutiyyat Par Iran, Teheran 1945-6 II, pp.337-
9, III, pp.4-10.
6. Razi, op. cit., p.62.
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prototype. Anjumans were societies or associations which existed
to discuss social freedom and liberation from politically
oppressive regimes. These two elements of discontent acted in
the role of an absent ideology, and were responsible for
holding the anjumans' members together, along with the need
felt for modernisation.1
The earliest attempt at uniting merchants and Ulama was
made, with partial success, by Sayyid jamal al-Din Asadabadi
— — 2 C —
Afghani, who believed that the Ulama should support the
Iranian people against the tyranny of the Shah. The
consolidation of the anjumans, however, occurred towards the
end of the reigns of Nasir al-Din Shah and Muzaffar al-Din
Shah, and it was this factor which made the Constitutional
Revolution a real possibility.3
Secret societies such as these were generally unknown
in the West, for they were modelled upon ancient Eastern
societies, * although several anjumans existed in France during
this period. Early anjumans consisted primarily of
revolutionary cells. Following the Constitutional Revolution of
1906, however, they developed very differently from other secret
societies, becoming more open, increasing their membership,
and openly communicating with each other.
Anjumans were of two types:5 the provincial anjuman,
and the 'popular' or political anjuman. The provincial anjumans
(Anjuman-i Iyalati or Vilayati) were vigilant bodies which
1. Lanbton, A., "Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905-6", St.
Anthony's Papers4, 1958, p.48.
2. Keddie, N., 'Origins of Religious Radical Alliances in Iran', Past and Present
34, 1966, p.74.
3. Lambton, "Persian Political Societies 1906-11", St. Anthony's Papers 6, 1963,
p.41.
4. Lambton, "Secret Societies", op. cit., p.43.
5. Lambton, "Persian Political Societies", op. cit., p.46.
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represented the Central Government, and supervised the
provincial governors. Each Iyalat comprised twelve members,
and each Vilayat six. Their duties included:
1. To decide the electoral and franchise rules.
2. To supervise provincial administration.
3. To answer complaints against governors.
4. To administer the revenue.1
The political anjumans, which numbered over 100 in
Teheran alone in the period immediately following the granting
of the Constitution, had three purposes:
1. To strengthen the Constitution and to initiate
reforms.
2. To watch over governmental actions and officials.
3. To appeal on behalf of individual citizens in
cases of real or alleged injustice.
It is unrealistic in practice to distinguish between the
two types of anjuman, for in fact, the provincial anjuman
became 'popular', and acted as a central body to \vhich the
'political' anjumans reported.2 After the Revolution, the
political anjumans possessed the potential to develop into
parties, and this was certainly their function at this stage.
As their role and power increased, politicians of many varied
persuasions became involved with these types of structures;
this then provided a link between the Majlis and the people,
the latter easily influenced by the politicians. The anjumans
were always prevented from becoming true parties by their lack
of a coherent programme or ideology, and an almost total
1. Ittihadiyya, M., Origins of Political Parties, unpub. thesis, Univ. of Edinburgh,
1979, p.249.
2. Lambton, "Persian Political Societies", op. cit., p.47.
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absence of national base.1 Despite government opposition and
suppression, from even the Shah himself, anjumans continued
to form, as in the case of the Anjuman-i Muqaddas-i Milli of
Isfahan, later known as the Anjuman-i Iyalati, which was set
up in 1906. Various 'popular' anjumans were also established,
including the Anjuman-i Tijarat, the Anjuman-i Taraqqi, and
the Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya, formed by Isfahani theological
students.
Anjumans were semi-political and semi-religious or
messianic in character. The various Tabaqat (strata) had their
own anjumans - the Shahzadigan, Tullab and Asnaf, for
example. There were also reactionary anjumans, including the
Anjuman-i Varamin led by Iqbal al-Dawla, and the Futuhat.
DawlatabadT claims that this last anjuman was created to
disrupt the Anjuman-i /*z.arbayjan.2 These reactionary anjumans
were principally formed to counter the activities of various
revolutionary anjumans, such as the Anjuman-i Makhfl,
set up in February 1905/1322, and whose members (Fida'T)
demanded a Court of Justice and the establishment of the
Majlis.3 The best known members of this Anjuman were Sayyid
Ziya Muhammad Ta&ataba'i, Nazir al-Islam Kirmani and Mirza
Aqa Isfahani, and its duties lay in supporting the Majlis, and
overseeing the deputies. Kirmani* maintains that its primary
function was to awaken the political awareness of the populace,
and that it later became more radical. He also suggests that
• __ _
Sayyid Ziya' s main aim was to form a Republic, although some
politicians argued that Republicanism and Constitutionalism
were not mutually exclusive, and supported either ideology.
1. Ittihadiyya, op. cit., p.251.
2. Dawlatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, Teheran 1950.





Kirmani points out that this particular Anjuman was
instrumental in bringing about the union of the two leading
Q
Mujtahids, Sayyid Abdullah-i Bihbahani and Sayyid Muhammad
Tabataba'i, Another aniuman, the Anjuman-i MakhfT-yi Sanl,
was organised in Riza'iyya in 1324-/1906 to continue the activities
of the former Anjuman. This Anjuman was led by Malikzada,
the son of Sayyid Ziya Muhammad Tabataba'i, who advocated
a hard line.1 Some of its members were from the Anjuman-i
Makhfi, but the latter was less active than this Anjuman. It
published a paper, Kawkab-dari, and secret missives,
Shabnama; it had a Nizamnama, (manifesto) and was,
paradoxically, simultaneously open and secretive, dominated by
Kirmani. It amalgamated firstly with the better organised
Anjuman-i Ansar, and later with the Anjuman-i Junub, which
consisted of Shirazis. At this point, its members decided to
work for the welfare of the South.2
The Anjuman-i Milli was a highly secret, 60-strong group
set up in March 1905/1323.3 Its members included Malik al-
MutakallimTn, Dawlatabadi and his brothers, and Aqa Mlrzi,
a royal prince, as well as merchants, mujtahids, guildsmen,
bureaucrats, Zoroastrian communities and tribes. Its committee
of 9, and a still smaller group of 5, sat weekly.
This revolutionary Anjuman sought to unite the scattered
efforts of the many already existing Anjumans. Malik- Zada
writes that this Anjuman sought the co-operation ofr< the two
chief mujtahids, * and it is sometimes claimed to have had links
with the Russian Social Democratic Party.5 Malik-Zada claims
that this Anjuman was very active in the Constitutional
1. Kirmani, op. cit., pp.233—A-.
2. Ibid., pp.74-8.
3. Malik-Zada, Tarikh-i Inqilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran, Teheran 1954.
4. Sayyid CAbd Allah Bihbahani arid Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i.
5. Ittihadiyya, op. cit., p.86.
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Revolution, and that it supported the struggle behind the
scenes.
Several anjumans worked closely with the Azadikhahan,
one of the most important being the Anjuman-i Azarbayjan,
which had 2,962 members,1 and was located in Teheran. The
Anjuman-i Azarbayjan was a significant force because of its
connection with the Tabriz Anjuman and the KumTta-yi Inqilab-
i and also because of the policies of the Azerbaijani deputies.
Its leader was Taqi-Zada.
The Anjuman-i Tabriz was established in 1906. According
to KasravT,2 the Tabrizis took sanctuary in the British
Consulate in order to force Muhammad CAli Mlrza to accept the
Constitution, and upon leaving the Consulate, their leaders set
up an anjuman. Its 20 members were promised the support and
active co-operation of the • CUlama. This Anjuman acted
provi'ncially and in Tabriz, and had a small core called the
Markaz-i Ghaybi. The Tabriz Anjuman soon began to show signs
of a split between moderate and extreme factions, although the
split never became final. Its activities included the editing of
its own paper, and the organisation of a large scale strike in
Tabriz.
The Anjumans became important upon the demise of the
Majlis, and at the same time increased in hostility towards the
_Shah. DawlatabadT states that the anjumans picked and trained
their members, and informed the Majlis that they could mobilise
2,000 armed men at any time. Eventually, the Majlis could not
act without the approval of the Anjumans or the press. When
the policies of the _Shah became more aggressive, the people
and the Anjumans wished to fight, but incurred the disapproval
1. Lambton, op. cit., p.50.
2. Kasravi, A., Tarikh-iMashrutiyat-ilran, pp.159-165, 176.
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of the deputies, who doubted the strength of the Nationalists.1
The failure of the Majlis was probably due to the divisions
among the deputies which were exploited by the Shah.
To summarize, then: the reason for the later development
of the anjuman into a political party, was its organisation, for
it was the obvious prototype of a political party, especially
during times of representative government. However, the
political 'party' in the full sense, which emerged during the
period of representative government, 1905-25, owed its genesis
not to Iranian representation but to Russian and later Soviet
influence. This was in the form of the Russian Social
Democratic Party, which, unlike any other party, had its
origins in Baku, before its influence extended to Iran and the
organisation began to take effect there.
Prologue to the Coup of February 1921:
The period between 1905 and 1921 was one of political
and economic turmoil in Iran. Intense political activity derived
from the granting of Constitutional Law in 1905:2 while it was
enthusiastically received by the populace, especially in Azerbaijan,
it came into increasing disrepute with the new Shah, Muhammad
c — — *
Ali Shah. A power struggle thus ensued between the monarchy
and central government, and the Constitutionalists, fought right
through to 1911. Hostility between East and West centring on
each of their individual concerns was of no great importance
to the Constitutionalists. Tension was rather caused in Iran
itself through the unwanted presence of any foreign influence
in the country, although it centred quite naturally on Britain
and Russia.3 Both of these powers were seeking concessions
1. Dawlatabadi, op. cit., pp.278-80.
2. Lockhart, L, "The Constitutional Laws of Persia", MEJ, vol.13 1959, passim.
3. Keddie, N.R., "The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800-1969: An
Overview", ME Studies 2 (1971), p.7.
- 24 -
from Iran, particularly on oil, and the populace was growing
increasingly restive with a government that had neither the
capability to restore economic health to Iran nor the
determination to promote the rights of her own citizens in the
face of foreign pressure.
These two sources of discontent, deriving from the
relation between the central government and foreign powers,
induced a rash of revolutionary movements within Iran whose
main goals constituted the removal of foreign influence and
intervention in Iran, the abolition of Iran's feudal system,
and the institution of comprehensive reforms.
The nineteenth century in Iran saw a deepening
complexity of society which both reflected and effected a
general growth of political awareness amongst the population.
The Qajar dynasty, while still claiming to be all-powerful
Kings of Kings, was in the process of losing its absolute power
among different sections of Iranian society. Provincial magnates
had immense power, since the Shahs controlled neither
bureaucracy nor armies in their provinces.1 Two new classes
also emerged in society: a united middle-class developed
gradually out of the lesser clergy and petit bourgeoisie, and a
new intelligentsia which welcomed and encouraged Westernisation
grew out of the modernisation of the Iranian education system.2
The power of the monarchy was thus being disintegrated, and
assumed by groups within society anxious not to further their
own careers but the democratic, and thereby stable and
confident, state of Iran.
The first manifestation of this political mobilisation came
in the "Tobacco Regie", in 1892,3 where a popular ban on
1. ^brahd,miyan, E., "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran", International
Journal of HE Studies, IV, 1 Jan. 1974, pp.3-31.
2. Bill, J., Politics of Iran, passim., US 1972.
3. Avery, P., Modern Iran, NY Praeger, 1965, p.95ff.
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smoking forced the cancellation of the tobacco concession given
by the government to Britain. Successive proposed concessions
were thereafter blocked through the deployment of this newly
found popular voice and will, all of which incidents served to
strengthen the people's political resolve.
Therefore, with the co-operation of the middle class and
intelligentsia, the Constitutional Law was eventually won from
Muzaffar al-Din Shah through the Revolution fought in 1905.1
The Revolution was supported by the guilds, and by wealthy
merchants, religious authorities and intellectual Western-
educated people.2 Thus, in December 1905, a group took refuge
in a mosque in Teheran to protest against the victimization of
two sugar merchants by the government in an attempt to lower
sugar prices.3 The bazar went on strike in support, and their
protest was also supported by a group of religious leaders who
took Bast (sanctuary) in Shah CAbd al-'Azim together with
their families, and by theology students financed by a dealer
and several merchants. The crisis was intensified through the
unexpected participation of the guilds, which previously had
only ever given limited support to groups such as the clergy. *
Further demonstrations took place, and the British Consulate in
Teheran was also occupied as a place of refuge.s Muzaffar
al-Din Shah was subsequently compelled to grant a
Constitutional Law in the face of these and other financial
disturbances, so weak was his power.4
1. /Ibrahimiyan, E., 'The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1950-53', Past and Present 41,
December 1968, p.192; Browne, E., The Persian Revolution of 1905-9 (CUP 1910),
pp.167-168.
2. Abrahimiyan, 'Factionalism in Iran: Political Groups in the 14th Parliament (1944—
46), ME Studies, p.192.
3. 4brahimiyan, 'Crowd in Iranian Polities', op. cit., p.185.
4. Sbrahimiyan, 'Factionalism in Iran', op. cit.
5. /Ibrahimiyan, 'Crowd in Iranian Polities', op. cit., p.186.
6. For more details, see Qbrahdjniyan, E., 'The Causes of the Constitutional
Revolution in Iran', ME Studies 10 (1979), passim.
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Despite this triumph, the Constitutionalists had only just
begun to encounter problems. Muzaffar al-Din Shah's successor,
his son Muhammad c A li Shah, objected strongly to the limits
imposed upon the power of the monarch by the Constitutional
Law, especially as regards the provinces. He therefore
embarked upon a campaign towards its annulment, further
antagonising the situation by sacrificing • Iranian interests to
those of Czarist Russia in his attempt to favour landowners.1
In response, an attempt to assassinate Muhammad CA1T
Shah was made in 1908 by Azadikhwahan, under orders from
Haydar Khan Amughli-2 In June, the Shah with his Iranian
Cossacks,- under Russian officers, bombarded and dissolved the
Majlis.3 Strong resistance ensued, with the conflict between
Royalists and Constitutionalists lasting until the autumn of
1909. The victory went to the Constitutionalists, who deposed
c —
Muhammad Ali Shah and put his son Ahmad on the throne
*
c
under a regent. Muhammad Ali Shah was exiled to Odessa,
apart from one brief and unsuccessful attempt to regain his
throne.*
Political diversity and development steadily increased
during the whole period. The Majlis itself divided into 3
factions: the Muc tadilin, the Azadikhwahan and the Bitarafan
(neutrals). The first of these was generally conservative, and
the second variously called Nationalist, liberal, extremist and
revolutionary; this extremism was active, and manifested itself,
for example, in the assassination of Atabak. The division
between the deputies was not a class difference but rather a
difference of interest.
1. Razi, op. cit., p.63.
2. Jawdat, H., Az Sadr-i Mashrutivat ta Inqilab-i Safid, Teheran 1970, p.12.
3. Ibid., p. 12; Razi, op. cit., p.64.
4. 'Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia', (no author), Central Asian Review 4, 1956,
p.300.
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Outwith the Majlis, political awareness was being
mobilised into organised structures. Three main parties
developed out of the anjuman system: the Firqa-yi Dimukrat,
the Moderates (Mu ctadilih), and the smaller Alliance and
Progress Party. The minority Dimukrats were more influential
q _
than the larger Mu tadilin, so the balance of power remained
precarious.
Support for the Dimukrats was basically proletarian in
character, coming particularly from the Anjumans in Tabriz,
from Iranian Turks, and from the anti-Royalist Mujahidin,
mainly in Baku1 The Muc tadilin comprised pro-Constitutionalist
Bakhtiyari Khans and tribesmen, conservative clergy, and
landed gentry and was of an upper class nature.2 Iran thus
seemed to be moving towards a constitutional and electoral
monarchy - the first committee to supervise elections was in
fact favoured by the Tabriz Anjumans, immediately after the
Constitution was granted.3
Despite this apparent success, the parties floundered
because of the collaboration, necessitated by Germany's rising
power, between Britain and Russia over the Conventional Treaty
of August 31, 1907. * As a result of this treaty, Iran was split
into three zones: the North, under the influence of Russia, the
South dominated by Britain, while the centre of the country was
under the influence of both.5 The Czarist government sought to
return Muhammad c All Shah to power, by provoking counter-
1. Jawdat, op. cit., p.26; M. Malik Zada, op. cit., p.40.
2. Jawdat, op. cit., pp.26-7.
3. Razi, op. cit., pp.64-5.
4. Jawdat, op. cit., p.27; cf. M. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, NY 1920,
pp.xxiv-xxviii; Razi, op. cit., p.65.
5. Churchill, R.P., The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Cedar Rapids, Iowa 1939.
For more details, see the following pages.
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revolutionary activity in Iran, and in December 1911, they
finally suppressed the remaining Constitutionalist strongholds
in Tabriz, Rasht, Anzali and finally Mashhad in 1912.1 It was
unable wholly to suppress the movement, however, which was
also supported, although somewhat ambiguously, by Britain.2
Earlier in 1911, Azadfkhwahan decided to employ American
financial advisers, partly because of the failure of Belgian
officials, partly because of the geographical isolation of the
United States, which precluded the temptation of territorial
expansion, and partly to counter-balance Russian and British
influence. Thus a request was made through the Iranian
embassy for trusted financial advisers.3 Morgan Shuster led the
group of five financiers appointed in 1911, to whom the Majlis
gave wide powers covering revenue and expenditure. A Russian
ultimatum at this time demanded Shuster's dismissal,
compensation for the Russian army, and a guarantee that
appointments of foreign advisers would be notified to Russia
and Britain.
These demands incited the fury of the masses, whose
slogan, "Death or Independence", challenged this threat to the
very existence of Iranian sovereignty. Upon the Majlis'
rejection of this ultimatum, both Russia and Britain moved
forces into the area. As revolutionary forces were engaging the
Czarists in Tabriz, Rasht and Mashhad, the Iranian
reactionaries, capitalising on the Russian and British concern,
effected a coup d'etat in December of that year. Aided by
detachments under the control of Yefrem Khan -the Dashnak, and
the Bakhtiyaris, they seized the Majlis building and
dissolved Parliament, so that the Qajar reactionary aristocracy
re-assumed power.
1. Old. ed. of Soviet Encyclopedia, art. 'Persiya', vol.45, 1940.
2. Jawdat, op. cit., p.10; Razi, op. cit., p.65.
3. Jawdat, op. cit., pp.29-31.
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The government then accepted the Russo-British ultimatum;
Shuster was dismissed on December 25, 1911, and left Iran on
January 11, 1912.1
This reconciliation between the Moderates and foreign
powers was a setback both for the Dimukrats and for
representative government. A number of liberal leaders fled the
country, and the Majlis was suspended for 3 years, only
recovering in November 1914, after the coronation of Ahmad
Shah, when it regained its leading role.2 It was further
dissolved again in November 1915, after an attempt to set up
a pro-German government in Qum.3 Between this event and the
sitting of the fourth Majlis in June 1921, neither the Liberals
nor Nationalists, reputedly honest, participated in Cabinets,
since the latter were said to be under either British or Russian
influence. The British regarded the Dimukrats as extremists,
who fought intermittently against Russia, Britain and the
Iranian government, aided occasionally by Germany and
Turkey.
Importantly, the end of the Third Majlis saw the final
collapse of co-operation between the Moderates and Dimukrats,
due to the collaboration of the former group with foreign
powers. The Moderates were accused of treachery and betrayal
of the true nationalists in order to gain power over central
government.
Concurrently with the rise of these parties, and in direct
response to the presence of foreign powers in Iran and their
influence over the central government, together with the
economic decay within the country, a series of revolutionary
movements arose. Variously Communist or nationalist according
1. Shuster, op, cit., p,198ff.
2. Razi, op. cit., p.66.
3. Avery, op. cit., pp.185-8; Malik Zada, op. cit., vol.4.
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to the majority of historians, it may be maintained that all
were in fact nationalist, since support from an external source
does not necessarily indicate domination by that source (e.g.
Soviet support for the Tudeh Party) and all were anti-foreign.
Through analysing these movements, we shall attempt to
substantiate and demonstrate this fact.
Uprisings in Azerbaijan:
Azerbaijan had consistently supported the idea of a
strong Iranian government, able and willing to promote the
interests of Iranians instead of those of foreign powers. When
the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution resulted in the withdrawal of the
Russians, who had occupied the country under the reactionary
—(2
puppet, Shuja al-Dawla, the Azerbaijanis increased their
efforts towards achieving these aims.
In December 1917, a Tabrizi group demanded the removal
of the pro-Russian governor of Azerbaijan, the return of anti-
Russian political exiles, and the holding of parliamentary
elections. The weak Teheran government neither responded to
this demand, nor tried to fill the political vacuum created
by the Russian withdrawal. Consequently, _Shaykh Muhammad
Khiyabanl (1879-1920) was able to take power.1
Khiyabani was an eloquent middle-class politician who
had taken part in the revolution of 1908-9, and who had been
arrested in the first World War by the Ottomans and deported
to Nars. As one of the Liberal Nationalist faction in the Majlis,
and a Dimukrat, Khiyabani was regarded by his supporters as a
democrat and Iranian patriot, not linked to any ideas of Azerbaijan
1. 'Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia1, op. cit., pp.303-313.
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separatism.1 Nor did he encourage foreign intervention, and in
fact rejected the help of Russia and Turkey, preferring instead
to introduce his own style of government, which encouraged
individual responsibility within the community.2
On April 10, 1920, JChiyabanl broke openly with Teheran
over the 1919 Anglo-Iranian Treaty. The Dimukrats subsequently
expelled the governor, occupied government offices, and
established a National Committee, for the welfare of the people.
Various cities, including Urumiyya and Zanjan3 came under this
Committee, which was strongly republican and anti-imperialist,
and wanted reforms, autonomy for Azerbaijan, and improvement
of relations with the Soviet Union.
This opposition to the 1919 Treaty caused the downfall of
Vusuq al-Dawla's Cabinet on June 25, 1920. Dawla was replaced
by the nationalist feudal lord, MushTr al-Dawla, who was
obliged to declare the treaty null and void until it received
ratification from the Majlis. Ivanov1* points out that the new
government was opposed to the British policy of open
dictatorship, and sought better links with the Soviet Union. It
wanted also to calm down the situation in Azerbaijan by
negotiating with Khiyabanf, who claimed that "the will of the
people must be above everything. If it so wishes, it must even
overthrow the _Shah, and if it so wishes and considers
necessary, declare a repubic".5 Khiyabani also believed in the
strength of local rather than national government, and
promoted the idea of a people's paper (his own was
Tajaddud, Revival), to protect them from the absolute control
of a strong central government.
1. Avery, op. cit., p.219; Makki, Tarikh-i Bist Sala-yi Iran, Teheran 1945-7, vol.1,
p.16; Abd Allah Mustawfi, Tarikti-i Mashrufciya.
2. Ivanov, Tarikh-i Muvin-i Iran, p.37.
3. 'Tabriz Uprising in 1920', (anon) 'Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia', Central
Asian Review 6, 1958, p.439.
4. Ivanov, op. cit., p.37.
5. Y. Aryan Pur, Az Saba Ta Nima, vol.2, Teheran 1972, p.211.
- 32 -
Mushlr al-Dawla proceeded to advance on Tabriz, but he
was resisted and forced to retreat. A new governor, Mukhbir
al-Saltana was dispatched to Tabriz, and on his arrival began
fruitless talks with Khiyabarii, which only lasted a few days.
This was long enough, however, to enable him to unite his
reactionary forces and make a surprise attack against the
divided and disorganised Dimukrats in their own homes on
September 4. jChiyabanl and many others were killed, Khiyaba.nl
himself being arrested and put to death;1 under Saltana's
command, more than three hundred families were killed, their
property seized and houses destroyed.2
Ivanov3 suggests that this revolutionary movement had
two major weaknesses: one, the failure to arm itself, and
second, its failure to disarm the Cossacks. These two factors,
linked to the absence of land reforms and neglect of conditions
of the proletariat, demonstrates the movement's underestimation
of the masses. Ivanov's further claim, however, that KhiyabanT
probably did not understand the importance of a broad popular
front of support, is spurious, for KhiyabanT had neither the




preceding ^ Saltana's attack, jChiyabani had sent his 200 best
fighters to aid the _Shahsavan tribesmen against Arshad, who
was rebelling in Ahar, with the result that he lacked sufficient
military strength .to counter the offensive of September 4.s
Furthermore, an assault launched very early in the morning
1. See Y. Aryan Pur, op. cit., p.214, and for more details, Ajari , A. Shaykh Muhammad
Khiyabani. Teheran 1950.
2. 'Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia', op. cit., p.441; see Ra' isniya, R., Nahid,
Du Mubariz-i Junbish-i Mashruta, Tabriz 1967, p.308.
3. Ivanov, op. cit., p.38.
4. A. Sultanzada, Asnad-i T arikh—i Junbish-i Kargari va Susiyal Dimukrat va
Kumunisti-yi Iran, Paris 1973, vol.4, p.94.
5. K. Tahirzada, Qiyam-i Azarbayjan Par Inqilab-i Mashrutiyyat, Teheran
1953, pp".505-6.
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allowed him no time to unite.1
After this crushing defeat, the movement struggled for
existence for a period in Ahar, and the fighting was continued
in these difficult mountainous regions by a band led by
Qiyami called the Qiyamiyyun va-Intiqamiyyun (Revenge
Insurgents).2 Two years later, Azerbaijan broke once again
with Teheran. Again, it was not an issue of separatism: this
time Riza Khan was attempting to bring the gendarmerie under
his control. The gendarmes, in conjunction with the
Azadikhwahan, rose in opposition to the central government
following the expulsion of the Dimukrats, Azadikhwahan and
I c tidaliyyun by Nasir al-Mulk. They finally revolted on
February 1, 1922, together with the Dimukrats, supporters of
Khiyabani, and some of the gendarmes. The latter were under
the leadership of Lahutl Khan,3 a man who had fled the death
penalty in Qum and taken up a post in the Azerbaijan
gendarmerie under Mahmud Khan Fuladl in 1922 (1300).
After occupation of government offices, Khiyabani' s
followers set up a National Committee, demanding British
withdrawal, the expulsion of Riza Khan from the Ministry of
War, payment by the central government of the gendarmes, and
the institution of reforms."
Opposition to Riza Khan had the effect of providing
recruits among the revolutionary movements in Azerbaijan
1. A. Azari, op. cit., p.492.
2. 'Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia', op. cit., p.441.
3. Lahuti Khan and his father were both poets, and were active in Azerbaijan.
4. Bahar, op. cit., pp.170, 176; Jawdat, op. cit., p.105.
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directed towards strengthening resistance against Riza
Shah. These forces did in fact defeat the Iranian Army, which
could hold only Bagh-i Shah. Command was subsequently taken
over by Habib Allah Khan-i Shaybanl, an influential gendarmerie
officer who persuaded Mahmud Khan-i Fuladl to withdraw his
support from Lahuti.1
ShaybanT began hopeless talks with Lahuti upon his
appointment, and war followed their inevitable collapse.
Astonishingly Lahuti then defected to the Soviet Union upon
the verge of victory, and left his army without a leader or
instructions.2 The resultant breakdown of morale within the
national army was more than likely the cause of its ultimate
defeat: the Iranian Army entered Tabriz on February 7, 1922,
looting the town, and arrested and tried many of the
members of the movement, and the revolt was suppressed.
The two revolutionary movements in Azerbaijan were
suppressed through internal pressure exerted by Teheran,
from where the central government tried to prevent the
dissemination of revolutionary ideas, but also by external
sources. It is rumoured that the British stopped all movement
and relations between Azerbaijan and the Caucasus, bribed
clergy to help suppress the revolution, and spread false
rumours about repression in Soviet Azerbaijan .3 They
furthermore organised private forces through Iran as a whole
and Azerbaijan in particular.
Thus, the revolts may not have brought autonomous
government to Azerbaijan, but they did achieve the collapse of
the Cabinet of Vusuq al-Dawla and the cancellation of the 1919
1. Bahar, op. cit., pp.171-3; Jawdat, op. cit., pp.105-6.
2. Jawdat, op. cit., p.106.
3. 'The 1917-20 Uprising in Persian Azerbaijan1, 'Borderlands of Soviet Central
Asia1, op. cit., p.HO.
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agreement. The consequent close ties with the Soviet Union
resulted then in the 1921 agreement of February 26. Despite its
suppression, the revolution was not rooted out totally, and
indeed 25 years later, it took the first opportunity offered,
c
under the leadership of Ja far Pishavari in 1945, to rise up
once again. These events will be discussed fully below in
Chapter 6.
Muhammad Taqi Khan-i Pisyan:
Another revolutionary movement arose in the province of
JChurasan, under the leadership of Muhammad TaqT Khan-i
Pisyan, in 1921.
JChurasan and its capital Mashhad had not previously
r
played a large part in the Constitutional Revolution; although
the province was big and was economically independent, the
social base for nationalism and autonomy was weak. Demands
for reform, better governors, and independence from foreign
influence were made in Bahar, the liberal nationalist
newspaper published in Mashhad yet no organised movement was
r
ever set up as happened in Azerbaijan to work towards
autonomy.
The governor of JChurasan between 1919-20 was Ahmad
Qavarn who worked with the liberal nationalist element in the
province, energetically tackling the problems caused by the
depredation of tribes and bandits. With Sayyid Ziya's coup
d'etat in 1921, Qavam lost his influence and position due to
his criticism of the new regime. Ziya subsequently gave orders
to Pisyan, as commander of the Khurasan gendarmerie, to
arrest Qavam and bring him to Teheran. Pisyan executed the
orders and took over Qavam's post as acting governor. He was
later appointed as commander of the JChurasan army by
1. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, Univ. of Pittsburgh 1964, p.107.
- 36 -
Ahmad Shah. Future developments moved quickly to change the
situation, and Sayyid Ziya was within a few weeks replaced by
Qavam himself, who naturally held no sympathy for Pisyan,
and the scene was set for a collision course between the two
men.
Pisyan's activities coincided with Iran's most turbulent
era. 1921 was a watershed in modern Iranian history, with a
complex of factors bringing matters to a head: general
insecurity and confusion, incompetent leadership, and foreign
intervention. On July 7, 1921, Pisyan received instructions
from Ahmad Shah forbidding him to intervene in national
affairs. Two days later, he received a further telegram,
confirming the premiership of Qavam al-Saltana.
Qavam' s official appointment led him to take a firmer line
»
over internal affairs, and his arrest and exile of certain
influential people and attempted control of Khurasani matters
led largely to the uprising.1 Pisyan feared reprisals by Qavam
after the coup of 1921, but he had strong support among the
Khurasani people. The populace chose a commission of six to
dictate a telegram to the central government presenting
Pisyan's case,2 laid out in the following points:
1. the budgetary status of the gendarmes should not
change.
2. the gendarmerie's promotion ladder should operate as
previously.
3. Qavam al-Saltana's horses and ammunition belonged to
the gendarmerie even though the former carried his
emblem, and should not therefore be reclaimed by Qavam.
4. Pisyan should be given two years paid leave in order
1. H. Makki, Tarikh-i Bist Sala-yi Iran, vol.1, Teheran 1949, p.
2. Malik—Zada, Tarikh-i Inqilab-i Mashruta-yi Iran (Teheran 1919), p.357; Makki,
op. cit., vol.1.
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to complete his studies abroad.
5. He should be escorted to the border by gendarmes.
6. The Belgian financial advisor, dismissed by the
central government, should be re-instated.1
These conditions were accepted by the Shah, with the
exception of permission for Pisyan to travel abroad. Pisyan
agreed, and released one of those arrested in order to make
him governor in his place.
The situation in Khurasan was meanwhile rapidly
deteriorating. Societies known as 'national committees' sprang
up in Mashhad publishing tirades against Teheran and the
Prime Minister, as well as Najm al-Saltana, governor of
Khurasan. At this point, the government realised the precarious
situation in JChurasan, and the danger of its imminent fall into
the hands of Pisyan. Samsam al-Saltana was therefore chosen
to govern the province. The appointment was' resisted by
Pisyan's supporters, who requested his re-instatement as
Commander of the Khurasani forces.
Pisyan regained his influence once again in August 1S22,
with the dismissal of his opponent Shawkat al-Mulk- Pisyan
reappointed the Belgian financial advisor to the Khurasan
treasury, and various other government officials, including
Col. Gillerup 2 were sent back to Teheran, disarmed. In
control of the provincial government and gendarmerie, Pisyan
resisted the pressure of the central government, and gained
general popularity as an educated man who neither took part
in local conflicts nor collaborated with foreign powers.3
1. M. Bahar, Tarikh-i Mukhtasar-i Ahzab-i Siyasi, pp.145-6.
2. A Swede, who was sent by the central government to take control of the wayward
Khurasan gendarmerie.
3. Bahar, op. cit., p.149; Y Aryan Pur Az Saba Ta Mima, vol.2, Teheran 1972, p.352.
- 38 -
Pisyan's objective was autonomy for Khurasan not, as
was commonly supposed, to attack Teheran and seize control of
the central government. It seems that Pisyan could have seized
Teheran with relative ease, since he had 8,000 trained men,
against a badly organised government force of fewer than a
thousand.1 The central government instigated serious measures
against Pisyan, provoking Khurasan's tribes against him, with
the result that 5,000 mounted guerillas were soon headed
towards Mashhad, but Pisyan successfully defeated the force
before it reached Mashhad.2
Quchan and Turbat Haydariyya rose against Pisyan and
he left Mashhad to crush them leaving Mahmud Khan Nawzari
in command. Pisyan then arrived at Quchan with the gendarmes
Q
and at Ja farabad half the gendarmes were killed and the
other half fled. Pisyan fought bravely but was killed.3 Mahmud
Khan Nawzari reported the incident to the central government
and was made governor, temporarily, of Khurasan. Although
the movement had been suppressed, Major IsmaCil Khan-Bahaduri
rose in an attempt to avenge Pisyan but was defeated and
exiled. *
Gilan Movement 1918-1922:
Gil an was a likely area for a local nationalist movement,
being separated from the Iranian plateau and Teheran by the
Alburz mountain range and was distinct geographically,
1. Bahar, op. cit., p.155.
2. Ibid.
3. Makki, op. cit., pp.275-300. A. Azari, op. cit., p.503.
A. Bahar, op. cit., p.l57ff.
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economically and linguistically and had a large enough middle
class to support such a movement.1
The formation of a brief rebellious Provincial Government
in Kirmanshah was followed in Gllan by armed insurrection
organised by young Mashruta revolutionaries headed by Mirza
Kuchik Khan, who was a Shi'ite Muslim and patriot of
remarkable fighting qualities and who was an incorruptible
leader. His intention was to free the country from external and
internal corruption.2 He drew up a plan of national reform
with a group of sympathetic men in Teheran in 1915- It called
for National independence, social reform and Islamic unity.3
By 1918, the Jangali movement of the lower classes was
calling for agrarian reform and by 1920 the Provisional
Revolutionary movement of Kuchik Khan pledged to ensure
republicanism, personal freedom, the dismantling of unilateral
foreign agreements, sexual and ethnic equality, and the defence
of Islam." To safeguard Iranian strength, the Jangalis
originally announced their intention to fight the Russian,
British and even German-Turkish5 forces as well as internal
bands of tribesmen and robbers. In 1918, although the
British invasion overcame resistance in Anzali, Soviet-Iranian
friendship societies were formed in Rasht and Anzali.
Upon Russo-British fighting, Kuchik had four options:
fight everyone, no-one, the Russians or the British.® The
extreme communist Ihsan Allah Khan persuaded him to support
1. Cottam, 1964 op. cit., pp.102-3.
2. Ibid., p.103. Katouzian, H., 'Nationalist Trends in Iran 1921-26', I■J.H.E.S.
10 (1979), pp.533-551.
3. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, op. cit., p.54. Fatemi, Diplomatic
History of Persia (NY 1952), p.219.
4. Jangal, 6 July, 1920.
5. Mostawfi, op. cit. Ill g. Dawlatabadi IV, 143.
6. Cottam, op. cit., p.105.
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the Russian forces, although he was not very enthusiastic.
On 4th June, 1920, Kuchik Khan and his 2,000 men took Rasht,
proclaiming Gilan a Republic. As promised earlier that year,
the Soviets landed at Anzali, putting the British to flight, and
inspired strength in the national liberation movement.
Ivanov divides the existence of the Republic into three
stages. From May to July, 1920, Kuchik's government localised
the movement, ending with the withdrawal of his troops to a
forest. From July to October the coalition between Kuchik Khan
and Ihsan Allah Khan disintegrated and on July 31st, a new
government came into existence in Gilan led by Ihsan AllahKhan. His
followers and those of Sultan-Zada constituted the National
Committee for the Liberation of Persia, but the failure of that
Revolutionary movement ultimately passed the leadership of the
movement to the Persian Communist Party in October 1920. Its
leader, Haydar Khan, decided to unite all revolutionary
feeling1 gradually and therefore limited action to agrarian
reform. By the 8th May, 1921, an agreement was reached
between Haydar Khan, Kuchik and the Gilan government leaders
and the Communists, so that on 4th August, 1921. Gilan was
declared a Soviet Republic.2 The weakness of the movement was
such that independence was never actually demanded, the state
calling itself the "Persian Soviet Socialist Republic".3 Kuchik
capitulated to the Teheran government of Vusuq al-Dawla in
January, 1922, but rebellion re-appeared in May, 1922.
Ivanov explains the failure of this movement as being due to the
repressive measures of the Teheran government and British aid;
and to the lack of a country-wide front - a factor caused by
1. For more details of Haydar Khan, see A.R. Sheikh Gulami and E. Wilson,'The Memoirs
of Haydar Khan', Iranian Studies, Winter, 1973.




the impossibility of communication with the National Liberation
movements of Azerbaijan and Khurasan. Also ideological and
personal differences amongst leaders overshadowed the principal
aim of establishing an anti-British movement, and the
compromise sought between Ihsan Allah Khan and Kuchik Khan1
was fraught with difficulties. Teheran and Britain further
* irk ooa
discredited the movement by implying Soviet dependence, a«4
pa. e_t-
indeed actual Soviet support failed to appear. With these in
mind, we should look deeper for the reasons for the internal
disunity allowing the above factors to take their toll.
Q
Shaykh Khaz al of Muhammara:
Before the days of Riza Shah, Khuzistan, an important oil
province, caused problems to the central government despite its
position as the main centre of foreign trade. Bad
communications meant that little control could be kept over the
Shaykh of Muhammara who resented paying taxes to the central
government and who was eventually in direct confrontation with
it. He had, early in the century,3 sold land, including Abadan
island, to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in return for scanty
assurances of his own safe position. But his autonomy was not
safeguarded against Riza Shah in 1924, who, despite popular
1. Laqueur, W.Z., The Soviet Union and Middle East, London 1959, p.30.
2. Ibid., p.31.
3. For this period cf. inter alia A. Wilson, S.W. Persia: A Political Officer's
Diary 1907-1914, London, 1941; Waterfield, G., Professional Diplomat, London, 1975;
Graves, P., The Life of Sir Percy Cox, London, 1941; Potter, L., 1 THe Relationship
of Sheikh Khazal with the Persian Government and 8ritish Government1, unpublished
M.A. dissertation, SOAS, 1971.
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suspicion, had British support. However there was no sign at
first of Arab nationalist1 leanings, despite the Arabic tongue
of the area, although embryonic nationalism did appear with
an increasing awareness by the people of their position, and
the feeling grew with the arrival of Persian-speaking oil
workers.2
However from the very beginning of the rise to
a c
power of Riza Khan, Shaykh Khaz al recognised the threat to
his position from him and thence proceeded to protect himself,
firstly by recruiting support from the tribal chiefs of the Lur,
Bakhtiari and Khamsa tribes, in opposition to Riza Khan,3
and secondly by strengthening his relationship with Ahmad
_Shah. * Finally he allied himself to the Majlis opposition but
all these ploys ended in failure.5 Also he sought to enlist
British support and styled himself the defender of Islam
against Riza Shah' s secularism.5 However as central government
began to consolidate Britain withdrew her support from the
Shaykh and transferred it to Riza Shah, thus destroying
C _ —
Khaz al's separatist ambitions for Khuzistan.
Shaykh _Khazc al ' s lengthy rule was due to a combination
of an ignorant local populace, a weak central government,
geographic isolation and foreign, that is British, interference.
As soon as the British withdrew their support for the Shaykh,
Riza Khan launched a three-pronged military attack, and
Khuzistan was subdued in a matter of hours, with almost no
1. Cottam, op. cit., 1964.
2. Cronin, S.M., 'Industrial Agitation and Tribal Unrest in South Iran, 1946', unpub.
M.A. dissertation, London, 1981, p.17.
3. Mustawfi, op. cit. vol.IV, p.478. Vincent Sheehan, The New Persia, (NY 1927),
pp.47-48.




loss of life.1 The integration of Khuzistan into Iran together
with further development of oil fields and the growth in size
and importance of port and refinery centres such as
Khurramshahr and Abadan, developed political awareness and
a sense of national identity among the inhabitants of
Khuzistan,2 although there was a further rising there in 194-6.3
In conclusion, for Iran, the growth of a virile Arab
nationalism has proved problematic. Due to this predominance
of Arabic-speaking KhuzistanTs and also on account of the huge
oil reserves, the threat of separation remains ever-present.
All revolutionary movements which had formed throughout
Iran between 1918 and 1922 were more anti-Imperialist than pro-
proletarian by nature. Their major weakness however was their
geographical dispersion and a lack of communication with each
other. Hence the reactionary central government was able to
suppress these outbursts one at a time. The movements may not
have destroyed the feudal system and halted Imperialism in the
short term, but they did prepare the ground for the defeat of
the Qajar dynasty and, together with the Bolshevik Revolution
in the Soviet Union, proved a severe setback to British
interests in Iran.* However Riza ^hah' s rise to power re¬
established Britain's Iranian interests and suppressed
revolutionary movements. After his abdication in 1941, several
such movements re-appeared, for example the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
and Kumala-yiKurdistan, the latter to be discussed in Chapter
II, and the former in Chapters IV to VI.
1. Mustawfi, op. cit., vol.IV, p.470; Makki, op. cit., Ill, pp.260-77; The Near East,
Dec. 25, 1925, pp.658; Jan. 22, 1925, p.87.
2. Cottam, O.S., op. cit., p.114.
3. Cf. Chapter VI.
4. Ivanov, Tarikh-i Nuvin-i Iran, pp.52-55.
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Riza Shah's Dictatorship (1921-41)
"The war ended with Russia in revolution, Turkey
powerless and Iran largely destroyed."1
The success of the October 1917 revolution in the Soviet
Union was coupled with revolutionary and anti-imperialist
movements within Iran and among some of her neighbours, such
as Turkey and Afghanistan. These movements, together with a
popular discontent over the 1919 Treaty, persuaded the British
to bring about a much more radical2 administration; a move
which had three probable intentions - to safeguard British
interests in Iran, to suppress the revolutionary atmosphere and
to keep Communism at bay.3 This was initially effected by the
formation of a top secret "committee of steel",1' chaired by
Sayyid Ziya5 and Nusrat Allah-i FTruz. This coup d'etat,
according to Makki,® was masterminded in London. At this
stage it was decided to include Riza. JChan in the scheme; he
was at this point a colonel in the Cossack Brigade and was
forthwith promoted by Ironside to the rank of Commander-in-
chief of that brigade. Armed with this new power, Riza Khan
marched his force (which was secretly considerably supported
by British influences7) from Qazvin to Teheran on 21st
February, 1921, and carried out a virtually bloodless coup.8
1. London Times, 26 Aug., 1941, Special Article on Riza Shah.
2. Ivanov, op. cit., p.43.
3. Tabari,jamiCa-yiiran Par Dawra-yi Riza Shah, Teheran 1976, p.52.
4. Ivanov, op. cit., p.46; Avery, op. cit., p.224.
5. Editor of the newspaper Ra1d , which was pro-British. He favoured the Anglo-
Iranian Treaty of 1919, as can be seen in his Russian article called the Anglo-
Iranian Treaty of 9.8.1919', published in the spring of 1920 in Baku. See Sultan-
Zada, Asnad-i Tarikhi-yi Junbish-i Kargari, Susiyal-Dimukrat va Kumunisti-yi Iran,
1973,. vjsI .4, p.96.
6. Makki, op. cit., p.48.
7. Sultan-Zada, op. cit.
k
8. Banani, A, 'The Modernisation of Iran - 1921-1941', Stanford Univ. Press, Ca.,
1961, p.36.
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Immediately after the coup, Sayyid Ziya arrested about 200
officers and other influential people.1
Riza JChan, who was born into a military class and had
enjoyed a military education, was trusted by the British and
even seen by many as a British agent - partly on account of
his opposition to Russian Communist infiltration.2 At his rise
to power in 1921, he was faced with an Iran in social,
political and economic chaos, and in which the previous
constitutional government had totally failed to achieve any
domestic stability; in the towns the population was disgusted
by the instability in the country and the consequent and
frequent uprisings throughout Iran. These factors, added to a
lack of reform and the continuation of foreign intervention,
facilitated Riza _Khan's coup.3
After the coup, however, the country was governed by
Sayyid Ziya, a supporter of the British,* and his
administration was popularly known as the "black cabinet".5
A treaty was concluded with the Soviet Union on February 26th,
1921, a major consequence of which was the optimistic and
grateful Iranian attitude towards the Russians - even Riza
JChan, in a newspaper article,4 praised the new relationship
1. Banani, op. cit., p.40; Sultan-Zada, op. cit., vol.4, p.96.
2. 'Dictatorship of Riza Shah1, Central Asian Review, vol.10, 1961, p.401; Cottam,
R., Nationalism in Iran, p.193; Sitara-yi Iran, 26 Feb., 1922; Katouzian , M.,
'National Trends in Iran 1921-26', IJHES, 1979, p.538; Wanner, J., Monograph No.47,
'Riza Shah's Regime and the Penetration of German Imperialism into Iran between 1934—
41', p.129; BBC Radio 4, File of 5th October, 1982 (7.50 p.m.).
3. Riza Shah and Sayyid Ziya disputed over who had led the coup. Whatever the truth
is, it had been masterminded by Major General Ironside.Tulsiram, The History of the
Communist Movement in Iran, Bhopal 1981, p.51.
4. Avery, op. cit., p.223.
5. Yak §af|ja Az Tarikh-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran, 1954 (1323), p.57.
5. Gulshan, 26th June, 1921.
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reached between the two nations. Despite all the optimism,
Sayyid Ziya was bent on subverting the treaty and to that end
he failed to publish all the articles of the agreement. Partly
due to this, and also because of the political hostility of
Ahmad _Shah and his court, and to Riza Khan whose lack of
support stemmed from fierce rivalry, Ziya lacked popular
support, a fact noted by the British; and he was replaced as
prime minister by Qavam on 25th May, 1921. According to
Banani,1 Qavlm was a friend of the British, whose spying
against the Soviet Union he had facilitated during his
governorship of Khurasan. He was also backed by the clerics
led by Mudarris. As in Ziya's black cabinet, the
administration of Qavam had two latent functions - to suppress
internal revolutionary movements, and to undermine the Russo-
Iranian relationship.2 Again, because of the general
unpopularity of these intentions and conflict with Riza Khan,
this cabinet too fell, to be replaced by those of Mustawfi al-
Mamalik and of MushTr al-Dawla. The actions of the government
of Mushir al-Dawla betrayed its very poor pretence of anti-
British, pro-Soviet sympathies, and Qavam was given the
opportunity to return to power. This time, not only did he lack
popular support, but at the same time as alienating British
friendship, he encouraged good relations with the United
States. At this juncture popular support was with Riza Khan
who, on the surface at least, was showing himself patriotic to
Iran and eager to establish good relations with the Soviet
Union. However, at the same time he was presenting to the
British an image of support for feudal capitalism, a desire to
suppress internal revolutionary movements such as those in
Azerbaijan and Gilan and the ability to bring himself to
power. In 1923, therefore, he arrested Qavam and gained the
premiership from Ahmad Shah and from there sought to
1. Qasirai, Tarikh-i Khanavadaha Par Iran, p.184.
2. Ivanov, op. cit., p.44.
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consolidate and improve his general appeal by including within
his cabinet nationalists such as Musaddiq and leftwingers from
the social democrats including Sulayman Mlrza Iskandari1 and
pressurised Ahmad Shah to travel to Europe. Meanwhile Riza
Khan was supporting agitators who were demonstrating for the
declaration of a republic2 in Iran. Later, however, he became
a bitter enemy of republicanism. By collaboration with the
feudal upper classes, he gained their support in 1924- and then
travelled to Qum, where he persuaded the clerics to grant him
their support also. On his return from the Holy City of Qum on
31st March, 1924, he made a proclamation calling for an end
to demonstrations and seeking united cooperation for internal
reforms. In the same proclamation he called for support for the
Monarchy, rather than Republicanism, and gave a convincing
impression of being a staunch Muslim. Next he went to
Parliament, asking them to grant him the post of commander-in-
chief of all the armed forces. The Mailis was unwilling to
grant him this power, since such a move would have been
contrary to article 50 of the constitution and was opposed by
the influential media; but they consented and by 14th
February, 1925, Riza Khan had gained the powers he sought.
His ambition was to become _Shah and, learning from the
experiences of previous prime ministers, he realised that he
must secure domestic support for this; he therefore created a
fLsisv I v a I
party called Tajaddud (RevoTutTon), whose manifesto consisted
of several promises to the people. These included:
1. The promise to give over government controlled
lands to the people.
2. The promise of freedom for political parties.
3. The claim that all citizens were to be treated
equally before the law.
1. Tabari, op. cit., p.58.
2. Banani, op. cit., p.52; Qa'Immaqami, Iran-i Imruz, p.36.
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Further, the party asked Parliament to abolish the Qajar
dynasty.1
However, after he had become ^hah and thus gained
supreme power, he broke his word; seizing all the land for
himself and banning political parties, he ruled the country
personally, (his son succeeding in 1941), without recourse to
Constitutional Law.
Further, in 1925 he abolished all workers' unions and
arrested 800 union leaders.2 He also arrested the communist
party leaders and as a result the Communist party went
underground. Riza _Shah pursued these anti-Communist policies
because he feared Communist influence in opposition to his
rule.3 On 21st October, 1925, the 5th Majlis abolished the
Qajar dynasty on the recommendation of Tadayyun, the Speaker
of the Majlis and provisional authority was handed to Riza
Khan. In the interim he published a proclamation advocating
the principles of Islam as well as a higher standard of living
for the people as his guiding principles; some of the clergy
believed him and called for popular support for his regime. In
November, a Parliamentary election was announced but due to
the suspicions of the majority of the population, the voting
attendance was minimal. The list of deputies was drawn up by
the Army Officers'* before the election was over, and on 12th
December, 1925, the Majlis ratified Riza Khan's regime, a
regime backed by feudal landlords and part of the clergy.5 In
fact the regime brought few systematic changes and in effect,
continued the status quo.
1 . Iran, 22 Jan., 1925.
2. S. Mani, Tarikhcha-yi Nahzat-i KargarT Par Iran, Teheran 1945, passim.
3. Tabari, op. cit., pp.87-8.
4. Ibid., p.61.
5. Ivanov , op. cit., pp.66-7.
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Upon Riza _Khan's elevation to the position of _Shah, he
concentrated on three major problems; the limitation in the
power of the tribes and the clergy, and the strengthening of
the army to effect his intentions.
Against the threat of the tribes, Riza Shah answered by
breaking their backs;1 he forcibly resettled them, oppressed
them, and quickly crushed various tribal uprisings.
Another possible threat was the very powerful clergy
which he was determined to limit. He secularized the legal
system2 and removed the veil, restricting the movements of
women, in effect. "On the 7th January, 1936, Iranian women
were formally, ceremoniously, indiscriminately and forcibly
unveiled."3 Religious meetings were suppressed by the
gendarmerie, and pious foundations were seized.1* An attempt
was made to abolish the religious calendar. These actions
had two motives; the destruction of Shi'ism and the restriction
of religious institutions. After his abdication many freedoms
were restored, including the veil, although many of the better
legal reforms were maintained. This clerical struggle was a
major contributor to the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty.5
As an autocrat, Riza Shah realized the need for an army6*
capable of maintaining his power. The Iranian army he built
1. M.8. Hijazi, Haqay'iq-i Guftani, 1945, p.27. See also Bill, J.A., 'Modernisation
and Reform from Above: The Case of Iran1, Journal of Politics, vol.32, 1970,
p .30.
2. Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Princeton Univ. Press, 1980. Keddie, N.R.,
'Class Structure and Political Power in Iran Since 1796', Iranian Studies, vol.XI,
1978, p.314.
3. Katouzian, Political Economy of Modern Iran, p.126.
4. Keddie, N.R., 'Class Structure', op. cit., p.314.
5. For more details, see Cuyler Young, T., 'The Problems of Westernisation in Modern
Iran', ME^J, vol.2, 1948, pp.54ff.
6. Qa'immaqaml, Iran-i Imruz, n.d.
- 50 -
was assembled on Western, rather than Soviet, principles; and
conscription1 was imposed during 1925. But despite the
recruitment of new young officers, Riza Shah' s trust and
dependence rested on older generals and the army, built to
suppress internal trouble, was ineffective against external
forces as demonstrated by its helplessness in the invasion of
1941.
After suppressing internal opposition Riza Shah turned his
attention to external problems. The Soviet attitude to Iran was
increasingly favourable after the Bolshevik Revolution and the
treaty concluded in 19212 established Iranian rights;3 however
Rilza Shah did not altogether abide by its terms and ultimately
violated it seriously by granting Northern oil concessions to
the Royal Dutch Shell Company. An intended agreement with the
American Company, Amiranian Oil, ultimately failed, mainly due
to lack of communication within the U.S. administration.
Relations with Britain gradually worsened and the D'arcy
concessions* of 1901 decreased in importance as Germany came
to replace Britain in Riza _Shah's priorities, although Britain
capitulated and signed a new agreement on 29th April, 1933.5
In the Middle East, relations with Turkey and
Afghanistan had previously been strained due to demarcation
disputes and religious differences,6 but a series of treaties
1. Groseclose, E., Introduction to Iran, O.U.P. 1947, p.21. Tarikh-i Artish-i Nuvin,
Government Publication, Teheran 1923.
2. See Tabari, op. cit., p.60. Kumholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East,
P.U.P./ 1980, p.183.
3. Frye, Richard, Iran, NY 1953, pp.72-3. Marlowe, J., Iran, London 1963, pp.39,
41. Lenczowski, G., Russia and the West in Iran 1918-48, Ithaca, NY, 1949, p.25.
4. For more details, cf. Gregory, L., The Shah and Persia, 1959.
5. Saikal, op. cit., p.24.
6. Groseclose, op. cit., p.142.
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was executed, culminating in that of Sa' dabad1 between
Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan on 8th July, 1937,
c
intended to resolve the Shatt al- Arab conflict.
By the 1930s, Riza Shah had established himself as an
absolute ruler and tried to consolidate his position
commercially by improving the tax system, liquidating capital
assets, monopolising foreign trade and establishing a state
bank,2 to replace the existing British-controlled bank.
Riza _Shah thus planned to reduce the British influence
which had placed him in power and was threatening to
constrain his individual power, and a further step was taken
with the assistance of Germany, a ready ally in an anti-
British strategy. In the hiatus left by the American failure,
German industry and commerce was introduced to the Iranian
economy on an increasingly large scale and Germany became
the main recipient of goods in Iran's export market in the pre¬
war years, winning 4l|% of Iranian exports in contrast to
Britain's 8%.
By 18th October, 1939, Germany's rising importance in
Europe too was unquestionable and she had also established a
secret Fifth Column within Iran. Encouraged by Germany's
position, Riza Shah entered into a clandestine3 agreement,
which allotted her an increased measure of raw materials and
the right to build a railway through Iran and to use Iranian
airspace. By 194-1 German bureaucratic penetration was
widespread particularly4 in governmental institutions, and
Germany furthermore commanded emissaries and agents,
1. Elwell—Sutton, Modern Iran, Appendix 6, pp.225-229. London Times, 26th August,
1941, special article on the Shah.
2. Wanner, J., op. cit., p.130.
3. Ivanova, op. cit., p.93.
4. Ibid., p.91. London Times, 26th August, 1941.
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especially in the north,1 who were capable of perpetrating
terrorist activities or sabotage operations in the Baku region
of the USSR.
But in order to utilize Iranian territory fully, Germany
was eager to persuade her new associate to enter World War II
and voiced this proposal on 17th August, 194-1. Despite the
promise of arms, Iran claimed neutrality, which induced
Germany to plan a military coup2 within Iran, which would
bring her policies into line. According to Amini,3 this coup
was to be backed by a division of the Iranian army, led by
Manuchihri, later called Aryana. Since the invasion of Russia
on 22nd June, 1941, Russia had warned Iran three times of the
danger of German espionage activities - on 26th June, 19th
July and 26th August.* On 26th June, they signalled Jtke
the planned coup d'etat, and on 19th July they reiterated their
warning, adding a reminder of the existence of German agents
in Iran, which threatened Russia and Iran herself, and on
16th August Russia and Great Britain handed a formal note to
the Iranian government, demanding the suppression of German
activity in Iran. In return they promised to respect Iranian
independence, neutrality and integrity and to work towards
developing friendly relations. They conceded that Iran might
keep those few Germans who were doing genuinely important
technological work and pledged to replace any forced to leave.
A week later Iran gave the following reply:5
"1. the number of German residents in Iran was no so great as
pretended; it scarcely touched the figure of seven hundred;5
1. Ivanova, op. cit., p.91. London Times, 26th August, 1941. Tabari, op. cit., p.150.
2. Miron Rezun, The Soviet Union and Iran, Geneva 1981, p.367.
3. For more details see Amini,, Az Sivvum ta Bistupanjum-i Shahrivar.
4. London Times, 26th August, 1941. Ivanova, op. cit., p.92. Tabari, op. cit., p.146.
Rezun, op. cit.
5. Ramazani, R., Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-73, Univ. Press of Virginia,
Charlesville 1975, p.28.
6. According to Russian sources the number exceeded 3,000.
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2 the Iranian government was sure they could not foment any
fifth column activities; 3 Iran was reducing the number of
foreign specialists in its employ anyway; and 4 the Iranian
government believed that the expulsion of Germans from Iran
without any logical reasons was against the neutrality of the
country."
This reply was not wholly satisfactory, and after a
week's attempt to persuade Iran to expel the Germans, they
could not make Riza Shah understand the immediate danger
both for himself and for his allies, Russia and Britain. For
many reasons, economic and strategic, Russia and Great Britain
could no longer afford to allow the danger to develop
unchecked; they had no choice but action.1 So on 9 August a
Russian ambassador met with Sir R. Bullard to discuss the
proposed German coup (which had been envisaged for the period
between 22 and 28 August). At 4 a.m. on 25th August, 1941,
allied troops crossed the border and attacked Iran by sea, air
and ground. The British entered at three points from the
Persian Gulf to the Turkish border. Russia struck in three
areas, in the northwest pushing toward Tabriz and Bandar
Pahlavl (Anzali), and in the northeast advancing
towards Mashhad.2 Riza Shah knew that he could not
rely on immediate German assistance, but he continued to
believe in Germany's final victory. In an effort to maintain
his political position for such an eventuality, he commanded
the Iranian army to resist.3 But this action effectively sealed
his own fate for the Iranian army quickly disintegrated and
the Allies managed to occupy all the important centres in the
south (British) and north (Russian) of the country. Churchill
described this sudden invasion as "abrupt steps". At the time
1. London Times, 26th July, 1941.
2. Ibid.
3. Wanner, J., op. cit., p.137.
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of the invasion 120,000 Iranian troops were included in the
fighting.1 On the same day ambassadors from Great Britain and
Russia promised that they would leave when the danger from
Germany was over, that they would not interfere with internal
affairs, and that the invasion was purely anti-German. These
promises were groundless - interference, as we have seen, was
present, and withdrawal did not take immediately after the
expulsion of the Germans from Iran - the British withdrew in
March 1946 and the Russians in May, 1946. Although
reprehensible at an international level, the Soviet/British
invasion at least delivered Iran from the absolutism of Riza
Shah. Russia, moreover, could legitimize herself on the grounds
of Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty, which stated that "if a foreign
power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those
of its allies, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops
into the Persian interior."2 But Britain had no such means of
justification. However the Prime Minister could not cope with
c — _
these problems and on 28th August, Ali Mansur was replaced
by the Foreign Minister FurughT and a ceasefire was
announced. The _Shah was still in control of the situation but
found himself under the irreconcilable pressure of two
antagonistic domestic forces. A radical group in the army
insisted on continuing resistance by political means, whereas
most civilian politicians, including Premier Furughi, were
ready to utilise the crisis to overthrow the Shah.3 Riza Shah
inclined to the first group. On the first of September he
demanded that the Allies evacuate certain towns and that they
pay war reparations; they replied with a demand for the
internment of non-diplomatic persons in the German colony.
Germany tried to prevent this by intervention and several top
German agents managed to escape or to go underground. * On
1. For general morale, etc., cf. Muhammad Riza Khalili, VaqayjC-i Shahrivar,
Teheran (n.d.), vol.11.
2. Ramazani, R., The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World
Affairs, Charlottesville, Univ. Press of Virginia, 1964, pp. 139-167, 186-192.
3. Wanner, J., op. cit., p.138.
4. Ramazani, R., The Foreign Policy of Iran, op. cit., p.290ff.
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15th September the allied forces began their advance on
Teheran.
On 16th September Riza _Shah was forced to abdicate
partly because of his own procrastination, partly due to allied
pressure and partly on account of a lack of popular support.
Bullard claims that it was the Russian advance to Teheran, not
explicit allied pressure, which forced his abdication; Riza
Shah's son suggests that his father could not, as a popular
leader, rule an occupied country; Riza Jjhah himself claimed he
was making way for a "younger force". He was deported to
Mauritius, thence to Johannesburg where he died in 1944.
By the time of Riza Shah's abdication, all of the major
landowners and initial leaders and those clergy and politicians
who had been in opposition to him, and all the leaders of
parties such as the Communist Party had been killed,
imprisoned or expelled.1
Neither at the time of the coup d'etat in 1921 nor upon
his becoming Shah in 1925 did Riza Khan possess any land or
money, but by the time of his abdication he was one of the
wealthiest Iranian landowners and one of the world's richest
men. According to Ahmadi,2 a deputy of the 13th Majlis at the
time, Riza Shah had 46,000 title deeds to land, the annual
value of which over the 17 years of his reign amounted to 30
million dollars (U.S.), and he possessed about 360 million
dollars in foreign banks,3 including those of Britain, America
and Switzerland. He amassed this by imprisoning or exiling
other wealthy landowners and seizing their property for
himself.* He was a principal shareholder in the Anglo-Iranian
1. Tabari, op. cit., p.144. Also H. Katouzian, op. cit., p.123.
2. Iqdar no.18.
3. Azhir no.188.
4. Anon. Guzashta Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayanda Ast, Teheran (n.d.), pp.85-105.
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Oil Company and received £12,000 per annum from Britain for
shares in the company.1 On his journey from Iran to Mauritius,
Riza _Shah confided in Kerman to two friends that he had
collected 1,000,000,000 dollars during his reign and was now
leaving with nothing.2
One respected member of the British Parliament commented
that Riza _Shah had purged Iran of all its thieves and bandits,
leaving the country with only one supreme bandit ... Ri^a
_Shah.3
Although Ri'za jShah's reign which lasted from 1925-1941
brought stability to Iran yet the cost was a great deal of
suffering for the people. His policies and the resulting
increasing modernisation made Iran in fact more dependent*
upon Western consumer imports and laid a heavier burden upon
the remaining peasants, as basic articles of food increased
considerably in price.
Ri'za Shah banned most political groups and his growing
fear of Republicanism and any movement threatening his rule5
caused the eventual disbanding of all parties including the
Iran-i Naw party founded by Taymur Tasn® which was a
socialist and progressive party but was in fact neutral towards
the _Shah.7 One exception to the ban was Riza Shah's own
creation, Sazman-i Parvarish-i Afkar, 8 which was little more
than Riza Shall' s propaganda machine. The lack of political
1. Fatih, Mustafa, Panjah Sala-yi Naft-i-Iran, Teheran 1335/1956-7.
Bidari-yi Kirman, no.20.
3. Iran-i Ma, no.567.
4. Ramazani, Foreign Policy of Iran 1941-73, op. cit., p.54.
5. Lenczowski, G., op. cit., p.105.
6. Khwajanuri, A., Bazigaran-i CA?r-i Jaia1i,Teheran 1978, pp.29-71.
7. Miron Rezun, op. cit., p.111.
8. Rahbar, no.438, 20th Azar, 1323 (11th December, 1944).
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communication meant that Iranian administration was prey to
corruption and illegalities.1
Throughout his reign, he controlled the Majlis personally2
and elections to choose individuals from local nominations were
predetermined and organised by the Shah.
In conclusion, the judgement passed by the Persian
Communist Party forms a brief resume of Riza ^Shah's twenty-
year reign, as quoted by Melikov: He was "the bitterest enemy
of the political freedom of the workers and peasants". He was
"the incarnation of the regime of feudal-clerical reaction, who
is, and will be, the definitive champion of British
Imperialism", and he was the "careerist-adventurer who has
tied the State to the military interests of England".3
1. Razl, op. cit., p.71.
2. Mahjuri,N., 'Zindagi—yi Yak Divana', Mard-i Imruz, 25.5. 1323 (16th August,
1944). Binder, I., 'The Cabinet of Iran: A Case Study in Institutional Development',
MEJ, vol.16, 1962, p.37.
3. Melikov, op, cit., p.405.
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CHAPTER 2
THE IRANIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT
The period in which political activity in Iran flourished
in comparatively free conditions and with considerable vigour
was a remarkably brief one when viewed from the perspective
of the long history that belongs to Iran. It spans the years
1905-47, with two marked phases. Most historians of Iran
regard the emergence of the first political parties as coming
with the Constitutional Revolution in 1905-11, and this
preliminary stage of political activity lasted until 1921, in
which year Riza Shah came to power. The second stage centred
on the years 1941-7, in this case following the abdication
of Ri'za Shah. It ended with the collapse of the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat in Azerbaijan, which was suppressed by the central
government along with all other movements opposed to its
policy.
A number of small parties sprang up during the first
phase of this political activity. Following after the events of
1908, the majority in the 14th Majlis was shared between the
Revolutionary Party (Inqilabi) and the Moderate Party
c
(1 tidali) , although there existed also minor parties, such as
the Unity and Progress Party (Ittifcfad va Taraqqi). During
the 14th Majlis (1944-6), a socialist movement, organised on
Communist lines, arose out of the members of the moderate and
revolutionary parties (the latter were officially 'democrats').1
A Communist Party appeared in Iran only after the
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and was responsible for
organising two conferences, in 1920, at Anzali, and in 1927 at
Urumiyya.
1. Bahar, Tarikh-i Mukhtasar-i fthzab-i Siyasi, Tehran 1945, vol.1, pp.2, 8-9.
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During this initial period, from 1905-21, the percentage
of the politically aware was low, barely reaching 3%.' Most of
the so-called parties were mere outgrowths of traditional
oligarchal patterns. They were slightly more structured,
however, and possessed an explicit ideology that focussed
broadly on nationalism and liberal democracy. As parties,
despite being briefly in a position of power, these were more
disruptive of the traditional political process than capable of
presenting a substitute modern political system; in the years
1906-8, and again in 1919-21, they served as agents of rapid
political change, yet could not produce any leader of political
acumen acute and sharp enough to sustain a stable party (or
governmental structure). When such a leader did appear, in
Ri'za Shah, he operated outside, and against, the party system.
The political vacuum which we have noted between the
years 1921-194-1 was due to the attitude and policies adopted
by Rib! Shah, who saw in the party system as a whole, a
democratic threat to his dictatorial rule, and as a
consequence, suppressed all parties across the political board.
This hiatus effectively prevented continuity between the two
periods of political activity: those parties that arose in 1941
in response to Riza Shah's abdication, a relaxation in
censorship and increased freedom of the press, had in effect
to begin from the beginning all over again, neglecting any
experience that had already been gained.2 Nevertheless, the
proportion of those politically aware at this time was probably
approaching 10%. This is reflected in the wide variety of
parties that arose, ranging through right, moderate and left.
Many of these parties were transitory in the extreme. In
general, the parties adopted patriotic and nationalist names;
published their own newspapers - most with irregular issues
1. Cottam, "Political Party Development in Iran", Iranian Studies, vol.1, 3, 1968,p.83,
2. L.P. Elwel 1-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran 1941-8", MEJ, 3 Jan 1949, p. 46.
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and limited circulation. These were often formed by prominent
individuals, or small groups based on a band or Dawra;1
seeking representation in the Majlis in the form of a
deputyship or ministerial post. It was therefore inevitable that
many such minor parties disappeared once the elections for the
14th Majlis were over. The existence of these groups was
characterised by fierce in-fighting, carried on through the
organs of each particular party. It is noteworthy that this
situation reflects the common circumstance of bitter acrimony
between rivals with similar programmes, all of which are
competitors for the same audience. (The exception to the rule
in this case, was the Tudeh Party). For all the actual
differences between such parties, it would not have mattered
if they were based upon Constitutional democracy, dictatorship,
Islam, or implemented through Marxist, nationalist or religious
principles.
Those fewer parties which did, on the other hand, have
a more lasting effect upon the political system in terms both
of ideology and political administration can be subdivided into
three groups, according to political persuasion.2
On the left were Hizb-i-Tuda and the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-
i Azarbayjan. On the right, three types of party emerged. The
first comprised Conservatives, and pro-British notables such as
Sayyid Ziya' s National Will Party; then there were the extreme
nationalist parties, which included the Pan Iran, Sumka,
Arlya, and the National Salvation Group of the Revolutionary
Nationalist Party; lastly, there were the religious groups such
as Fida'iyan-i-Islam and the Mujahidin-i Islam.
Between the right and the left were a number of other
c—
1. E.g. Ta avun; some had as small a membership as 10!
2. G. Razi, "Genesis of Party in Iran: a case study of the interaction between the
political system and political parties", Iranian Studies, vol.Ill, 2, 1970, pp.72,
74-6.
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parties - Mihan Parastan, Paykar, Mardan-i-Kar, Ittihad-i-
Milli, Vahdat-i Iran, Iran-i-Ma, and the Socialist Party.
The most important parties were the Tudeh, the Social
Democrat and the Jabha-yi Azadi, each of which had the
support of at least 500 people. The outstanding characteristic
of the successful parties was their narrow ideological appeal,
utilised to attract the support of the new intellectual element.1
There are two major differences between the two phases
of political development within Iran. Firstly, the changed
social structure, caused by modernisation and industrialisation;
and secondly, the spread of socialism, an ideology which
attracted not only the modern working-class and segments of
the new intelligentsia, but also the traditional elements within
society (bazari).2
Different historians offer varying explanations, for the
rapid proliferation of political parties within Iran during the
later years (1941-7). Analysis of the existing literature of the
time, however, seems to indicate the following factors as
significant in the formation of the parties.
Party political activity was encouraged by the occupying
powers, it appears. This activity enabled the Powers to
consolidate their position and maintain much-needed social
stability in Iran. The parties formed, as is usually the case,
a channel through which socio-economic discontent could be
articulated; thus parties contributed to the stability of the
status quo.
The growth of both a middle and an intellectual class
during the years between 1921-41 also contributed to the
1. Cottam, op. cit., pp.93-4.
2. J. Bill, "The Crowd in Iranian Politics, 1905-53", Past and Present 41, Dec. 1968,
pp. 201-2.
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propagation of liberal ideas, and aided the development of
political parties. Moreover, for the first time after the
Constitutional Revolution, the Majlis was able to debate openly,
and the deputies were thus enabled to express their views and
form different groups. Often, these would expand into parties,
based on a particular political ideal. This circumstance
applied to various strata within Iranian society - landowners,
workers, intellectuals, politicians, who seized the opportunity
to make claims for their rights.
As a result of the occupation, it was feared by many
parties that Iran's independence was threatened, and might not
be regained after the war. Their only option, then, was to form
their own parties to disseminate their ideas through society,
informing the people of the danger of foreign occupation, and
urging them to resist. The National Front party (Hizb—i-Jabha-
yi Milli), for instance, led by Musaddiq, and supported by
many patriots, sought to eliminate British influence over Iran's
internal affairs.
Finally, the most significant factor in the formation of
political parties lay in the dissatisfaction of the Iranian
people with the existing situation in Iran. This feeling was
heightened by the food shortages of 194-4, which were mainly
due to the large numbers of foreign troops in the country.
Furthermore, in 1943, Iran was forced by foreign powers to
increase the currency in circulation, a situation that resulted
in high inflation. Concern for this circumstance led to the
establishment of several parties, in the attempt to voice the
dissatisfaction felt generally. As will be seen, most of the new
parties emerged during the years 1943-4.
Numerous other parties were very short-lived. Some of the
smaller groups proposed ambitious manifestos and were simply
incapable of implementing them in practice, as the Democrat
Party of Qavam, for example. Others, such as the National Will
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party (Irada-yi Milli) were created solely to deflect support
from the influential Tudeh Party. These also lacked the support
of the majority of the working-classes, but drew their members
instead, from the educated middle and upper class sectors of
Iranian society, a fatal flaw.
The limits of this study permit only one chapter to be
devoted to the minor political parties. The Tudeh, and
most importantly, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan, however,
will be considered in greater detail, as appropriate to their
significance in Iranian political history. Here, we shall follow
the lines of the political persuasion of the minor parties,
classifying them loosely according to right, moderate and left,
although it should be noted that such categorisation is more
one of imposition for the purpose of easy classification than
following a strict definition made from within each party itself.
Left-Wing Parties:
Thus, while we shall begin with those parties on the
Left, only the Tudeh and the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan and
that of Kurdistan can be fully called left-wing parties. The
others, such as Hizb-i Iran, Hizb-i Jangal, Hizb-i Hamrahan,
Hizb-i Susyalist, all exhibit socialist views on a milder scale,
although they can each be distinguished by certain individual
characteristics. Certain features are basic to the make-up of
all these parties: membership in all rested on conditions of age
(over 18), a flawless past record, the swearing of an oath of
allegiance to the party and its manifesto (which included
forswearing of membership to any other party); and payment
of fees.1 The majority membership came from the new
intellectual class in Iran, but their emphasis was placed
primarily upon upholding the rights of the working
1. Maram-nama va Barnama-yi, A'in nama-yi Hizb-i Hamrahan, Teheran, Oct. 1942, p.3;
Mar3ni-naroa-yi Hizb-i Jangal, Teheran 1946, p.l, part 2.
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class.1 A parallel stress was made by all of these parties upon
the 'enlightenment' of the Iranian population concerning the
dangers inherent in a pro-foreign-power government in Teheran
such a government, they felt had the interests of that
foreign power at heart, at the expense of those of her own
people.2
A basic 3-fold programme, with individual emphases, can
be seen in all of these parties, centering around political,
economic and social aspects. The political aim focussed
externally upon the integrity and independence of Iran, and
the removal of foreign influence within the central government;
internally upon democratic government and parliamentary party
vote. Economically, they demanded the establishment and growth
of the Iranian economy, proper use of resource and land
distribution, and the general improvement of Iranian economic
well-being. In the social sphere, their aim was towards
adequate health and welfare facilities provided by the
government, free compulsory education, and reform throughout
Iran.3
The Hamrahan party programme can be taken as
representative of those parties under this category:4
It was concerned first and foremost to ensure democratic
rule in Iran by securing freedom of speech and action for
every citizen, except where harmful to public welfare, as part
of the struggle against all forms of dictatorship or despotism;
this also entailed the maintenance of the country's defence.
1. Cottam, op. cit., pp.88-9; Razi, "Genesis of Party in Iran", Iranian Studies III
2, 1970, pp.77-8.
2. Najat-i "Iran, Jan 13, 1942.
3. Ibid.; Maranunama-yi Hizb-i Jangal, p.6; Razi, op. cit., p.77.
4. Machalski, Poltical Parties in Iran 1941-6, Krakow 1962, pp. 145-8; Mararo- nama-
yi Barnama-yi S 'In-'nama-yi Hizb-i HamrShSn, Teheran n.d., p.l.
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Internally, democracy should be achieved through the upholding
of justice and the fight against social corruption - either
bribery, fraud, or the exploitation of labour. Thus there was
also to be a fierce struggle against unemployment on one hand,
and laziness on the other; and compulsory insurance against
illness or accidents during work. Agricultural reform played a
large role, the party demanding that a greater part of
agrarian products be given to the peasants themselves, beyond
mere subsistence level, while production was to be upped
through new and advanced technological and scientific methods
of agriculture, and the area of tillable land increased. In
conjunction with this, compulsory but free education was to be
provided throughout the country, to include technical teaching
and supplementary education for workers. This would then form
the basis for free elections to municipal councils, bodies that
would administer the fiscal needs of the towns, regulate
housing and water supplies, etc. the government would be
responsible for maintaining communication systems, the natural
resource industries in the country; balancing taxes with
personal incomes, and thus securing a just distribution of
wealth; the provision of free health and welfare services, as
well as eradicating the problems of alcohol and opium smoking;
and lastly, increasing the growth of the population through
raising the standard of living, and through infant care.
Although the programmes for these left-wing parties have
been seen to be very similar, nevertheless, in-fighting occurred
between them as a result of their individual emphases.
Therefore, the Hizb-i Jangal and Hizb-i Iran fought mainly on
nationalist and anti-foreign intervention platforms, whereas the
Hamrahan and Hizb-i Susyalist were concerned with internal
exploitation and social welfare: Hizb-i Jangal members asserted
that while patriotic feeling had been suppressed in the past by
tyrannical rule exercised through both internal and external
influences, now, all Iranians were aware of the crisis that
they faced, and should unite to change the government, and
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denounce the instruments of imperialism.1 This should be
compared with the Hamrahan party's argument that successive
Teheran governments had been oppressive to gain their own
advantage. With the exception of a few exploiters who lived
parasitically off the work of others, most Iranians worked in
factories, offices, or farms, or as workers or engineers, and
it was only by uniting their efforts and co-operating together
that they could achieve their rights.2
By examining the individual life of these parties, we can
see that their influence within Iran, both political and social,
was indeed minor.
The Hamrahan Party was formed in October 1942, under
the leadership of Mustafa Fatih, after the latter' s break with
the Anti-Fascist Society.3 It consisted chiefly of progressive
intellectuals who had socialist sympathies.4 However, as a
consequence of disagreement between its leaders among other
things, the Hamrahan Party split in April 1944, and a new
party emerged under the name of Hizb-i Susyalist.5 The Hizb-
i Susyalist was a fully leftist, socialist party, and its new
organ, Imruz va Farda, (put out instead of the former paper,
Sham) claimed that the reason for the split lay in the
apathetic opposition to Sayyid Ziya and the "reactionary party"
on the part of the Hamrahan deputy Hasan Naraqi, and in the
lack of attention that the party's committee paid to the
protests subsequently made over the issue.6 Mustafa Fatih, on
• • •
the other hand, maintained that the Hizb-i Susyalist broke
away because they had only joined his party in order to find
1. Najat-i Iran, Jan. 13, 1942.
2. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
3. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran", HE J 3, 1949, p. 49.
4. Haram--nama-yi Hizb-i Hamrahan, Teheran, Oct. 1942, passim.
5. Machalski, op. cit., p. 148.
6. Elwell-»Sutton, private notes.
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jobs, and were therefore disappointed that he had not obtained
any for them.
The Hamrahan Party also suffered from the resignation of
CAbd al-Qasim Naraqi, deputy for Qazvln. Sham expressed regret
that he should have resigned after his explanation over his
reticence concerning Sayyid Ziya had been accepted by the
Party Committee. Naraqi, however, announced that, having been
unable to attend meetings out of ill-health and personal
reasons, he felt that he should offer his resignation.2
The Hizb-i Susyalist, led by _Shahidzada and Bani Sadr,
sympathised with the Peoples' Party of Iran, and also with the
USSR;3 it was thus unfavourably disposed towards the West, in
contrast to Hizb-i Paykar, which tended towards France, and
against the Soviet Union. * The Hizb-i Susyalist also fiercely
opposed Tabataba'i's National Will Party (Irada-yi MillT).s
Unlike the Hamrahan party, the Hizb-i Susyallst had fewer
members in the capital, and more numerous branches in the
provinces and towns, such as _Shiraz, Mashhad and Babul. The
programme of the Hizb-i Susyalist, based very much on the
socialist model of the USSR, incorporated most aspects of the
ideology of the contemporary progressive parties, but was never
given the opportunity to put its ideas into practice because it
was blocked by reactionary elements in order that they might
protect their own interests.6 Thus both the Hizb-i Hamrahan
and Hizb-i Susyalist, as other parties, disappeared without any
1. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
2. Ibid,
3. Machalski, op. cit., pp.148-9.
4. "Twenty-eight Iranian Political Organisations 1941-53, Review of Iranian Political
and Economic History, Spring 1979, vol.3, no.l, p.75-81.
5. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
6. Machalski, op. cit., p.148.
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real achievement or influence, although their ideology was
continued in a modified way through an informal amalgamation
of its members with the Tudeh.1
The Hizb-i Jangal formed a milder version of the previous
revolutionary Jangal movement, now resurrected by Muhammad
Tadayyun in January 1943.2 The party had great hopes for
success, believing, that that would come as a result of their
solid support from the whole of GTlan.3 Their appeal was made
therefore to all lovers of freedom and intellectuals, not simply
for passive support but rather for action instead of mere
political discussion. The Hizb-i Jangal believed that since the
country was passing through a critical phase, even momentary
apathy or indifference could have fatal consequences; sacrifice
and heroism were thus necessary to eradicate all the problems
and obstacles along the way, and to consolidate the first
definite and ruthless steps the party had already taken.
The Jangali programme remained essentially unchanged
from that of the earlier movement, but adapted itself to
contemporary circumstances. Jangal formed a coalition with the
Tudeh and Mihan and other socialist groups.* Because of its
strong standing among the working class, Jangal came under
much pressure from the reactionary forces, including extreme
censorship - just as had the earlier movement5 - and it was
finally crushed in 1947-
The very circumscribed support, from among the bourgeois
intelligentsia mainly in Teheran, was the chief reason for the
1. Elwell — Sutton, private notes.
2. J. Kovac, Iran and the Beginning of the Cold War, Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Utah,
1970, pp.34-5.
3. Ibid.
4. Elwell-Sutton, Political Parties, p.57.
5. See Ch.I, Gilan Movement.
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Hizb-i Iran's lack of electoral success, compared with the
provincial backing given to Jangal in Gilan.1 The Hizb-i Iran
was formed in May 1944 by Farivar, orginally a member of the
Hamrahan committee;2 the editor of its paper, Shafaq, was M.
Rahmani, who started publishing Shafaq by November 1944.3
Hizb-i Iran fought on a nationalist, anti-imperialist base, yet
it also exhibited religious tendencies, and had close ties with
Hizb-i Mihan, Vahdat-i Milli, and for a short time between
1945-6 also with the Hizb-i Mardum, and through it, Jabha-yi
Milli. *
We should also discuss here the Hizb-i Kumala-yi Kurdistan,
although it cannot be fitted into the typological scheme which
we have outlined. Despite the fact that the Hizb-i Kumala-yi
Kurdistan was definitely left-wing, it was more in the nature
of a regional national liberation movement than a nationwide
political party. Nor, however, can it be subsumed under the
Azerbaijan democratic and nationalist movement, although both
worked towards autonomy. The Kurdistan problem was
compounded by its international character; Kurds inhabited not
only the Iranian province of Kurdistan, but also parts of
Turkey, Iraq, Syria, USSR and Afghanistan.5 Their
demand for autonomy was an interim solution, pending the final
aim of an independent, unified Kurdish state. As the Communist
Party of Iraq declared at its second conference, July 1956,
Iraqi Kurds are inseparable from all other Kurds in Kurdistan,
a province which lay between Iraq, Iran and Turkey; autonomy
for each Kurdish group is a preliminary solution before the
final unification of Kurds in an independent Kurdish state.6
1. Elwell- Sutton, private notes.
2. Elwell-Sutton, Political Parties, p.53.
3. Ibid.
4. Machalski, op. cit., p.150.
5. Naamani, I.T., "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination", MEJ, vol.20, Summer
1966 , no.3.
6. A.R. Qasimlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds, ch.12, section 1.
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This statement follows the general Communist support for
the right of self-determination, which included, of course, an
independent Kurdish state. Lenin stated:1 "each national
problem requires its own concrete solution", and thus the
Communist Parties of Iran, Iraq and Turkey all individually
supported the Kurdish movements in their own countries - the
Tudeh in Iran, and the Iraqi and Turkish Communist parties.2
The West had a similar vested interest in the issue,
which was diametrically opposed to Kurdish autonomy and
independence, however.3 The danger inherent to such Western
powers in the possibility of radical democratic change came
with the Communist element. This posed a direct threat to
Western interests in the Middle East: the oil monopoly (cf.
Kirkuk), military bases and so forth. On the one hand, it was
possible to support the Kurdish movement, but at the same
time, this would incur the hostility of the national governments
of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, which the West was unwilling to
risk. These powers thus enforced their disapproval through the
agency of local feudal lords, tribal chiefs, and religious
leaders; the two former groups, indeed, were the most
formidable obstacle in the way of Kurdish national liberation
- see their roles for instance, in the autonomy movement of
1946 in Iran, which was crushed by the central government
with the support of Britain and America. *
The Kurds for their part, recognised the necessity of
struggle5 against external influences if they were to fulfil any
1. A.R. Qasimlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds, c h.12, section 1.
2. A.R. Qasimlou, People Without a Country, 1975 , intro., p.8.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.; Kurdistan and Kurds, ch.12, section 2.
5. Feili, O.Y., and Fromchuck, A.R., "The Kurdish Struggle for Independence", The
Middle East Review, vol.ix, no.l, 1976, pp.47-59.
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claim for democracy or self-determination and gain their aims
and rights. Nevertheless, they would have done better to have
united with all the democratic movements in the Middle East in
order to dissipate and eliminate imperialist influence in the
economic field, military bases, the CENTO presence and
influence and the oil monopoly, since it was this force that
resisted the movement for national liberation most fiercely. How
strong the Kurdish feeling ran can be seen from its re-
emergence after the recent revolution of 19791 in Iran with
similar claims, in spite of the apparent destruction of the
movement in 1946. It thus appears that the only way in which
to solve the Kurdish problem is through amelioration of
conditions within Kurdistan, since that province is extremely
disadvantaged in comparison with the rest of the country:
apart from Kirmanshah, there is no industry in Kurdistan,
and capital income per annum among the peasants is only $100.
Radical land reform is thus required as are educational
facilities to lower the high rate of illiteracy;2 and the
granting of basic cultural rights would help to improve the
Kurdish situation.
The Kurdish people with a population of 13 million
according to nationalists, but as few as 6 million according to
William Eagleton,3 are spread out through Iran, Iraq, Turkey,
Syria, and the Soviet Union. They inhabit mostly mountainous
regions and support themselves through agriculture and
pastoral farming. The majority are Sunni Moslems, and they speak
an Indo-European language,* and have their own cultural
heritage: the first Kurdish literature dates from the seventh
century, and a Kurdish press from 1898.5 In Iran, the Kurds
1. Kurdistan Report, No.2, March, 1981, London.
2. National Census of Population and Housing, Nov. 1966.
3. Eagleton, W., The Kurdish Republic of 1946, London 1963, p.38.
4. Limbert, J., "The Origins and Appearance of the Kurds in the Pre-Islamic Iran",
Iranian Studies, vol.1, 1948, p.41.
5. Feili, op. cit., p.47; Naamani, op. cit., pp.280-81.
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form 16% of the Iranian population,1 living mainly in the
Western plateau, covering an area of 125,000 square kilometres
- a distinct ethnic minority.
The first organised movement of Kurds in Iran began in
1943 with the creation of the Kumala, the committe of Kurdish
Youth, reflecting a tendency popular among Kurds in general
at that time.2 Internal support for the movement came mainly
from progressive tribal leaders, landowners, merchants, and
forward-looking clergymen and intelligentsia.* External help
was derived from the support given in the USSR in particular
(among the socialist countries) - a Kurdistan-Soviet Cultural
Relations Society was formed, on the basis of this co-operation.
When the Kumala finally announced its existence in public in
April 1945 it was to found the Hizb-i Kumala-yi Kurdistan,with
the religious leader GhazT Muhammad at its head. The new
party was approved on September 12, 1945, at a meeting*
between Ghazi and Makhirov, president of Azerbaijan SSR.
The Hizb-i Kumala-yi Kurdistan in effect replaced the ineffective
Tudeh Party in Kurdistan, and built upon the support that had
been given to the Tudeh. The ICO founder members declared in
the party's manifesto their advocacy of freedom from fascism,
and the return to constitutional liberties, rights that they had
enjoyed before the reign of Rika Shah. The three papers,
'Kurdistan', 'Havar' and 'Hilat' started publication with the
final dissolution of the Kumala.6
The programme of the Democrat Party of Kurdistan was
based upon: freedom, self-government and autonomy for
1. National Census of Population and Housing, Nov. 1966.
2. A. Roosevelt, "Kurdish Republic of Mahabad", ME J, July 1947, p.247.
3. Machalski, op. cit., p.166.
4. Farquhar to Bevin, April 18, 1946. (E 3499/3/34) PRO, p.10.
5. Roosevelt, op. cit., p.254.
6. Ibid., p.262.
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Kurdistan; education in Kurdish, and local officials not
'imported' form the central government; law and security for
all classes of society; co-operation and friendship with
Azerbaijan; increased efficiency in the exploitation of natural
resources, agriculture, education and health care; general
welfare and prosperity in Kurdistan.1
Ghazi's position was consolidated with the acquisition of
Mulla Mustafa Barzanl's support from Iraq.2 With his help,
Kurdistan autonomy was announced on January 11, 1946,
affecting Mahabad, Ushnu, Mianduab, Sardasht, Saqqiz, and
Maku.3 This followed the declaration of a people's government
on December 15, 1945; GhazT was elected as President of the
Kurdish Republic, at a mass meeting of delegates from all over
Kurdistan on January 24, 1946, while his cousin, Husayn Khan
Sayf GhazT became Minister of War in the 13-strong cabinet. *
Kurdish thus became the official language, with local Kurds as
administrative officials; the Iranian army and police appointed
by the central government were disarmed and replaced with a
Kurdish national army;5 partial land reform was effected,
limited in its scope by the Kurds' willingness to redistribute
only that land that had been abandoned by fleeing feudal
lords or tribal chiefs, so that it was not so widespread or
effective as in Azerbaijan; trade with the Soviet Union was
also initiated, and helped improve Kurdistan's economic
situation.6
Barzani played a major role in the talks between the
Democratic parties of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, held in April
1. Ivanov, MS. "Kurds in Persia", Central Asian Review, 1959, p.192.
2. See Roosevelt, op. cit., p.257.
3. Ivanov, op. cit., p.192.
4. "The Kurds in Persia", Central Asian Review, vol.7, 1959, p.192.
5. Ibid.
6. Farquhar to Bevin, April 18, 1946, p.2. (E 3499/3/34) PRO.
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1946 in Tabriz* These centred on the 7 Articles, with the
conclusion of a treaty of mutual aid friendship.1 These talks
were important for both parties, and enabled them to present
a united front against the oppressive central government;
Teheran, indeed, received the 7 Articles very badly.2
Suggestions concerning local autonomy and bureaucracy were
submitted to Qavam, but while ostensibly accepted, were in the
end dropped by Qavam.3 This resulted in more friction between
the Kurds and the central government. In December 194-6,
Iranian troops were sent to supervise the elections to the 15th
Majlis in Kurdistan..* Barzani, at that time in Iran, conducted
negotiations with Qavam to try to reach an agreement. The
suppression of the Azerbaijan autonomy movement, however,
caused Barzani's efforts to fail. The Iranian army moved into
Kurdistan on February 22, 1947, the Kurds were disarmed and
the movement crushed with the help of local feudal lords and
tribal chiefs.5 The short-lived autonomy finally collapsed with
the execution of its leaders: while Barzani returned to Iraq on
April 13, Ghazi, his brother Sadr Ghazi, and cousin Sayf
Ghazi were arrested, brought before a military tribunal, and
executed on March 30, 1947, along with many others.5 BarzanT
came back to Kurdistan, May 22, in an effort to continue the
fight, but with an Iranian force of 10,000 facing them, the
attempt was doomed to failure. Barzani then left for the USSR
in June, 1947.7
1. A.R. Qassimlou in People Without a Country.
2. Roosevelt, "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad", MEJ, vol. 1947, no.3, p.258.
3. Ibid., p.259.
Ramazani < R.K., "The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's
Republic: Their Rise and Fall", Studies on the Soviet Union II (1971), p.471.
5. "The Kurds in Persia", Central Asian Review, vol.7, 1959, p.192.
5. Roosevelt, op. cit.
7. Qassimlou, People Without a Country, ch.2.
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Five main reasons can be adduced for the collapse of the
Democratic Party of Kurdistan. The Kurds, while accepting help
from the Soviets, also resisted Soviet disapproval of their
own ideology. The peasants were suffering from a failed
tobacco crop and consequent drop in trade with the rest of
Iran. The party depended upon the import of food, a scarce or
non-existent commodity partly due to the extra men to be fed.
There were allegations of Soviet non-co-operation, and
Kurdish tribesmen gave no support, the party relied heavily
upon Barzani, while the rank and file in the army comprised
a mere rabble, out only to gain its own material profit.1
Much research needs to be done in this area, beyond this
brief overview. Nevertheless, several comments can be added
here.2 Western writers are mistaken in assuming the Party to
be a Soviet puppet;3 this is impossible in the face of the
strong religious tendencies of the Kurds in general, and of
Ghazi himself. The true cause of the revolution was not
Communist-inspired by the USSR, but due to the abject poverty
within Kurdistan, a situation ignored by the central
government. The movement sought to establish Kurdish as the
official language in schools and local government, and was
purely a nationalist movement, quite independent from the
Soviet Union. The USSR became involved only through the
Kurds' need for material support that was not forthcoming from
the Iranian government.
1. Roosevelt, op. cit., p.260.
2. This section is included for the sake of completion of the thesis. Those
interested should see:- Eagleton, W., The Kurdish Republic of 1946, London 1963;
Adamson, The Kurdish War, N.Y. 1965; Safrastian, Kurds and Kurdistan, London 1948;
Limbert, J., "The Origins and Appearance of the Kurds in Pre-Islamic Iran", Iranian
Studies, vol.1, 1968; Kurdistan Report No.2, March 1981; Wenner, L.M., "Arab-Kurdish
Relations in Iraq", MEJ, vol.17 1963; Feilli and Fromchuck, "Kurdish Struggle for
Independence", Middle East Review, vol.12, no.l, 1976; Edmonds, C.J., "The Kurds
and the Revolution", MEJ, vol.13, no.l, 1959; Naamani, I.T., "The Kurdish Drive for
Self-Determination", MEJ, vol.20, 1966, ru.3 Roosevelt, A., "The Kurdish Republic
of Mahabad", MEJ, vol.20, 1947, no.3; Ramazani, P.K., "The Autonomous Republic of
Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's Republic: Their Rise and Fall", Studies on the
Soviet Union, 1971; "The Kurds in Persia", Central Asian Review, vol.7, 1959.
3. Farquhar to Bevin, April 18, 1946, p.2. (E 3499/3/34) PRO.
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Kurdish history, thus, is a catalogue of unsuccessful
attempts to achieve autonomy from Persia, Turkey and Iraq.
The 'bandit' image is a false and misleading one: their
struggle was the safeguarding of a period of political freedom,
gained after the Soviet occupation (1941-7). And just like the
Kurds in Iraq, the struggle for democracy, and its attainment
in Kurdistan, even if but briefly, was destined to change the
political future of the area.1
Moderate Parties:
In the period between 1941-7, a number of moderate
parties - those between the extreme right and left - emerged.
They were characterised by their adherence to an established
pattern during this phase of political activity, one that
demanded a narrow ideology and restricted popular appeal,
mostly from the new intellectual class.2 We shall discuss these
parties according to their chronological development, starting
with the Hizb—i Azadi-yi Iran in 1942, and finishing with the
Hizb-i Ittihad-i Milli. None of them were long-lasting, or had
• •
any major influence on the political scene. Nevertheless, they
were important as models and examples of political
organisations for later parties.
Hizb-i Azadi-yi Iran:
the party was founded in September 1941, under the leadership
of Amir Ahmad Mahmud.3 Membership was under the usual
conditions;'* and its support was gathered particularly from
among the Majlis deputies. Its official organ, Darya, was used
to publish and disseminate the party's programme. The major
concerns of the manifesto centred on social, political and
1. Edmonds, op, cit., p.10.
2. Cottam, op. cit., p.88.
3. Machalski, op. cit., p.144.
4. See Left-Wing Parties, section of present Chapter, supra.
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economic reform:1 the complementary issues of national Iranian
independence and integrity, and internal democracy, with a
constitutional monarchy as in the best interests of Iranians,
and comprehensive social policy covering welfare, land
distribution and reform,2 health care; tax reform; workers'
aid; maintenance of security, army reform, national service in
public benefit schemes, and establishment of good political,
economic and cultural relations with Iran's neighbours.
The Hizb-i Azadi-yi Iran had both legislative and
executive authority. The hierarchy of the latter included the
quarter committee, presided over by the foreman, the district
committee, a parochial committee, and a central committee under
the control of a chairman. It was organised on the basis of an
anjuman in every bakhsh, consisting of 30 party members.
These elected a representative to the council in every
Shahristan then sent its representatives to the Assembly, at the
centre of every Ustan, which in turn sent delegates to the
annual Congress in Teheran.3
In 194-5, the party leadership was transferred to Dr.
Hasan ArsanjanI, and came to be regarded as distinctly pro-
Western. It did not live much longer, however: it folded up in
1946 due to poor organisation and leadership, lack of support
and pressure from the repressive measures of the central
government. Its members gradually became part of the Tudeh,
and the Hizb-i Azadi-yi Iran disappeared altogether.'*
Hizb-i Milli-yi Iran:
The Hizb-i Milli-yi Iran was founded in October 1941 by
Muhammad Tadayyun, a former Minister of Education.5 Its main
1. Hizb-i Azadi-yi Iran (Booklet), Teheran 1941, passim.
2. For more details see Manifesto, n.5 above.
3. Hizb-i Azadi-yi Iran.
4. Zafar 383, 1st Aban, 1325 (23 October, 1946).
5. Elwel1-Sutton, Political Parties, p.50.
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platform was the establishment of a National democratic
government, and its supporters came chiefly from the educated
classes. On top of the usual conditions of membership, members
of the Hizb-i Mill! were required to give obedience to the
Central Committee and to the party regulations; to actively
propagate the party programme; to give loyalty to both party
and country; and to contribute monthly to party funds
according to their wealth.1
The Hizb-i Milli was the only party with fixed official
headquarters. Its organisation created branches all over Iran,
with a four-fold basic structure: a Central Committee; a
Committee of Inspectors; regional committees; and lastly, a
Council for overall control. The Council was elected from
members of the regional committees; the method of election was
decided initially by the Central Committee, and then by the
Council itself. It was also the Council which defined the duties
of the Central Committee - to legislate the electoral procedure
to the Committee of Inspectors and regional committees, and to
adjudicate the inter-relationships between the respective
committees.
On a more local level, there existed branch offices and
local committees, including committees of inspectors. These were
supervised by the Central Committee's nationwide organisation,
since they owed it complete obedience.
The Hizb-i Milli's programme focussed primarily upon the
struggle for equality between all nations, and freedom from
despotic tyranny. They thus recommended economic and political
self-sufficiency to maintain Iran's international integrity
seeking good relationships with neighbours such as Britain and
1. Waram-Nama-yi Hizb-i Mil1i—yi Iran, Teheran 1941, pp.5-7.
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the USSR. The party's internal policy was directed towards
secret, free, direct elections with a universal franchise. Law
was to be regulated in accordance with the welfare of the
state, not for the benefit of foreign enterprise, and justice
should be a priority for all. Free trade was to be encouraged,
and hoarding forbidden, the national economy should be
improved through agriculture, cottage industry, and the
exploitation of Iran's mineral wealth. A strong army would be
established to defend the country from outside interference, and
stabilise it from within, with the holding of political, social
and economic conferences. As regards welfare, it was a
progressive programme, demanding free compulsory education;
the improvement of roads and other amenities; a comprehensive
National Health Service, including water purification and
hygiene; the opium trade was to be restricted through treatment
rather than suppression; a progressive tax-system would ensure
that the burden of the tax change fell squarely upon those
elements of society that could best afford it.
The fortunes of the Hizb-i Milli depended heavily upon its
leader, Tadayyun. On his fall from power, therefore, in 194-2,
their support dropped considerably. It took another year before
the party reached a healthy state again, by August 1943.
Ittihad-i Milli:
Ittihad-i Milli was born after the Constitutional upheavals of
1942, when democracy replaced the rule of Riza Shah Pahlavi.
A group of 22 Majlis deputies, including HashimI, TusT, Bay at
and Malikzada, who had wide experience and knowledge of the
struggle for civil freedom, joined together before the end of the
12th Majlis to form a group under the name Mihan (Mother
Country).1 Most of their membership was drawn from government
officials, while the conditions of acceptance were identical with
the normal pattern. Party organisation was very restricted,
1. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
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concentrated around Teheran and a few provinces. As
membership changed, new members were chosen with great care:
at the official launching of Ittihad-i Mill! at a conference in
194-2, Murtada Qui! Bayat was elected first President, a man
who was then vice-president of the Majlis. Within six months,
a 28 point party programme had been formulated. The press
organ of the party was the newspaper which bore the same
name as the party, edited by Muhammad Hashimi, and first
appearing on July 15, 1943. The first issue pointed out that
political and economic power within Iran, as well as the
international authority of the country was dependent upon the
unification of all the elements in the nation. Consequently, the
party's leader strove toward the principle of friendship
between Iran and her neighbours, for patriotism, and for
social justice. In addition to the manifesto put forward by the
Hizb-i Mill! in the economic sphere, the Ittihad-i Mill! were
• •
concerned to strengthen the economy by attracting foreign
investment, entering into international trade and popularising
the taxation system. The party aimed to realise the social
potential of the country by encouraging religious awareness
and constitutional independence, linked to social and family
strengths and to charitable assistance. Thus judicial reforms
were planned in legislation, justice and court procedure.1
Otherwise, the programme followed similar lines to that of the
Hizb-i Milli.
After the first six months, the party's situation changed.
A significant decline in support from within the Majlis showed
itself, and the party's work was necessarily curtailed to extra-
parliamentary activity, propaganda meetings and so forth. In
1944, the Ittihad-i Milli, which had been pro-British,
amalgamated with the Hizb—i Millat, and together they formed
a People's Party, Hizb-i Mardum.
1. Ittihad-i Milli, 14/7/4-3 yr.l, issue no.l.
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Hizb-i Millat:
Hizb-i Millat was a reformist party, founded by Muhammad
% •
Sadiq Tabataba'i in January 1942. Tabataba'i's invitation to
• • • • •
all to join the party reflected his advocation of social
democratic nationalism. The party itself fought on the platform
of political freedom through parliamentary government, equality
of all individuals as laid down by Islam, unity of the nation,
and progress that respected traditional customs. Party members
were suspicious of external interference, since they felt that
much of Iran's national integrity and greatness had been
destroyed as a result of it. They were proud of the country's
history, and thus resented the way in which other nations had
brought trouble to Iran. Membership conditions and duties were
similar to those of other parties, but Millat members were also
required to call each other 'brother', in the Islamic tradition,
to demonstrate their unity, and wore uniform to indicate that
no social barriers existed within the party. Its influence was
felt, indeed, throughout Iran, and it had branches in all of
the major cities, towns, villages, and provinces.
The main unit of the party organisation was the Jarga.
The Jarga comprised a group of people from all sectors of
society, gathered to debate the major issues that faced the
party. Each branch of the party had its own 'association',
although when Millat diversified its organisation, it was more
common for single social groups such as workers or teachers,
to form their own jarga. The duties of this 'association' were
to promote and organise party activities in accordance with
Millat's beliefs and aims; and to encourage and assist the
establishment of the new jargas.
If a region contained more than three jargas, a union
was normally formed between them. All of its members were
drawn from the different jargas in the region, and each had
a president and two deputies. The function of the union
(ittiljadiyya) was to supervise the activity of the jarga. A
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similar procedure was employed in the event of the close
existence of 3 unions, which then joined to form a council of
unions. This council also had the task of dealing with the
economic and social problems of the region.
The General Assembly was formed from individual
representatives from all the unions in the country. It met
annually for 15 days in May, and had four major functions:
the presentation of annual reports from representatives on the
previous year's activities; discussion and decision concerning
the policy for the forthcoming year, including any
constitutional changes that were deemed necessary; arrangement
of the party's budget for the following year; and the holding
of elections for the posts of Treasurer, Secretary, etc., and
once every 3 years, for the position of party leader.
"In exceptional circumstances requiring an immediate
decision on some matter, other than a change in the
constitution, another committee known as the Supreme Council
was formed. This body could occasionally replace the General
Assembly, particularly if its offices were required near the
month of May.
The most important body of the party was the General
Council, which had authority to make all decisions concerning
the party's actions and policy. Its members formulated Millat's
internal, external, political and economic policies, all of which
were put forward for approval by the General Assembly in May.
It also had the responsibility of creating all the party posts,
and supervising all the elections for these positions.1
In addition to these bodies, there existed within the
party organisation a number of artistic societies that
specialised in language and publication, whose aim was to
1. 111ibad—i Milli, 14/7/43, yr.l, issue no.l, pp.21-6.
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propagate the party manifesto throughout Iran.
Althought Millat was avowedly nationalist, it was also
considered by its opponents to be pro-British. There seems to
be little supporting evidence for this claim, however: rather,
due to the party's influence and power, its opponents wished
to discredit it, and therefore attributed to it pro-British
sentiments at a time when foreign intervention was particularly
suspected. In fact, the party's primary manifesto unequivocally
condemned foreign intrigue in Iran, and both Britain and the
Soviet Union came under this criticism.
MillaJ: worked closely with other patriotic parties, and
enjoyed especially good relations with the Unity of Iran Party
(formerly the Hizb-i Iran). Millat, together with Ittihad-i
Milli, was eventually succeeded by the People's Party.
The aims of Hizb—i Millat were as follows:
To strengthen Iranian nationhood by unifying the various
Q
indigenous racial and linguistic groups into a union of Ajam.
To regain Iranian rights from foreign control, and
achieve a measure of autonomy in accordance with the
international situation at the time, while at the same time
relaying ties of friendship with other powers.
To support small businesses and enterprises but not on
the level of national capitalism; to work for the workers and
peasants to improve their situation.
To utilise national resources for modernising industry -
particularly to develop agricultural methods and machinery at
a time when all tilling and farming was done by hand.
To establish a national court in order to punish traitors
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and those who worked against the good of the nation by
hoarding food or engaging in other illicit activities.
To strengthen the Islamic faith by purifying it of the
extraneous superstitions and fictions which had attached
themselves to it.
To halt the cultivation, importation and selling of opium,
a widespread practice, by making drug trading a capital
offence.
To strengthen naval, land and air forces in order to
protect the national security of Iran, and ensure that the
servicemen were well provided for.
Education, health services and employment were to be
available for all. Marriage was encouraged at a time when the
population level was low, in order to build a strong and
unified nation. Finally, Millat also promoted the idea of an
information organisation, which was both to receive
international news and to educate foreign power about Iranian
policy.
The Hizb-i Mardum, the re-organised Millat party,1 was
formed in August 1944•2 Sadiq Tabataba'i, now president of the
14th Majlis3 took over leadership over again, as head of a
group of ministers and deputies active in the struggle for
Constitutional rule between 1905-11. * These included three
prominent ministers: Aman Allah Ardalan, Ibrahim Zand, and
Murta'za Quli Bayat (the former prime minister), and many
1. Kovac, op. cit., p.36.
2. "28 Iranian Political Organisations 1941-53", Review of Iranian Political and
Economic History, pp.75-81, Spring 1979 vol.3, no.l, p.75.
3. Machalski, op. cit., p.162.
4. Ibid., p.162.
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other deputies such as Nasir Qui! Ardalan, Dr. Aqayan,
Bihbahan!, Tihranl, Dawlatabad!, Riza Muayyad Siabit and
Sadri.
Many members of the National Union Group (Ittifaq-i
Milll) in the Majlis joined the Hizb-i Mardum,1 among them
Amir Ibrahim!, Sadiq Bushir!, CIzzat Allah Bayat,
Shari C atzada, Fuladvand, Matidi Kazimi, Mustafa Kazimi,
———
• • • •
Mir5 at Isfandiyari, and Hashimi. The Hizb-i Mardum also
appeared to have the support of the Court, since it included
Zand, who was the Shah' s nominee as Minister of War, Aqayan,
a well-known friend of the Court, and Fuladvand, who helped
the Shah in his plan to prevent the opening of the 14th Majlis
on February 1944- Moreover, Tabataba'i himself was reported
to be in favour with the court at that time.
The rest of the party membership was composed mostly of
officials, engineers, a few doctors, merchants and landowners.
The official party organ of the Hizb-i Mardum was Mihr-
i Iran, and the aims and programme of the party were
disseminated through its pages.2 The party's manifesto declared
Hizb-i Mardum's aim to be the achievement of unity for the
nation, the preservation of Iran's freedom and independence,
the restoration of the true principles of democratic government,
and the observance of social principles which it labelled in
brackets (Susyalism). Judging from the class membership of the
party, however, it was unlikely that the establishment of
Socialism could have really been one of the party's aims;
indeed, it failed to be a progressive body at all.
The Hizb-i Mardum did, on the other hand, prove to be
1. According to Machalski, Hizb-i Mardum also enjoyed the support of the Ittihad-
i Milli, which numbered about 30 deputies; op. cit., p.162.
2. Review of Iranian Political and Economic History, op. cit., p.75.
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hostile to the Millspaugh Mission,1 undertaken by an American
financial adviser - Kazimi delivered a violent attack on it in
the Majlis; Bihbahani had always been one of the Mission's
staunchest opponents, and a number of other deputies
Dawlatabadi, Sadri and Sadiq Bushiri - stood for everything
to which the Mission was opposed.
The Hizb-i Mardum continued to follow the ideals of the
Ittihad-i Milli, then, a party which had arisen two years
previously, but had at that time shown no conspicuous
activity.2
Mihan Parastan:
The Hizb-i Mihan Parastan originated in October 1942,
gathering in its ranks the radically nationalist elements.3
These came mainly from among the intellectuals and moderately
progressive intellectual class in Teheran especially, and the
bigger provincial towns; many prominent writers in Iran also
belonged to Mihan Parastan.*
Mihan Parastan was similar in programme to the Hizb-i
Hamrahan, although more left-wing, and to Paykar:5 all these
were in opposition to the Tudeh Party and Mihan Parastan
later amalgamated with Paykar. Its chief members were
Muhandis Humayun, Khusraw Diba, Karim Isfahani, Muhandis
Razavi, Pahlavan Pur, CAli Shaygan and Ahmad Tahiri. Others,
connected with the party organs, Mihan Parastan and Shahbaz,
1. For more details of the Millspaugh Mission see: Millspaugh A.C., The Americans
in Persia, Washington, 1946.
2. Most of the information used for this party was obtained from personal notes taken
by Prof. Elwell-Sutton, who was an attache to the British Embassy in Iran during
this period.
3. Machalski, op. cit. (1962), p.149.




included Mahdl MalikT, editor of Sitara, Munirl", editor of
Ittifaqat, Qumi and Sayyid Sarabi.1 Both Namvar, who produced
Shahbaz and CAli Jalali, editor of Mihan Parastan, belonged
to the Executive Committee of the party.2
Mihan Parastan's programme comprised elements common
to most parties of this period with regard to both external and
internal policies, although the party urged that Iran maintain
political neutrality similar to Switzerland. By itself, the party
was unable to make an impression on the privileged classes.
It was therefore forced to amalgamate with Paykar and other
progressive parties, on June 194-5, to form the Mihan Party.
Hizb-i Paykar:
•
Paykar was born in 1943 out of a group of youngish men
united by dislike of the Tudeh, led by Jamal Shadman
(Secretary), Khusraw Iqbal, and Jahangir Tafazzuli. The
party's organ was initially the paper Bahar, which was
subsequently succeeded by Nabard, and then also by Tran-i
Ma, an excellent paper sustained on a high ideological and
literary level by Jahangir Tafazzuli. Tran-i Ma was one of the
most regular national daily papers for several years, and had
a strong voice in Iranian public opinion, giving a sense of
democratisation and progress.
While membership conditions were more or less identical,
Paykar's membership itself was more intellectual than other
similar parties. It numbered about 1000 members in Teheran,
with branches in Arak, Shami and Khurramabad; total
membership by the summer of 1945 was 10,000. Paykar was
organised through a number of bodies:
a General Assembly
1. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
2. Mihan Parastan stopped publication under government censorship in June 1943.
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the Head Central Committee
Head Revision Committee
Committees in various districts and provinces




The latter two divisions were formed in towns and
villages, and were the least tightly-knit of the party
organisations.
Paykar stood in opposition to the Tudeh Party, which had
Soviet ties, and also in opposition to the National Will Party
of Sayyid Ziya which favoured British interests. In
contradistinction, Paykar looked towards France, a country
which had little direct interest in Iran, thus conforming to the
common belief that an internal party must necessarily maintain
some foreign influence. Otherwise, its programme closely
ressembled that of the general pattern. Thus it was natural
that it should dissolve and amalgamate with a number of
similar parties: Istiqlal, Mihan Parastan, Azadikhwahan, tn
June 1944, to form the Mihan Party.
Mihan:
The Hizb-i Mihan was formed into June 1944 through the
coalition of Paykar, Istiqlal, Azadi-yi Iran, and Mihan
Parastan. It represented a middle way between the Tudeh and
the National Will parties, in order to give those who supported
neither a political voice - one with a decidedly national and
progressive emphasis. Conflicts within the Mihan soon emerged,
however: several former members of Paykar deserted along with
Tafazzuli, and CAbd al-Qadir Azad went to Sadiq Tabataba'i's
party, Mardum. In spite of developing an intensive
propaganda, especially among the intelligent working class,
Mihan failed to gain representation in the Mailis, and it too
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collapsed in 194-7 when all the parties were forced underground
and gradually disappeared.
Hizb-i ICtidal-i Iran:
This party was a union of the Hizb-i Najat-i Millat and the
Guruh-i Bahman - its organ was the paper Bahman.1 The party
platform was comprised of two closely related nationalist
ideals: the resistance to foreign intervention in Iran which
underestimated Iran's true strength, and opposition to Allied
interference which impeded Iranian advancement, and caused
financial and political hardship. On this basis, the party
appealed to all Iranians to join in their struggle.
The main centre of the party's activity was in Teheran,
although it had a few branches in the larger provinces,
controlled by provincial and district committees. Membership
was similar in structure to the other comparable parties, and
most recruits were drawn from the educated and middle-class
segments of society.
Hizb-i IC tidal-i Iran's programme was also on a three¬
fold economic, social and political pattern, and included the
usual respect for external independence and integrity and
internal freedom of speech, movement and press in democratic
rule; general welfare throughout the country, covering health
care, education, working conditions, employment, agricultural
improvement on a socialist basis, (with respect also, however,
for traditional Islamic principles). The party did not, in fact,
claim to be socialist, but it did exhibit socialist tendencies.
Q
The Hizb-i I tidal suffered under foreign pressure and
governmental suppression that existed at the end of the War,
when all political parties were weakened. The party's
opposition to Muhammad Riza Shah led to its open suppression
1. Bahman, Sept. 1946 (Supplement).
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by the central government, and as its political activity was
curtailed, it was forced to go underground.
Right-Wing Parties:
All of the conservative parties had their base in response
to the growth of the Tudeh Party.1 This meant naturally, that
their ideology was rooted in reaction to (rather than being a
spontaneous and original outgrowth of) that of the Tudeh. This
circumstance, when allied with the offensive against the
Communist-linked Tudeh produced an extreme right-wing
ideology that was shared by all the conservative parties.
Several other factors served to increase this tendency: all
these parties had close ties with the Court,2 which was itself
actively pro-British. The Tudeh were seen as Soviet-sponsored,3
and thus left-wing and right-wing clashed not only internally
but also within the context of international politics. Cottam's
party typology classifies the differences between right- and
left-wing parties according to a number of criteria:4 the left
were personality independent, the right personality dependent
(cf. Qavam and Sayyid Ziya); leadership recruited on the one
side from the new intellectuals and on the other from the
oligarchy; a situation paralleled fairly closely also among the
rank and file membership (with a corresponding limited appeal
to other sectors of society); the left was narrowly and rigidly
ideological, and the right, while still narrow, yet had a
broader ideological appeal when compared with the Tudeh-,
authoritarian and non-authoritarian.5 Within this general
1. Zabih, Communist Movement in Iran, 8erkeley 1966, pp.111-2; Razi, G.H., "Genesis
of Party in Iran: A Case Study of the Interaction between the Political System and
Political Parties", Iranian Studies, vol.Ill, no.2, 1970.
2. ^brah^mian, "Social Basis of Iranian Politics: Tudeh Party 1041-53", Columbia
1969, p.16ff.
3. Cuyler Young, T., "The Social Support of Current Iranian Policy", ME J, vol.6,
Spring 1952, no.2, p.140.
4. Cottam, op. cit., pp.86-87.
5. This last opposition perhaps applies more to the theory than the practice, since
right-wing regimes in Iran have in practice been notoriously authoritarian.
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typology, we shall differentiate between the conservative and
pro-British type, and that of extreme nationalist tendencies.1
Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli:
The founder of the Irada-yi Milli was Sayyid Ziya al-DTn
Tabataba'i- Sayyid Ziya was associated with Riza Khan's coup
d'etat of 1921, and he subsequently became Prime Minister after
only three months in office.2 A conflict of interest, however,
with Riza Khan, led to what became a 22 year exile, beginning
in British mandated Palestine. During this time, Sayyid Ziya
was involved in various activities, also acting as Secretary of
an Islamic congress held in 1931.3 He had been engaged in
journalism since 1907, and had brought out the papers Sharq.
Barq and Ra d in succession, the last reputedly the leading
newspaper in Iran in 1921.
Sayyid Ziya returned to Iran, and to political activity,
in 1943. Reactions to his stand were mixed: Dr. Musaddiq had
__
opposed Sayyid Ziya for 23 years due to his former activities
in Iran. Hizb-i Vatan, however, published a pamphlet asking
Sayyid Ziya to return to Iran and heal the ills of the country
in this difficult period of Iranian history.* Sayyid Ziya's
opponents claimed that his return had been arranged under
British patronage in order to employ his agency to combat the
Soviet challenge in the Tudeh Party. Indeed, this popular
belief which associated him closely with the British was a
hindrance in his career as a national political leader, although
in 1943 he had the support of several leading political figures
Q Q — —
of whom Abbas Mas udi, the owner of the influential paper
1. Razi, op. cit., p.74, where he also distinguishes ideological parties of extreme
religious orientation - these we shall deal with as they developed later on the
political scene.
2. Elwell-Sutton, Political Parties, op. cit., pp.51-2; Lenczowski, op. cit., p.235.
3. Kovac, op. cit., p.42.
4. S.8.M. Hijazi.Haqayiq-iGuftani, Teheran, p.38.
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Ittilacat, was probably the most prominent.1
In October 1943, Sayyid Ziyi, began editing the paper
Ra d-i Imruz. At the same time, he announced his candidacy
for the national elections then in progress. He was
consequently elected as a representative for his home-town of
Yazd.2 Following this in December, he organised a number of
independent papers, including Azad, Nur, Nida-yi Azadi, and
Khurshid-i Iran into a national press association. This move,
which was without precedent in the history of Iran, represented
a commitment to the ideal of progress. In practice, however,
it proved to be unco-ordinated and influenced by external
sources; before long it broke up into small groups.3
Q
Ra d-i Imruz first attacked the Court and civil service,
a criticism that could have opened the way to the undermining
of the monarchy and stronger Communist influence. It therefore
moved to the more radical action of vilifying the Tudeh Party:
it was declared to be atheist, and its members traitors and
c —
anti-nationalists. Ra d-i Imruz was subsequently replaced by
Vazifa.
Sayyid Ziya's political activity began with the founding
of the Hizb-i Vatan, which was re-organised into the Halqa
• • •
party in mid-1944. The Halqa system formed the basis of Hizb-
• •
i Irada-yi Milli's organisation, which resembled in some ways
a secret society: members of each of the ten halqas were
responsible only to their 'circle-leader', who in turn was one
of a group of 9 responsible to a group leader. Each member
was addressed only by his rank and number." This system
developed into the Hizb-i Irada-yi Mill! following the 1944 oil
1. Elwell-Sutton, op. cit., p.52.
2. Ibid,, p.52. Machalski, op. cit., p.158.
3. Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli, 2nd edn. 1945, p.40.




Hizb-i Vatan and the succeeding Irada-yi Milli were
formed by nationalist conservative elements to counteract the
activity and influence of the Tudeh and the Hizb-i Mardum.
Irada-yi Milli, supported by the British, parried the Tudeh's
attacks on the West by criticising the Soviet Union, and
accusing the Tudeh of being a tool of the Soviet government.
The Irada-yi Milli itself, however, was too closely associated
with Britain and with the Court, too conservative in ideology,
and too traditional in constitution to be sufficiently innovative
or flexible in the circumstances. This difficulty could not be
overcome even by the election of Sayyid Ziya to the 14th
Majlis from the British zone of occupation, together with the
support of a number of Majlis deputies and members of the old
oligarchy. With the co-operation of the police, members of the
party organised assaults upon Tudeh clubs and upon trade
unions, killing active left-wing agents, and at the same time
disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda.2
The Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli was the largest and most active
among the conservative parties. It had branches all over Iran,
including the Northern provinces where Vatan had formerly had
much influence. The President of its Central Committee was
Riza Quli Hidayat; Vice Presidents cAli Asghar Firuz, Husayn
Kashif and Firuzan. Sayyid Ziya was a Secretary, along with
Sadiq Sarmadi, editor of Nida-yi Iran, and Pasargad, editor
of Xliursliid-i Iran. In spite of its parallel position on the
right to the left-wing Tudeh, and despite its strong support
from the West, the Iranian Court, and its own organisation and
propaganda, the Irada-yi Milll lasted no longer than two years,
and was dissolved by Qavam in 1945. Sayyid Ziya was
imprisoned, and although he was released after the 15th Majlis
1. iWery, Modern Iran, N.Y. Praeger 1965, p.362.
2. Machalski, op. cit., p.157.
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elections, he was unable to revive the party. A number of its
members, however, adopted other labels, and continued their
support of the Court. One of the major reasons for the party's
dissolution came from Sayyid Ziya's inability to establish
himself as the champion of nationalism: he was regarded by
many as an arch-traitor and an instrument of British
imperialism. In 1920-1, as editor of Ra d, the British
ambassador in Teheran described Sayyid Ziya as a notorious
anglophile.1 Iranians also saw Sayyid Ziya as instrumental in
bringing Riza Khan to power in the coup of 1921. On his return
to Iran from Palestine, he was therefore immediately suspected
of working again with his old ally, a suspicion that was in
fact well-founded. The American ambassador reported to
Washington that Sayyid Ziya was encouraged by the British,
who also persuaded the Shah not to oppose him or his political
activity.2 Furthermore, Sayyid Ziya failed to make of his
party the sole defence against Communism, for he had rival
parties - CAdalat, Qavam's Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran, and the
court, with its military supporters. Sayyid Ziya also
compromised the party to a certain extent by pledging different
things to different classes, particularly over land distribution
between landowners and peasants, promises which in the long
term he was unable to fulfil. The right-wing policies of the
party did not have wide appeal to the Iranian public as a
whole, a public that had only recently been released from the
oppression of Riia Shah's rule. Dr. Musaddiq pointed out on
March 8, 1944, in the 14th Majlis: "The present regime in Iran
is not really one of freedom for the simple reason that it takes
a long time for a nation to recover morally from the effects of
a prolonged period of dictatorship. It is for the deputies to
help and lead the people. Sayyid Ziya can only work when he
can close the Majlis and silence the press."3
1. Letter front Norman and Curzon, Mar. 18, 1921, Documents of British Foreign Policy
1919-39, Oxford, OUP 1943, vol.13, p.745.
2. Foreign Relations, vol.IV, 1943, p.389.
3. Parliamentary Procedures Mar. 8, 1944.
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Several points can be drawn from the limited success of
the Hizb-i Irada-yi Milll in respect of its appeal and its
structure. We have remarked that its strong pro-British leaning
was, although clearly in counter-balance to the Soviet
influence, a stumbling block to its wide acceptance. Cottam has
observed that in fact, while the Hizb-i Irada-yi Mill! and the
Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran resembled each other closely in each of
•
the criteria of typology, there was a substantial difference in
degree of perceived attachment regarding their relations with
the British among the Iranian public.1 Thus Qavam was
believed to be 'close' to the British as most aristocratic
politicians were. Sayyid Ziya, however, was believed to be at
least as close to the British as the Soviets were the the Tudeh.
Among the new intellectual class, which now formed the most
politically aware group within the country, and were therefore
a major source for appeal to recruitment, several different
view-points existed regarding the best foreign policy for Iran.
The Irada-yi Milli inevitably limited its appeal to this group
by adopting an extreme pro-British stance, for others felt that
ties with the USSR could equally well be made, others again
that Iran's dignity could only be restored through the
restoration of lost territories; the majority of the new
intellectuals rejected any close association with a foreign
power, (although accepting Iran's boundaries as essentially
unalterable).2
Secondly, it was becoming clear in this period (1941-6)
that the earlier broad appeal was less effective in mobilising
the politically aware than a narrow ideology. In this respect,
the party can be compared with the European Fascist movement
of the 1930s, for it combined a backward-looking ideology with
a modern organisation, and at the same time was militantly
anti-Communist, appealing to nationalist and socialist
1. Cottam, op. cit., pp.86-7.
2. Ibid., pp.87-8.
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sympathies. It extolled traditional values, while still
exploiting any form of discontent open to it, not hesitating to
use violence against its chief opponents.1 This resemblance to
fascism was noted by the American technical advisor
Millspaugh, who was indebted to Sayyid Ziya for supporting
him in the Majlis yet who nevertheless considered the Irada-yi
Mill! as tending towards fascism.2
The Hizb-i Milli finally disintegrated under the dual
factors of Sayyid Ziya's personality and its general lack of
ground support. It was not a party that was truly an
outgrowth of public Iranian sentiment, but rather an artificial
and imposed ideology, that, together with its violent measures,
prevented its widespread and genuine acceptance within Iranian
political life.
Programme of the Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli:
1. The defence of the political and economic independence of
Iran and the Iranian constitution.
2. Freedom and equality for all citizens.
3. The raising of the living standard of all citizens, and
combatting misery and poverty by founding houses and
workshops for the destitute and impoverished.
4. Reform in instruction and education, religious tolerance,
equal rights for women.
5. Support of family life by imposing, among other things,
a tax on bachelors, and encouraging young couples to
start families.
6. Reform of the law of inheritance.
7. Reform of the act on public functionaries, directed
towards making the administrative apparatus more
effective.
1. $brah4mian, op. cit., The Social Basis of Iranian Politics, p.131.
2. Millspaugh, op. cit., p.78.
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8. Reform of the administration of justice by respecting the
independence of the courts and their dependence upon
Constitutional Law.
9. Agricultural reform through the distribution of public
estates among the peasants; revision of the relations
between landowners and tenants; supplying untilled land
with water; founding a Bank of Agriculture.
10. Reform of public health care, with a prohibition on opium-
smoking and cultivation of poppies; high tax on alcoholic
beverages; support of sport; building of hospitals; advice
on hygiene etc.
11. Educational reform: compulsory universal schooling; adult
evening classes; freedom in education for ethnic
minorities; the creation of an independent Advanced
Board of Science.
12 & Industrial activity, with research into new mineral
13. riches; establishment of heavy industry and hydro-electric
plants; support of private enterprise, with regard to
worker-employer relations, based on generally accepted
principles; compulsory insurance for factory workers;
prohibition of child labour below the age of 12; creation
of a Ministry of Labour.
14. The creation of a merchant navy; elimination of state
monopoly; increase in exports.
15- Reform of taxes; tax relief for new factories and
companies; revision of the public budget; cessation of the
employment of foreigners in public offices without
parliamentary approval.
16. Reform of police, army and gendarmerie through the
amelioration of living conditions, the ending of
conscription in national service; the creation of a
voluntary army; separation of the army and gendarmerie.
17. Communications reform - building new roads and railway
lines.
18. Constructing telegraph and telephone lines, provincial
radio stations, and airways; abolition of postal
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censorship, etc.
19. Defence of Iran's external independence; permanent
neutrality; maintaining good relations with all states, in
particular the USSR, US and Britain.
20. Opposition to dictatorship of any kind.
21. Additions to this programme were only to be considered
by the party Congress or on a motion from at least one
third of the party members.
22. Ways and means of adherence to these principles, and
preparation of detailed programmes to achieve the aims
set out in the above 20 sections were to be the task of
the technical sections of the party in Teheran and the
provinces. These should be presented to the Majlis by
party representatives, and put into practice after their
ratification.
Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran:
Dimukrat-i Iran was a party created by Ahmad Qavam in
194-6, when he was Prime Minister of Iran. It took form as a
direct counter-balance to Tudeh influence within the Majlis
itself, for Qavam felt his position threatened by the presence
of seven Tudeh cabinet members, especially in view of
approaching elections. Ideally, Qavam needed a strong
oppositon party in government,1 something which the Iranian
political system lacked, despite her Constitutional basis. Thus
he announced over the state radio on June 29th the creation of
the Hizb—i Dimukrat to contest the election in opposition to the
Tudeh, hoping thereby to weaken it.2 This step further
accentuated the divisions existing between the Shah and the
left, as Qavam indicated to each his intention of bringing
about the downfall of the other. Using ex-Tudeh agitators, such
as cAlf Umld for example, to help organise the Dimukrat-i
1. Dimukrat-i Iran, J'an. 3, 1947.
2. Ibid. Oct. 24, 1946, Supplm. ed. p.2.
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Iran, Qavam established a strong coalition of landowners and
higher officials who represented the interests of the bourgeoisie
and defined the feudal system. The party thus represented the
old aristocracy who sought revenge against Riba Shah for
ousting them from power, and the newer middle-class created
by Riza Shah.; both elements were present in the first Central
Committee of July 10, 1946.
The limited range of classes within the Hizb-i Dimukrat
accounts to some extent for the rather indeterminate programme
of the party, divided into 11 articles:1
Art. 1: The party was pledged to the independence, integrity and
and sovereignty of Iran.
Art. 2: Political and economic freedom according to democratic
principles within Iran.
Art.3: Agrarian reforms to help the country's economy,
principally through improving the living standards of
rural workers and farmers, and by improving relations
between landowners and peasants.
Art.4: Private property was to be distributed justly.
Art. 5: Revenue to be raised according to the workers'
financial capabilities.
Art. 6: Exports to be increased following reforms in industry
and agriculture.
Art. 7: The legal and administrative system was to be
completely revised throughout the country.
Art.8: The Health Service to encompass a universal system of
health education and peripatetic clinics; education
reforms were to follow a similar pattern.
Art. 9: Ministries of Reform, Work and Propaganda to be
established.
Art. 10: Improvement of security through strengthening the
army, police and gendarmerie, both for internal
1. Dimukrat-i Iran Oct. 24, 1946.
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stability and to maintain Iran's territorial integrity.
Art, 11: Reform of inland communication systems.
There was, however, one serious setback. The programme
called for complete equality of franchise, but this was opposed
by the popular Ayatullah Kasharii. The party tried in vain to
find an equally impressive religious leader to advocate its own
point of view,1 but it lost considerable support over this
issue.
Problematic, too, was the Hizb-i Dimukrat's support from
the bazaar, exemplified by three figures - Abu al-Husayn
Mirzada* a religious sayyid, Dr. Baqa'I, a European-educated
lawyer, and Husayn Makkl. the historian, all of whom were
friendly with Kashani. The party's link with the bazar was
destroyed when the Hizb-i Dimukrat was 'secularised' following
the expulsion of Ha'irizada from the Central Committee.
The initial development of the Hizb-i Dimukrat, until its
coalition with the Tudeh (together with the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-
i Azarbaijan, Hizb-i Iran, Iran-i Ma, and Hizb-i Susyalist) on
August 1, 194-6 (when it achieved true party status) followed
one among several options. The party could have consolidated
its position among the aristocracy, by adding the new
aristocratic class to the old pre-Shah upper classes. It could
have made further inroads among the intellectual and middle-
classes. Or it could have assumed the role which the Tudeh
had fulfilled among the urban working class. In fact, the Hizb-
i Dimukrat ventured into all three areas, as part of its ploy
of setting different classes against one another.
The party appealed to the middle-classes in various
ways: a great deal of work was done amongst youth groups,
so that the party's constituency was to be found within the
1. Farhang, op. cit., Mar 28, 1948.
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secondary schools; a women's organisation flourished, since
many Iranian women were dissatisfied with their position.
Support also came from the professional classes, with successes
among the engineering, industrial management and technocratic
classes, who, similar to the upper classes, were unhappy with
the heavy pressure of the Tudeh.1 The working class
represented a very hazardous area of appeal. Since Qavam was
trying to keep peace with the Tudeh in order to convince them
of his support, he dared not encroach upon their main field of
activity - the working classes. The solution to this dilemma
was the coalition of the Dimukrat and the Tudeh and its
controlling council of United Trades Unions. It was a very
fragile alliance, for the hard-liners who opposed the Court
clashed with those urging compromise with the Shah, and there
was a split between those who favoured supporting British
interests and those, including Qavam himself, who favoured the
US, within the Dimukrat.
The party was further weakened through the break up of
the 'marriage of convenience' between basically incompatible
factions: the intelligentsia opposed to the aristocracy,
landowners set against salaried workers, conservatives clashing
with radicals. One right-wing radical intellectual wrote that
Qavam was a multi-millionaire in control of property the size
of Belgium, who was merely trying to deceive the discontented
by pledging his support to them against capital feudalists.2
Following the collapse of this cabinet coalition, labour
policy changed dramatically. The previously inactive Minister of
Labour and Information, Muzaffar Firuz, set up a workers'
organisation for non-Communist wage earners, which stripped the
Tudeh of its major asset - the working class.3 The Dimukrat-i Iran then
1. Anon., Khatirat-i Qavam, Khwandaniha, Sept. 28, 1955.
2. F. C A1a Karim Allah, Shahr-i Dimukrat, Teheran 1946, p.7.
3. Khwandaniha, Apr. 24, 1948.
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implemented Qavam's labour law of 1946, by negotiating higher
wages from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the Soviet-
operated fisheries, and by creating a syndicate of Iranian
workers, run by leading anti-Communists. After the collapse of
the Azerbaijan national government, the Tudeh's only ally was
the CCUTU, which managed to retain its power and remained a
major political force, which Qavam was determined to break.
Its General Secretary was thus arrested, its paper' banned, its
organisers detained, and the headquarters and party buildings
occupied by the army. This represented the Dimukrat's most
important strategic success. Its determination to break the
influence of the Tudeh was in the long run, however, its
downfall, for its members gradually became disaffected with its
operations against the Tudeh and, group by group, left, many
in fact joining the Tudeh.1 Qavam's concern for the security
of the left also gave cause for concern to conservative Iranian
pro-Western opinion, which believed that by controlling the
15th Majlis, he would sacrifice Iran's resources, beliefs that
were, in fact, unfounded.
The failure of the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran highlights its
three major problems. The working masses were not universally
aware politically, and it was therefore a very difficult and
painstakingly slow task to mobilise them into action. Secondly,
the only way to gain the support of the new intellectuals was
to develop a very narrow ideology. Lastly, the brutality of the
measures used against the Tudeh caused such demoralisation
amongst the party's membership that it is clear that violent
means were of very limited effectiveness.3
The Hizb-i Dimukrat was essentially an elitist party, not
1. ?afar 401, 28th Aban 1325 (19th Nov. 1946).
2. Assisted by Sayyid Ziya and the gendarmerie, Zaf ar 385, 3rd Aban 1325, 25th Oct.
1946.
3. Zafar 401, 28th Aban 1325 (19th Nov. 1946).
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rooted in the masses; its rapid rise to power was due to
support from the army and police. Thus, with Qavam's
resignation as Prime Minister, his party dissolved too. Its
members, realising that the Hizb-i Dimukrat was similar in




The Adalat traces its origins back as far as 194-1, when
the association of "patriots, honest, and unselfish people" first
came into existence, and it became one of the largest and most
popular parties in Iran. The party's constitution was formed
on the disintegration of the Iran National Party: the new party
order favoured an American alliance.
The leader of cAdalat was CA1T .Dashti. Dashti appeared
initially to support the reforming programme of Ri'za Shah- This
support gradually disipated, however, and following Riza
Shah s abdication, Dashti was in fact a bitter and vociferous
critic of the monarchy over such issues as the crown lands, a
court party or military control. It was also led at different
times by Jamal lmami» a French-educated civil servant, SiphihrT,
the director of Teheran radio, and various other deputies.
c —
Hizb—i Adalat found itself with a lack of credibility
after its formation. Its liberal stance was ridiculed and a
popular joke at the time made a play on DashtT's name: his
Q
initials were Ayn Dal, and the word alat meant 'tool', and
the pun suggested that DashtT ruled the party personally.
Nevertheless, the party had two strong allies. Factory
managers in Teheran set up trade unions which supported Hizb-
c
i Adalat; and the party was reputedly linked to the secret
paramilitary group, the National Movement, led by General
"Arya. Although c Adalat was predominantly composed of senior
civil service and older professional men, its programme was so
- 104 -
constructed as to appeal to a far wider audience. Its first aim
was to oppose dictatorship, either individual or collective, and
place control of public affairs purely in the hands of the trade
unions. Its second intention was to promote personal freedom,
freedom of the press, industry and commerce, and freedom
before the law, so that all inequalities would be abolished.
This entailed assigning all production to nationalised industry:
the government would deal only with social policy, and
political and administrative control. Agriculture was to be
strengthened through setting up water installations,
distributing seed-corn, and improving health facilities;
education and administration were also to be reformed.1
Q
A clear demonstration of Adalat's limited success in the
14-th Majlis can be seen in the fact that despite the help of
Prime Minister Suhaylf, and the Minister of the Interior, the
party could only manage to win 11 seats. The impact of the
party was in any case limited within the Majlis, which tended
to be divided into fraksiyuns, rather than along party lines.
Q —
Outside the Majlis, however, Adalat thrived, and became
financially independent. Thus its seats were linked to the
structure of the parliamentary bureaucracy, its working support
came from union members in the factories, and its white-collar
elements were drawn from the ranks of senior civil servants.2
At the party's zenith, Imami and his brother were both
directors of the Bank of Iran; Khwajanuri worked in the Office
of Propaganda. Many party workers wore the letter Ayn
proudly on their clothing. This support, however, rapidly
Q _
declined when Adalat lost its grasp on important posts. It
finally disintegrated completely with Qavam's creation of the
Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran. Its leaders disappeared in different
directions: Dashtl to Europe, Imami to prison, Khwajanuri
1. Cf. Manam-i Ma, in Bahrain, 22nd Aban, 1322 (14 Nov. 1943, no.10).
2. 4)brah4juian„ op. cit., p.120.
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defected to Qavam, while the unions were dissolved, and its
provincial branches collapsed.1
Hizb-i Umidvar:
Umldvar was formed in 1942 of a central nucleus of 11 men, all
highly educated and many in influential positions. Its leader
was CAli Akbar Tabriz!, a strongly pro-democratic and anti-
dictatorship figure. In 1939, at the beginning of the War,
Tabrizi supported the Allied powers. When the Allied forces
entered Iran, however, Tabrizi became suspicious of the
British. These fears later disappeared, and he again put
forward to any who would listen, persuasive arguments in
favour of the Allied cause. As with Sayyid Ziya's pro-British
policy, this attitude gained Umldvar little support. Patriotic
Iranians refused to join, although the party fought on a
nationalist platform, as shown by its aims: These include the
protection of Iranian interests and freedom by encouraging
patriotic direction and the pursuit of justice, interpreted both
morally and religiously. The party insisted on a forward-
looking policy of struggle against foreign intervention, and
misleading propaganda, treason, injustice and dishonest
officialdom.2
The tactical programme included private and public
meetings and the distribution of propaganda under what
amounted to seige conditions. The party hoped for police
recognition and planned what assistance an protection they
would ultimately require,3 while planning the ultimate policy.
The history and development of the Hizb-i Umidvar is
hidden in mystery, since there is little extant material
1. Khwandaniha, July 6, 1946.
2. Memorandum by Kasma'i, Journale de Teberan, 3rd May, 1943.
3. Ibid.
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available. From the scanty information, however, it certainly
seems likely that the party was crushed by the hostility of an
oppressive government, and reaction against its support of
Britain.
There were also, apart from the above true parties, a
number of what should properly be defined as fractions, or
small discussion groups, although some called themselves
parties. These were very short-lived and of minor influence,
and we thus have little extant information about them. Most of
them lasted only a few months before they dissolved and
amalgamated with other relatively larger parties, and played
a very insignificant role within the Iranian political system
between 1941-7. They included parties covering the whole
political spectrum, but since their programmes resemble those
of the organised parties, we shall not find the need to repeat
them here. Our main aim in this section is merely to include
a brief outline of all parties and groups in order to present
a total picture of the political activity in Iran during this
period.
The Hizb-i Istiqlal was one of the parties that put
forward a more carefully planned programme.1 As its name
indicates, Istiqlal sought to defend the sovereign independence
of Iran. Its leader, cAbd al-Qadir Azad, gave his name (which
means 'free') to the party organ; he himself was forced to flee
Teheran in the December Revolution of 1942. Istiqlal's main
opponent was Sayyid Ziya, with whom it clashed because of his
dictatorial tendencies. Its membership numbered around 150.2
Hizb-i Dihqan was founded in May 1942. It had a firmly
religious focus, although it concentrated its political attention
1. IClamiyya-yi Hizb-i Istiqlal, 26th Mihr, 1325 (18th Oct., 1946).
2. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
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upon the vital nature of Iran's agricultural potential.1
Early in the same year, the Hizb-i Khalq was set up
under Furuz'ish, who was in the Ministry of Justice and who
edited Najat-i Iran. This was a left-wing party, but it had a
very limited activity, and centred its policy on an independent
and sovereign Iran, protecting the country against
foreigners, and developing a welfare state for its citizens.2
A very similar party was the Hizb-i Najat-i-Mihan, led
by Pasargad, who also edited its paper, Khurshid-i Iran. Najat-
i-Mihan primarily arose as a consequence of left-wing parties
with which Pasargad and his colleagues were disaffected.3
Other parties established in this year (1942) included the
Kargaran, the Mardan-i-Kar (led by Ibrahim!), and the Jabha-
yi Azadi, which amalgamated with the Tudeh.*
kUcLr
The Hizb-i Yaran was founded and led by C Abbas HuHaH
and cAli Javahir Kalam, who edited Iqdam* Iqdam was replaced
in 1945 by the weekly paper "Hur".s The party's membership
was drawn mainly from the bazaar. Its policy was vague,
though it did look toward the unification of patriotic Iranians;
its class policy was never fully worked through. Hizb-i Yaran
failed to spread through the country, and played no really
important part either in internal or foreign policy.®
Finally came the creation of the Hizb-i Kar in 1944, under
the control of NafTsT, The main article in the party's
1. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
2. Ibid.
3. Machalski, op. cit., p.161.
4. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
5. Machalski, op. cit., p.150.
6. Elwell-Sutton, op. cit.
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programme stated that the primary duty of the party was to
improve workers' conditions in order to create a unified front.
Its weekly paper, Pand,1 published the party's policies, but
the Hizb-i Kar contributed little on the Iranian political
scene.
The focus of all these minor parties was almost
exclusively upon Teheran. Although a few branches were set up
in other major cities, these were virtually ineffective.
Furthermore, although their appeal should have been universal,
they found their support mainly among the educated upper and
middle classes. Thus they tended to turn rather into limited
'interest groups', with no attraction for the working class. The
conditions of membership were unvarying and the same as all
parties or groups: Iranian citizenship, over the age of 18,
with no criminal record.
In addition to these minor political parties, small groups
and associations mushroomed rapidly in this period. One of the
more important of these was the Kirmanshahiyan which was
about 600 strong and possessed its own paper, the Tran-i
Tawan.3
The Qumlha was popularly supposed to have been formed
specifically for election purposes: it was certainly supported
by Sayyid ZiyH
The Shimal-i Gharb had around £000 members, the
majority religious, who were notorious as trouble-makers.
Another group set up for the election was Janub-i Gharbi.
Others were linked with particular regions: Azarbayjan, a 2000
strong union supported the interests of that province; Sava'Iha,
1. Pand 1-5, 1944.
2. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
3. Ibid.
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supported the Sava district; the Qazvinis, the Najat-i Milli;
the Guruh-i Dihqan; the engineers', teachers' and trades'
unions; the Azar group of college graduates under Dr. Shafaq;
the Landlords Society of the North; the Guruh-i Shamshir,
whose paper was Ittila C at-i Iran; the Paymaniyan Party,
which supported the religious beliefs of its leader, Sayyid
Ahmad Kasravi, . the Kumlta-yi Intikhabat of 2000 members; the
Kumita-yi Intikhabi-yi Milli; the Iltihad; the Nahzat-i Milli;
the Islam Society; and the Gulpayiganis from that city.
As with the larger parties, none of these small groups
had the organisation or support to wield much influence, and
they tended to dissolve into mere united-interest groups.
Conclusions:
Iranian society is politically speaking of a very delicate
nature, consisting as it does of widely differing class
interests: workers, intellectuals, capitalists all compete for
power and influence. As the public grew in political
awareness, so the party system and structure developed, and
three stages can be discerned which correspond to the
percentage of the politically aware.1 The first limited the
parties to mere outgrowths of traditional oligarchal patterns,
slightly more structured, and with an explicit ideology focusing
broadly on nationalism and liberal democracy. The second
stage, following Riza Shah' s abdication saw the narrowing of
ideological appeal in order to attract and mobilise the new
intellectual element. The third stage, while out of our brief
(1950-3) was one in which party activity was able to enlist the
participation of virtually the entire politically aware
population.2
1. Cottam, op. cit., p.93; and the article in general for much of this discussion.
2. Ibid., pp.93-4.
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The main area of activity was always around Teheran,
where the most powerful figures were to be found. The numbers
of parties fluctuated quite considerably - it increased
dramatically during the approach to elections - and there was
a prevalent belief that all confusions would disappear when the
class-struggle began in earnest.1 The failure of most of the
parties was due, however, to the irreconcilable differences
between the party leaderships and the audience which they
were attempting to reach. Many leaders were self-seeking
careerists, striving to maintain the existing power-struggle and
consolidate their individual positions within it. The radical
public, on the other hand, wished to break that same system,
and thus gave them little support. The general tendency was
towards strong and charismatic leaders, like Qavam or Sayyid
2iya, to rally the various elements of society in times of
danger or threat from outside and inside Iran; but internal
conflicts nearly always destroyed the parties and rendered them
powerless.2
During the period 1941-7, the elements of the successful
ideological appeal were becoming clear. An essential feature
was an intense devotion to the goal of a truly independent
Iran with a dignity consonant with Iran's great past. They
included, also, an acceptance of modernisation and achievement
of values which called for rapid social and economic change,
meaning reforms within the administrative and judicial systems,
agriculture, health care, education, working conditions and
relations, and cultural liberalisation. Within these areas of
general agreement, there was a wide range of viewpoints.3 We
can thus distinguish three main types of political party.
The first1* consisted of those established by the ruling
1. Elwell-Sutton, private notes.
2. AbrihAroian. op. cit., p.123.
3. Cottam, op. cit., pp.87-8.
4. Salnama-yi Mihanparastan, Teheran 1944, pp.25-6.
- Ill -
class, whose membership was drawn from merchants, landowners
and government officials. They promoted the interests of the
ruling class, by whom they were financed. Such parties exist
world-wide, and when one is eclipsed, another soon re-appears
to maintain class control. Sayyid Ziya's Irada-yi Mill! provides
a good Iranian example.
The second were nationalist parties, whose members were
highly patriotic, educated and enthusiastic, and whose aim was
to dismantle ruling class power and initiate internal reform in
both the social and economic spheres. They believed deeply in
welfare for all Iranians, and held national history and
cultural achievements in high regard, working towards the
establishment of democratic government within Iran.1 Hizb-i
Milli provides a good Iranian example.
The third were formed from those who supported a
democratic national government, believing in welfare and equal
opportunities for all citizens. Although this type of
party tended to rely ultimately upon the Iranian
people, yet they looked too towards external support
of either a moral or material nature. They did not, by
so doing, compromise their passionate patriotism and nationalist
aims, but wished to learn from foreign ideological programmes,
and to derive help from their parties in times of internal
crisis.2
Among the parties of the extreme left, most advocated
thorough-going socialist policies. These, such as the Tudeh and
the Hizb-i Hamrahan, supported the peasant, agricultural and
industrial classes, promoting the cause of the class-struggle.
It appears that only the Tudeh had any significant or long-
lasting influence on Iranian politics or social life. Most, in
contrast to the Tudeh, had a limited appeal within Teheran
1. Salnama-yi Mihanparastan, op. cit., p.26.
2. Ibid., p.27.
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itself. The small parties proposed attractive and impressive
programmes, but their leaders (often simultaneously both focus
and catalyst) lacked the necessary strength of character to
procure parliamentary seats for their members. They also
suffered from considerable financial corruption, which in turn
resulted in grave inefficiency.
The party system was characterised rather by quarrels
of a sporadic and spontaneous nature than protracted
ideological struggles. This limitation of the party political
life was matched by a corresponding lack of constitutional
parliamentary life. The only serious attempt to alter this
situation came during the 1906-11 Persian revolution, but this
made no lasting impression, and its democratic rule was
effectively stifled. After the fall of Riza Shah's dictatorship in
194-1, the political system fragmented completely, and the newly-
found, and highly delicate tools of parliamentary politics
failed to lead the Iranian people to a common goal as they
ought to have done. Government attitude to the parties was at
best indifferent, and most often hostile; collaborators of the
reforming movements were frequently arrested at demonstrations,
and the older, conservative elements within the government
disrupted the progress of such parties with any means at their
disposal.
A successful party required the support of both internal
and external elements; the latter most often was found either
in Britain or the Soviet Union. If internal support alone was
achieved - such as with the Hizb-i Millat - a party could
count only on a precarious future, for it risked foreign
intervention if its policies were not in the interests of an
outside power. If, on the other hand, a party received support
solely from external sources, as with the Irada-yi Mill!, it too
could count only on a limited future. The Tudeh remains the
single highly-organised and partially influential party within
Iran today because of its dual support. Yet it, too, could not
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capture general support within the country and its hold is thus
limited. This is due in some part also to the propaganda
thrown against it from various sources, including, of course,
Muhammad Ri'za Shah, who accused it of treason because of its
Communist basis and link with the USSR. We shall examine the
Tudeh Party in detail in the following chapter, but it is clear
here, that despite receiving moral and ideological aid from
the Soviet Union, the Tudeh was not an instrument of the





(1) THE ORIGIN OF THE TUDEH PARTY
Within the Iranian political system during the period 1941-
47 there existed a number of left-wing parties which exhibited
a varied range of Socialist leanings. The Tudeh Party, as the
largest, most influential and long-lived indeed of all the
political parties, was the sole true and full-fledged Communist
grouping. Its proclaimed ideology was Marxist-Leninist, not
Socialist, and statements of this fact by the hostile cental
government were not refuted by the Tudeh Party.
This situation has led the majority of observers of this
period of Iranian history, both ignorant and informed, to
assume the total dependence of the Tudeh Party upon the Soviet
Union. The organisation of the USSR on Marxist-Leninist lines
and its proximity to, and interest in, Iran prompted the natural,
but mistaken, idea that the Tudeh Party was nothing but a
Soviet creation or a Soviet puppet.1
This presupposition can clearly be refuted with the
recognition that Communism was not simply an ideology wholly
imported from the Soviet Union but had long-standing precedents
in Iran going back as far as the political aspects of the
teachings of Mani2 from 242 onwards and the ideology of
Mazdak3 a century later.
The history of Iran has been punctuated by egalitarian
1. Sayr-i Kununist Par Iran, Govt. Publication, 1959.
2. K. Kishavarz, Tarikh-i Iran, 1975, p.85.
3. F.M. Javanshir, Hamasa-yi Dad, Teheran 1980, pp.191-215.
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peasant uprisings, and while it would be difficult to show that
the Tudeh Party was a natural outgrowth of such movements,
it is clear that it would have made no progress in Iran if it
had not found many who were predisposed to give a favourable
reception to its ideas. Its beginnings can perhaps be traced
back to 1880, when an article on scientific socialism reprinted
from a Turkish paper was published in Iran,1 together with an
editorial comment, while a year later Farhang in Isfahan
published a series of articles by the Iranian political
philosopher, Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (Afghani), considered the
pioneer in the spreading of reforming ideas in Iran.2
At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, much
socialist influence was being gained from the Russian based
Social Democratic movement throughout Iranian socialist circles.
The Tudeh was at its inception party to this reception, not as
is commonly assumed as a dependent grouping, but rather as
an independent localised Communist party within Iran. The
more secure footing of the Social Democratic movement in Russia
made it the natural mutual ally of the tentative Iranian
parties. Thus we shall begin our discussion of the origin of the
Tudeh Party with an analysis of its initial connection with the
Social Democratic party, and follow it afterwards with that of
Q
the Hizb-i- Adalat and the Persian Communist Party (PCP).
c — c —
Social Democratic Party (Ijtima iyyun-i Ammiyun)
The most important character concerned with the SDP was
Haydar Khan.3 He was born of a radical family and was
influenced early on by Narimanov, founder of the Social
Democrats in Baku. Haydar Khan was given the task of setting
1. Iran, 202, 1259 (1880); Hizb-i Kurounist Par Cha Sharayit-i Tarikhi Tashkil Shud,
Nama-yi Mardum, 265, 2nd Tir, 1359, Teheran, p.3.
2. G.fi. Sabri-Tabrizi, Zindigani va Afkar-i Sayyid Janial al-Din Asadabadi (.Afghani),
unpub. thesis, U. of Tabriz, 1958.
3. SheikhoTeslarai & Wilson: "Memoirs of Haydar Khan, Amu Ughlu', Iranian Studies,
vol.VI, no.l, 1973 , passim.
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up an electrical plant in Mashhad. While in Mashhad, he was
advised by Russian social democrats to establish a political
grouping. However1 he failed to achieve this because of the
ignorance of socialist ideas amongst the population. As the
factory venture proved unsuccessful he moved to Tehran, where
his ideas did attract a certain following, even amongst the
clergy.
At this time, the Social Democratic party in Baku2 spread
its influence throughout the Caucasus; after the Persian
Revolution, it also seized the opportunity to spread into Iran
initially through the exchange of ideas with Persian
revolutionaries. The ultimate transfer of the party into Iran
was the task entrusted to Haydar Khan.
Advice was given by the Baku organisation to the
Markaz-i Ghaybi (Secret Centre), a- 1-2 man group of middle-
class radicals in Tabriz, who knew the Caucasus, and
assistance was also given to the Kumita-yi Sitara (Star
Committee) of three Armenians, and four other constitutionalists
■in Rasht and to Bahar and his intellectual group in Mashhad.
The leader of the Kumita-yi Barq (Committee of Light) was
Yefrem Khan, of the Armenian Dashnak party. By the end of the
Constitutional revolution in 1909, out of the secular parties,
the Social Democrats were second in strength only to the
Constitutionalists. According to Tarbiyat "... during the first
period of the Constitution, the only organised party was that
of the Social Democrats".3
1. Muntakhabat-i Khatirat-i Haydar Khan "Amm Ughlu", Yadigar, vol.13, Dec. 3, 1946,
pp.61-80.
2. Ettehadieh, M., The Origin of Political Parties in Iran, unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Edinburgh, 1979. For more details of the Social Democratic party in Baku, see:
Abrahimian, Social Basis of Iranian Political Parties: Tudeh Party 1941-53, Columbia
University, 1969.
3. E.G. Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia, C.U.P., 1914, p.26.
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The Social Democratic Party had branches in the four
Northern cities and several 'front' organisations, including the
Anjuman-i-Azarbayjan, in Tehran; the Mujahid (Fighter) in
Tabriz, and the Mujahidin (Fighters) in Mashhad. With a
strong party newspaper in Tabriz, the party gained a major
success in persuading 300 Armenian, Georgian and Russian
volunteers to guard Tabriz and collected a force of Caucasian
revolutionaries. Yefrem Khan, with the combined force of social
democrats and Dashnaks, liberated Rasht and with help from
the Bakhtiyar tribes, captured Tehran. The membership,
however was rather illusory since the party was small, weak
and ignorant of socialism: it rather advocated, in fact,
constitutionalism, secularism and parliamentary reform.1 On the
other hand, the programme of the Baku Social Democratic Party,
which was translated into Persian by Tabriz! radicals, was
more socialist - calling for land-ownership by farm-workers
and universal religious freedom.2
The Mujahidin merely stated that their programme was in
accordance with the principles of Islam, and in 1907 the
programme of the Mashhad group focused upon centralisation,
rather like that of the Bolshevik Party in Russia.
The radical element sought not a Marxist ideology:
instead they looked for Caucasian support for the constitution.
Haydar Khan rescued the party, when its 'raison d'etre'
seemed lost with the defeat of the Royalists in 1909- He was
supported by the radical Prince IskandarT, an ex-
constitutionalist, and Taqizada from Tabriz, both of whom were
wary of the label 'socialist' because of popular misconceptions
of the term.3
1. For details of the party programme see "Maramnama-yi Mujahidin—i Mashhad Sal-i 1907"
Dunya 2, Aut. 1962, pp.99-103.
2. /Ibrahijnian, op. cit., p.184.
3. Dunya 2 (an important document, concerning the Iranian Democratic Party), Summer
1966, pp.99-103.
- 118 -
Within parliament the party had 27 deputies.1 Outside
parliament, Haydar Khan was the organisation's leader. Haydar
* %
Khan probably avoided the Majlis because of his ignorance of
Persian and therefore the non-parliamentary group was more
daring in outlook.2 They attracted the opposition of the cUlama
by their radical newspaper 'Tran-i Naw' (New Iran) and by
their violent tactics (for instance, the murder of Ayat Allah
Bihbahan! in 1910, which sparked off a spate of assassinations).
After the Anglo-Russian invasion of 1911 the party was
weakened and its newspaper banned. Several socialists were
executed and many more fled. The Iranian movement split into
two streams following upon the Russian Revolution:
Parliamentary Reform and International Radicalism. The
Reformists were strongest in Parliament, the Radicals in the
Caucasian oil-fields. Haydar Khan meanwhile, was killed in
the struggle of the Gilan movement, which was partly
communist. After the first Russian Revolution, Iranian radicals
£
in Baku formed the separate Adalat (Justice) Party, which
ultimately became the Persian Communist Party.
Justice Party (tfizb-i-C Adalat)
The origins of the early cAdalat Party3 are to be found
in the social conditions obtaining in Iran in this period. The
peasants of the countryside were oppressed by tyrannical
landowners and lived in abject hunger and poverty. In
reaction against the harsh measures employed by the
landowners, together with the chance of employment, these
1. M. Malikzada, Inqilab-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran, Vol.5, 1954, p.133.
2. ^brah^mian, Social Basis of Iranian Politics: Tuden Party 1941-53, Columbia, 1962.
For list of party deputies, see Kavah, July 1st, 1918.
3. Not to be confused with the party of the same name of 1943, which had completely
different aims and a programme organised along class struggle and anti-fascist lines.
The later party was totally independent of this original group. Cf. Azhir yr.l, 39,
July 19, 1943.
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peasants migrated across the near-by border into Russia,
a large number being attracted to Baku where the oil
refinery offered job opportunities. They were willing to stay,
despite Iranian consular pressure and the cold reception they
found, accepting low wages and poor conditions, because these
were, however unsatisfactory, still more promising than the
situation that faced them in Iran.1
Several factors were responsible for the pull towards
communism which attracted the Iranian workers in Baku. Their
strong sense of exploitation by the local landowners contrasted
sharply with the principle of equality operating within the
socialist party. The socialist party in Baku exerted a large
amount of influence itself - under the leadership of Narimanov
and the sentiments expressed by the Russian Revolution, which
favoured the workers' cause2 also attracted them.
The Baku party encouraged such feelings, including the
revolutionary flames aroused in the workers by the 1905
Constitutional Revolution in Iran. Such patriotic and
revolutionary ideals compensated for the lack of education
among the Iranian workers and thus inspired - as well as
armed with weapons supplied in Russia - they returned to Iran
to join the already existing anti-government constitutional
groups. They were unable, however, to unite with the
Mujahidin for the latter were supported by the landowners, a
compromise which was unacceptable to the workers, fighting as
they were, on class lines. As a result of this internal conflict,
the zeal of the returning workers was dissipated: some were
killed, others abandoned their revolutionary ideals. The later
Q
Adalat party's membership formed around the dedicated core
who retained their fervour and enthusiasm for the revolutionary
cause. It should be noted that Iran was not ready at this
1. Azhir 40-45, July 20-25, 1943.
2. Ibid. 55, Aug. 19, 1943.
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point to accept or adopt communist principles, and the party
blossomed when this receptivity had increased and strengthened
within Iranian society.1
Q _
The first official meetings of the Adalat Party were held
in the Baku oil refinery following the collapse of the Tzarist
regime. During these meetings, the president - A-. Ghaffarzada
- was elected, and the constituent committees were formed. In
this initial period, the Iranian workers were the most active
members; they were anxious to prepare the ground for an
industrially efficient Iran, with a strong worker element, but
even more, were eager to grasp those principles of communism
with which to return to Iran and create within the country a
democratic form of government.2 This movement was due
to unfavourable social and political conditions within Iran.
The c Adalat was a true workers' party: its programme
and manifesto were adopted from the Social Democratic Party of
the Soviet Union, as were the methods employed by the latter
party. A Council of Iranian workers was soon formed within the
Social Democratic Party, its members numbering 50,000 by
1917 -3 It established contacts with sympathetic groups within
Iran itself, spreading propaganda throughout the country, so
that within a short period secret branches of the party had
sprung up, extending the party's influence from the Soviet
Union, over Iran, and linking up with groups such as the
Social Democratic party. Union between these two parties, however,
was not achieved, due to the divergent aims and ideas of both
Q —
groups: Adalat accused the Social Democrats of furthering the
interests of the bourgeoisie to which many of them belonged,
1. Azhir 46-50, July 26-30, 1943.
2. Ibid. 72, Oct. 21, 1943.
3. Ibid. 56, Aug. 22, 1943.
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and the Social Democrats responded by charging the workers with
interfering in the internal affairs of Russia in
supporting the Bolshevik Revolution.1
Q
The leading figure and most prominent member of Adalat
was Ghaffarzada, elected as president. Ghaffarzada was asked
in 1920 by the Soviet authorities 2 to return to Iran to
coordinate the work of the Gllan movement. His death at the
Qhands of opponents of the Adalat Party, before he was able
to begin his activity, had a dramatic effect on both the Gilan
movement and the c Adalat Party itself. It was responsible,
together with the formation of the Musavat Party in Baku,
under the leadership of Rasulzada. for the weakening of the
cAdalat party; Ghaffarzada was replaced by Pishavari.
The establishment of the cAdalat Party in GTlan, which
was supported by the Communist movement, was part of the way
communism was introduced into Iran. Its presence exhibited,
however, both positive and negative features. Although it
emphasised class equality and land redistribution, its actual
grasp of communist ideology was weak, it opposed other
ideologies,3 and the party was fragmented into communist and
non-communist elements, who quarrelled between themselves.*
During this period, the party changed its name to the Persian
Communist Party (PCP) and pledged support to the Soviet
Union.s
After the collapse of
1. Azhir 58, Aug. 26, 1943.
2. Ibid. 78, Nov. 7, 1943.
3. There was an alliance in the movement
the uneasy alliance between
between religious and communist elements.
4. Azhir 117, Feb. 13, Zabih, op. cit., p.22.
5. The First Congress was held in Anzali, June 1920. Zabih, op. cit.
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communists and non-communists in the Gllan movement in July
1920, a National Committee for the liberation of Persia was set
up, but its policies were deemed too radical for the present
state of the Iranian peasantry, and it was also seen at the
1920 Congress in Baku, organised by the Comintern, that the
Iranian delegates were primarily anti-British nationalists,
rather than committed communists. This led to a new thesis in
October 1920, at the election of a new Central Committee (of the
PCP), modifying the earlier anti-religious stance and the call
for action for immediate land confiscation. However, a united
front against Britain and the Central Government was effected
by May 1921 and a first attempt was made to extend the
party's influence beyond Gllan. On August 4, 1921, Gilan was
once again proclaimed a Soviet Republic, but the unity was
fragile and the entire movement soon collapsed.
The methods of the PCP now shifted towards the creation
of trade unions and peasant organisations and gradual
infiltration through education and propaganda. The most fertile
groups for the latter activity was found to be among Iranian
upper and middle class students studying in Germany, who
were exposed to European democracy. These students became the
core of anti Riza Shah sentiments and formed the backbone of
the communist opposition.2 Germany became the centre of these
activities, since the PCP' s movements were restricted in Iran
by the policies and legislation of Riza Shah's government. In
early 1929, the students started publication of their monthly
journal Sitara-yi Surkh (Red Star).3 Later in 1931 another
newspaper, Paykar (Battle)* was issued fortnightly, edited by
2. The Soviet Union and Iran, Soviet policy from the beginnings of the Pahlavi
dynasty until the Soviet invasion in 1941, Miron Rezun, Geneva, 1981, p.288.
3. M. Rezun, op. cit., p.288.
4. Ibid., p.289.
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M. CAlavi- The Iranian students, with the support of the local
German Communist Party, spread these publications throughout
Europe, even managing to smuggle copies into Iran.1 This fast
growing student movement was felt as a dangerous threat by
Riza Shah. He therefore requested the German government to
ban all such publications and prohibit further propaganda. At
the same time, he introduced a law forbidding similar
propagandising activity within Iran. The Germans acquiesced
to this somewhat reluctantly, wanting to maintain their
economic ties and good relations with Iran. Paykar was
Q
banned, and its editor, Alavi, expelled. Despite this, a new
publication was started, under the name Nahzat (Movement),
which shared the same fate as Paykar.2 In 1931, these students
having attracted mass support among fellow Iranians studying
in Germany, decided upon return to Iran encouraged and led
by Arani.3 There, as a consequence, the propaganda law was
passed by the Majlis in the same year and they were forced to
work underground. Secret discussion groups organised by Aran!
were formed from lower middle class elements, such as
students, teachers, lawyers, judges and trade union leaders
attracted through the communist publication Dunya, which was
strongly anti-fascist,* and sports and cultural clubs were used as
covers for these meetings. They were uncovered, however, in
1937, apparently through widespread infiltration by the Iranian
secret police and 53 of the most prominent members were
arrested under the 1931 law. Put on trial in 1938, all denied
being communists, but 45 were convicted and given prison
sentences. Arani received 10 years, but in his defence, he
vigorously upheld his dialectical materialism and attacked the
1. M. Rezun, op. cit., p.291.
2. Ibid., pp. 292, 94, 95.
3. Arani was born in Azerbayjan and educated in Tehran. He then studied in Berlin,
where he adopted the marxist ideology with which he returned to Iran in 1930,
dedicated to popularising it there.
4. Dunya 3, 1936, p.29, 5 (1947), pp.15-62.
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1931 law as unconstitutional and a violation of justice. He also
claimed that both socialism and communism, as intrinsic
elements of western civilisation, could not be barred by Iran,
which was attempting to westernize itself.1
Arani died in prison 16 months later. His colleagues
claimed that he had deliberately been refused medical
treatment, while the authorities insisted that he had died from
incurable typhus. However, in 1943 Azhir stated that, although
Arani had died from typhus, the authorities had purposely
placed him in the cell of a former typhoid prisoner. The other
53 members convicted made contacts among other political
prisoners within the prison, and were definitely hardened by
their prison experience. Upon their release in 1941, they then
formed the nucleus of the new Tudeh (Masses) Party, whose
leaders were Arani's colleagues from Europe.
(2) THE TUDEH PARTY (HIZB-I-TUDA )
The release of the communists was part of the general amnesty
brought about by the invasion of Iran by the Allied powers in
1941, when Riza Shah also abdicated. At this time all political
restrictions were lifted and publications were allowed to
circulate. There was a general upsurge of interest and
participation in political affairs amongst the population, with
a predominant desire to avert the possibility of another
dictatorial role similar to Riza Shah's, although there was no
strong central authority to replace his former government. This
might have presented the Tudeh party with the opportunity to
establish itself in power, but several factors in fact prevented
this from happening. Despite its organised structure, it was
still a young party and lacked the experienced leaders needed
for the co-ordination of such a programme. On top of this,
Iranian society was not really ready for a proletarian role,
1. Arani, T., DifaCiyyat-i Duktur Arani.
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which would have required a much greater political awareness
than existed amongst Iranians at the time, and its leftist
policies constituted a considerable threat both to the Iranian
conservative elite, i.e. landowners and capitalists, and to the
Western powers.1 The party organisation closely resembled that
of Western political parties and therefore created a left-wing
challenge2 to Iranian ruling class interests, which were right-
wing, and to its foreign policy. The ruling class had
traditionally supported imperialist countries such as Britain.
If the Tudeh came to power it was likely that a shift towards
Communist governments would take place, with the Soviet Union
playing a major role. International and national pressure thus
weighed heavily against its taking power although it was
supported morally and ideologically by the USSR.
The Tudeh were, however, the only progressive party
within Iran, and they defended the 1905 Constitutional law,
together with the ideals of democracy. Although basing their
principles on Marxism-Leninism, they were wise enough to
endeavour to adapt communist goals to the particular conditions
and format of Iranian society.1* This accounts in part for their
strong constitutional and nationalist emphases, as well as for
their argument in favour of the restoration to all those living
in Iran of the rights promised them by the Constitutional Law.
Such ideas and policies were revolutionary in Iran, in that
they were extremely progressive and quite unknown in Iranian
history, but the Tudeh cannot be said to be revolutionaries in
a military sense, for they did not call for force and violence
in order to obtain power, but advocated the parliamentary
electoral system as the best way instead. This in fact seems
1. Lenczowski, G., "Communist Movement in Iran", MEJ, vol.1, 1947.
2. Zabih, S., Communist Movement in Iran, University of California, 1966.
4. Barnama-yi Hizb-i Tuda-yi Iran, n.d., Tehran.
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one of their weaknesses, since they had no alternative options
in the face of electoral fraud, which would leave dictatorship
still in control. However they recognised that military methods
would be unsuitable in the present climate and the likely
reaction of the Allies to any threat to the status quo in Iran,
given the threat that fascism was posing internationally and
the lack of mass organisations to influence and use within Iran
itself.
Due to its belief that social conditions in Iran were not
right for communism, the Tudeh modified its approach by
seeking to support the constitution. However, certain Tudeh
enemies, such as Sayyid Ziya, attempted to frighten traders
and capitalists in Iran with the name of communism.1 Their
policy was also influenced by the religious character of
Iranian society. The vast majority of Iranians were devout
Muslims - as indeed were many of the members of the Tudeh -
and the party was anxious not to lay itself open to attack on
Q —
the charge of being communists, which they feared the Ulama
(religious leaders) might bring against them. As a visible sign
of respect, they thus held a religious ceremony in
commemoration of the death of Aran! and also that of Mudarris,
who had been the leading religious opponent of Riza Shah.2
Q —
The desire to avoid creating tension with the Ulama, by
adopting a broad programme, was one of the immediate aims
which the party established for itself. The others included the
release of the remaining '53' still imprisoned, recognition of
the Tudeh as a legitimate organisation, and the printing of
their own newspaper, to come out daily. These were mostly
achieved quite early on, and by 194-1, the party was declaring
'democratic centralisation' to be its objective. The leadership
had grown strong enough to impose its decisions on the
organisation, and as a result, it divided into sub-committees
around the cell structure; the rural leaders were unaware of
1. See ,J|brat4mian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, PUP, Princeton, 1982, p.285, 5.
See also Rahbar, 17 May, 1944.
2. Ibrahimian, op, cit., p.282.
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all the gains they might have reaped if they had emphasised
the differences between the provinces and Tehran.1
At the conference which was held in June 1942, the 120
delegates from all the Tudeh's sources of support who attended
- and whom the Party hoped would create a nationwide basis
made a number of demands: they requested from the
government allowance for greater class representation in
politics, the safeguarding of human rights - under which
repeal of the 1931 propaganda law2 (which had outlawed
communism) was included. They called also for land
distribution, improved conditions for the peasant class and for
legalised trade union activities, particularly free collective
bargaining, and lastly they wanted to spread communist
education throughout the country.
The party had reached a national scale by the time of
the Majlis elections in 1943-44. Its leaders came primarily from
the professions - intellectuals, lawyers, etc., and the ranks
were filled with various labour groupings. The party also
organised a freedom front, which ran 30 different newspapers.3
In the elections eight of the Tudeh's 15 candidates were
returned from the Northern industrial areas of Isfahan, despite
strong opposition from the British as well as from the
Conservative elements within Iran.* This meant that the Party
now gained influence in Parliament, and by having members
elected, it thus legitimated its appeal, although it chose to
emphasise not its communist nature, but rather individual
rights and general reform. Part of its strength also derived
from the fact that the Tudeh deputies voted within the Majlis
1. Rouhallah Ramazan. The Autonomous Republic of Azerbayjan, p.411.
2. Zabih, op. cit., p.75.
3. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran 1941-8", MEJ, 3rd Jan. 1949.
4. Zabih, op. cit., pp.79-80.
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as a party unit.1
Sayyid Ziya Tabataba'i attempted to counter this
widespread influence and support of the Tudeh by creating the
rival National Will Party,2 which according to Binder was
backed by the British3 and closely connected to the Court.*
As a result of the effort to tar the Tudeh's image by
accusing it of being an instrument of the Soviet Union, Sayyid
Ziya himself came under suspicion from the Party, as well as
from other progressive parties, and the people themselves, who
feared a dictatorship similar to that which they had
experienced in 1921s which led to Riza Shah's dictatorship.
Pravda's claim5 that Sayyid Ziya was recruited by the British
to destroy the Tudeh and other democratic parties was indeed
given credibility by his subsequent actions.
The Party also faced opposition from reactionary Muslim
tribal chiefs in the South. Qashqa'i and Bakhtiyari leaders
were ready by 1945 to help Americans in Iran fight the
communist infiltration which threatened their property.7
The Tudeh published its programme (a remarkable act in
itself) at the Congress held in early August 1944,8 to which
168 delegates came. The points which were adopted covered a
1. Marlowe, Iran, London 1963.
2. For more details concerning the NWP, see below.
3. Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society, California, 1964.
4. Ibid., p.206.
5. Rahbar, No.621-622, 11 th—12th Murdad, 1324 (2nd-3rd August, 1945); and no.631-
632, 24th—25th Murdad, 1324 (l5th-16th August, 1945).
6. Rahbar, No.646-647, 13th—14th Azar, 1324 (4th—5th December, 1945).
7. Leland Morris, US Ambassador to Tehran to Sec. of State Stettinius, Feb. 28, 1945,
891 00/2-2845.
8. See section on Tudeh Party platform.
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wide range and drew much support for the party. They included
a strong nationalist emphasis; firm opposition to foreign
intervention, especially British;1 and affirmation of Iranian
national independence - which to some extent rivalled the
Nationalist movement, as well as a call for world peace.
Internally, the Congress pledged support for the oppressed,
and stressed the need for equality, constitutional rights and
liberties, such as freedom of religion, ideas and a modernized,
centralized economic order.
The Communist nature of the Tudeh was purposely
played down by the Party in comparison with its nationalist
and patriotic character.2 The Tudeh believed that Iranian
society was not ready to accept Communism. If it was offered
to the people they would resist it forcefully simply because it
came too early and was not understood by them.3 This was a
fact also ■ recognised by the reactionary elements within the
central government, who realised its propaganda potential.
They encouraged the populace to distrust Communists as tools
of the Soviet Union: when the Soviet Union in 1944 asked for
an oil concession in the North, the Tudeh was associated with
this Communist regime whose aim was the infiltration of Iran.*
The Party did indeed support the request, but the background
to the oil concession issue shows how its name was smeared by
the government, which was clearly pro-West and anti-Soviet in
its attitude and policies.5
The original oil concession granted by Iran, in 1901,
established the pattern of 'imperialist' exploitation of Iranian
1. Mihrigan, H. Asnad va Didagana, Teheran 1981, pp.64-77.
2. Sima-yi Mardumi-yi Hizb-i Tuda-yi Iran, P.M. Javanshir, Teheran n.d., passim.
3. Personal interview, Aug. 5, 1982, with Iskandari.




oil. It was given quite rashly, for the immediate payment of
£400,000, a financial boost to the sorely impoverished Iranian
economy. D'Arcy was granted the right to work oil over an
area that covered four-fifths of Iranian territory - excluding
the North. The concession was sold in 1909 to the newly formed
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (A10C), which itself was backed by
the British government after 1914.
There was thus never a question of the AIOC's integration
and sponsorship by local Iranian industry. It was a foreign
company, extracting oil purely for British use; no subsidiary
industries were established to help build up Iranian industry
as a whole, or the national economy.1
Despite constant conflicts between Britain and Riza Shah
over the concession in the South, the central government made
repeated overtures to Western companies (Dutch and American2)
in regard to oil concessions in the North. This is striking
evidence of the pro-Western attitude of the government, for
such concessions were in violation of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty
of 1921. In very generous terms, the Soviet Union there
released Iran from considerable debts; in return, she requested
the condition that no country or foreign company should be
granted oil concessions in the area which formed her Southern
border (Northern Iran).3 The British oil concessions had from
the beginning been restricted to the South, but the Soviet Union
feared that a Western power might turn oil concessions in the
North into an anti-Soviet base.*
1. For full details see N. Simpson, The Seven Sisters, Hodder S Stoughton, 1975,
pp.70-1.
2. Miller, A.D., "The Influence of Middle East Oil on American Foreign Policy: 1941-
48", Middle East Review, Spring 1977 - gives more details of American involvement
in Iranian Oil.
3. Ramazani, R.K., The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs
1500-1941, Charlottesville, Va. 1966, pp.139-167, 186-192.
4. For the general effect of this area of history on Anglo-Soviet relations, see
Ewalt, D., "The Fight for Oil", in History Today, Sept. 1981, p.11.
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This was an accusation that was taken up, in a slightly-
different form, by the West and others when the Soviet Union
approached Iran in 1944- with a request for an oil concession
in Northern Iran: allegations were raised that the Soviets
intended to annex Iranian territory under the guise of oil
concessions. In fact, a comparison of the economic position of
the Soviet Union in 1921 and 1944, and of the terms of the
British and proposed Soviet oil concessions, cautions against
a too easy acceptance of this view.
In 1921, the economic situation of the Soviet Union barred
it from extending any sort of help to Iran; in 1944, ' however,
despite the war, she was one of the most industrially developed
powers in the world. She was therefore then able to offer aid
to Iran in building up the Iranian oil industry; she also
badly needed to replete her dangerously low oil stocks on
which she had drawn heavily during the war. The integrity of
her wish for friendly relations with Iran and the support for
an independently strong Iranian nation is shown, at least on
paper, by the terms of the concessions which she proposed. The
Iranian government was to be given the entire right to control
all the economical and technical operations of the company;
Iran would keep 50% of the oil produced; Iranians would fill
two-thirds of the executive posts, including the highest jobs;
Iranian technicians would be trained; and at the end of the
concession, all production equipment, machinery, buildings,
etc. would pass into the hands of the Iranian government,
without any compensation whatsoever.1
The Tudeh Party's backing of the Soviet request should
be examined in the light of this background. The support
which it gave to the granting of the Soviet oil concession was
based upon the reasonableness of its terms and the benefit it
would bring to Iran - not as an automatic response in favour
1. Kumaramarigalam, op. cit., pp.17-18.
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towards the Soviet Union. The central government on the other
hand, took this opportunity provided by the Party to smear the
Tudeh's reputation by associating it with the popular concepts
of Communism. Thus the Party's confirmation of the Soviet claim
that an oil concession would safeguard the security of the
Soviet Southern border1 was distorted by the central
government, which insinuated that the Tudeh's aim was
actually the Soviet penetration of Iran: did not the Tudeh's
own platform state that an economic presence was inevitably
followed by political intervention, and did this not constitute
a threat to Iran's independence?
The campaign initiated by the central government against
the Tudeh's Party's backing of the Soviet request was therefore
an anti-Communist one. Further evidence of this inherent anti-
Soviet tendency within the central government is found in the
manner in which it rejected the Soviet oil concession, after it
had initially looked upon it with favour. The Iranian
parliament passed a bill introduced by the moderate
nationalist, Dr. Musaddiq, which called for a moratorium on
all concessions to foreign companies until after the end of the
war.2 Musaddiq's stand was an independent one: he genuinely
disapproved of oil concessions to both the West and the Soviet
Union. This bill formed, however, a very convenient foil for
the central government, since it enabled them to refuse the
Soviet request without making their pro-Western and anti-Soviet
bias explicit. The disguise is shown up very clearly by the
clause contained in the 'anti-foreign intrigues' bill that
protected already existing concessions, i.e. the operations of
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Furthermore, the AIOC
concession was even extended by 9 years in April 1944, and
additional negotiations with foreign companies were continued
1. A.K.S. Lambton, 'Some of the Problems facing Persia', International Affairs 21
(1946), 254; Special letter to the Hamrahan Party's members 8, 1944 .
2. Ibid., p. 264.
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and were expected to go through successfully.1
There is thus a clear correlation between the central
government's pro-Western policy and its anti-Soviet and anti-
Tudeh attitude. The former can be explained in terms of the
traditional British (and Western) preservation of the status quo
of the Iranian ruling class, whereby their oil concessions in
the South could be kept secure. Support for the West meant the
maintenance, therefore, of the government.2
Although the Tudeh Party's role in the issue of the oil
concession to the Soviet Union must be viewed without the
prejudicial government propaganda smears, and therefore
judged on less secure grounds than those normally applied, it
nevertheless could have adapted more efficient measures and
taken better precautionary action. The presence of a Soviet
military contingent, for example, during the demonstrations
organised by the Party gave substance to the allegations that
the Tudeh were preparing for, or at least favoured, Soviet
intervention in Iranian affairs.3
The Tudeh Party might also have benefitted more from a
policy which was directed towards the abolition of British oil
rights in the South, instead of expending much energy in
support of the Soviet Union from which they gained little
result. Another pattern might have emerged if they had
pursued a non-dynamic balance.5 The Party claimed that it
did not possess the power to fight the British and would thus
have had little chance of realising that goal. This was not
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government was weakened, and the Tudeh had widespread
influence within it. Anti-British popular sentiment was running
high at the time: the hatred felt against the British for their
role in bringing Riza Shah to power was fuelled by their
occupation of Iran.1
The claim that an oil concession would safeguard the
Soviet-Iranian border was perhaps an over-statement. Iran,
being so weak, could scarcely constitute a threat, and the
Soviet army was then considerably more powerful than the
British forces, if they were afraid of an attack by the British.
It might be said that in contradistinction to Dr.
Musaddiq's 'negative equilibrium' policy, the Tudeh Party
followed that of 'positive equilibrium'. This laid them open to
mounting propaganda that the Party was a front for Soviet
interests and activities, especially in view of their support for
the Soviet oil concession. It was indeed one of the weaknesses
of the Tudeh Party, which a later reactionary government used
to bring about the collapse of the Party.
The political turmoil and the internal conflicts within
parliament caused by the question of concessions, sponsored by
c —
combined Soviet and Tudeh pressure, led to the fall of Sa id's
government in November 1944- In a letter to Muhammad Riza
— 2 C —
Shah Sa id declared that although he enjoyed the support of
many of the members of parliament, he was resigning both as
a result of Tudeh (plus Soviet) propaganda, especially protests
from Rasht and Tabriz, against him, and in the hope that by
his resignation the conflicts would be resolved, and the
friction and differences be ironed out. He was succeeded by
Murtaza Bayat, a popular choice, but it took 11 days before
his appointment was confirmed due to the general confusion and
1. Sultanzada, op. cit., vol.Ill, pp. 196-220.
2. Special letter to the Hamrahan Party's Members 8, 1944.
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argument.1
The Tudeh supported Bayat and his administration in its
initial days,2 but the new government swung to the right early
in 1945. The new premier did not grant favours, as most
previous governments had done, and many of which had fallen
because of lack of support from the conservative deputies.
Bayat, too, was too weak to withstand the opposition, much of
which arose from British suspicion of the government's Soviet
leanings ( Sayyid Ziya opposed him for the same reason), and
his government was dissolved. The next administration formed
in Spring 1945 by Muhsin Sadr, also moved to the right,
arousing fears that the Soviet Union might not respect the
withdrawal deadline of March 2, 1946. Sadr reacted to the
militant stance of the Tudeh over the question of the oil
concessions in the Spring of 1945 by closing the communist
headquarters and suspending all newspapers. This formed the
backdrop to the ensuing struggle in Azerbaijan3 and Kurdistan,
between the Tudeh, the Soviet Union, and the Iranian
government.
(3) TRADE UNIONS AND THE TUDEH PARTY
The fragmentary activity of both Trade Union and Communist
groups during the first two decades of the twentieth century
was eventually co-ordinated and organised into the Central
Council of Federated Trade Unions in 1921. The Council
produced its own newspaper called Haqiqat (Truth) and
restructured the regional unions of small groups - such as
textile and oil workers, as well as arranging demonstrations
and strikes. The unions mainly represented small, less-
developed trades - only 6 unions out of 32 were in progressive
1. Special letter to the Hamrahan Party's Members 8, 1944.
2. Ra°d—i Imruz 3-78, 1945.
3. See following chapters below.
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industry. Ri'za Shah ruthlessly suppressed all of the unions'
activities in 1926 (5 of their leaders died in prison), but his
economic measures which included road construction, the
building of railways, ports and factories, acted as a spur to
the remnant of the movement, since these modernized methods
increased the industrial labour force fifty-fold.
The growth of the proletariat was also assisted by the
50% expansion of the oil-related work-force and the
amalgamation of small workshops to form larger units; by 194-1
hereby industry alone employed 170,000 workers. The conditions
under which they laboured, however, were appalling,
resembling slave labour. With no organised unions, workers'
reaction was very disjointed and most often on a spontaneous
basis. For example, a strike called at the Abadan oil refinery
to demand better conditions resulted not only in an agreed
wage increase, but also drew a British gunboat and 500
arrests. This 'transitional' period was one that weakened union
activity, since it meant the loss of a personal relationship
between workers and employers, which led to the disappearance
of moral responsibility on the part of the owners for the
working people, while no substitute had been created to replace
the old system.
Behind the movement however were leaders who truly
believed in socialism - including Pishavari From its formal
formation in 1941, the Tudeh encouraged the Trade Unions
which supported this movement. The Party was the political
expression of the communist revival, set up by the Arani
Circle,1 who were ex-prisoners, and its aims, under its
opposition to colonial imperialism, were directed towards the
restructuring of the political economy in a democratic form.2
1. Zabih, op. cit.
2. Demonstrated by a provisional statute; see Zabih, p.74.
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Thus the Central Council of Trades Unions represented an
attempt by experienced trade unionists together with Tehran
workers to rebuild the unions. The labour-emphasis of the
Party increased its support throughout Iran, especially in the
textile-dominated areas around Isfahan, where much demand
was made for improved wages and conditions. The Tudeh
succeeded in transforming aggrieved workers into a
considerable political force and during 1942-3, unionist tactics
widened popular support, with each victory strengthening the
movement's appeal.
Although the elections of 1943-4 left the Tudeh with only
8 out of 120 seats, efficient organisation and unique backing
from a mass political movement proved a great source of
support. The Central Council of United Trades Unions (CCUTU)
grew to 200,000 strong within a year and 400,000 by 1946.1 The
struggle became somewhat more bitter2 during the inflationary
period in the four years to 21st March, 1945. Fifteen years
before, a strike in the largest textile mill in Isfahan had
ended with the imprisonment of the leaders, and in the
Khuzistan oil fields, first affected in 1922, a general strike in
1929 had paralysed the industry, and five of its instigators
were still in prison in 1941.3 This four year period saw
Isfahan plagued with strikes and a lockout which drove
starving workers into factories and granaries. The rising was
quelled in July 1943 by Bakhtiyarf and Qashqa'i tribesmen on
government orders. The oil-fields avoided much of the trouble
as the trades union movement respected the Allies' efforts
against the Axis powers. The first activities of the
underground movement were not until May 1946, despite its
existence in Khuzistan for some length of time previously; the
CCUTU had been or was a stabilising factor, an encouraging
1. /$braha,mian, Social Basis of Iranian Politics, Tudeh Party 1941-53.
2. Ibid.; E. Sykes, 'Isfahan', Journal of Central Asian Soc., vol.33, 1946.
3. Cf. /Jbrahijnian, op. cit., and Zabih, op. cit.
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influence upon the war-effort and denouncing walk-outs and
wage disputes. This spread to other regions as well,
especially manufacturing plants in Tabriz, the textile and coal
industries and railways in Gllan and Mazandaran, in Tehran's
light industry, in the mills of Isfahan, Shiraz and Yazd, and
in the Khuzistan oil fields. The unions in these centres, whose
members numbered tens of thousands by 194-6, also sponsored
strikes as early as 1942, and in 1946 were supporting several
general strikes.
Contrary to Lenczowski's view1 that many misguided
individuals realized the truth, when the Tudeh pressed home
the Soviet position during the 1944 crisis in the oil industry,
Ibrahimian offers opposing evidence, on Constitution Day,
1945, of 20 mass meetings. The one in Tehran alone drew 40,000
people in May 1946; 80,000 people marched in Abadan alone;2
and in October 1946, 100,000 people celebrated 5 years of the
Party's existance in Tehran, and American estimates set
communist support at 40%.3
The march in Abadan ultimately led to a three-week
strike, beginning in Agha Jari on May 14th. This was preceded
by a strike on April 15th, during which the General Manager
conceded the demand for the reinstatement of 7 workers made
by the 2000 strikers and the plant manager had a change of
attitude. At the same time, a wage demand for double pay was
put forward at Gach Saran. The Tudeh's influence among the
workers'* was demonstrated in early June, when they organised
to construct a barrier around Khcrramshahr to prevent its
submergence by floods. Although the oil company in Abadan
1. G. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-48, New York 1949, p.234.
2. (london)Tinies, July 16, 1946; J. Jones, 'My visit to the Persian oil fields', IRCAS
34, 1947.
3. New York Times, June 15, 1946, quoted in Ibrahimian, op. cit,
4. FO 371 file IP.52723 Telegram, Willoughby to Le Rougetel, Aug. 10.
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gave technical advice, they were unable to control the work¬
force as were the Tudeh, who commandeered company vehicles
and regulated traffic, etc.1 The workers at Agha Jari were
agitating for improved housing as far back as 1938, and the
strike in which 10,000 men participated in May was in support
of demands for medical facilities, the provision of midwives,
ice and drinking-water, special allowances, and Friday pay.
The company, adopting a stiff attitude, called for military
intervention (which was made available) on the grounds of the
political nature of the demands, and the drastic step of cutting
off the vital water supply. A government commission was able
to persuade the company to settle, however, and in fact it (the
company) paid the workers wages for the duration of the
strike: an unprecedented act which was nevertheless disguised
as a beneficial payment ex gratia to its employees. This had
the effect, naturally, of encouraging other workers to adopt
similar action.
Isfahan at this time was a city of some significance,
having alone escaped the two-pronged Allied invasion and
having suffered various strikes earlier the same year. The
workers in Isfahan came out in sympathy with those striking
at Agha Jari, and a procession estimated at 7000 took place.
A success here would clearly have been indigenous, i.e. free
from Allied intervention. The Tudeh's influence in the mills
and town advanced considerably with the appointment of a
Tudeh supporter to the post of Governor-General. It was also
affirmed by a series of shorter strikes - at an Ahwaz spinning
factory on June 3rd, at the port of Bandar-i Shahpur on June
6th, and in the Abadan bazaar on June 11th, as well as such
unionist backwaters as Bushahr. The union was in fact
(2 —
recognised as a result of the 1 timadiyya mills strike of June 11-
17th.
1. FO 371 etc., op. cit.
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On July 8th came the alarming incident of a meeting of
C
Ali Umid with 40 non-commissioned officers from the Ahwaz
garrison, and on the 13th, the CCUTU demanded from the AIOC
the recall of the Governor-General of Khuzlstan, Misbah Fatimi*
• •
the disarmament of the tribes, an end to the AIOC's
interference in internal Iranian affairs, and wages for
Fridays. With only an hour's notice, 22,000 men from the
refinery alone (excluding those in essential services) struck at
6.00am. It was a very well organised and peaceful affair. The
strike-leaders, who effectively controlled Khurramshahr,
commandeered transport and confined Europeans to their homes;
committees for food, and security and propaganda were set up
under a Directing Committee. Meanwhile, martial law was
declared and police and gendarmerie forces were reinforced.
Telegrams were sent to the party heads of Tehran adding to
the previous demands for better conditions of employment and
living standards in general.
The reply was a promise that the Chief of Staff
guaranteed no further military intervention.1 At 5.00pm, local
Arabs opposed to the strike clashed with demonstrators
marching past the HQ of the Arab Union, and an Arab merchant
who was a contractor for the AIOC was killed. The violence
swelled, during which a second Arab contractor died (both
bodies were mutilated2), and shooting began, involving fire by
troops, and lasted until late into the evening: in all a total
of 25 people were killed, and 173 injured.
The Arabs had secret encouragement from local officials:
it is known that a consultation with the Sheikhs was held on
the 14th; the Governor-General considered arming them and the
next day, suggested that the Arabs should set fire to the
Tudeh HQ and assemble their tribesmen, who were already
1. FO 371, op. cit,
2. Clarmont Skrine, World War in Iran, London 1962; see later.
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gathering. The left-wing Iranian press, with substantial Soviet
press support, accused the British and the AIOC of conspiracy,
although this was unlikely to have been true.
The British Ambassador warned the Consul of
Khurramshahr against interference with the Arabs, and
suggested that similar advice be given to the AIOC:1 the
British were determined to give no grounds for accusations
against them on such an account - on July 27, the Arabs
indeed claimed that the British had restrained them from acts
of vengeance,2 and on the 15th, counsellor Sir Clarmont Skrine,
in an investigation of the Indian artisans' grievances, also
urged restraining of Arab retaliation on the Governor;3 the
latter, Major Fatih, was probably using the Arabs to
pressurise the government. On Willoughby's arrival in Abadan,
he warned that if Prince Muzaffar Firuz ordered the release of
the Tudeh ringleaders, Arabs might retaliate with the murder
of all Persians, regardless of whether they were members of the
Tudeh or not, and this was borne out by the war-like assembly
of Arabs at the Governor's house. The central government was
torn between a desire to carry out the British recommendation
that it assert its authority, and its wish to avoid alienating
the Soviet Union and much Iranian support by treating the
Tudeh Party and Iranian nationals too harshly. They decided
upon sending reinforcements to the Governor-General on July 15,
together with a telegram ordering the arrest of Tudeh members,
and the drawing up of a list of suspected agitators to be
passed on to the government, who would either arrest or expel
them from Khuzistan. Prime Minister Qavam instructed the
Governor-General to use discretionary measures to prevent
further disturbances. Misbah Fatimi remarked to Mr. Northcroft
of the Company, that this was not the expected propitiation of
1. FO 371, 52718, Le Rougetel to Willoughby, July 14.
2. FO 371, 52723 Willoughby to Le Rougetel, July 27.
3. FO 371, 52719 Willoughby to Le Rougetel , July 15.
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the Tudeh, regardless of cost, but he was in fact proved
wrong within a few days.1 Firstly, a delegation which included
Muzaffar Flruz on the Prime Minister's behalf, Radmanish,
acting Minister of Commerce, and 3 Tudeh members, arrived on
July 15. They inspected the damage, interviewed many of the
wounded, and released some of the strike leaders. Firuz then
called a meeting with the AIOC to discuss ways of ending the
strike: this strange meeting took place with the government
delegation and AIOC leaders in one room, and five strike
leaders with Iskandari and some others as mediators in
another. The AIOC had made some minor concessions over pay
of Friday wages, and by 1.00am it was agreed that the strike
would end at dawn.2 The AIOC resented the Tudeh's
management of the issue, and wished to break the leaders of
the Union, a move which, apart from being undiplomatic, would
have helped neither the Company, nor the closely-linked British
Government.
By this time, fear of the Arabs had killed the strike,
and all that was being sought was the release of imprisoned
Tudeh leaders, and extrication of the Party by attaching blame
to the British and Arabs.3 Firuz, according to Skrine,* tried
to persuade the AIOC that some concessions on their part would
end the strike, for which they were partly responsible,
claiming that he himself had ordered the end of the supposedly
'illegal' strike. Release of Tudeh leaders was useless, he said.
In the meantime, however, he told Tudeh members elsewhere
that the Prime Minister was indeed urging an end to the
strike, promising release and assistance towards the defeat of
Fatimi and Fatih, and in holding the British and Arabs
responsible for the violence which had occurred, he also
1. FO 371, 52721, Willoughby to Le Rougetel, July 15.




threatened them that they would be embarassed, and the Party
would collapse when the workers returned to work voluntarily.
That same night, Firuz also warned the Sheikhs of
Khorramshahr from instigating further disturbances, and the
next morning assured 30,000 workers in Abadan of Qavam1 s
interest in their welfare, as well as the Company's good
intentions. The work-force returned to work on July 17, with
no damage to AIOC property or installations, and a week's
production was the only thing lost. Qavam also received, at the
same time, a congratulatory message from the British Foreign
Office, stating how successful had been the efforts of the
Governor-General and the authorities in maintaining peace. The
day following, the British Ambassador tried on the
Government's behalf to stem the tide of representation arriving
from Tehran, which threatened political stability.1 Le Rougetel
reported to the Foreign Office the anti-authoritarian and non-
industrial nature of the strike, and Qavam's apparent inability
to exercise governmental authority in Khuzistan, and enforce
his will over Firuz and others - hence the situation was still
'incalculable'.2 Le Rougetel recognised the undesirability of
Firuz who was the main obstacle to any improvement: this was
in accord with the US Ambassador, Allen, who warned against
any hasty counter-productive action.
On July 23, Col. Zargaml of the War Ministry, Turaj-
Amin, and two officials from the Ministry of Justice, arrived
to investigate the causes of the riots. According to
Le Rougetel,3 this was a prc-Tudeh commission, who distorted
the evidence to show that the disorders were due to the
British, and the AIOC, who were also responsible for
organising Arab resistance against the central government and
1. FO 371, 52719; FO to Le Rougetel, July 18.
2. Ibid.
3. FO 371, 52706 doc. no.12322, Le Rougetel to 8evin, Oct. 20.
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the Tudeh Party.
The Tudeh were particularly popular with the Union
movement at that time, and the British were consequently
especially anxious to counteract their influence through the
creation of an oil workers union.1 By July 14, the British were
negotiating with the Tudeh, which nonetheless did not prevent
the strike breaking out. Indeed, the major contributory factor
for the strike was the party's fear that the British sought to
destroy the CCUTU through repression, or incitement of the
Arabs. When the strike ended, the Company had agreed to pay
a minimum daily rate of 35 rials, including wages for the rest
day (Friday). It was pointed out to the Prime Minister that
this agreement, costing £1 million per year to the Company,
was in violation of the Labour Law, which laid down that
wages were to be fixed by the High Labour Council. British
workers in the Company, as well as politicians and experts,
complained that the Company was badly organised and needed
strengthening and more discipline, and this call was taken up
by the British Foreign Office. The Labour Cabinet was forced
to choose between improving conditions in order to stem Tudeh
influence, and its ideology, which of course, espoused the
Union movement.
The British response also extended to the posting of two
(2
Navy ships to Abadan, off the Shatt al- Arab, an act to which
the Iranian government reacted with suspicion, declaring it to
be an unfriendly act if it was connected with the strike, and
the Iranian press was similarly hostile. Foreign Secretary
Bevin considered the evacuation of British and Indian
personnel, or alternatively occupation of the area to maintain
continued production.2 Plans were mooted to send Indian
1. For more details see: Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: a study in power politics,
London 1955.
2. July 11 Memorandum from Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs, E. Bevin; The Situation
in S. Persia, CAB 129 vol.11 CP (46), p.269.
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troops to Basra, within easy reach of Abadan, the present
threat to the city being seen as more important than an
Egyptian or Iraqi reaction. The risk was also considered to
outweigh the possibility of Soviet intervention. The move would
be disguised under the pretext of the replacement of British
troops awaiting repatriation. The troop dispatch was announced
as a precautionary measure of protection for the AIOC, which
gave rise to much concern within the Iranian government and
press over the mention of protection of Arab lives, a reference
probably inserted by the British to appease Iraq. Iranian
demands for the removal of the troops were met with
reassurances from the British that they had full confidence in
the government's authority. Indeed, the presence of the Indian
forces increased popular support and greater official influence
in the area, as well as that of the Company and the Arabs. The
discordant note between the Indian claim to have a
safeguarding role, and the Foreign Office statement that they
were replacement troops was in fact picked up by the State
Department in Washington, who were afraid of a violation of
the UN Charter. The action, according to Iran, was a threat
to her security, the prestige of the government, and also a
weakening influence on the UN. America forestalled an Iranian
outcry in the Security Council, but avoided taking on the role
of mediator with Britain.1
By this stage, the Tudeh was finding it necessary to
convince its supporters through publications that it was not
merely making political capital out of a communal antagonism,
but that it in fact favoured the Arabs, and all provincial
minorities.2 Iraq was entertaining hopes that Khuzistan might
become part of Iraq, and this idea was formulated by the Arab
League early in August. Antagonism toward the Tudeh in
Khuzistan was primarily tribal, with the Sheikhs forming the
1. FO 371, 52723, Washington to FO, Aug. 13.
2. ^afan, July 30, 1946; quoted in Ibrahimian, op. cit.
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tribally tight-knit Arab community into the Sacd Party, in
opposition to the Tudeh, whose appeal was principally to non-
Arab wage earners. British relations with Iraq further
strengthened her feelings of protectiveness towards the Arabs
in Iran as well, so that the combination of all these factors
encouraged the nationalist element of the Tudeh's attitude, with
a strong anti-immigration polemic, and accusations against
Khuzistan that it was seeking independence and of conspiracy
between Britain and Iraq.
Whereas the British had previously turned to the Tudeh
Party in the South, they now began to strengthen Qavam's
position in order to prevent Soviet infiltration and hence the
Tudeh's power. On June 29, Qavam formed the Democrat Party
to contest the general election and defeat the Tudeh1 and
towards this end he enlisted the support of some former Tudeh
organisers. When he invited the party to send a representative
to the Cabinet they despatched three of their best members -
Iraj Iskandari, Faraydun Kishavarz, and Murtaza Yazdi. In
spite of their hostility, the Tudeh supported Qavam in order to
to achieve three goals: one, to combat imperialism; two, to
resolve their differences; and three, to increase the chances of
democracy.2 Much reform was initiated through the work of
Iskandari as Minister of Economy, Kishavarz as Education
Secretary and Yazdi in the Department cf Health, and indeed,
the coalition significantly strengthened Qavam. However, it is
important to notice that Qavam's ulterior motive in inviting
Tudeh co-operation was to undermine the Party's influence in
the union movement as a means to control labour unrest.
A period of turbulence ensued following upon the end of
the strike, including the suppression of the trades unions in
the South by the British and the central government. The
1. Binder, op. cit., p.206.
2. Rahbar, supplementary issue, Summer 1946, 6.
- 147 -
Tudeh's objections about this to Qavam fell on deaf ears as he
was in fact one of its instigators. In that year, there were
also disturbances in the Fars region in which many people
were killed. Many party members, including the Tudeh,
recommended to the government that it should crush the
rebellion and maintain the integrity of Iran. The revolt seems
to have been a plot between the British and Iranian
governments, and when the central government concluded peace
with the tribes and called it a 'patriotic revolution', the
Tudeh was incensed. Due to this, and other reasons, an
official split opened between the coalition: Qavam argued that
the Democrat Party ought to have a body which would supervise
the approaching general election, but it was clear that this
was an idea designed to prevent the election of the Tudeh. In
the ensuing break, the three Tudeh ministers refused to attend
Parliament, and the coalition collapsed.1 Qavam's attitude
towards the communist movement suddenly shifted, and all
union activity - in particular the strike in Tehran on Nov. 12
- was stopped, and hundreds of union and party members were
arrested throughout the country. The party press was disbanded,
and none of the Tudeh's members were safe with the threat of
prison and other oppressive measures hanging over them, while
at the same time their freedom of meeting was restricted which
virtually curtailed all their activities. There were several
reasons behind this policy: Firstly, the Tudeh had tried in the
interval of some years after World War II to awaken the
political awareness of Iranians with respect to their rights.
The central government was naturally apprehensive of too much
popular knowledge, since it would expose their repressive
methods. Secondly, it knew that the Tudeh was almost sure to
win the elections to the 15th Majlis, and so determined to
discredit the Party's leadership, and warn the population
against the dangers of a communist regime. It was not alone
in this attitude, since other "imperialist" governments, like the
1. Bayaniyya-yi Kumita-yi Markazi-yi Hizb-i Tuda, Summer 1946.
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British or American, were also anti-communist. Thirdly, Qavam
needed to increase his personal popularity, which was at a low
ebb, and he thus justified his orders for mass arrests by
claiming that he was protecting the country from such communist
threats.
While Qavam's policy may have been effective in Tehran,
it was still necessary to subdue the provinces. One example of
the government's methods was the imposition of martial law in
Mazandaran, where army and police officers were moved in,
occupying all the towns en route from Tehran, and many
people were arrested, tortured and killed.1 The excuse given
was the country-wide one day railway strike.
The Tudeh's complaints reached the interenational Trades
Unions' Federation through the channels of the press, and the
Federation wrote in strong protest to the central government,
advising them that this was an action in violation of their
treaty with the Allied powers. The Iranian government, seeking
to retain its prestige, invited a delegation from the Federation:
the commission at once saw through the design of the
government, and recognised the fact that the ruling
Democrat Party had no popular base in Iran, since the workers
supported the Trades Union movement and the Tudeh Party.2
Following the repression instigated by Qavam, the Tudeh
went underground, although their electoral candidates, such as
A. Qasimi in Gurgan, were arrested. In a press interview,
Qavam, answering questions concerning the Party, said that the
Tudeh was frightened of the common people, who did not want
the Communist Party in Iran.3 The government's condemnation
of the Party as responsible for the creation of a class-struggle
1. Shamshir-i Imruz, Sayaniyya-yi Kumita-yi Markazi-yi Hizb-i Tudeh, Autumn 1946.
2. Ibid,
3. Shamshir-i Imruz, op. cit.
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was inaccurate, since in fact aggravation of the class conflict
was the result of the dictatorship of Riza Shah, who made the
majority poorer, and a minority richer.
The Tudeh Party in reality failed because of the
ignorance of the population, their willingness to believe the
central government, and the weakness of the democratic process
in Iran, and it took five years for the Tudeh Party to finally
reorganise itself.1
(4) THE PLATFORM OF THE TUDEH PARTY
The elements of the Tudeh' s party platform can be
outlined as follows:
1. Man's right to internal freedom and independence:
This was seen as the right to struggle against foreign
imperialism and colonization which threatened Iran's integrity,
and her right to choose her own destiny.
Economic as well as political independence was called for:
economic dependence upon another power, the Tudeh believed
necessarily entailed political domination by that power, so that
control within Iran should be solely in the hands of Iranian
nationals.
Despite this clear indication of strong nationalist feeling,
the party's opponents2 claimed that the Tudeh was pressing for
the subsuming of Iran into the Soviet Union, in an effort to
discredit the party. That the Tudeh did share Marxist-Leninist
doctrines with the Soviet government did not mean, however,
that they wanted either political intervention or domination
1. Rahbar, suppl. Bayaniyya-yi Kumita-yi Markazi-yi Hizb-i Tuda, Mar. 1946.
2. Sayr-i Kumunist Par Iran, Govt, pub., Teheran.
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by the Soviet Union in Iran's internal affairs.1
2. The establishment of democratic role and the protection
of the rights of the individual:
True democracy would balance the economic status of all
Iranians, as well as improving Iran's political system.
Democracy did not exist at the present time, contrary to claims
made to that effect, because the landowners found it easy to
pressure the poverty-striken peasants to vote for candidates of
their choice, and those living in towns accepted bribes in
order to supplement their very meagre incomes.
The Tudeh also urged the recognition of basic rights such
as freedom of speech, press, movement etc. within society, as
the necessary foundation for a political system. The use of
such rights must, however, be regulated by and conform to the
Constitutional Law: Law 13 with respect to the press, and 21
related to the freedom of movement.
This emphasis upon the importance and centrality of
observance of the Constitutional Law is a major feature in the
Tudeh's platform.2
3. Dedication to the struggle against dictatorship:
The Tudeh included in this the fight against the
opportunist elite whose support was responsible for the
maintenance of a dictator's rule. The 15 year dictatorial rule
of Riza Shah, for example, was made possible only through the
co-operation and aid of a corrupt army and body of
landowners, so the Tudeh believed.3
1. Barnama-yi Hizb-i Tuda-yi Iran, Tehran, 1981.




4. Cleansing and purification of the police system and
civilian corruption:
Corruption amongst both police and civilian elements was
regarded by the Tudeh as a result of Riza Shah' s dictatorship.
A supreme court should be set up to deal with such offenders,
with power to return property and money gained by this
extortion.1
5. Separation of civil and criminal law administration, and
the abolition of all legislation passed by Riza Shah:
This inclusion was designed to limit the power of Riza
Shah and his police. The Tudeh referred to articles 27 and 28
of the Constitutional Law which stated that all legislation
inimical to the interests of the people was forbidden: they saw
in the Constitutional Law a higher legislative authority than
that invested in or held by the Shah.2
Although comprehensive abolition was called for, the
Tudeh's primary concern was for a repeal of the 1931
propaganda law, a repeal which would accord them a legal
existence and the right to stand for election.3
6. Abolition of conscription abuses:
The ending of improper exploitation of soldiers as house
servants and manual workers for the officers, and the
extension of their legal rights to include military training and
maintenance grants during the period of their service.1*
1. DifaCiyyat-i Duktur Arani, p.47.
2. At his trial, Dr. Arani referred to this corruption of the police.
3. Qasinti, op. cit., p.30; Asnad wa Didagaha, p.143.
4. Iskandari: personal interview, Tehran, Aug. 1982.
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7. Improved use of land, and better conditions for the
peasantry:
The Tudeh believed that a lack of incentive, due to the
fact that the peasants possessed no share in the land which
they worked, combined with primitive tools and methods, were
responsible for the unproductive state of agriculture in Iran.
The party offered two solutions:
(a) government redistribution among the peasants of the large
estates of wealthy landowners and those owned by Ri£a
Shah;
(b) the foundation of a bank designed to extend loans for
mortgages, and the purchase of more sophisticated
equipment.
The government should also fund and install wells and
irrigation systems to forestall the frequent threats posed by
droughts; and set up health and education facilities to enable
the peasants to increase their work hours and efficiency, and
benefit from technological advances made in other countries. If
all this was carried through, agricultural output would jump,
aiding the economy by reducing imports and supplying goods
for export. This was, in fact, a very progressive, humanitarian
and nationalist policy.1
8. The welfare of the workers:
In 1S43, no law existed which protected workers' rights,
and the Tudeh thus set out an eight-point bill which they
urged should be passed:
(a) a maximum working day of 8 hours
1. Dunya, vol.9, 1963; Dunya, vol.12, 1975.
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(b) overtime wages to be paid for time over and above that
limit
(c) responsibility of the employer for any medical costs
incurred as a result of an injury sustained by an
employee at work
(d) entitlement of workers to a specified number of paid
weeks' holiday per year
(e) entitlement of each worker to a pension upon retirement
(f) no child under 14 to be legally permitted to work
(g) equal pay for male and female employees
(h) 2 months paid post-natal absence for all female workers.1
The Tudeh worked widely amongst the working classes to
awaken their class consciousness, encouraging them to fight for
their rights by establishing a trade union movement, and
urging them to support the Tudeh as the only party concerned
for their welfare. Their party platform indeed makes clear how
deeply committed to the workers' cause the Tudeh party actually
was, a point illustrated particularly by their concern for
female workers, an especially vulnerable group.
9. Organisation of the labour force:
The fragmentary nature of cottage industry in Iran was
harmful to the workers' conditions, so the Tudeh believed, and
they accordingly encouraged the formation of unions, to remove
the need for exploiting middlemen between the workers and
consumers, giving the employees themselves more control over
their work situation.2
10. Reform in civil service legislation:
Fundamental changes were required to reform the
1. Qasimi, Hizb-i Tilda chi miguyad va-chi mikhwahad, Tehran 1943, pp.62-81.
2. Ibid., p.82.
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administration of the civil service: there was a large wage
inequality which worked against the junior staff, who thus
commonly accepted bribes, thereby corrupting the civil service
administration, nor was discrimination made for those employees
with large families to support. The Tudeh urged for a similar
trade union movement to be set up, and also demanded that
more educated currently unemployed young men be employed by
the civil service.1
11. Equal social, economic and political opportunities for
women:
The Tudeh party was the only partly genuinely interested
in a comprehensive improvement in the status of women in Iran.
Women were exploited by the male society because of their
economic dependence; the Tudeh aimed at establishing women's
independence, leading towards a more humanitarian society.
The employment of women would on the one hand create this
independence, and on the other, would in the long run benefit
the Iranian economy since the number of those working would
be dramatically increased.2
12. Fundamental reform in education and health services:
The Tudeh saw education and health services as a basic
human right and as such it was the responsibility of the
government to promote them: free and compulsory education up
to a secondary level, with the inclusion of both art and
political science in the curriculum (also at university level);
a national health service covering the entire country, available
to all on request.
1. Qasimi, op. cit., pp.83-90; A. Iskandari: personal interview, Tehran, Aug. 1982.
2. A. Iskandari: personal interview, Tehran, Aug. 1982.
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13. Reform of the tax laws:
Social equality is the necessary foundation of society,
and a fair distribution of tax impositions should require
proportionately more from the wealthy than from the poor.
Bribery of tax officials by the rich should be stopped.
Linked with this, the Tudeh advocated a nationalised
industry - otherwise, the profits accrued in private business
went into the pockets of individuals, and not into the state
treasury from which the whole country received support.
Government should also subsidise staple foods and provide
mortgages, while at the same time setting up co-operative
schemes whereby the working class could purchase low-priced
goods.
(5) THE ORGANISATION AND INFLUENCE OF THE TUDEH PARTY: 1941-47
Even in an embryonic stage, the Tudeh party created an
extremely efficient organisation, which proved a firm foundation
upon which to develop. Although it attracted many fee-paying
members, its influence extended far beyond these, while they
remained its core.
The conditions for membership were three-fold: any
candidate of Iranian birth, over the age of 23,1 and who
accepted the party manifesto was eligible. He was thereupon
required to produce a written recommendation to the party
signed by two party members, there thence admitted for a 6
months probationary period, during which he was expected to
demonstrate his loyalty and enthusiasm for the party. If his
behaviour satisfied the party he was then made a full member.
1. A youth organisation existed for those below this age.
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His first obligation as an official member was attendance
at all cell meetings and payment of membership fees: 30 rials
for men, 15 rials for women and young people, monthly. Within
the party, a feeling of unity, together with strict adherence
to the regulations was fostered, and all members were expected
to acquire such methods and knowledge as was necessary for
the fight against the enemies of the party, and to actively
engage in propaganda activity in their immediate environment.1
Each member had the right to vote and stand for election
for any post within any organisation of the party structure.2
He also shared in policy decision-making, participating in the
group discussions held for that purpose, and was free to raise
objections against either a particular point or person.
Praiseworthy behaviour - enlisting mass support or gaining
financial aid, for instance - was encouraged by verbal or
written commendation, while conversely, measures leading to
expulsion could be taken against detrimental activity:
disciplinary measures were taken against non-attendance of cell
meetings, non-payment of fees, false accusations against fellow
members, or creating factions within the party; expulsion could
be enacted in the case of traitors who betrayed the party.
There was, however, a right of appeal against expulsion,
taken before the National Congress, which set up a special
commission of investigation.3
The organisation of the Tudeh was founded upon
democracy, and conformity to the party line, as expressed
through a chain of authority. This chain represented the
various levels of gradation, from the single cell unit through
to the central committee of the party - the structure of all
Communist organisations; the Tudeh similarly multiplied





committees etc. in order to reach as many people, of varied
class and background as possible.
The cell (hawza) forms the active centre of the party
structure. It operates with a minimum of 3 persons, and is the
place where plans are made, and the party line and doctrine
expounded; its meetings were normally held in the work-places
of its members - schools, factories, etc. A secretary, responsible
for the functioning of the cell, was elected every 6 months.
Where a number of cells exist in a localised area,
delegates from each are elected onto a co-ordinating committee,
which in turn elects 5 delegates yearly to the local committee,
the executive organ of the party in that area. Above the local
committees are the regional committees which cover districts or
even provinces. These are made up of either 7 or 15 delegates
elected from the local committees every 2 years. Meetings of
these committees are held quarterly, when a report for the past
4 months is given, and an outline for the next presented. Also
present is a delegate from the central committee, who informs
the members of policy developments to which they are expected
to conform.
The supreme organ of the party is its National Congress.
This meets every two years to discuss top level party policy,
with a view to adapting or changing it if necessary, and to
elect a Central Committee. At the first National Congress of the
Tudeh, in August 1944,1 it elected 11 members to this
Committee, and set up at the same time a nine-member Control
Committee, - a political bureau - to replace the office of
President, and a three-member Secretariat, which was reduced
to one general secretary in 1946 to facilitate the work of
organisation.
1. For more details see Asnad wa Didagaha, Tehran 1981, pp.64-77.
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The party also established its own publishing house: the
leadership, while realising that the press was the most effective
means of- propaganda for gaining support and spreading the
party's influence, were rather shortsighted, however, in their
indifference to the fact that the readership was limited to
intellectuals living in Tehran (where most of the publications
were produced); even if the newspapers were distributed
throughout other cities, there was a 77% illiteracy level among
the very people they were hoping to influence. Despite this, a
continuous stream of publications flowed out, starting with
Siyasat, issued a few weeks after the party's reception in
194-1 - Siyasat was succeeded by a new organ after the Tehran
Conference, when a special section for publication was created.
In 1943, the daily Rahbar was started, but was replaced by
Razm when Rahbar was censored by the government - this
immediate substitution being a standard procedure of the party.
The official papers of the party were, as a rule, published
clandestinely. Thus, through its own publications, and also
through those who supported the Tudeh party line, such as
Nabard, Azhir, Farman, Tran-i ma, Darya, Damavand, Najat-i
Iran, C Ali Baba, Arman-i Milli, £afar, ShuClavar, Tawfiq,
Umid, and Mihan Parast.an1 - the party exerted extensive
influence both over and through the Iranian press.
The areas of the Tudeh's most intense activity were: the
North - the provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan and Mazandaran (as
well as Isfahan), because of their proximity to the Soviet
Union; the South, where the Anglo-Iranian oil fields were
situated, as the party was eager to foster nationalist feelings
amongst the Iranian workers against the 'imperialist' British;
and naturally, in the capital, Tehran.
In spite of concentrated effort in these Northern provinces,
however, the Tudeh had an only limited success. The peasants
1. RaCd-iImruz 375.
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in these areas were largely ignorant and illiterate and easily
manipulated by the wealthy landlords antagonistic to
communism. The tribes, too, were a stubborn element; in the
North, they were almost solidly for the Shah - as the Shah
Savan (Lovers of the Shah) tribe in Azerbaijan exemplifies;
while in the South, they were under the thumb of the British,
who manipulated them with financial and moral support and
threatened them into resistance to the Tudeh's successes,
which, as a result, was virtually nil.
The party had somewhat greater success among the
minorities living within Iran - the Armenians, Kurds,
Assyrians etc. It promised them equal rights and status with
native-born Iranians, but it was still in Azerbaijan, the
province most heavily affected by the Soviet occupations that
they had most influence; this was substantiated later on, when
in 1945 the Azerbaijan Democrat Party was formed, with whom
the Tudeh collaborated.
The greatest influence exerted by the Tudeh was really
among workers and intellectuals (students and professors). The
party was able to create the very powerful Central Council of
Workers' Syndicates in Iran, which by 1945 numbered some
100,000 members, and which gained much ground for their
demands through strikes and demonstrations. The appeal of the
Tudeh to students is evident in the fact that in 1951, up to 75%
of students studying at Tehran University had pro-communist
leanings, while many lecturers, secondary and primary school
teachers were sympathetic to the movement. The party also
organised a special recruitment drive among religious students,
with a large measure of success - some of the religious leaders
- Baqa'i for example - were even attracted - which, however,
proved to be shortlived.1 A limited number of government
officials lent their support, as did a substantial core of young
1. Bindar, Political Developments in a Changing Society, op. cit,, p.205.
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army officers; but a mass response was elicited from women in
Iranian society, since the Tudeh was the only party interested
in promoting and fighting for their welfare and advancement,
including their equal status with men.1
The Tudeh was thus faced with three main obtacles: the
resentment and antagonism of the ruling and middle-classes who
traditionally benefited from exploitation of the peasantry and
lower classes; strong opposition from the central government,
as well as from the British, both of whom fiercely resisted any
form of communism; and restriction caused by the weight of
Islamic orthodoxy within Iran, which was naturally anti-
communist. Despite these difficulties, however, the party built
up a solid mass of support in a very short time, and quickly
became a driving force and catalytic influence within Iranian
society.
(6) CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE TUDEH PARTY
Several clearly defined areas can be identified as
connected with the reasons for the failure of the Tudeh Party.
One resides in the class structure of Iranian society. Another
is the nature and expectations of that society and a third
centres upon the Communist element within the Party and
government-inspired reaction to it.
Leaving aside, to begin with, this last point, the
manipulation of society played a significant part in the lack
of success which the Tudeh Party achieved. A wide gap existed
and continued between the Party organisation and its
supporters because of the fear created in the atmosphere.
Tudeh ideology, initiative and leadership came mainly from the
Western-educated elitist middle-class. Its main appeal was on
the other hand, to the working class, which it genuinely
1. Asnad wa-Didagaha, pp.240-50.
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considered to constitute the grass-roots of society. Although
successful amongst the Trades Unions and workers, the Tudeh
never completely bridged the class chasm because of central
government claims that it was intolerant of alternative
ideologies; the manifestation of this governmental resistance lay
in the fact that the Party received little support from upper-
class elements. This capitulation of socialist ideal to personal
interest is a universal phenomenon.
Another popularly-propounded claim was that the Tudeh
gave little recognition to minority groups. The central
government manipulated the suspicion within rural communities
of Marxist, Persian-speaking leaders with Shi'ite backgrounds
who controlled the Party from the capital and, it was believed,
neglected minority problems. In fact there was a steady
adherence of various minority groups and this interest was
strengthened and developed after 1945 in the context of the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat movement, although much suspicion was
fuelled by insular perspectives in certain areas.
Any success by the middle-class in revolution is worthless
without rural support. The Tudeh Party, faced with the choice
of peaceful parliamentary reform or violent extra-parliamentary
revolution, chose the former (yet failed to prepare an
alternative programme if the principal measure ended in
failure). The Parliamentary solution, however, was never
viable as long as the rural community was tied to the landed
elite since this alliance prevented the radical middle-class
from attaining a majority in the Majlis. It seems, then, that
the Tudeh Party should have opted for violent action in that
situation and to counter governmental propaganda. Popular
dissatisfaction with Riza Shah' s regime was such that this
course may well have worked.
The period of active Tudeh campaigning was much
compressed because of suppression against the party: the effect
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was that the party took every chance it could to get its
message across to the masses; hence, for example, the coalition
with Qavam, which was entered for this reason, though I
agree it was a bad idea because it came to be suppressed.
The Tudeh could not create a united front in time and
could not harmonize all the democratic forces against the
governmental plotting. If, for example, Tudeh had more
successfully created a united front with centralised leadership
in the case of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan in 1945, it
might thus have supported and protected the democratic
government and survived central government suppression. In
other words, the causes of failure amongst democratic
movements must be sought in the disunity of the progressive
forces of Iran.
These errors of judgement and approach were exploited by
the central government to label the Tudeh Party as
treacherous, and to create popular antipathy. Marxist-Leninist
ideology smacked of atheism to the devout masses. In a country
with a 75% illiteracy level, knowledge of communism was
limited, or reduced to an ideology of godlessness, a popular
assumption of which the central government made much capital.
Secondly, due to widespread political ignorance, communism was
indissolubly linked with the Soviet Union; all communist parties
were, by definition, instruments of that country. It was an
easy task for the landowning classes on both accounts to
portray a Party so openly identified with communism as a
threat to personal and national integrity.
A caveat must be added here, however. Despite the
common association of the Tudeh and communism, it is not a
straightforward or simple connection. The Party was a strange
admixture of paradoxical contrasts. The backgrounds of a
number of its leading figures indicate a relgious influence
that was not entirely suppressed. At the same time, the Party
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exhibited both patriotic and nationalist tendencies - its
upholding of the Constitution and Law, for instance. Thus
although the Communist factor was obviously one of importance
it should not be used as a criterion on a simplistic or
reductionist level.
The strength of the existing government and military
loyalty and power was matched by such strong religious faith
that undisguised or diluted communism was unacceptable. Left
on its own, the Tudeh was helpless, mainly due to a lack of
armaments. The Party was ultimately defeated by internal





THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN AZERBAIJAN
(1) The Establishment of the Firqa-yi Diraukrat-i Azarbayjan
The establishment of the Dimukrat Party of Azerbaijan has
been traditionally interpreted by both Western and Persian
scholars as nothing but a Soviet creation. It is an approach
characterised by the importance given to the role of the Soviet
Union within the province of Azerbaijan: the presence of this
Communist regime has been assumed to have been such a
powerful factor that the establishment of a party with so
marked an affinity with socialist ideas could not have come
about except under its direction and aegis. This is an answer,
however, which fits the facts too neatly, a trap of which we
must beware, since it conveniently hides much more complicated
motivations and tensions.
If we are, then, to accept this as one reason (although
as we shall show later, not completely in the above form), we
must also consider and investigate alternative explanations.
These, it is suggested, are to be found in the particular
history of Azerbaijan: its internal development, and its
relationship with the rest of Iran and especially Tehran and
the central government.
Northern Iran formed the centre of the national and
democratic awakening of modern Iran: it was from (Iranian)
Azerbaijan that this movement spread outwards to other parts
of Iran. The formation of the Dimukrat Party should be seen
as the result of an inner logic within the historical development
of Azerbaijan. The root conditions for it reside in the strong
sense of national and cultural pride held by the people of
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Azerbaijan. Characteristic of such feelings were revolutionary
and democratic fervour, combined with a passionate espousal
of social and political justice; and prior to the accession of
Riza Shah, Azerbaijan had traditionally received special
attention and respect. Just these elements, however, were seen
by Riza Shah to represent a real threat to the exercise of his
dictatorship, and he embarked upon a programme of
discrimination against Azerbaijan,1 which took the form of the
elimination of a specific Azerbaijani character and culture and
the concomitant movement for democracy. Further tension was
aroused by the activities of the central government towards
Azerbaijan following the abdication of Riza Shah, which
deepened the Azerbaijanis' grievances and sense of national
humiliation while at the same time sharpening their
frustration, resentment and anger against reactionary rule.
It was therefore quite natural that many Azerbaijanis
threw their support behind Pishavari, whose commitment was as
deep and passionate as their own, and natural once again that
when the attempt to achieve a redress of their grievances
through parliament failed with the rejection of Pishavari by
the 14th Majlis, that they turned to other means, which found
their fulfilment in the creation of the Democrat Party of
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan has traditionally occupied a special position
and received special attention from the rulers of Iran, who
recognised its economic and strategic potential. Its abundant
grain crops have given rise to Azerbaijan's reputation as the
'bread-basket' of Iran,2 used many times over to avert severe
food shortages throughout the whole of Iran. Export of fruit
and leather from Azerbaijan is a valuable source of foreign
1. Nigarishi bar Sitam-i Milli dar Dawra-yi Siyah—i Silsila-yi Pahlavi, Tabriz,
1978, passim; Puny? 12, Winter 1975.
2. R. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, University of Pittsburgh, 1954, p.118.
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capital for the economy, too. Strategically, lying in the north
west corner of Iran, next to the Russian frontier, it forms the
apex of the Iranian defence triangle against both Turkey and
Russia, ancient enemies of Iran. As a province it has long
been associated in the minds of Iranians, with good historical
support, with the seat of protest movements against the central
government; its prestige rose with its pioneering role in the
1905 Constitutional Revolution. Remarks made by Dr. Musaddiq
in the 14-th Majlis indicate the regard in which Azerbaijan was
also held by the central government: Azerbaijan, he said, was
the heart of Iran; Azerbaijanis were patriotic, brave, and
determined.
Nevertheless Azerbaijan had clearly defined local
characteristics, and to some extent can be said to possess a
national character.1 In contradistinction to the majority of
Iranians who are Persian-speaking, the Azerbaijanis use a
lk< Tu
language closely related to ^Turkisry. Their sense of national
pride, which expresses itself in a demand for cultural
autonomy, can be clearly seen in events such as the Tobacco
protest of 1891,2 their participation in, and leadership of, the
Constitutional Revolution of 1905,3 the revolt of Khiyabanl
occasioned by the 1919 Treaty made by the Prime Minister with
the British,* and Lahuti ' s revolt in Azerbaijan against Riza
Shah's policy over the gendarmerie.5
Azerbaijan, before the accession of Riza Shah, was thus
considered in many respects the cream of Iran (it was even the
place chosen for the raising of the royal family). At the same
1. For a clearer understanding, see: R. Hashutiyan, Maslala-yi Mil1 at (Problems of
Nationality), Tehran 1945, passim.
2. For more details, see Avery, Modern Iran, New York, 1965, p.95ff.




time, it was the centre of what the Iranian rulers saw as
'revolutionary' ideas. Since the introduction of the
Constitutional Law in 1905, the Azerbaijanis who had fought
hardest for it, strove to ensure that it was upheld, vehemently
opposed any attempt to undermine it. The governor of
Azerbaijan appointed by Riza Shah stated that: "Azerbaijanis
are Turks. They ate hay and gained the Constitutional Law.
Now they eat straw and will reform Iran", a sentiment which
reveals how government officials feared the power of
Azerbaijan.1 Riza Shah perceived in Azerbaijan a real threat
to his rule, and proceeded upon a policy designed to weaken
and dissipate its traditional influential position. The province
rapidly deteriorated in standing, suffering concurrently a
deliberate neglect of basic economic and political rights - such
as the maintenance of roads, aid for reconstruction, etc.2
The high tax rate levied upon Azerbaijan, admittedly in
proportion to its wealth, did not, however, result in due
returns under Riza Shah. Its wealth accrued from grain was
steadily eroded and spirited away, as in the instance of 1940,
when Mustawfi purchased the whole crop at a below-market
price and sold it to Tehran; the Azerbaijanis were compelled
to buy low-grade grain from Gurgan which proved to be
poisonous, and when a complaint was brought by the Mayor of
Tabriz, Ansari, to Mustawfi, the latter merely removed him
from his post and made no attempt to remedy the situation.3
Mustawfi, even as governor, did not refrain from denigrating
the Azerbaijanis - an extant letter written by him contains the
sentence that the Director of the National Census (to whom the
letter was addressed) was to be envied: he counted people,
whereas Mustawfi was reduced to counting donkeys.*
1. Azarbayjan 6, 28th Aban, 1320 (19th November, 1941).
2. Faryad 4, 21st Azar, 1321 (12th December, 1942).
3. Dad 24, 18th Aban, 1321 (9th November, 1942).
4. Sitara 1211, 3rd Azar, 1320 (24th November, 1941); for more details of Mustawfi's
slander, see Sitara 1203, 1223; these are corroborated by reports given to me in
personal interviews.
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Part of Riza Shah's restrictive policy was a programme
to eliminate the use of Turkish. Muhsini, Director of Education
in Azerbaijan, announced a penalty of yoking, and forced
drinking from animal troughs for anyone heard speaking
Turkish;1 Zawqi, his successor, ordered the payment of a fine
for the same offence. These discriminatory measures had most
effect upon the younger students who were thus forbidden to
use their mother language; some did not begin to understand
Persian until a late age, and the education of a number of
them was seriously retarded. The policy of Riza Shah was
therefore to a large extent counter-productive, for it motivated
future generations towards reaction against the central
government, in defence against slander and abuse of their
national pride and their respect for the Constitutional Law.
The declaration made by Azerbaijanis to Tehran following
Riza Shah's abdication is a clear indication that the province
was not simply dedicated to revolution against the central
government, for in it they announced that they would forget
past injustices, and pledge support to the new regime if they
received assurances of its commitment to uphold the
Constitutional Law, and the continued wishes and rights of the
Azerbaijani people.2
There was, however, continued tension between Azerbaijan
and the central government. The Azerbaijan Society was created
immediately after Riza Shah's abdication, with the aim of
reversing the trend of discrimination, especially with regard
to the use of Turkish. The central government forbade the sale
of its newspaper, Azarbayjan, first published in Persian and
Turkish in October 194-1, outside the province, and the Society
itself was broken up after six months by Fatimi, governor of
Azerbaijan at that time,3 who stopped all publication of the
1. Kayhan, No.863, 26th Bahman, 1324 (15th February, 1946).
2. Sitara 1198, 20th Aban, 1320 (11th November, 1941).
3. Azarbayjan 26, 13th Day, 1320 (3rd December, 1941).
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paper.
Following the collapse of the Society, the provincial
committee of the Tudeh Party was established in Azerbaijan in
April 194-2,1 and attracted the political progressives, workers
and peasants who had been disappointed by the failure of the
Society.
The organisation and political tactical skills which the
Tudeh brought engendered more opposition from the central
government; members were subject to arrest, torture and death.
At the same time, Sayyid Ziya took positive action against the
Tudeh by spreading propaganda that the Party's aim was to
undermine Islam, and its members were thus infidels whose
death needed no justification.2 Harassment such as the storming
of the Trades Union Congress building in 1944, which resulted
in 7 dead and many others injured was quite common, and
1 * —there was no evidence of police intervention. Sayyid Ziya was
encouraged by the Prime Minister, Sadr, declaring a reward
for anyone killing or arresting Tudeh Party members,1* and the
army units stationed in Tabriz were used as back-up forces.
Despite this persecution both from Tehran and locally, the
Tudeh's popularly- increased, as the Azerbaijanis disapproved
of the central government's activity, and sought an
alternative. The support is reflected in the unprecedented
response at the mass meetings of November 1944, in 10
Azerbaijan cities, where the party slogans called for a return
to democracy, and renewed adherence to the Constitutional Law
gained by the forefathers' blood.5
1. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran", HEJ, January 1949, vol.3, p.48.
2. RaHbar 1511, 22nd Isfand, 1323 (13th March, 1945).
3. Rahbar 718, 25th Urdlbihisht, 1325 (15th May, 1946 ).
4. Azhir yr.2, 178, 24th Murdad, 1323 (15th August, 1944).
5. Rahbar 438, 20th Azar, 1323 (11th December, 1944).
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The central government also engaged in economic
discrimination against Azerbaijan. The rationing system was
weighted against the province: commodities such as sugar were
received in very small quantities, and usually late, causing
much hardship. Sadr ignored the multiple telegrams sent
warning of serious consequences, and a column in Pishavari's
newspaper, Azhir, devoted itself to letters and telegrams
expressing the grievances of people oppressed by the brutality
of gendarmes, short rations and a high crime rate.
The return of Pishavari himself to Azerbaijan presaged
the final steps taken in the protest of Azerbaijan against
unfair economic and political treatment of the province by the
central government, and the establishment of the Democrat
Party as a serious alternative. The rejection of Pishavari's
credentials by the 14th Majlis forced him to seek non-
parliamentary measures. The elections in Azerbaijan had been
delayed on various pretexts by Tehran, but obviously in an
attempt to gain time for official candidates to canvass and
gain election (by improper methods) instead of those put
forward locally; the government feared a progressive majority
that would oust Sayyid Ziya from the Majlis; (Sayyid Ziya
openly admitted in the Majlis his patronage by the British1).
Parliament opened without the Azerbaijan representatives and
provoked an angry reaction in Azerbaijan expressed in large
demonstrations and a flood of telegrams and letters of protest
which urged the Majlis to disown their acceptance of Sayyid
Ziya's nomination, for his influence would be a threat to
Iran's nascent democracy, and would be a disruptive element,
causing internal political conflict.2 This was later proved to
have been a correct assessment by the testimony of A. Mazlumi,
1. Azhir 133, 26th Farvardin, 1323 (15th April, 1944). British Minister to the
Foreign Office, 20th January, 1944, FO. 371/Persia 1944/34-40186.
2. For more details of Sayyid Ziya's activities, see Azhir, year 1, 119, 12th i.sfand,
1322 (21 February, 1944), 120, 14th Isfand, 1322 (23rd February, 1944), 123, 11th
fefand, 1322 (1st March, 1944), 124, 14th Isfand, 1322 (4th March, 1944), 125, 16th
Isfand, 1322 (6th March, 1944), 126, 18th Isfand, 1322 (8th March, 1944), 127, 21st
Isfand, 1322 (llth March, 1944).
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who told Azhir1 that he had been recruited by Sayyid Ziya to
spread dissension among the workers, unions and Tudeh
members in Azerbaijan. Upon arrival, however, he had been
convinced that he should not carry out the task. According to
Mazlumi, others had also been sent to different provinces for
the same purpose.
Despite government interference, the Freedom Front gained
the majority when the elections were finally held in March
1944. It is a popular myth that Russia swayed the result of
these elections, and their lack of interference was recognised
even by the British Foreign Office.2 Pishavari was thus
elected, winning 15,780 votes, a considerable number at that
time in Azerbaijan. Judging from his programme, Pishavari
took a strongly progressive stand. It was this that caused
parliament's prevarication in the confirmation of his seat.
There was an angry reaction from Azerbaijan, floods of
telegrams reaching Tehran with the accusation that although
the elections had been properly conducted and legitimate
candidates elected, these men were being refused appointment
by parliament - in contrast to its non-interference in other
regions where elections had in fact been rigged.
As a result of the prolonged and widespread pressure,
the Majlis eventually accepted the secondary Azerbaijani
candidates, but refused the credentials of both Pishavari and
Khuy'i, the first two representatives. Azerbaijanis saw in this
move a deliberate discrimination against Azerbaijan. Dr.
Musaddiq,3 an M.P. for Tehran, was also disturbed by
Khuy'i's rejection. He criticised it as a violation of the
Constitutional Law. Pishavari was refused six weeks later in
1. Azhir 2, 150, 9th Khurdad, 1323 (30th May, 1944).
2. F.O. 371/Persi a/943/34-35117.
3. Ustavarr, K., Siyasat-i Muvazana-yi Manfi dar Majlis-i Chahardahum, Teheran 1949,
2 vols, passim.
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an open abuse of justice and democratic, constitutional
principles. The close vote - 50 against, 47 for, with 3
abstentions - was itself not binding since the 100 members
present were a deficient number; Iqdam (Action)1 claimed that
greater representation might have swung the vote in
Pishavarl's favour. The whole procedure thus took place in
violation of Constitutional Law which required a 51% majority
(in Pishavari's case it was 50% and was less for Khuy'i)-
PishaVari was subsequently refused the right to make a speech
of appeal2 because parliament feared that he might convince
those members who had been persuaded to disallow his election,
that they had been deceived; one of these said that he
regretted having cast a negative vote, and was still ignorant
of why Pishavari's credentials had been considered invalid.
Similarly, his speech might reveal to the public the
unconstitutional nature of the elections and parliament's role
in the whole procedure.
Many of Iran's progressive papers did indeed come out
in condemnation of Pishavari's rejection, warning the Majlis
that it would lead to disastrous consequences for the country.3
Parliament ignored these and similar telegrams from other parts
of Iran (such as Rasht and Khurasan);" Sadr declared that he
could not answer one or a hundred telegrams. If the protests
from Azerbaijan are read carefully, they make it clear that
they had in mind a well-defined programme for Azerbaijan) and
did not simply make vague and insubstantial threats. If
P'ishavari was rejected by the Majlis, the Azerbaijani people
would return him again in Azerbaijan through alternative
1. Iqdam 526, Tehran.
2. Azhir 2, 171, 1st Murdad, 1323 (23rd July, 1944).
3. Dad 29, 24th Azar, 1321 (15th November, 1942), Khavar 5, quoted in Azhir 170,
27th Tir, 1323 (18th July, 1944), Rahbar 336,
4. Azhir 2, 174, 12th Murdad, 1323 (3rd August, 1944).
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political means.1 P'ishavari alluded to these intentions in his
final speech before parliament. Since he had been refused
acceptance to the Majlis, he would enter politics in some other
way.2 He further clarified this position in a later article in
Azhir,3 where he said that he knew the meaning of the 15,780
votes he had received (i.e. the Azerbaijanis1 determination for
political redress of their cause), and that he was committing
himself in response to the trust that they had placed in him,
to defend their rights by whatever means were at his disposal.
In addition to the indigenous push which culminated in
the creation of the Firqa—yi Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan, there are
several secondary factors involved. The national character of
the Azerbaijanis was responsible for their political awareness,
which was much greater than that of other provinces, and
restlessness against the landowners. The generally fragile
political situation in Iran encouraged the ruling class' neglect
of the minorities within the country. Exploitation more than
improvement for them was uppermost in Tehran's mind as it
grew richer and the provinces poorer, and the administration
enjoyed various personal advantages and privileges.
British policy was to insist on the retention of
concessions in Iran gained through the rule of Riza Shah and
which, like any concessions, was opposed by Azerbaijanis. To
carry the policy out, Britain supported the reactionary
opposition which was suppressing the democratic movement;
Sayyid Ziyi, was allowed to return from Palestine by the
British to assist the opposition against, for example, the
Tudeh Party.
The Russian attitude on the other hand, gave Azerbaijan
1. Azhir 2, 167, 20th Tir, 1323 (11th July, 1944); 168, 22nd Tlr, 1323 ( 13th July,
1944).
2. K. Javadiyan, personal interview.
3. Azhir, 170, 27th Tir, 1323 (18th July, 1944).
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a political opportunity. Azerbaijan was a zone of Russian
influence, and this enabled the people's political power to
mature, influenced by Soviet socialism. The Soviet influence
was also a deterrent to interference from the central
government in Azerbaijani affairs.
(2) Pishavari in Tabriz
The closure of the parliamentary option led Pishavari to
consider alternative methods for achieving authentic recognition
of the proper status of Azerbaijan.1 While still in Tehran, he
conducted a joint correspondence with both Shabistari, leader
of the Azerbaijan Society, and Bakharov,2 President of Soviet
Azerbaijan, on the matter of obtaining Soviet moral and
financial support for the setting up of a new party in the
province. With this assurance in hand, he returned to Tabriz,
leaving Azhir to be edited by friends.3 Further consultation
between Pishavari and Shabistari resulted in the decision to
establish the Firqa-yi Dimukrat After 3 days of talks with
-Padagan, who was leader of the Azerbaijan branch of the
Tudeh, all 3 then agreed that the Tudeh should be incorporated
into the new Party once it had been founded: Padagan was to
announce its formal membership at the Tudeh conference. This
confluence is accounted for by several factors: Prior to the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat; there existed only 2 progressive parties
within Azerbaijan - the Tudeh, and the Freedom Front.* The
latter was set up by Pishavari and Shabistari, and thus it
was natural that they should unite. In the same way, the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat desired the support, rather than the rivalry,
of the Tudeh whose aims were almost identical with its own.
1. Javadiyan, personal interview August 1982.
2. Kuniholm, B., The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, P.U.P. 1980, pp.274-
5. " ~~
3. Oniki-yi Shahrivar, Tabriz 1946, p.l.
4. Ibid., p.l.
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The Tudeh for its part, was willing to join its support in
order to improve its widespread and broad following,
to broaden' further its appeal to the working-class, to
increase toleration of different ideologies and to
consolidate its non-revolutionary principles.1 The trades union
movement, too, came under the aegis of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat,
as a result of its link with the Tudeh. With the amalgamation
of these 3 movements into the Firqa-yi Dimukrat a single,
united, and broad based revolutionary front for progressive
action was created in Azerbaijan* The policy adopted by
Plshavari was that of minimising class differences and
maximising the joint conflict against Tehran- "Our aim is to
unite all Azerbaijani people. The class struggle will not
appear until we have secured our national rights"; he appealed
to industrialists and workers to "put aside class differences
and unite for the national good of Azerbaijan"*2
Physical recruitment to the Firqa-yi Dimukrat proved a
more difficult task. The failure and political insincerity of
previous progressive parties had created an air of mistrust
among the population, which made canvassing a singularly
unfruitful activity, when it was coupled with the effects of
oppression and threatening propaganda from the central
government. Instead, Pishavari published on September 3, 19453
(first issue of the newly established organ of the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat - Azarbayjan), a twelve-point declaration of purpose,
which was intended to be distributed among the people for the
signature of those who agreed with it.
It was widely read to those who could not read, however,
yet despite a number of signatures, many were still withdrawn
later out of fear, a fact that was not overly disappointing to
1. Kishavarz, in Aras 2, 11 Day, 1326 (1st January, 1947).
2. Azarbayjan, No.l, 14th Sharivar, 1324 (5th September, 1945), No.5, 26th Shahrivar,
1325 17th September, 1945).
3. Dunya 4, 1979, pp.70-74. Farquhar to Bevin, April 1946 [E 3499/3/34] PRO, p.l.
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Party's leaders. Its publication - eventually with 48 signatures
- had an impressive reception; telegrams sent from all over
Azerbaijan and printed in the official organ of the Party,
Azarbayjan,1 were full of congratulations and signed in
increasing numbers. The first issue contained telegrams from
Ahar, Marand and julfa. with 87 signatures each;2 in the
second, the signatures exceeded 250 per telegram;3 750 in the
third,* and on into the thousands.
The introduction to the declaration put Azerbaijan's
struggle for national provincial representation into the context
of international democracy - rights which were exercised by
most progressive countries, and which were guaranteed in
theory but not in practice, to Iranians as well, by the
Constitutional Law. Azerbaijan was committed to adherence to
this Law, and thereby to a central government which respected
it, and therefore given the world situation, with democracy
victorious, it would no longer' tolerate oppression by the
central government. In the new need for a progressive party
to rule with reference to the wishes of Azerbaijanis, the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat would serve the need for a focal point,
around which progressives from all strata of society could
gather.
The subsequent twelve points amplified this position:
Point 1: While the Firqa-yi Dimukrat respected the integrity
1. Shabistari had edited a newpaper of that name for the Azerbaijan Society; the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat subsequently adopted the same title for its own organ, and
Shabistari remained as its editor although Pishavari retained overall editorial
authority. The paper had a significant propaganda function within the Party, written
as it was in Turkish, the mother tongue of Azerbaijan, (as well as Persian).
2. Azarbayjan 1, 14th Shahrivar, 1324 ( 5th September, 1945).
3. Ibid. 2, 17th Shahrivar, 1324 (8th September, 1945).
4. Ibid. 3, 20th Shahrivar, 1324 (11th September, 1945).
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and independence of Iran, it also sought autonomy
for i Azerbaijan in order that it might improve its
culture and carry out construction programmes.1
Point 2: In order to achieve this quickly, a provincial body
should be elected to begin work immediately. It
would be active in cultural, economic and medical
spheres, and would be vigilant in replacing without
delay those government officials found to be unsuited
to their job.2
Point 3: Turkish was to be taught to third year levels in all
primary schools, and thereafter both Turkish and
Persian. A national university of Azerbaijan was to
be established.3
Point 4-: The Firqa-yi Dimukrat Party would try to improve
industry and to increase the number of factories in
Azerbaijan. It would also aim to reduce unemployment
as quickly as possible, partly through encouraging
cottage industry as well as heavy industry.
Point 5: The Party wanted an increase in trade: since the
closure of trade routes had caused hardship to
peasants, they would look for other outlets and
extend opportunities for selling Azerbaijani products.
Point 6: They called on all citizens of Azerbaijan to unite
towards the modernisation of their cities - one of the
immediate aims was to purify the water of Tabriz.
Point 7: The Firqa recognised that the wealth and well-




being of the country depended on the peasants, and
therefore urged them to be receptive to improvements
and reform. To improve relations between peasants
and landlords the Party proposed to lift the heavy
taxes levied on the peasants. They also desired the
redistribution of lands vacated in a hurry by the
wealthy and that belonging to the state amongst the
landless peasants, and the availability of modern
equipment to be made to them.
Point 8: Immediate alleviation of unemployment would be
effected by building factories, increasing trade, and
constructing a railway network and new roads.
Point 9: They expressed belief in free and true elections,
with no interference by government officials etc.
Elections should take place on the same day
throughout Iran, and should be conducted on the
basis of proportional representation.1
Point 10: The Firqa-yi Dimukrat
corruption amongst civil
same time work for a
employees to avoid the
would commend work done
promised to fight against
servants; they would at the
raise in salary for such
need to take bribes, and
well.
Point 11: Half of the tax raised by the central government
would be spent by the Firqa on internal
improvements within Azerbaijan, and they would try
to reduce the amount of indirect tax demanded.
Point 12: The Party wished friendly relations with all
democratic countries, especially the Allied Powers;
1. Par-tin, M.W., United States - Iranian Relations, 1945-1947, North Texas State
University Ph.D., 1977, pp.69-70.
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to achieve this, they would fight any nation opposed
to such relations.
The conclusion of the declaration announced that the
Firqa primary responsibility was to the support of
Azerbaijan. The reforms of i Azerbaijan would be of benefit to
the whole of Iran, so that only after these had been carried
through, would they turn their attention to those parts outside
Azerbaijan.
The publication of the declaration provoked an immediate
response from the central government, which initiated a
campaign alleging that Azerbaijan was demanding secession
from Iran in order to set up an independent state. To
counteract any possible negative effects of this propaganda,
Pishavari called a meeting of Azerbaijanis from all strata of
society, designed to clarify the position taken by the Firqa:
drawing a map of Azerbaijan within the totality of Iran in the
air, he made it clear that the Party's demand was for political
autonomy within Iran.1
With any suspicions or doubts thus allayed, the
organisation and activity of the Firqa began in earnest.
Local branches were set up under the direction of provincial
organisers in various towns and cities, and efficient prior
planning ensured quick success for the party. A general
meeting was convened on September 13, when a centralising
body in the form of a provisional committee of 11 was elected.
Pishavari was appointed its president, with Shabistari as his
deputy. The C.C.U.T.U. announced its decision to unite, and
the Tudeh's membership was promised by Padagan and Qiyami;
the strength gained from the Tudeh support was recognised by
1. Reza Shahshahani, "The Background of the Iranian Affairs", Science and Society,
London, 1946, vol.10, p.130.
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the appointment of Tudeh members to the central committee.1
A further, preparatory conference was held on September
20, before the first Congress, planned for October 1st.
59 delegates were elected to represent the different strata
within Azerbaijan society; (1500 people attended the meeting).
The conference was also taken as an opportunity to express
the Firqa's policy in a formal petition2 addressed to the
respective Foreign Offices of the Allied Powers. The concern
felt by Azerbaijan over the suppression of democracy in Iran
was laid out, and, with an appeal to the 2nd principle of the
Atlantic Charter,3 a request was made for freedom to establish
democracy in Iran, and to achieve the political autonomy in
Azerbaijan* that would accord with the people's wishes
concerning their own destiny.
During the 3-day Congress, several important steps were
implemented. The amalgamation of the Tudeh and the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat was officially confirmed (Azarbayjan stated that
60,000 Tudeh members joined the new party'); and the
manifesto was approved® and the central committee elected, with
Pishavari as head, and Shabistari and Padagan as deputies.
The policy adopted closely resembled the declaration of
September 3, with additions such as the right to freedoms of
speech, press and association.7 Until November 1st, local
1. ^brah^mian, "Communism and Communalism in Iran: The Tudeh and the Firqah-i
Dimukrat", IJMES 1 (1970), p.309.
2. Rahbar, 640, 6th Azar, 1324 (27th November, 1945).
3. Kuniholm, Origins of Cold War, op. cit., p.103 (Charter of March 1941).
4. Ibid., p.280n.
5. Azarbayjan 5, 26th Shahrivar, 1324 (17th September, 1945).
6. Farquhar to Bevin, op. cit., p.l.
7. Tulsiram, The History of the Communist Movement in Iran, Bhopal (n.d.), p.103.
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conferences were to be held throughout Azerbaijan to elect their
committees; the franchise to vote was to be open to all, of
either sex, between the ages of 20-80. In the meantime,
thousands of supporters from all over Iran arrived to
congratulate the Party's founders, and gathered outside in a
clear indication of the enthusiasm generated towards the new
movement, (in parallel to the widespread and broad-based
character of the delegates at the Congress itself).
The Congress of October 1 represented a very significant
movement in the history of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat Party. Its
official recognition of the new movement gave to the Party an
authoritative status in the minds of many Azerbaijanis, who
saw it as the real embodiment of their hopes for national and
political autonomy.1 It acted, therefore, as a crystallisation
of the organisation, and as a catalyst which attracted strong
support for democratic demands. Its popularity became so
evident that the Firqa drew much publicity from countries
outside Iran, both negative and positive. As a result of these
combined factors, the central government felt the Firqa to be
a dynamic threat, and reacted vehemently in a series of
repressive measures.
(3) The Road to Independence
The transformation of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat into the
National Government of Azerbaijan was due primarily to force
of circumstances, rather than being a natural consequence of
policies adopted by the party. Its constitution did not include
a necessary progression from party status to its establishment
in the role of governing body in Azerbaijan, although one of
its basic demands was for autonomy in Azerbaijan. The
development was in fact a result of external pressures which
acted upon the Firqa and its particular situation so as to
1. Farquhar to Bevin, op, cit., p.l.
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make the step from party to government almost inevitable.
Two factors were of extreme importance. We have already
explained the nature of the peculiar tie of need and solution
which existed between the Firqa-yi Dimukrat and the people of
Azerbaijan. With the increasing popularity and success of the
Party, two contenders for influence and political power were
created - the other, the official structure organised by the
central government.1 It was not possible for the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat to retain its status as a minority group in the face
of a rival movement whose actions were authorised and official.
In order to develop, it was therefore forced to act on a
similar level. This meant that it was in effect levering for
political power on a national basis.
The second element was the strong governmental pressure
against the Party which increased Firqa resistance to any
— C—
control of Azerbaijan from or by Tehran. In consequence, Sa id
was Prime Minister from March 1944- and was considerably
biased towards Britain, as shown by his unofficial 'title',
'British Stooge', used by pro-Russian Liberals, the Tudeh and
«- c
the Freedom Front. During his premiership, Sa id had to
confront a number of problems, most seriously the "workers'
revolt"2 in Isfahan3 which threatened to become general if the
Tudeh was not quickly suppressed,* and which was followed by the
Oil Concession crisis in the North involving the Soviet Union.
Following this and the revolt of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, the
Premier had to resign. Two schools of thought dispute the true
motive for the withdrawal of Parliamentary confidence. One
1. Azarbayjan 8, 29th Shahrivar, 1324 (20th September, 1945).
2. N. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg of Iran, New York, 1954, p.216.
3. See the British Consul's 'Bi-weekly Reports', FO 371/Eastern 1944/Persia
34-40163.
4. Ra'd-i Imruz, 15-25 May, 1944.
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suggests1 merely that Hakiml", the replacement premier, would
be less biased between the two powers, Britain and Russia; the
more cynical view2 is that the deputies' fear of a Northern
separatist revolt forced them to agree to Russian conditions for
— — ^ c -
a conclusion of the crisis. Hakimi assumed office from Sa id on
24th October, 1945, and immediately proved himself to have as
little neutrality3 as his conservative pro-Western and anti¬
democratic predecessor as exemplified by Hakiml's actions on
November 14th, * when several days of severe anti-Tudeh
repression followed.
Hakim! thus led the reactionary core within the central
government that was supported by the reactionaries who had
fled from Azerbaijan. This group was so insensitive to the
mood prevalent in Azerbaijan that the government was regarded
as completely intransigent and unwilling to compromise or
negotiate.5 In this way the Firqa and the central government
represented a total bifurcation and polarisation of forces. This
situation is exemplified in the reaction to the activity of the
Mayor of Tabriz.6 His refusal to recognise the newly elected
council was taken up by the Firqa with the central government
as a breach of Constitutional Law. Tehran ignored all the
Firqa's complaints, impelling the Party towards the decision
that they would be forced to take the matter into their own
hands. They thus ordered the newly elected Council to take up
1. Ruznama-yi Rasmi, year 1, no.181, p.563.
2. /Jbrahimian, "Factionalism in Iran: Political Groups in the 14th Parliament (1944-
46)", Middle Eastern Studies, p.42.
3. la&ari, K., Iran's Policies Towards the United States during the Anglo-Russian
Occupation, 1941-46, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, p.201.
4. Arfa.Gen. Hassan,Under Five Shahs, London, Murray, 1964, p.346.
5. One of the oppressive measures taken by Tehran was its refusal to give Azerbaijan
any money to pay wages or salaries.
6. Azarbayjan 9, 30th Shahrivar, 1324 (21st September, 1945).
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its duties.1 Similarly, their response to the tolerance by the
government of gendarme brutality in the rural areas was the
formation of Fida'i groups.
Soon after the formation of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat and its
obvious support amongst the peasants and workers of rural
areas, the Central Government became alarmed and in order to
support the landed classes, sent the gendarmerie to wage a
campaign of oppression against rural Firqa support. In the
long term,2 however, this worked to the advantage of the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat; many fleeing from the terror ran into the
arms of the Party and began to support it for the counter-
measures which it took to defend them against the gendarmes'
brutality.3 In addition, judicial procedure was drawn into the
campaign. Local courts were advised to treat acts performed by
the gendarmerie (which included violation of private property
and even sexual harassment) as outside their jurisdiction and
to turn away complaints made by peasants. Many of the latter
took flight into the mountains and deserts; some reached other
cities and spread the details of government oppression.
The initial response of the Firqa itself was passive. It
published its grievances abroad through foreign consulates and
embassies in Iran, but the reaction was negligible. Turning to
the internal reaction, a long list of 78 complaints was sent
from the Firqa to Musaddiq* containing grievances against the
persecutory regime of the gendarmerie against innocent victims
in the rural areas. But there was no positive response from the
Central Government; indeed coverage was prevented in Iran
by banning sales of the paper Azarbayjan outwith the
1. Azarbayjan 9, 30th Shahrivar, 1324 (21st September, 1945).
2. Mardum, Special Number 38, 21st Bahman, 1324 (10th February, 1946).
3. Azarbayjan 8, 29th Shahrivar, 1324 (20th September, 1945).
4. Tabari, op. cit., p.202.
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province and by restricted mail services. The government's
attitude indeed produced immediate repercussions as the
movement realised that peaceful solutions had been exhausted.
On November 15th crowds led by the Firqa seized the
gendarmerie posts in several important cities. The seizure on
18th November by the Firqa-yi Dimukrats of Miyana cut off the
province from the capital; the central government, however,
insisted that General .DarakhshanI, who had Tudeh sympathies,
remain but prepare to evacuate, rather than to capitulate
immediately.
Furthermore the Firqa published a statement declaring
self-defence of this sort in the villages to be legal. Groups of
young workers formed Fida'i bands, armed by the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat, and had much success in counteracting the
gendarmerie's activity in the villages.
This dialectic between oppression and jostling for power
was extended by a third element. There existed in the province
a great eagerness for the Firqa-yi Dimukrat to take the reins
of power more firmly into their hands. They thus urged the
Party towards forming a national government as the logical
outcome, as they saw it, of the Firqa's own aims and
promises.
Thus the Firqa-yi Dimukrat entered its second stage of
development, wherein all its members, and particularly the
leaders, began to take comprehensive steps towards establishing
the Party as the National government in Azerbaijan.
The first task was seen as educating Azerbaijanis as to
the importance of local and parliamentary elections, and was
undertaken by means of the Party newspaper and through
conferences. The most significant was a committee meeting held
1. Arfa , op. cit., pp.346—347; Fatemi, op. cit., p.269.
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on November 8th. It was resolved to start upon positive action
to facilitate and work towards the establishment of a national
government. To this end, the decision was taken to establish
the national government of Azerbaijan, without official
permission from the government in Tehran, on December 12,
194-5.1 Provincial and local elections were ordered, and a
statement was issued with the following points:2
a) Provincial and parliamentary elections were to be held
regularly, and any attempts to delay them would be
opposed.
b) The formative period of the Firqa was over. It was now
able to fulfil the wishes of Azerbaijani people and set up
a national government.
c) A pledge was taken that following the provincial
elections, a conference would be organised at which the
newly elected representatives would meet.
d) Members of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat were promised 'cards',
signed and stamped by the central committee, to give
them official recognition.
e) A body for organising young Azerbaijanis would be
created whereby several people would be elected to
instruct young people as to their duties.
f) The formulation of a solution for ending gendarme
brutality in the villages, including the mobilisation of
all Azerbaijanis against the gendarmes.
The provincial elections were announced immediately after
1. Farquhar to Bevin, op. cit., p.2.
2. Oniki—yi Shahrivar, op. cit., pp.16-18.
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this committee meeting had taken place. They were followed by
the staging of the First National Congress in Tabriz on
November 20th.1 The chair was occupied by the brother of
Sattar ■ Khan, the nationally-acclaimed champion of constitutional
law from Azerbaijan, and 800 delegates2 were present to hear
the introductory speeches on contemporary events. Analysis of
these statements demonstrates that the speakers had no
separatist intentions, each concluding his address with the
words "Long live Iranian independence, integrity and
freedom" and "Long live Azerbaijani autonomy" (note, no
reference to independence).
KhalTl Azad3 stated that "Our aim is that the
Constitutional Law be properly obeyed, and we appeal to the
reactionaries in Tehran to put an end to the cruel oppression
and slander perpetrated against the Azerbaijani people".*
Khurramdln* said that to ask for a Provincial Council
was not to seek separation from Tehran. Their aim was still to
send representatives to the National Parliament in Tehran, not
to break off relations with Tehran. The wish to establish a
National Parliament of Azerbaijan came from the view that it
would do the work presently performed by the Provincial
Council.
KhurdishT6 said "My speech is addressed to the enemies
of the Azerbaijani people, those who slander us with
accusations of separation. We never want to separate from
Iran. Azerbaijan belongs to Iran and Iran to Azerbaijan".
1. New York Times, 27th November, 1945.
2. Dunya 8, 1978, p.47.





Sayyidi1 commented, "We can rule ourselves better than
others can rule us. All the slanders of the opposition have but
one motive - the suppression of the Democratic Movement. I
believe Azerbaijan should first reform itself, then the rest of
Iran, because Azerbaijan is at the very heart of this country".
PishavarP himself said that the Iranian authorities
preferred to solve the Azerbaijan problem in London,
Washington, or Moscow, rather than solving them in the
Azerbaijan, at Tabriz, as part of the Iranian problem. The
question had to be resolved in Iran. Because Azerbaijan was
a friend of the Allies, they should not interfere in either
Iranian or Azerbaijani affairs, and he concluded,3 "Now, we
are able to govern Azerbaijan ourselves. We do not want to
separate from the rest of Iran; we ask only for autonomy,
Azerbaijan is not India. The Azerbaijani nation is a vibrant
one and it has a shining history. It gave birth to people such
as Sattar Khan, Baqir Khan and Shaykh Muhammad KhiyabanT.
We want national autonomy; we want out trade, our health¬
care, our education, our communication systems, everything, to
be in the hands of Azerbaijani citizens. Freedom is not
something which will be handed to us as a plate. It will have
to be fought for. If the central government chooses to
suppress this movement by force, we will retaliate with force".
The Congress elected a National Committee of 39 members.
Its main function consisted in taking on the role of
intermediary with the central government in the negotiations for
autonomy and the right to establish a national government in
Azerbaijan. These were to be conducted through peaceful means;
it did not possess authority to say anything against the
independence and integrity of Iran.




The Congress also issued a declaration1 and sent copies
to the central government officials and the foreign consuls in
Azerbaijan. Careful reading of this document reveals the
Congress' policy towards the rest of Iran, and particularly
towards Azerbaijan.
The text of the declaration read as follows:
1) Azerbaijan has a right to autonomy because of her
particular experience, her history, and cultural and
linguistic differences, and a right to enjoy democratic
government in accordance with the Atlantic Charter. The
wish to establish a large amount of self-government for
Azerbaijan does not mean, however, the acceptance of a
threat against Iran's integrity or independence.
2) The National Congress, -by claiming autonomy, does not
intend the redrawing of Iran's borders, nor to be part
of a separatist movement.
3) Azerbaijan supports the democracy which was granted by
the Constitutional Law in 1905-6. In keeping with other
provinces, Azerbaijan would send representatives to the
national parliament and pay a fair tax to the central
government.
4) Congress expresses clearly and officially its respect for
the integrity and independence of Iran. At the same time,
however, it will set up an Azerbaijan national government
to control Azerbaijan's own affairs. It will thus
introduce democratic government sanctioned by
Constitutional Law.
5) According to the Manifesto of the National Congress,
1. New York Times, op. cit.
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Azerbaijanis would vote for a national parliament. The
national government would be composed of people from
this parliament, people responsible towards Azerbaijanis.
6) Azerbaijanis have a special affection for the Turkish
language. By forcing people to speak an alien language
(Persian), they are prevented from improving their
education, literacy, etc. The National Congress therefore
mandated a National Commission whose task would be the
reintroduction of Turkish into all official documents and
posts, and the ensuring of its inclusion into the
curriculum of all schools.
The statement of policy issued by the National Congress
was an even more important document1 than the declaration,
although some of its points exhibit a close similarity to the
declaration. It concentrated upon the demands for democracy
and autonomy being made in Azerbaijan as being legitimate in
international terms and also loyal to the Constitutional Law
within Iran itself. Such demands did not represent a wish for
secession from Iran nor a willingness for a violation of Iran's
integrity and independence. The National Congress declared
that since Azerbaijan could be considered a nation it should
be allowed national autonomy in the form of a provincial
council which would operate as a national parliament, and
proposed the candidates for these elections, as well as those
for the Iranian parliament. The national parliament would give
to Azerbaijan the good law required for the determination of
its own destiny, denied to it by Tehran, and would ensure
political, economic, educational and cultural freedom for the
establishment of autonomy. Power to implement such measures
by removing central government officials from their posts,
enforcing the teaching of Turkish in all schools, and elimination of
1. Pisyan, N., Marg Bud Bazgasht Ham Bud, Tehran, 1326/1947, pp.61-3.
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treacherous elements within the police and army, was given to
a National Commission. Members of the National Congress had
power to supervise the elections to the National parliament,
and to safeguard the Commission by all possible means.
In Pishavari's closing speech,1 he stressed the need for
close supervision of elections to prevent corruption; the need
to inform foreign nations, the central government, and above
all, Azerbaijanis themselves, of the Party's aims; and the
urgent necessity of preparing a manifesto for the National
parliament, setting the mode and date of elections, how many
MPs there were to be (in the national government and
parliament), and. defining the constituencies. By the time the
Congress disbanded, the National Commission had set the date
for the elections for November 21st.
The elections in Azerbaijan2 for the National parliament
constituted the first in Iranian history to be conducted fairly.
The electorate had been warned to ignore any propaganda and
trust only those candidates whom they knew to be worthy.
Those who were not members of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat had the
right to stand for independent election. In response to the
pure nature of the election procedures, the majority of
Azerbaijanis actually participated in the voting, for the first
time.3 Over 5 days, approximately 23,951 votes were gathered
in Tabriz.4 The large number corresponds to the conviction of
the electorate and to the lack of pressure or coercion, as can
be seen quite clearly from the low number cast in ten days in
the elections for the 14-th Majlis held a few months previously.
Despite coercion to vote from the central government through
1. Supra. National Congress, 3rd Session, November 20, 1945.
2. New York Times, op. cit. Lenczowski, S., Russia and the West in Iran 1918-48,
New York, 1949.
3. Azarbayjan 59, 12th Azar, 1324 (3rd December, 1945).
4. On-iki-y-l-Sh-abr-iv-ar, op. cit., p.31.
5h K L r 7 V 1 f 0liik»5«.
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bribery etc., the poll was only 11,000, indicating that most
people were indifferent, or did not trust the central
government. The November 21st elections demonstrated the trust
which the Azerbaijani people placed in the Firqa-yi Dimukrat,
on the other hand, for the total number of votes cast,
Pishavari as its leader, gained 23,550.
The results of the elections clearly illustrated the
popularity achieved by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat. At the same
time, they also encouraged the Party to go ahead in opening
the National parliament. The elections were so successful in
proving the unity of purpose of the Azerbaijanis that even the
opposition element were not able to deny the appeal of the
Party. Its success silenced those who were most antagonistic to
the Firqa's claim to be the party which most represented the
people. Despite this, however, the central government
endeavoured to play down the Party's popularity as it was
reflected in the elections results. Their propaganda suggested
that the Firqa-yi Dimukrat gained its support not from local
Azerbaijanis but rather from Russians who had crossed the
border to vote for a party led by a handful of adventurers.1
This assertion is also reflected in the reports that appeared in
the foreign press.2
Despite this propaganda the growth was very rapid; from
creation to government took only a period of 3 months from
September 3rd to December 12th and must have been grounded
in a majority of support. This could have well been despite
any assistance profferred from the Soviet Union in military or
financial terms. Socialism cannot be readily exported unless the
ground is ready to receive it and although the Azerbaijani
1. Partin, M.W., U.S.-Iranian Relations, Ph.D. thesis, North Texas, 1977, p.103.
Pisyan, op. cit., p.37.
2. London Times, 29th April, 1946. Muller, "Behind the Scenes in Azerbaijan",
American Mercury, June 1946, p.701.
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people were not aware of socialism, the circumstances for its
reception, in the face even of the strong religious element,
prevailed: in particular the suppression by the central
government prepared the region for the democratic movement.
(4) Azerbaijan's National Government
The purpose of the establishment of a National Government
and its aims were definite and clear-cut from conception
through to fulfilment. It is, of course, true that the initial
desire of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat did not include the formation
of an autonomous government. Yet despite their deflection as a
result of non-cooperation by the central government, their
demand for the upholding of constitutional law - i.e.
democratic rights - in Azerbaijan did not change. While the
Firqa had originally envisaged the agent to be the central
government, it finally took the job into its own hands and
thereby set up the National Government of .Azerbaijan, in order
to establish and maintain the liberty and rights of the
Azerbaijani people in Azerbaijan.
The National Government took office and started work
straight after December 12th.1 What the ministers lacked in
experience they made up for in dedication. Pishavari, as Prime
Minister,2 was able to lead and to guide with his political
background and expertise.3
The actual day on which the National parliament opened,
1. Rahbar 658, 29 Azar, 1324 (20th December, 1945).
2. The other ministers were: Biriya - Education; Javid - Interior; Kaviyan - Defence;
Ilhami - Finance; Rasuli - Commerce and Economics; Azima - Justice; Mahtash -
Agriculture; Awrangi - Health; Kabiri - Post & Telegraph. Note that there were
ministers neither of Foreign Affairs nor of War. See Rahbar 656, 27th Azar, 1324
(18th December, 1945), 658, 29th Azar, 1324 (20th December, 1945).
3. For more details of parliament procedure, see Az.arbayjan 79, 23rd A_zar, 1324 (14th
December, 1945).
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December 12th, is of particular significance due to two factors.
Here, the twin role played by the central committee is of vital
importance. Members of the central committee were appointed as
heads of the local Fida'i groups (General Khabiri in Maragha,
Danishiyan in Miyana, and Panahiyan in Tabriz) and their
organisation concerning the safeguarding of the electoral
proceedings on this day, as well as the personal safety of the
candidates, played the largest instrumental part in ensuring its
unspoilt and uninterrupted conclusion. Fida'i groups from
outside the city were brought in to surround Tabriz, while the
local group disarmed the police and army, who threatened to
break up the proceedings; barracks were taken over all
through Azerbaijan, such as cAjabashir, Maragha, etc.
Simultaneously, other members of the central committee
were given the responsibility of removing governmental officials
from office, and taking over government buildings and posts.
It was thus due to the efficiency and dedication to their cause
exhibited by the central committee that through the confusion
and disturbance inevitably caused by the takeover, the
National Parliament was guaranteed the necessary circumstances
in which to carry out its programme. Pishavari was elected
Prime Minister; parliament requested him, as a matter of
urgency, to make known his Cabinet and to present his
programme for the National government that same afternoon.
The first objective that the Government deemed most
urgent, was a cleaning-up operation of all those government
officials at present in office who were part of the widespread
corruption which was prevalent. It was an arduous and
lengthy task, since most were remnants from Riza Shah's long
dictatorial rule;1 yet the new ministers were aware of their
responsibilities to the people and were anxious for it to be
done as quickly as possible.
1. Azarbayjan, 23rd Azar, 1324 (14th December, 1945).
- 195 -
Their second aim concerned the prosperity of the
province.1 With this in mind, the National Government issued
a declaration setting out the steps by which they proposed
to achieve their goal:2
1. the private sector of the Azerbaijan economy was
to be restricted.
2. all offices were to come under the supervision of
the National Government, while all officials would be
expected to carry out their duties efficiently and
responsibility.
3. obedient officials would be rewarded through the
improvement and grant of appropriate work
conditions, those who shirked their work would be
dismissed.
The National Government had been formed in order to
improve the quality of life in Azerbaijan, and every
member of society therein had a role to play.
Everyone was expected thus to participate in the
efforts to build up society by working industriously
and conducting themselves in honest behaviour. Those
who created friction or were a disturbing influence
upon the public in any way, or who embezzled from
employers, or who failed to work to the best of their
ability would be regarded as enemies of the people
and treated as such.
All officials were to devote themselves to the
welfare of Azerbaijan and her people, and the
National Government was prepared to do all it could
to encourage and realize this attitude.
The issue of this declaration, together with the personal
dedication among the individual members of the Government,
did much to effect a considerable up-grading of the reputation
of the Azerbaijan bureaucracy, for the populace quickly
recognised the sincerity and determination within the National
Government with respect to its promises.3
The Cabinet announced to all the Foreign Diplomats living
1. Rossow, R., "The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946", MEJ, vol. 10, 1956, p.19.
2. Tabari, K., op. cit., p.218.
3. See Chapter 5 passim.
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within Azerbaijan that they were quite at liberty to remain
and their safety would be guaranteed. This also applied to any
foreign nationals residing temporarily or permanently in the
province. It was also announced that the government had
taken over responsibility for the finances of the province. State
officials would be allocated responsibility over parts of this
but any laxity or dishonesty would be brought to a court of
law.1
In conjunction with this operation, the National
Government began steps to re-deploy and re-organise the three
branches of the security-forces; the army, the police and the
gendarmerie.2
Alongside police and army reforms, the gendarmes also
laid down their arms, and left their posts. At the time of the
formation of the National Government the gendarmerie had been
arresting a large number of people and jailing them. The
Parliament then approved a general amnesty for all prisoners,
put into effect upon the surrender of the gendarmes, an act
which seemingly ended this source of disturbance. The National
Commission, prior to the Government, had tried to secure the
release of these prisoners, but the act was only fully completed
upon the passing of the amnesty.
The last, and most difficult stage, was the subjugation
of the army. The delicacy of this problem was compounded by
the fact that the army took its orders from Tehran, where the
government - unimpressed by the provincial opposition - was
at no pains to find a peaceful solution.
Colonel Darakhshani, commander of the 3rd Division of
the army in Tabriz, tried to resolve the difficulty by
1. See Chapter 5, section on court reform.
2. See Chapter 5 for reform of police and army.
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requesting orders from Tehran-1 They arrived at 8pm on
December 13th, instructing him to call a meeting of his senior
officers towards reaching a decision concerning the best course
of action to adopt - in other words, whether or not resistance
was practicable.2 The Firqa-yi Dimukrat in turn put
considerable pressure upon Darakhshani for a quick decision,
especially because it was widely believed that the central
government was intending opposition. It was a suspicion
harboured even more readily since the Commander-in-Chief of
c
the Armed Forces, General Arfa. , was a particularly right-wing
officer, son of an English woman and hence thought to be pro-
British, and a monarchist sympathiser. The suggestion of his
involvement encouraged the belief among Azerbaijanis that the
supposed plot was his inspiration, and hence many lives might
be lost.3
Simultaneously with Darakhshani's meeting, Pishavari
invited the officers to another meeting, at which he explained
the aims of the newly-formed National Government, the
importance of the army's surrender, and the danger of
resistance.1' As a result, a truce was duly signed between the
army and the National Government of Azerbaijan.
The terms of the truce® arranged for the army's laying
down of its arms, and co-operation with the National
1. Darakhshani, interview in Firman, in which he was asked whether it was his
personal decision to surrender, or a direct order from Teheran. He replied that it
was his own, since he feared the strength of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, and he thus asked
Teheran to give their approval to this decision; see Rahbar 656, 27th Azar, 1324,
(18th December, 1945).
2. Rahbar, op. cit.
3. For more details, see: Arfa, Under Five Shahs, passim.
4. Personal interview with Col. Javadiyan (August, 1982), who was present at
Pishavari's meeting.
5. Rahbar 656, 27th Azar, 1324 (18th December, 1945).
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Government. The document, signed in duplicate, decreed that
for the short term period, the army was to be confined to its
barracks until further notice, so that the National Government
could organise all the necessary provisions, and supervise the
collection of munitions. All the officers were given the free
choice to leave Azerbaijan under the safe conduct of the
National Government, if they did not wish to remain and
co-operate with the new authority.1 Those wishing to stay
would be required to take an oath of loyalty, and would
thereafter resume their commissions and live in good conditions.
After swearing the oath, all ranks would be returned their
arms and recommence normal duties.
After the truce was signed, Darakhshani then requested
the publication of a declaration on the day following, December
14-th, which ran as follows:
"Tabriz barracks lay down arms"
According to the decision of the meeting of senior
officers, to prevent bloodshed, and in deference to
the wishes of various groups including merchants,
it was agreed that the Tabriz barracks would l_ay
down arms and respect the truce between Darakhshani
and Pishavarl, which was signed by Darakhshani,
Commander of the Third Division, December 14.2
Yet despite these commitments, the agreement under the
2nd article of the truce was quickly broken by Colonel
Bahrain? when he encouraged his officers to disregard the
curfew that had therein been imposed upon the barracks. The
officers' lead was followed by their men, and the night was
spent in wrecking and looting their accommodation. Ammunition
1. Personal interview with Col. Javadiyan (August 1982), who exemplifies those army
officers who chose to leave.
2. Rahbar 659, 30th Azar, 1324 (21st December, 1945).
————— .a
3. Personal interview with Col. Sharifi and Col. Javadiyan, March 1982 and August
1982.
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was also seized and distributed throughout the town - a
dangerous act which might have caused considerable bloodshed
in spite of the motive of sabotage. The same thing happened
under Col. .Zangana1 in Urumiyya. This was avoided mainly as
a result of the prompt and courageous response of the Fida'is,
supported by the National Government and its appeal for calm
from the people in the face of what was regarded as a plot
inspired by the central government.
The remainder of the army units within Azerbaijan also
submitted with little or no resistance. The few protests were
easily overcome by the National Government, and the violence
was in fact on a much lower scale than that reported by
Tehran. 2 Celebrations and street parties followed throughout
Azerbaijan as expression of their relief at the successful
accomplishment of what had been expected or anticipated as a
formidable task. They reflected, too, appreciation of the
wisdom and ability of the National Government in its avoidance
of bloodshed.
It was recognised, however, that major tasks still lay
ahead in the form of continued opposition from several
quarters. Not only was the central government irate: Azerbaijan
had now become the focus of international attention, and was
thus attracting slander and denigration from multiple sources.
These included opportunists, hoarders; landowners (such as
ZulfaqarT and Yamln Lashari in Zanjan); smugglers and
criminals supported and armed by Tehran.3 False propaganda
concerning supposed Azerbaijani 'separatism'4 and 'atheism',5
1. Personal interview with Col. Sharifi and Col. Javadiyan, March 1982 and August
1982.
2. For more details, see Pisyan, op. cit., passim.
3. This verified by eye-witnesses in a personal interview with Or. A. Puri and Mr.
Iskandari, and Mrs. Naqshina.
4. Rahbar 644, 11th Azar, 1324 (2nd December, 1945).
5. Ibid, 646, 13th Azar, 1324 (4th December, 1945).
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and claiming the movement had a Russian, not indigenous
Azerbaijani1 base, from the central government mushroomed, in
proportion to its fear that other parts of Iran might follow
Azerbaijan's lead. In order to deal with these threats, the
National Government concentrated upon the organisation and
deployment of the Fida'I.
The Fida'i were divided into two groups: one continued
their normal duties, with arms; the other was subdivided into
sections to provide defence. The basic problem facing the
National Government, however, came in the form of their
inability to provide either group with basic essentials. The
Fida'i constituted, in the majority, of workers, peasants and
other non-privileged volunteers. Yet with no money forthcoming
from the central government, the National Government did not
have the wherewithal even to feed or clothe them. The answer
was found in the re-opening of those factories that had been
closed and the commencement of production, and this source was
further supplemented by generous donations from the general
populace - a measure of the groups' popularity which was
effected by the introduction of a system of government bonds
and a just tax system.2 As a result, the Fida'i gained in self
confidence and pride, establishing groups in places such as
Maragha, Sarab, Ardabil and even Zanjan. They possessed a
strong motivation and moral urge, yet their offer to march on
Tehran and take over the capital was turned down.
Such an action was representative of the typical approach
adopted by the National Government. There are several reasons
to indicate that in this case, however, it was a mistaken one
1. For more details, see Rahbar 647-8, 14th—15th Azar (5th—6th December, 1945), 649—
654, 16th—22nd Azar (7th—12th December, 1945).
2. Cf. Chapter 5 for more details of the labour movement and taxation system.
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that should have been avoided. The lesson from the past should
have intimated to the Government that Tehran had always
succeeded in crushing previous democratic movements, and
would try to do the same now.1 If in fact, they had marched
on Tehran, in the opinion of many observers2 the broad
sympathy towards their cause, derived from general
dissatisfaction, would have given them ample support to end
the oppression of the central government. Although this was not
in fact done, there did take place negotiations between
P'ishavari and Qavam, during which a useless provisional
treaty was attempted. During the ensuing three months of
negotiation, the suppression of the Democratic Movement was
planned; and its execution is described in Chapter 6.
(5) Reaction Against the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
It is appropriate to divide the reaction against the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat into two parts, internal and external. These
correspond to pressure which came from within Iran, primarily
from the central government, and to international coverage of
the movement, both from the West and from the Soviet Union.
At points, the two aspects merge into one and we will indicate
as much.
The central government played a major role in the
reaction against the Firqa-yi Dimukrat on two fronts, as it
were. The Firqa, in its first three months, was a rapidly
growing movement which was attracting widespread support
within Azerbaijan. It was able to recruit members from all
segments and strata of society towards the pursuit of
democratic ideals and autonomy for Azerbaijan. It thus posed
1. A. Azarl, Qiyam-i Kulunil Muhammad Taqi Khan-i Pisyan, Teheran, 1950, and Shaykh
Muhammad Khiyabanl, Teheran, 1944, passim.
2. A similar drawing of implications exists in Azarbayjan 212, 9th Khordad, 1325
(30th May, 1946).
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an increasing threat and challenge to the conservative elements
which dominated the central government. This, then, was a
confrontation between rival groups struggling for power. On the
other hand, the central government itself was split and divided
amongst itself at this time. The foci of these dual aspects
related to Azerbaijan as a province, and secondly to Tehran.
The immediate policy adopted by the central government
towards the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was suppression leading to its
elimination.1 The campaign had been initiated by action
against progressives and radicals throughout Iran. Trade
unions were shut down and the leader of the movement ( Rusta)2
was arrested. It was in fact at this period also that the
terrorisation by gendarmes ran at its most brutal.3
The terrorisation employed by the central government was
aimed towards preventing any successful implementation of
social and democratic reform, and autonomy which would lead
eventually to a democratic government in Azerbaijan. It was to
a large extent, however, a blind policy. The central
government was during this period suffering an acute crisis of
factionalism.H The premiership changed hands alternately
between Sadr and Hakiml. Both were in actual fact under
British influence (as indeed was most of the government),5 and
the British favoured the government status quo against the
1. Rahbar 632, 25th Murdad, 1324 (16th August, 1945); 632-4, 25th—29th Murdad, 1324
(16th— 20th August, 1945); 637, 1st Shahrivar, 1324 (23rd August, 1945).
2. Cronin, S.M., Industrial Agitation and Tribal Unrest in South Iran 1946, M.A.
Dissertation, 1981, p.65.
3. Rahbar 633-4, 25th—26th Murdad, 1324 (17th—18th August, 1945 ); 637, 1st Shahrivar,
1324 (23rd August, 1945).
4. Abrahimian, "Factionalism in Iran: Political Groups in the 14th Parliament (1944—
6)", MES, vol.14, no.l, passim.
5. Kay Ustavan, Siyasat-i Muvazana-yi Manfi dar Majlis-i Chahardahua, vol.1, Teheran
1949, pp.127-8. Mew York Times, 5th December, 1945.
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democratic movement in Iran. Sadr's appointment was resisted
by the nationalist minority in the Majlis, led by Musaddiq.1
They refused to take their seats on the grounds that Sadr was
(constitutionally) too old; his anti-constitutionalism and
collaboration with Riza Shah' s dictatorship was well known;
and the vote was inquorate (68 out of 125 did not constitute a
three-quarters majority).2 Hakimi, who was Musaddiq's last
•
_ •
resort and was backed by Sayyid Ziya and ultimately, therefore
by the Shah, pressed for a stronger government to deal, as
they saw it, with the Soviets. Qavam, and the other members
of the Democrat Fraksiyun, on the other hand, sought
progressive democracy, the aim, too, of the the Tudeh Party.
The Records of Procedure of the Majlis indicate that the
parliament was too caught up both in personality and power
conflicts to be capable of formulating an adequate or realistic
opinion of the aims of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat. It therefore came
to the mistaken conclusion that the Firqa was simply an
artificial party made up of adventurers and manipulated by
traitors.3 The military option that was adopted on these
grounds ultimately foundered on the resistance to the
gendarmes, and the non-co-operation of the Soviet Union.
During the crisis, the Soviet Union professed to regard
the movement as a democratic movement struggling against the
reactionary approach of the central government, and treated it
as a legitimate indigenous demand for local rights,* refusing
to allow the central government to send reinforcement troops to
her garrisons in Northern Iran. She stated that repression led
to bloodshed and an increased troop presence would mean an
escalation of unnecessary violence;5 she also desired to follow
1. Razm, year 1, no.109, pp.453-454.
2. Ibid.
3. New York Times, 5th, 5th, and 9th December, 1945.
4. Rahbar 643, 10th Azar, 1324 (1st December, 1945).
5. For more details, see Rahbar 548, 15th Azar, 1324 (6th December, 1945).
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a policy of non-interference. It was the opinion of the Soviet
Union that the problems of the North were caused by the
central government; no government should need recourse to such
measures if it held the confidence of its people. The Soviets
would therefore guarantee the non-participation of troops in the
terror imposed by the gendarmes.
The central government subsequently took up a different
track, upon diplomatic lines. A more subtle plan was adopted
by which it was hoped that the Azerbaijan people could be
deceived if an ostensibly efficient and sympathetic governor
were appointed. Able to win their support, his offers of reform
would in actual fact be a pretence, yet would, it was hoped,
persuade the people to turn against the Party leaders. Bayat1
was given the post, and indeed was an excellent politician.
This plan failed, too, however, for the Firqa's leadership was
politically mature and saw through the central government's
attempt to use them as pawns in a political chess game. The
Firqa-yi Dimukrat was able to counteract the government's
propaganda with its own, and restrict the effectiveness of the
former. Therefore its position was strengthened among the
Azerbaijanis as a consequence of the dichotomous approach
employed by the Tehran government.
The propaganda campaign undertaken by the central
government had widespread repercussions in the international
arena.2 Britain especially felt the situation to be a
particularly sensitive one for her position in the Middle East,3
1. For details of the Bayat deception, see Rahbar 648, 15th Azar, 1324 (6th
December, 1945), and 649, 16th Azar, 1324 (7th December, 1945); and New York Times,
30th November, 1945.
2. Pisyan, op. cit., p.31; London Times, April 29, 1946; Rahbar 644-5, 11th and 12th
Azar, 1324 (2nd and 3rd December, 1945 ), 649-650, 16th and 18th A£ar (7th and 9th
December),. 653, 21st Azar, 1324 (12th December, 1945).
3. For a more comprehensive understanding, see Kuramangalam, M., Iran at the
Crossroads, Bombay, 1946, passim.
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and accordingly turned what were originally, and in essence,
internally Iranian affairs into the focus of world attention.1
This centred first of all on international press coverage
of the supposed march on Tehran by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat,
armed with Soviet weapons, on November 19th.2 Reuters
announced that London believed or suspected that such an event
could not be organised without the support of the Soviet Union.
The conclusion thus drawn by Britain was that the Soviets
intended a take-over of Iran and it was therefore Britain's
duty to intervene to prevent this and in some way to safeguard
Iran's democracy and independence, which she saw threatened
by the separatist Firqa-yi Dimukrat movement. However, Bevin's
note3 to the Soviet Union asking permission for Iranian troops
to move into Iranian Azerbaijan was answered with a firm
rebuttal, which indicated that the Soviets believed the central
government to be at fault, and that it should not
need additional troops in Azerbaijan, if indeed it held
the confidence of the people." Britain, still fearful that
such a democratic movement should spread outwards from Iran,
took the matter to the U.N.,5 where she was supported by the
Iranian representatives, who reflected the views of the central
government. In this way, external opinion was given to
believe that the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was a separatist movement,®
whose victory was to be decried; the local Iranians were by
the same measures and means kept ignorant of the actual
nature of the Firqa. The U.N. delegates, cAla' and Taqizada,
1. Axarbayjan 212, 9th Khordad, 1325 (30th May, 1946).
2. Kuramangalam, op. cit.
3. Pisyan, op. cit., p.45.
4. For the full communication between SU/GB/Iran, see Pisyan, op. cit., pp.34-8.
5. London Times, 6-8 May, 1946. A^arbayjan 212, 9th Khordad, 1325 (30th May, 1946).
6. Rahbar 644, 11th Azar, 1324 (2nd December, 1945).
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were in fact double instruments of the British1 and Iranian
governments: on the insistence of the British, the central
government encouraged its U.N. representatives to take the
problem to the General Assembly, and thus turn it into an
international issue. Its status as an international problem
would give the central government weight to force the Soviet
Union to withdraw its support of the movement, and leave
Tehran free to crush it.
We can thus see quite clearly the process whereby the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat came to be labelled as a separatist
movement: it was a necessary ploy of the central government,
in its attempt to remove Soviet influence against the crushing
of the movement, to declare it to be a separatist movement
since only as such could it be constituted as an international
problem and be brought to the U.N. Not only so, but the
fundamental instigation came from the British, who were
suffering under the Cold War atmosphere and were fighting
fiercely any suspected attempt of Soviet-backed movements
spreading in any part of the world. If it had so wanted,
world opinion could easily have understood the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat as an autonomous movement on the model of the United
States' system of State government. In its refusal to accept
this view, the prevailing attitude persisted in identifying
'autonomy' with 'separatism', declining to recognise that
political, cultural or economic autonomy was being sought by
the Firqa solely for an Azerbaijan within Iran. The party was
seeking for popular participation, so that Iran could be united
as a country.
If historical facts are accepted, it will be seen that the
really disruptive movement was that among the Southern tribes,2
who were acting under the influence of the British. As a
1. Ajarbayjan 212, 9th Khordad, 1325 (30th May, 1946).
2. See Chapter 6, section 3.
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planned warning as to the consequences of an autonomous
Azerbaijan. the British encouraged the Southern tribes to
agitate for their own autonomy, to show how the idea would
snowball throughout all Iran.1 The Southern tribes had formed
a precedent in that respect already in the 1920s,2 with the
British using Shaykh Khaz al on that occasion. In contrast to
the Southern tribes, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was truly
democratic, its aims directed towards an end to the
discrimination against Azerbaijan by the central government,3
an end to British influence in and over Iran, and to Sayyid
Ziya's terrorisation connected with it," and to end up finally
with the setting up of a democratic government initially in
Azerbaijan, and then to Tehran.
Despite the misrepresentation of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
within Iran, the populace soon understood its true nature and
aim: the march on .Tehran never materialised; the Firqa
realised its promised reforms within Azerbaijan and indicated
that they were thus not simply empty verbalisations. It
further confirmed its desire to co-operate with the central
government by accepting the peace treaty proffered by
Qavam, both to diffuse the slander, and to show that it was
indeed autonomy and not separation, that the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
wanted.
The central government propaganda against the movement
was in the long term to the advantage of the Firqa and
Azerbaijan: the highlighting of the political, geographical,
historical and economic importance of Azerbaijan focused
attention on the Azerbaijanis as a nation, different from the
other nationalities in Iran, with their own language, customs,
1. See Chapter 6, section 3.
2. See Chapter 1, p.32.
3. See Chapter 6, section 3.
4. Rahbar 644, 11th Azar, 1324 (2nd December, 1945).
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etc. It was pointed out that Azerbaijan was ethnically different
from the rest of Iran not only within Iran, but also in the
international press.1 It was this kind of national identity
which lay at the heart of this considerable enthusiasm for
autonomy and which inspired the impetus which encouraged the
badly-needed reforms, which were executed by the National
government and are to be discussed in the following chapter.
1. London Times, May 11, 1946.
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CHAPTER 5
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE FIRQA-YI DIMUKRAT
When the National Government of Azerbaijan was
established under the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, its main aim was
directed towards a comprehensive reform of all Azerbaijan,
since the province had for the past 20 years during the rule
of Ri'za Shah, been totally ignored and neglected, as we have
attempted to show in the previous chapter. The reforms enacted
in the single year that the National Government survived
exceeded all those introduced throughout the previous 20 years.
They included land reform, division of land among the
peasants, re-opening factories or building new ones, generally
reducing unemployment, reconstruction of cities, resurfacing of
roads, creating Fida'i groups, establishing the National Army
of Azerbaijan, improving education, introducing a national
health service, reducing the crime rate, lowering of inflation,
prohibition of profiteering and the black market, and ending
the coupon system.1 Law was made equal for all Azerbaijani
citizens, the national language was made the official one, even
in government documents. A theatre holding 800, and 50
general hospitals, with 700 beds were built.2
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat was created in order to fulfil what
it saw as the wishes of the people of Azerbaijan, and to take
the destiny of Azerbaijan into their hands in order to defend
the territory from the conservative and arbitrary central
government rule. One of their goals was to use their income to
1. Zafar 283, 28th Khurdad, 258, 27th Urdibihisht, 1325 (16th June and 17th May,
1946~
/
2. Ibid. 363, 4th Mihr, 1325 (26th September, 1946 ); Dad, 23rd Khurdad, 1325 (13th
June, 1946).
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effect the necessary reforms that were long-overdue. Pishavarl
declared: "We are not against capitalism. On the contrary, we
can use capital to reform Azerbaijan. We are trying to make
Azerbaijan a wealthy province. Therefore, our wealthy people
are not detrimental to us but rather, can benefit us all. We
take advantage of their work to use it for the benefit of Iran.
We do not have class conflict: we want democracy for all
Iranians".1 He thus encouraged both public and private
enterprise.2
The reforms of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat were achieved in
such a short period of time primarily due to the support given
both to the party and to its programme throughout Azerbaijan.3
According to the newspaper Dad, in support of eyewitness
accounts, the workers were willing to do whatever needed to be
done whenever it was required, and tried to match the rapidity
of the reforms with the speed of their own labour.* The party
quickly reached a position of power, and acquired much
popular support, since the Azerbaijanis recognised the
oppressive and inefficient nature of the central government's
dealings with Azerbaijan. They resented the apparent
disparagement of Azerbaijan made by local government officials;
and the peasants, who were subject to harsh treatment at the
hands of local landowners, backed by the gendarmerie, decided
to turn to the Firqa-yi Dimukrat as being what they saw as
the only viable alternative. Thus young and old, peasants and
landowners, workers and employers alike gave their support to
the party.5
1. Azarbayjan 1, 14th Shahrivar, 1324 (5th September, 1945); 5, 26th Shahrivar, 1324
(17th September, 1945).
2. See labour movement below.
3. See Chapter 4.
4. Dad, 3rd Murdad, 1325 (25th July, 1946); and also various personal interviews
with appropriate contemporary figures, summer 1982.
5. Ibid., 7th Murdad, 1325 (29th July, 1946).
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The Mailis refused to pass PishavarT's credentials,
because of their fear that he might press Russian policies and,
consequently Azerbaijani discontents were given a chance to
participate in their own political development. According even
to Central Government sources, local branches of the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat were established and quickly sprang up throughout
Azerbaijan where people were free to meet for political
discussion, represented by all strata of society. Where no local
branches existed, local people would join together and request
instructions from the party. In different areas there would
occasionally be competition in forming local branches.1
One influential newspaper comments that Pishavari and
and the Firqa-yi Dimukrat leaders realised first of all the
social and economic ramifications of the central government's
20 year policy towards Azerbaijan. During WWII, prices and
inflation had soared. One of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat' s first aims
was to reduce prices by 40% throughout Azerbaijan,2 and thus
set up a series of 'government shops'. Foods and materials
were supplied to these and then sold at a special low fixed
price. Custom was attracted to the government shops away from
others, forcing these to lower their prices in turn, with the
general effect of lowering inflation and ending the coupon
system previously in operation.3
Pishavari was anxious to put a stop to the coupon
system, whose disadvantages he saw clearly when it was
introduced in Tehran by the Millspaugh Mission,* for it
produced and stimulated black-market trading. The black
market further encouraged hoarding, since suppliers knew that
by creating shortages they could demand higher prices. It also
1. Personal interview with Mr. Iskandari, September 1982.
2. Iran-i Ma 861, 8th Aban, 1326 (30th October, 1947).
3. Dad, 22nd Khurdad, 1325 (12th June, 1946).
4. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia, Washington, 1946, p.141.
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increased corruption through the production of counterfeit
coupons.1
Two types of government shops were created: one where
payment was in ready cash, and the second, which extended
credit with a 12% interest rate.2
With this 40% decrease in prices, food became much
cheaper. 3 kilos of bread which would previously have cost 11
rials, now only cost 6 rials. House rents also came down. Since
inflation was reduced, civil servants, despite receiving 25%
less than the rest of Iran, were not in real terms any worse
off than these, according to the C.C.U.T.U.3
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat leaders reportedly also took great
interest in the telegraph system operated in Azerbaijan,
because it was felt to be vitally important for communication.
Within 2 to 3 months, it was running more efficiently than the
Tehran system had ever functioned.H
Pishavarl was keen that the wealth of Iran should be
used wisely and effectively. Thus, for example, he is known
to have ensured that large lorries that had been imported from
America but which had lain idle in Tabriz simply for the want
of spare parts or for minor faults, were repaired and restored
to working order. They subsequently then became a great asset
to Azerbaijan.5
A public works programme figured largely in the
immediate purposes of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat. Road repair and
1. Dad, 8th Murdad, 1325 (30th July, 1946).
2. Ibid., 9th Murdad, 1325 (31st July, 1946).
3. Zafar 363, 4th Mihr, 1325 (26th September, 1946).
4. Dad, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th Tlr, 1325 (15th, 16th, 17th, 18th July, 1946).
5. Ibid., 13th Murdad, 1325 (4th August, 1946).
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construction, schools, hospitals, environmental concern, sport
complexes, port maintenance, etc. were all part of the reforms
envisaged and implemented. We can best see the achievements
made through looking at the reforms enacted in Tabriz,
Marand, Khuy and Riza'iyya (Urumiyya).
It is well known that the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, while
instituting reforms throughout Azerbaijan, were naturally
concerned primarily with the condition of the capital, Tabriz.
People enthusiastically welcomed the proposed reforms, and
actively participated in their implementation: the streets of
Tabriz, for example were tarmaced by workers during the right
to cause minimum disturbance, and one street was so finished
in only a few nights.1 An unbiased source reported that the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat was able to transform a graveyard into a
public square in only 6 days due to the eagerness and
willingness of the workers. The National Square was then used
by civilians for military manoeuvres every morning, and as a
speaker's podium, since a platform was also erected.2
The enthusiasm of workers was further exhibited in the
restoration of the Shah ^jjoll park, where builders worked 24
hours a day to get it finished quickly. Shah fj'ali, one of the
largest parks in Azerbaijan, situated in the south of Tabriz,
was one of great beauty, with a lake in its centre. The park
had been built by cAbbas MTrza i-;;r ■ Qajar to provide a
communal leisure centre, and in the hope of using the lake as
an emergency supply of water. Nothing of this sort was ever
built under Riza Shah, and those parks that had been made
were left unattended, almost becoming animal reservations.
Plshavarl, however, began to take great interest in Shah C^li
and determined to restore it to its former glory. The lake was
cleaned, trees and shrubs planted, a generator was installed
1. Did, 25th Tir, 1325 (16th July, 1946).
2. Ibid., 9th Murdad, 1325 (31st July, 1946).
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to provide electricity to light the park, and Pishavari had
built on the east side a mental hospital, within the grounds
of the park.1 A newspaper article stated that the governor's
residence, the Tabriz Ustandarl, was another building which
the Firqa-yi Dimukrat restored after its fall into disrepair
during Ri!za Shah' s rule. Pishavari took the building in hand,
had it repaired, redecorated, modernised, and planted flowers
and trees in its grounds.2
Several sources confirm that a major and unique feature
in the provinces, was the erection of Tabriz radio station. The
Firqa-yi Dimukrat were concerned that unbiased and true
reports of the situation in Azerbaijan should be heard, instead
of the portrayal given by Radio Tehran, the central
government, national papers and even foreign correspondents.3
Radio Tabriz was welcomed and not only within Azerbaijan or
even Iran, but in neighbouring and distant countries as a
voice of democracy and freedom.* In order to play down the
achievements of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, however, Tehran was
saying that the party had not in fact established a station
but were really disguising it as Radio Baku heard in Tabriz.
The reality was that the radio station was built within 10
days, equipped with receiving equipment bought from the Soviet
Union, and a young clerk from the school of Post and
Telegraph studies in Tehran was put in control. Radio Tabriz
reputedly had a better range of programmes and a more
powerful transmitter than Radio Tehran.5
1. Dad, 3rd Murdad, 1325 (25th July, 1946).
2. Ibid., 25th Tir, 1325 (16th July, 1946).
3. Zafar 283, 26th Khurdad, 1325 (16th June, 1946); personal interview with Gen.
K. Javadiyan, August, 1982.
4. Personal interview with Gen. M. Iskandari, August 1982.
5. Dad, 4th Murdad, 1325 (26th July, 1946).
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Radio Tabriz instituted the practice of going out into the
streets to speak with the people, gathering their opinions and
asking for information. It devoted a few hours a day also to
a programme especially for Kurds; and to this end in Mahabad
the capital of Kurdistan, a local studio was set up with four
microphones.1 This Kurdish programme was misunderstood in
Tehran and Tran-i Ma insisted that, "Now, Kurds have their
own radio station".2 It is generally accepted that Tabriz radio
played an important part in the Azerbaijan movement, giving
full and accurate reports concerning contemporary Azerbaijan
affairs.
Perhaps the other most important feature introduced by
Pishavari was the installation of running water in Tabriz. The
pipes were brought from the Soviet Union, at a cost of 15
million rials, and a total length of 31 miles laid within
Tabriz.3
Many well-known cultural reforms were also instituted:
and there was constructed a large theatre, in which films on
economics and politics, entertainment and education were
shown.* The Firqa-yi Dimukrat broadened their cultural
horizons, too, by founding an Irano-Russian Society, where
discussions of both cultures were held, and eminent figures
from both countries were invited to speak.5
Education in both its practical and theoretical aspects
was encouraged. Apart from many ordinary high schools built,
one for training railway drivers and engineers was set up,
for there was a severe shortage of labourers on the railways,
1. Dad, 6th Murdad, 1325 (28th July, 1946).
2. Iran-i Ma, 1st, 2nd Khurdad, 1325 (22nd and 23rd,
3. Dad, 13th Murdad, 1325 (4th August, 1946).
4. Ibid., 10th Murdad, 1325 (1st August, 1946).
5. Ibid., 11th Murdad, 1325 (2nd July, 1946).
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and even following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops,
management of the railways was still largely in Soviet hands.1
This circumstance resulted partly because no Azerbaijani had
yet completed the course, and because Tehran had delayed
sending the requested specialists to take over from the
Russians.2 A military academy, police school and the University
of Tabriz were all established by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat to
serve the whole of Azerbaijan.3
The people of Azerbaijan, more so perhaps than any other
in Iran, were devoted to the ancient history and glory of
Iran, her independence and integrity. This is clear from the
erection under Pishavari of numbers of statues of the great
figures of the past throughout towns in Azerbaijan, a
_ c —
circumstance that was unique in Iran. Statues of Shah Abbas
the Great and Nadir Shah, for example, were common in the
province; Plshavari replaced a statue of Riza Shah in "Bagh-i-
Gulistan, one of Tabriz's parks, with that of Sattar Khan, who
was regarded as the national hero and defender of the
Constitution in Iran.* Thereby can be seen the respect held by
all Azerbaijanis for the ancient history of Iran, and her
national heroes.
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat' s reforms were, not limited to the
major cities, but extended to smaller towns, such as _Marand,
for example. Marand is a town about 26 miles from Tabriz with
a population of 12,000. It is known that within 2 or 3 months
of reforms being instituted, all Marand's streets had been
tarmaced, and 15,000 trees planted; a road three miles long
was built between Marand and Yazji; public baths, 3 schools
and 3 clubs, a national park and a library constructed, the
1. Dad, 21 Tir, 1325 (12th July, 1946).
2. Ibid.
3. Ses Sections below.
4. Dad, 14th Khurdad, 1325 (4th June, 1946).
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latter providing night-classes for a total of 240 men and 60
women. Communally life was improved through the
establishment of a hospital which had vaccination facilities,
and the town council budget was raised from almost nil to a
sum sufficient to pay the salaries of its staff and employees.
A local committee of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was set up and all
over Marand party posters and slogans were displayed in
Turkish.1
Two examples can also be taken from Western Azerbaijan
- its capital Urumiyya (then known as Riza'iyya) and Khuy.
Urumiyya was an important town for the added reasons
that many Kurds lived in the environs, and it was close to the
Soviet border.2 To combat illiteracy in Urumiyya, the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat set up evening classes, and established a school
which catered particularly for underprivileged students,
providing them with meal and clothes.3 Clubs and trade unions
were also founded, and a local committee with 16,000 members.'1
A theatre and cinema were put up, roads built, repaired,
tarmac-ed, the gutters repaired, the dilapidated park was
re-opened and modernised, and a bridge constructed over the
rebuilt reservoir of Nazluchai, the water also being used for
irrigation purposes in the summer.5
Khuy, with a population of 35,000 had reportedly received
no reforms whatever during the rule of Riza Shah. Its streets
went unpaved, there was no electricity-supply or drinking
1. Dad, 17th Khurdad, 1325 (7th June, 1946).




4. Ibid. 855, 14th Mihr, 1325 (6th October, 1946).
5. Ibid. 781, 17th Tlr, 1325 (8th July, 1946).
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water. When the National Government was established, the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat embarked on a comprehensive public works
programme in the town. All streets were tarmac-ed and
widened, a marsh-drainage scheme was inaugurated to regain
the malaria-free conditions that had once obtained during the
Soviet Occupation - one member from each family was drafted
to work on the scheme; running water and electricity were also
supplied. Electricity had previously been controlled by private
investors who charged such extortionate prices that few could
afford to take advantage of it. The Firqa-yi Dimukrat,
however, nationalised it, making it generally available.
The contrast between the rule of Riza Shah and the
nature of the National Government under the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
is sharp and of great proportions. It is commonly believed that
Riza Shah himself refused to institute any reforms; he also
failed to encourage, and even positively discouraged, private
citizens from carrying any through, attempting to confiscate
their wealth for himself. An example of this is shown in the
case of A. MakuyT, who effected reforms in Maku: MakuyT was
killed on the order of Riza Shah who subsequently appropriated
his wealth.1
Thus it can be seen quite clearly that Riza Shah had no
interest in towns or villages. In Julfa, for example, despite its
position near the river Aras, there was a permanent water
shortage; its inhabitants had to pay 300 rials for an hour's
supply of water. In spite, too, of its geographical importance
- Julfa lies on the Soviet border - no attempt was made to
ensure its inhabitants' loyalty through a decent standard of
living: no medical facilities or electricity supply existed, nor
drinking water, and there was only a single school for the
whole town.2
1. Personal interview with Mr. A. Puri, August 1982.
2. Dad, 19th Khurdad, 1325 (9th June, 1946).
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Bazargan, too, was another strategically placed town,
since it was the gateway to Turkey and Europe. In the past,
Bazargan was known as the Asian trade-route, and during the
Safavid period, great interest was shown in Baku and Bazargan
in respect of the defence of Iran's trade. Nevertheless,
"Bazargan was neglected under Riza Shah - its roads
degenerated, a telegraph system was introduced only with the
advent of the Soviet occupation, and the town was in general
totally forgotten.1
Salmas, with a population of c. 15,000, was also
reportedly neglected by Ri'za Shah despite having suffered a
severe earthquake. A good deal of relief aid was raised, yet
only one tenth of the entire sum was actually spent on
reconstructing the town, and rehousing its inhabitants. When
the Firqa-yi Dimukrat took over, however, they established an
electricity supply, system, provided drinking water, repaired
and built roads, and constructed schools.
Through this brief comparison, the amount and quality of
the reforms instituted by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat is pointed up
clearly. In one year, December 19-45 to December 1946, the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat may be thought to have introduced more
reforms than in the whole history of Iran, whatever part of the
country be considered. This is particularly important to
Azerbaijan., since during the Pahlavi period many scholars
believe that Azerbaijan had consistently been neglected as a
consequence of the Azerbaijanis' political consciousness. The
following sections will deal with the main areas of reform
effected by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat during this single year.
The National Army
The establishment of a national Azerbaijan army was a
1. Dad, 31st Khurdad, 1325 (21st June, 1946).
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particularly delicate operation for the National Government to
undertake. In view of the highly emotional and bitter response
of the central government in Tehran to the autonomous status
claimed for Azerbaijan, and both its and international media
insistence that the Firqa-yi Dimukrat headed a separatist
movement whose ultimate aim was secession from Iran (and
alliance with the USSR),1 a National army might well, and
would almost inevitably, be construed as a direct step in that
direction: an open challenge to Tehran's authority.
Nevertheless, the National Government felt the threats emanating
from the central government to be sufficiently serious as to
warrant the need for an Azerbaijani national army, to protect
the rights of the province to autonomy. Prior behaviour on the
part of Tehran had shown that the Central Government was not
willing to uphold in any measure the Constitution, which
theoretically guaranteed such rights.2
As a first step towards confirming the loyalty of
Azerbaijan to Iran, and to the central government, the
National Government omitted from its posts that of a separate
Ministry of Defence.3 The National Army was also initially
intended to be made up of volunteers. This decision was later
overruled in favour of 1 year conscription for all young
Azerbaijanis between the ages of 20-29. * Pishavari explained
this change of attitude in an article entitled: "For all, all,
all", in which he took the opportunity to outline the necessity
for an army and to appeal to those of conscription age to
enlist in support.5 The bill was passed on 30th Azar, 1324
(21st December, 1945) by the National Parliament, and as
1. Razm, supplementary no., 2nd Day, 1324 (23rd December, 1945).
2. Lockhart, "The Constitutional Laws of Persia", HEJ, vol. 13, 1959, p.378.
3. Rahbar 556, 658, 27th and 29th Azar, 1324 (18th and 20th Oecember, 1945).
4. Ibid. 644, 11th Azar, 1324 (2nd December, 1945).
5. Azarbayjan 120, 18th Bahman, 1324 (7th February, 1946).
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expected there was immediate angry condemnation of the
legislation from the central government.1 The National
Parliament simultaneously elected a Supreme Council of War,
which was to prepare a paper setting out the regulations for
the conscripted soldiers.2 The formation of the National Army
of Azerbaijan was announced on January 11th, 19463 by
Kav'iyan, It was a day of celebration, with students marching
through the streets to the army headquarters to express their
gratitude. Workers and peasants gathered at a mass meeting
displaying banners covered with slogans such as: "In order to
safeguard the National Government of Azerbaijan, all should
join the National Army"; "At any moment, at any time, we are
ready to defend Azerbaijan"; "Long live the National
Government and National Army of Azerbaijan"; "Azerbaijan are
proud to serve in their National Army".* The Minister for
Education, BTriya,s addressed the crowd (made up of all
strata of society, men and women), saying that the Azerbaijani
people had been oppressed for a long time. They had only
known freedom since December 12th when the National
Government had been instituted. Now, in order to preserve their
liberty, it was incumbent upon them to safeguard the
Parliament of Azerbaijan and its province. Therefore, the
National Army deserved their support; thereby, they could all
demonstrate to their opponents their willingness to die rather
than to give in.
Biriya's speech was followed by that of Padagan.5 In the
past, he said, conscription legislation had only been realised
through police intervention and through compulsory force in
dragging conscripts to the barracks. Already now, however,
1. Razm, op. cit.
2. Ibid.
3. Azarbayjan 120, 18th Bahman, 1324 (7th February, 1946).
4. Ibid.
5. Private notes of Biriya.
6. Ibid.
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thousands had volunteered to join up. Padagan stressed the
fact that all democratic movements demanded personal sacrifice:
today, this sacrifice could be made by joining the National
Army. Kaviyan1 concluded the meeting, thanking all present and
informing them that if they desired to sign up, they should
promptly go and register at Army H.Q.
More speeches were delivered at a reception held at the
headquarters. Here, PlshavarP announced that they had done
well to establish the National Army. Immediate support had
been forthcoming from all strata and generations of society -
even old men were anxious to join up. However, the people
would have to continue giving this support in order to
guarantee the success of the Army in protecting their liberties.
The existence of such a force was proof to the Central
government that it could not destroy the movement in one single
blow (nor had it succeeded in any of its other approaches); it
was to be constitutive in preserving the unity of the
Azerbaijani people, which Tehran was trying hard to break.
There were two options which could be followed, argued
Pishavari:
- either the Tehran government allows us to enjoy
independence in our education and economy, and
permits us our national rights;
- or we will mobilise against the central government,
march on Tehran and replace it with a democratic
government.
If the Tehran government forces us to take the second
option, we now assure them that because of our National Army,
we are capable of carrying it through successfully. Merely
when the Fida'i entered Zanjan they caused many influential
1. Biriya, op. cit.
2. A^arbayjan 120, 18th Bahman, 1324 (7th February, 1946).
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people to flee.
Much of Pishavari's communication from Tehran indicated
that should an Azerbaijan army march, there would be a
revolution in Tehran itself, in support of Azerbaijan's
nationalist aims. In order to be prepared for action at any
moment, the army needed ammunition, bombs, tanks and
aircraft. If necessary, he warned, they would sell their basic
essentials adequately to equip the army. Hardship might thus
result, but would have to be endured.1 The Bolshevik
Revolution provided an example of how this was done, before
finally they were freed from the yoke of Tzarist tyranny. "I
am certain that the Azerbaijani people are equally capable of
doing this", Pishavari said, "for in the past 5 months they
have ably demonstrated their fortitude and their loyalty to the
Party".
Various questions arise as to how the National Army could
have formed a fighting force with such a dearth of both
officers and arms. As for officers, those within .Azerbaijan
were supplemented with volunteers from various other
sympathetic provincial forces. These were primarily mutinous
elements who came to join the democratic movement. The 1st
Regiment of Mashhad, for example mutinied complete with arms.
The mutiny was in fact against the pressure exerted by Gen.
Arfah within the Iranian Army to force its ranks to join his
Nahzat—i Milli party, to prevent their joining the Tudeh. Those
who refused to join were posted to out of the way backwaters,
including Mashhad. In Mashhad, however, a group of 20, led
by a Tudeh-member army officer, Iskandari, organised a
revolt, and captured a small cache of weapons, including 2
wireless vans. Before they arrived in Azerbaijan, however, via
the Turkman steppe, many were killed in a clash with the
1. Azarbayjan 120, 18th Bahman, 1324 (7th February, 1946).
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gendarmes of Gunbad-i Qabus.1 The group explained the
reasons for their participation in the Azerbaijan struggle in
terms of the need to fight "against traitors and mercenaries",2
and to "fulfil the wishes of our comrades who have been
imprisoned and to serve the country and the people of Iran".3
Their motivation came primarily from a hostile attitude to Gen.
Arfah, whom they wished to be replaced. When the central
government realised the strength of their will, Arfah was
dismissed and succeeded by Razmara. Razmara proved to be no
more acceptable than had been Arfah, and the situation in the
Army rapidly deteriorated, and it quickly became demoralised
and disaffected.4
They were joined by contingents from Shiraz and Ahvaz,
both individuals and whole units. Another major source was a
number of students from the Air Force College in Tehran. The
deficiency in numbers of senior officers (the Army was
commanded by Gen. Panahiyan) was offset by the promotion of
several capable Colonels to the rank of General - including
Nava'i, Nadiri, Iskandari, Panahiyan and A_zar, the increase
of responsibility of Generals Danishiyan and Kayan, and the
promotion of the the best captains to the rank of Colonel.
The second major step was the establishment of a Military
Academy in Tabriz, under the guidance of Gen.
Panahiyan. Conditions for entry were a knowledge of Azari, a
clean record, good health, and a minimum education of three
years at high school (sigla). Those students with a 6 year
higher education (diploma) graduated with the rank of Sutvan
1. Tulsiram, The History of the Communist Movement in Iran, Grafix, Bhopal 1981,
p.98.
2. Rahbar 694, 27th Farvardin, 1325 (16th April, 1946).
3. Iran-i-Ma 507, 27th Farvardin, 1325 ( 16th April, 1946).
4. Mihraban, R. Gushaha'i Az Tarikh-i Mu^asir-i Iran, Tehran, 1982.
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2, and those with only the sigla, that of Sutvan 3. Courses
were initially for 3 months, although they were later extended
to 6, and were very intensive. Books, clothing, food and
accommodation were all provided free, and on top of this, each
student received 50 tumans a month.1 The core of the students
came from Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, while the staff were all
from Tehran, with the exception of two Soviet instructors, who
taught the advanced levels, including the use of sophisticated
weapons.2
A police school was also set up in Tabriz to train
policemen for the whole of Azerbaijan.3
As regards weapons, the most common assumption is that
they were supplied by the Soviet Union. However, unbiased and
detailed analysis shows that the capture by the incipient
army of all the army camps in the province, ensured that all
the existing arms in Azerbaijan came into the hands of the
National Government. It was not, in fact, a sophisticated
force, as was discovered later by the central government. The
presence of only 5 tanks and the same number of aeroplanes
demonstrates the inadequacy of a theory of Soviet supplies.
Three tanks came from Azerbaijan, one from ShTraz, and one
from Mashhad; the aircraft were all flown in from Tehran.*
The National Army of Azerbaijan was composed of around
300,000 troops. These were divided into 2 sectors:5 the first
were Fida'i on active duty in the towns, cities and villages.
The Fida'i wore no uniform and served only part-time, since
1. Rahbar 672, 23rd Isfand, 1324 (14th March, 1946).
2. Personal interview with a Colonel in the Iranian National Amy, March 1982.
3. Azarbayjan 96, 19th Day, 1324 (9th January, 1946).
4. Their pilots were: Cols. Kava, RafiCi, Riza, Muvaddad, and Hava'i; personal
interview with retired army officers of the period.
5. Did 778, 14th Tir, 1325 (15th July, 1946).
- 226 -
they also had other jobs. They joined in manoeuvres, however,
to maintain the necessary level of competence for the defence
of Azerbaijan. They had originally been volunteers under the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat, but when the National Government was
established, those who were needed were taken on full-time and
paid, while the others remained part-time. The Fida'i
comprised men, women and children (i.e. both young and old),
all of whom were armed as long as they were able to carry out
their duties.1 To encourage the youth towards heroic and
patriotic action, they were given wooden guns to carry;2 and
marched, in rows of four, during manoeuvres, repeating the
Firqa party slogan in emulation of the adults. On 17th
Bahman, 1324 (10th February, 194-6), the National Parliament
decided to award a medal of December 3rd to commemorate the
formation of the National Government to all people, either
directly or indirectly involved in the Fida'i.3
The second constituted those troops who remained in
barracks. These were provided with food and clothing from the
Government, and were paid about 10 rials a week.* This
corresponded to the rate paid to the National Army of Iran.5
All Azerbaijanis, including Plshavar! and members of the
National Government, wore uniforms, and were armed.* The
Army's uniform was the same as that of the Iranian army, with
the exception that Azerbaijanis wore on their caps a metal
badge portraying a flame within a circle, and on their
epaulettes a badge with a hand grenade, symbolising the age
of explosion.7
1. Dad 778, 14th Tir, 1325 ( 5th July, 1946).
2. Ibid., 787, 23rd Tir, 1325 (14th July, 1946).
3. Mardum, supp. no.42, 24th Bahman, 1324 (13th February, 1946).
4. Dad, 8th Murdad, 1325 (13th July, 1946).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 24th Tir, 1325 (15th July, 1946).
7. Ibid., 12th Tir, 1325 (3rd July, 1946).
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There was, however, according to Amid Nuri, a great
difference in character underlying the respective forces. Morale
was high in the Azerbaijani army, for they were united in the
common goal of defending Azerbaijan. Practices and manoeuvres
were held every day, but the soldier was kept in good spirits
primarily through the freedom and encouragement given him:
off-duty, in contradistinction to the Iranian Army, the
Azerbaijani soldier could sit, read newspapers and have
political discussions with his fellow soldiers. All classes were
represented in the Army, yet no class conflict was apparent,
for all were united in their goal of preserving Azerbaijan's
integrity. In the Iranian army, on the other hand, political
discussion was prohibited1 and the composition of its soldiers
created an unsettled atmosphere: most of its soldiers were
peasants, who had joined up simply to escape unpopular
land-owners. The popular view seems to have been that the
Army did not fulfil the soldier's aspirations or wishes,
cramped his freedom, and gave him no goal to work towards.
This left him generally dissatisfied, with no hope and a very
low morale.2
The formation of a National Army of Azerbaijan has given
rise to the casting of other aspersions upon the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat. These, not surprisingly, have much to do with the
charge of separatism.3 Yet, for the sake of survival, it is not
at all unusual for any party or movement to require some
measure of support, preferably from a major power. Discounting
firstly, the claims made that it was the British who brought
both the Tudeh and the Firqa to power, it is reasonable to
state that the movement needed the help of one of the great
powers, whether Britain, America or the USSR. Since, however,
the central government was backed by the two Western powers,
1. Did, 14th Tip, 1325 (5th July, 1946).
2. Ibid., 23rd Tin, 1325 (14th July, 1946).
3. flzarbayjan 212, 9th Murdad, 1325 (30th May, 1946).
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it was natural that the Firqa-yi Dimukrat should turn to the
Soviet Union.
While it lasted, Soviet support was primarily of a general
moral nature, assistance in times of emergency - when famine
threatened the province because of the central government's
embargo on essential provisions, for instance - rather than
direct supplies either of troops or arms.1 As Pishavari said in
his speech, "We did not want separation: this was the reason
for our not establishing Ministries of War, or Foreign Affairs.
The establishment of the National Army was for purposes of
defence of our autonomy, and it was thus a totally different
entity from the Iranian National Army".2
Two clear issues thus emerge here: the creation of a
National Army of Azerbaijan was made possible first and
foremost as a result of the loyalty and dedication of the
Azerbaijanis as a whole to the Democratic movement, for it
was through their support that its ranks were filled. As a
corollary to this, the Army itself cannot be seen as set up in
rivalry to the Iranian National Army. Its primary purpose was
the safeguarding of those democratic rights to autonomy in the
face of opposition from the central government, and not an
offensive force designed to achieve the supposed aim of
separation from Iran.3
The government also turned its attention to crime
prevention and a general tightening of security within the
province. The re-organisation of the police was based upon an
existing force of mixed old and new members (in a 3:7
proportion respectively). Many people* have pointed out that all
officers were given education and schooling, with the chance
1. Laczowski, Russia and the West in Iran 1918-1948, Ithica, Cornell U.P. 1949, p.288.
2. Zafar 258, 15th Hay, 1946.
3. Azarbayjan 212, 9th Khurdad, 1325 (30th May, 1946).
4. Personal interview with Mr. A. Purl, Col. Javldiyin and Mr. Iskandarl, July,
August, and September, 1982.
- 229 -
to attend conferences etc. This was considered to be an
important step forward, for the uneducated police force had
been very unpopular. The calm that prevailed was a
significant factor in this achievement (which incidentally got
rid of much of the bribery, too). A newspaper correspondent,
impressed by a police parade, asked the superintendent,
General Kaviyan, how long the recruits had been training and
reported that he replied that it had been only a very short
time due to their eagerness to learn.
One advantage of the reform was the reduction in the
crime rate. Kaviyan announced . that "every month, only three
or four thieves are arrested - mainly recent arrivals in
Azerbaijan, according to the files - and there is no theft
during the day".1 In reply to the correspondent's expressed
reaction to the safety of the streets, he pointed out that the
police were friends of the people, and refused to co-operate
with thieves and brigands; the chief himself, for instance, was
believed to be devoted to Azerbaijan. The falling crime rate
also corresponded with the reduction in unemployment; and due
to the policing activity, armed force did not need to be used
against the local people.2
The same correspondent reported that the relations
between prison officers and prisoners also improved, as did
prison conditions. The number of prisoners dropped to 400, and
at one point to 180, from a previous figure of 2,500. They had
a prison library and educational facilities, so that upon
release they were well-read and socially aware.3
In effect, the newly-organised police force worked solely
towards its proper task of protecting persons, prisons and




property.1 Thus life in the towns, cities and villages quickly
returned to normal, as government officials took over
responsibility from the guerillas, and the latter were put under
the command of a specific region.
The Labour Movement and Industrial Reform
A labour movement had existed in Azerbaijan since the
formation of the Tudeh Party in 1941. The Tudeh had
encouraged the labour movement throughout Iran,2 and a
Trades Union movement had been eagerly established in
Azerbaijan by the local democratic elements. It had faced
fierce opposition from the aristocracy of Azerbaijan, who were
pro-Western and anti-Communist. This group had seen a threat
to their interests in the formation of trades unions, and had
joined forces with the reactionary elements in Tabriz to help
the central government harass and terrorise the labour
movement.3 The previous existing order was for the notables a
natural one: any discontent was seen as interference by
foreign agitators in the almost divinely-constituted social order
that made work the appointed duty of the peasant.4 With the
creation of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, a powerful respresentative
voice was given to the trade unions and labour movement, so
that although neither had previously had much chance to
develop in Azerbaijan, they now entered upon a new era. The
Tudeh in Azerbaijan, led by Padagan, and the trade unions,
1. Interview with Kaviyan, head of Azerbaijan police force, ^afar 403, 36th Aban,
1325, 21st November, 1946.
2. See Chapter 3.
3. Rahbar 680, 9th Farvardin, 1325 (29th March, 1946); Zafar 228, 20th Farvardin, 1325
(9th April, 1946); Rahbar 632-634, 25th-29th Murdad, 1324 (15th-20th August, 1945),
637, 1st Shahrivar, 1324 (23rd August, 1945).
4. S.G. Eveling, November 28th, 1944 (RG/84/2243), National Archives; cf. the
analogy of the different tasks of the human fingers used by a local notable, S.G.
Eveling, June 1st, 1945 (891.00/6/148) National Archives.
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led by B.iriya,. at this point, declared their intention of
co-operation with the Firqa-yi Dimukrat.1
The Azerbaijan workers were organised in 11 unions,
including Clerks', Transport Workers', Weavers', and Chemical
Workers' Unions, each representing a distinct section of
industrial manufacture.2
The Central Council of the movement was in .Tabriz, and
to it were affiliated the individual unions of each factory. The
Trades Union Congress maintained close ties with the Central
Council of Trades Unions in Tehran,3 and through the latter,
with the World Syndicate of Trades Unions."
The situation obtaining in Azerbaijan was described by
Pishavari in Azhir, during 194-4--s The Pashmina and Parchabafi
factories had closed, with the loss of 800 and 400 jobs
respectively. Twelve year old children were earning 2 rials a
day instead of attending schools (which were themselves very
short-staffed); this situation was, in fact, merely the lesser
of two evils, for their labour was instrumental in maintaining
production. Employers, who even in Pishavari's eyes could not
reasonably be expected to disregard their own interests,
nevertheless were treating their workers merely as a commodity,
paying no heed to the lower classes' plea for some sort of
return at the least on the vast profits being made by the
owners. By June 11th, Pishavari was describing Tabriz as a
ruined village.6 The city's hospitals had been closed for six




5. Cf. Eveling May 5, 1944, (891.00/3053), November 28, 1944 (RG/84/2243), U KG TD
March 7, 1944 (F1867/138/34) PRO. Azhir, 21st Farvardin, 1323 (10th April, 1944),
23rd Khurdad, 1323 (13th June, 1944).
6. Ibid.
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months and only 27 primary and high schools remained open.1
Biriya declared that serious action needed to be taken to
combat unemployment, but only Jahanbani was sent to listen to
the complaints. When a factory meeting was called on November
18th, with Pishavari in attendance, Biriya assured the workers
that the labour and trade union movement was not for
'plunderers', and no-one should thus fear either for life or
property.2
The establishment of the National Government of
Azerbaijan on December 12th, 1945 by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
marked a new but limited advance. The new government
immediately faced financial disaster. The National Bank of
Iran, in reaction to the creation of the National Government
ordered a prohibition of credit and withdrawal throughout the
whole of northern Iran for both private and public purposes,3
which created a money-less section in all Iran of 8 million
people. Despite the general protest, exemplified by a mass
transfer of capital from the National Bank of Iran to the Shahi
Bank, the National Government of Azerbaijan was left facing
the huge problem of paying all public salaries and wages. The
difficulty was resolved to a certain extent through the revival
of industry and the establishment, six months ahead of Tehran,
of a Ministry of Labour headed by Biriya,1' which created
employment to balance the slump aggravated by the flight of
worried factory owners. These measures taken by the National
Government of Azerbaijan stand out in contrast with Tehran's,
1. Azhir, 21st Farvadin, 1323 (10th April, 1944), and 23rd Khurdad, 1323 (13th June,
1944).
2. U.K. Govt. Tabriz Dairy, 21st November, 1945 (9804/239/34) PRO.
3. Rahbar 559, 30th Azar, 1324 (21st December, 1945); Mardum, special numbers 46,
29th Bahman, 1324 (18th February, 1946), 50, 7th Isfand, 1324 (26th February, 1946).
4. U.K. Govt. Tabriz Diary, 31st December, 1945 (900/900/34) PRO. Rostow, R., "The
Battle of Azerbaijan", MEJ, vol.10, 1956 , p.19.
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where much talk was made about reducing unemployment which
was in reality only directed towards enabling the establishment
of a new Ministry of Labour to create highly-paid jobs for the
upper classes.1 Pishavari criticised the central government for
not seeing that unemployment could be, and was successfully
in Azerbaijan, reduced by reviving and creating new industry
within Iran, both to provide employment and goods, and to
reduce foreign imports.2
Thus the Pashmina factory, one of the largest in Tabriz,
which had shut down due to the ending of a lucrative contract
to provide uniforms to the Red Army3 and the instability of the
area, was re-opened and modernized. It subsequently became
the largest and most efficient factory in Iran,4 supplying
uniforms, worth 1 million rials, instead to the Fida'T and
National Army of Azerbaijan. Its efficiency and that of
industry in general in Azerbaijan was also improved as a
consequence of Pishavari's concern for employee-welfare. This
covered the equipment of factories with clubs, cafeterias,
swimming-pools and sports complexes.5 The Pashmina factory
had a hall to fit 150 people, and facilities for films and
speakers where discussion groups also met. Extensive medical
care was offered, drinking-water and good, cheap food, and
injured workers were treated at one of the best Soviet hospitals
in Tabriz in private rooms that cost 150 rials a day. A nursery
school was also attached for the use of the employees, with a
special teacher who taught the rudiments of writing and
reading. The children also had the use of a garden, bedrooms
and a toy-room, a feature unique in Iran.5 It was a factory
that was truly national and based upon democracy. Workers
1. Dad, 1st Murdad, 1325 (23rd July, 1946).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 30th Farvardin, 1324 (19th April, 1946).
4. Ibid., 31st Tlr, 1324 (20th April, 1946).
5. Ibid.
6. Zafar 350, 20th Shahrivar, 1325 (11th September, 1946).
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shared in its success through a proportionate rise in wages,
and its profits were spent primarily on benefits for the
workers, as well as equipment for, and expansion of, the
factory. Chavushi, the man in charge, was only a simple
worker, but one with a great enthusiasm. Four Soviet advisors
worked in the factory for 6 months, training technical staff,
including the 6 Azerbaijani workers who took over on the
departure of the four Russians.1
Plshavarl also opened a stocking and nylon-cloth factory,
introduced from the Soviet Union,2 and installed in two houses
belonging to Cols. Darakhshani and Ilha mi. Despite the
financial problems, the employment benefit and production
increase justified the one million tumans expenditure on the
plant, plus another 400,000 on installation. The factory
produced 9,000 stockings per annum, as well as underwear and
jackets. Since PishavarT's policy was to employ female workers,
the factory also included baths, a club, cafeteria, nursery and
playroom. A wooden floor countered the possibility of damp in
the building, there were regular medical inspectors, and the
workers wore a special uniform. A notice above the entrance
proclaimed: "Work in this factory is not for the lazy".3
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat nevertheless did not oppose
capitalism, for it recognised the benefits that it had brought
for the development of the third world. They encouraged
private enterprise, * and cottage industries,5 and gave
assistance to factory owners facing closure. Raw materials, and
facilities were provided in return for material benefit to
society. In this way, the formation of trade unions was a
1. Zafar 350, 20 Shahrivar, 1325 (11th September, 1946).
2. Dad, 1st Murdad, 1325 (23rd July, 1946).
3. Zafar 319, 10th Murdad, 1325 (7th August, 1946).
4. Ibid, 356, 21st Murdad, 1325 (18th August, 1946).
5. Ibid. 267, 7th Khurdad, 1325 (28th May, 1946).
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positive element for production. Nor was this confined to
Azerbaijan, for the workers sympathised with other workers all
over Iran. The situation of trades unions differed widely
between the North and South.1 The Firqa-yi Dimukrat provided
strong support and backing for the movement, whereas the
South was heavily under the influence of the British oil
companies. This created a viability gap whereby the
independence of the trade unions was assured in the North,
while the central government was able to crush the movement
in the South through collaboration with the A.I.O.C.2 The
Azerbaijanis showed their solidarity by organising a mass
meeting of 30,000 strong to condemn the action. While the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat provided medical and education facilities,
together with conferences and congresses, the very existence of
trades unions was illegal in the South. The Azerbaijan
situation angered the A.I.O.C. and central government, and
provoked their sharp reaction. The A.I.O.C. prohibited any
further employment of Azerbaijanis, and those already employed
were ordered to be fired.3
The other accomplishment of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was
the promulgation of a Labour Law, passed on May 12th, 1946
six days before the National Labour Bill enacted by Qavam.
This law was theoretically introduced throughout Iran, but was
implemented as intended only in Azerbaijan; workers in the
South complained constantly about its lack of proper
1. Michael Foot, in "Truth is in the oil-fields", says: "Although the condition of
workers in the South is not perfect, it is better than elsewhere" (Zafar 330, 24th
Murdad, 1325 [15th August, 1946 J ). Why Foot disregarded Azerbaijan is not clear.
His article concludes that the movement begun in Iran (this refers to Azerbaijan)
but prevails not only there and in the Middle East, but is also shaking most Asian
countries; "we must be aware of it".
2. Zafar 356, 27th Khurdid, 1325 (17th June, 1946).
3. Ibid. 223, 15thFarvardln, 1325 (4th April, 1946).
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enforcement.1 Its broad compass covered the recognition of
trade unions, the right to strike, and the settlement of worker-
employer disputes by the Ministry of Labour.2 Workers' rights
and conditions were promoted through a number of measures:
wages were increased, enabling increased chances of financial
security in conjunction with a drop in inflation and low
housing costs. Evening-classes were conducted in factories,
including political education. Health care was provided free
of charge; industrial disputes settled by a council of three -
one worker, one employer, one Firqa-yi Dimukrat member.3 Full
pay was given on official holidays, and redundancy payments
were made upon voluntary closure of a factory if the
circumstances were beyond its owner's control. Annual paid
holidays covered a period of between 15 days and a month
depending upon the type of work. Minimum wages were to be
determined in future legislation,* an eight-hour working day,
and forty-eight hour week were set by law, and an overtime
pay rate of 50% was fixed. Illiterate workers were given
permission to leave work an hour early to attend classes. A
ban was also placed upon the import of goods similar to those
produced within Azerbaijan, except those essential items listed
by the Azerbaijan Ministry of Commerce and Economy. All
government employees, for example, were to wear locally-
produced clothing, although this was partly linked to an
exhortation to dress well.5
The first Labour Congress of workers in Azerbaijan was
held in Tabriz on 3rd Murdad, 1325, in the National Square.5
1. Zafar nos. 256, 25th Azar, 1325 ( 14th April, 1946), 257, 26th Azar, 1325 (15th
April, 1946), 258, 27th Azar, 1325 (16th April, 1946), and 259, 28th Azar, 1325
(17th April, 1946).
2. U.K.G., Azerbaijani Labour Law 3/9/46 (E19210/950/34) PRO.
3. Zafar 369, 14th Mihr, 1325 (23rd September, 1946).
4. U.K.G. TD August 31, 1946 (F9264/900/34) PRO.
5. Personal interview: Mr. A. Purzad and Mrs. V. Naqshina, August and September 1982.
6. ?afar 315, 5th Murdad, 1325 (27th July, 1946).
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The representative of the Central Council of Trades Unions in
Tehran was invited to attend and to perform the opening
ceremony.1 Azerbaijan was represented on the Central Council
by Mahzari, who was also present at the Congress.2 Louis
Sayana, chairman of the World Congress of Trades Unions also
attended.3 Sayana had been to Moscow for the Second
Conference of the World Syndicate of the Council of Trades
Unions, and from there he travelled to Iran to look over the
labour organisation in the country. He arrived in Azerbaijan
on 4-th August to check the progress made in Azerbaijan, and
to attend the Congress.* In his speech, Sayana declared, "You
Azerbaijani workers and peasants have brought democracy and
freedom to Iran by your blood".5 Pishavar! followed him,
saying, "Azerbaijani workers, along with those throughout the
world, have a responsibility to ensure that democracy prevails
in Iran".6 Rusta, a representative of the Central Council also
spoke, saying, "300,000 workers and progressives pin their
hopes of achieving democracy in Iran on you. Azerbaijan is the
heart of democracy in Iran, and I am glad to see that
unemployment has ended here".7
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat's relations in this respect with
the USSR in respect to the labour movement and trades union
movement were not close. Throughout the crisis, Soviet policy
was dictated by self-interest, at least as far as the Tabriz
unions were concerned: partly to encourage production of
supplies for the Red Army, and, towards the end of the War,
\
A
1. Zafar 369, 14th Mihr, 1325 (6th October, 1946).
1~
2. Ibid. 379, 26th Mihr, 1325 (18th October, 1946).
3. For more details about Sayana, see Zafar 309, 30th Tir, 1325 (21st July, 1946),
310, 311, 312, 2nd Murdad, 1325 (24th July, 1946).
4. Ibid. 313, 3rd Murdad, 1325 (25th July, 1946).




to cause agitation within the labour unions.1 When Eveling
asked Pishavar! why the Firqa-yi Dimukrat had accepted Soviet
aid and moral support, Pishavar! replied that they would
gladly receive aid from whomever was willing to give it,
whether moral, economic or technical - just as Britain and
America helped the Constitutionalists in Iran from 1905-11.2 He
also added that such help would have to be uncondescending
and respectful of their natural and national pride, but it
would be gratefully received, since the Firqa-yi Dimukrat were
eager for the establishment of a modern and technically-based
industry.3
The labour movement and trade unions in Azerbaijan were
sponsored by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, and in their hey-day
enjoyed a considerable strength and influence. Through the
efforts of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat and its affiliated trade unions
national industries were established and developed, and
private enterprise was encouraged, so that on the one hand
production was increased and on the other, unemployment
within Azerbaijan was simultaneously cut down. The Labour
Law enacted by the party did not remain merely on the statute
book, but passed into active use, whereby Azerbaijan workers
received health, welfare and education services, as well as
personal rights and freedoms; workers' rights and those of
employers were both taken into equal consideration. This
movement, however, lasted a mere year, and after the defeat
of the National Government in Azerbaijan under central
government pressure, backed by British and American influence,
the Azerbaijan Trades Union movement, along with the CCUTU
(and their affiliated member, the Tudeh Party) were outlawed.
All went underground in 1947. It must be recognised that
1. Lajvardi, H., Politics and Labour in Iran 1941-49, Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford, 1981,
pp.264-7. ~
2. Dad, 26th Tir, 1325 (17th July, 1946).
3. Ibid., 27th Tir, 1325 (18th July, 1946).
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despite the short-lived existence of this movement, its
importance goes far beyond the extent of its life in terms of
years. The freedom given to trades unions throughout
Azerbaijan within this period, and its successes were gained
in a very short time, was and still remains a unique
experience within Iranian history.
Land Reform
Azerbaijan as a province held great agricultural
potential, for it had rich soil, fertile ground, good weather,
all confirming its reputation as the "bread-basket of Iran".1
This potential was not being fulfilled, however, due to the
repressive system of feudal land tenure, which while operative
throughout Iran, was particularly harsh in Azerbaijan. The
system, which had survived for thousands of years, established
a relationship between peasants and land-owners that amounted
to near slavery of the former. Many land-owners possessed
vast tracts of land, and treated their peasants as cattle:
ZulfaqarT for instance owned most of the district of Zanjan, an
area equal to the size of Belgium, and was nick-named, 'Mr.
Zanjan'. Zulfaqari 'ruled' with a private armed force, and
control over government officials, police and gendarmes. Any
peasant who brought a complaint to him was as a matter of
course beaten, imprisoned, or killed.2 Land-owners retained
absolute control over the peasants - peasants were unable
either to travel freely or to marry, without the approval and
permission of the landowner; they were expected to bring
'presents' constantly, eggs, milk, chickens: the landowners had
no responsibility to extend aid in emergencies, whether private
or collective, and levied a high rate of tax upon the
1. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, University of Pittsburgh, 1964, p.
2. For the full scale of his misdeeds, see Mard-i Imruz 200, Farman 501, Jfuq 1,
Najat-i Iran 400, Tarqaqi 12, Arzu 31. Progressives and trade unionists were treated
similarly.
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peasants.1 If the latter were unable to pay the required sum,
the only option available was migration, also without
permission, so that it became a drastic operation for the
peasants. Thus at the beginning of the twentieth century, many
Azerbaijani peasants were fleeing to Baku in Soviet
Azerbaijan.2
Due to this situation, when the Tudeh Party was formed
in 1941, they saw the imperative of representing the peasants
and workers. The Tudeh programme3 included the necessity of
land redistribution and reform, to abolish the feudal system
and establish the rights of these classes. Despite their good
intentions, and the basic correctness of the programme, the
measures taken by the Firqa were restricted in effect, partly
because they were very radical, and because they were
implemented with undue speed. Most importantly, however, the
Tudeh policies exacerbated the conflict between peasants and
landowners: their emphasis upon peasants' rights was at the
expense of the landowners, whereby no solution to the
problem was found, but the opposition of the two groups still
more clearly defined. Thus 1945 was a year of peasant
discontent, replete with rent-strikes and other disturbances.*
With the establishment of the National Government of
Azerbaijan, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat implemented the measures set
out in the declaration of September 3rd,s whereby the feudal
land tenure system was abolished. Pishavari condemned the
Tudeh policy, and declared that the Firqa would achieve a
1. Ivanov, M., Tarikh-i Nuvin- Iran, n.d., pp.6-17. M. Javanshir, Hantasa-yi Dad,
Tehran, 1980, pp.63-71.
2. Azhir 40-45, July 20-25, 1943.
3. See Chapter 3.
4. Abrahimian, Iran 8etween Two Revolutions, Princeton, 1982, p.397. Azarbayjan 2,
17th Shahrivar, 1324 (8th September, 1945).
5. See Chapter 4.
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peaceful resolution of the strained peasant-landowner
relationship.1 His resolution was subsequently approved by the
National Parliament, and by the First Congress of peasants:2
"All Azerbaijanis unite, and try to unite the Azerbaijani
people. The conflict between peasants and landowners will be
manipulated by the enemies of Azerbaijan, so you must forgive
each other. Peasants should pay the landowners, who in turn
must consider the peasants' conditions, and not tax them too
heavily".3
A Commission of government officials was set up
specifically to investigate the problem of peasant-landowner
relations in September 1945.* Its report was sent for approval
to the Governor of Azerbaijan, but its recommendations were
disregarded by many landowners, who employed gendarmes to
further harass the peasants.5 This situation is clearly reflected
in both points 11 and 12 of the programme of the National
Government.8
The legislation concerning land distribution and reform
is divided into two parts, regulating public and private land.
Land redistribution was considered to be an essential element
in the resolution of the conflict. Through it, peasants would
receive their dignity as human beings and proper tenants,
giving them freedom from the feudal landowners and a personal
incentive to farm.
According to a single Article of the 16th February, 1946,7
1. A^arbayjan 2, 17th Shahrivan, 1324 (8th September, 1945).
2. See below.
3. Azarbayjanl,14th .Shahrivar, 1324 (5th September, 1945).
A
4. Ibid. 22, 15th Mihr, 1324 (7th October, 1945).
5. Ibid.
6. See Appendix C.
7. Azarbayjan 131, 1st Isfand, 1324 (20th February, 1946).
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all public land, including that given to individuals by
Muhammad Agha Khan Qajar since 1850,1 was to be divided
amongst the peasants. This was a complementary law to that
passed on 23rd Isfand,2 whereby public land, their produce,
and forests were distributed amongst the peasants and their
families; they had only to go to their local committee and
request their share. This law encouraged the realisation of
agricultural potential, for negligent peasants were threatened
with the removal of their land.3 Everyone with a complaint
about distribution could come before a special committee to
make their complaint and it would be sorted out there. * The
Firqa-yi Dimukrat claimed that there was nothing
unconstitutional about the division of public land amongst
peasants since public land was given away by the Shah, so
that the procedure could not be illegal.5 Jahan Shahlu* one of
the Dimukrat leaders, commented that ownership was permissible
for the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, but landowners who had acted
cruelly in the past should be answerable to a national court,
where the penalty would be decided.®
Where land continued in the hands of the previous
owners who were Dimukrat supporters, there was little
disagreement between peasants and landowners. This was
especially the case in the border country of Azerbaijan* where
land had been distributed in the Qajar period, and was
already worked under the principle that owners would receive
only one tenth of the profits. Thus a strong incentive existed
among the peasants to protect the border - as, for example, in
Shul, a village near Maku - where the land was owned by the
1. A^arbayjan 174, 27th Farvadiri, 1325 (16th April, 1946).
2. Rahbar 672, 23rd Isfand, 1324 (14th March, 1946).
3. Ibid.
4. Azarbayjan 179, 2nd Urd, 1325 (22nd April, 1946).
5. Mardum, special no., 22nd Day, 1324 (12th January, 1946).
6. Dmyya-yi Imruz, special edition, 3rd Day, 1324 (24th December, 1945).
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Bayat-i Maku'l family.1
According to section ten of the 27th Bahman Act, all
property belonging to landlords who had left Iran, and were
encouraging sabotage, and those Azerbaijanis absent from the
province, was confiscated by the Government. As a result,
3,000 pieces of land came into the Firqa's hands and were
divided amongst peasants, including farms, orchards and wells;
the land of emigres comprised around 437 pieces.2 Two days
later, the Ministry of Agriculture, under Mahtash, stated that
they would actively enforce the law, which ensured that
redress could be had through the Treasury by means of a
lawyer.3 If, too, landowners with only small tracts of land
lost it through redistribution, they were given financial
compensation in order to enable them to live.4
The distribution itself was effected through the agency
of surveyors, who were sent through the villages and districts
of Azerbaijan with a map to mark out the boundaries. This
method was found to be laborious and slow, so that later,
representatives were sent to each village to consult with the
people as to how best to effect the division.5
For the implementation of the redistribution and reform,
the Firqa passed a resolution consisting of 14 points. A
Commission of 5, from the Ministries of Agriculture, Justice,
Finance, Internal Affairs, and one from the provincial council
was thereby set up to receive reports from village committees
on the amount of land, and the number of peasants. It would
1. This helped to establish peace; Dad, 27th and 29th Khurdad, 1324 (17th and 19th
June, 1945).
2. Azarbayjan 133, 5th Isfand, 1324 (24th February, 1946).
3. Rahbar 667, 17th Isfand, 1324 (8th March, 1946).
4. Azarbayjan 173, 26th Farvardin, 1324 (15th April, 1946).
5. Ibid. 174, 27th Farvardin, 1324 (15th April, 1945).
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then authorise the appropriate division of land, having access
to the Land Records Office and Topographical Records. It was
pointed out in the resolution also, that the sale, transference
or renting of property subsequent to redistribution was
illegal except in the case of illness, when it could be rented
under the owner's own personal supervision. All villages
retained some land for public welfare - sites for schools, baths
and parks etc.
In all, over a million peasants benefitted with land by
the Act of 27th Bahman (16th February), dividing both public
and private land.1
The First Congress of peasants, held in Tabriz on 14th
April, 1946 was the first such congress held in Iran. The aims
of its 600 delegates were two-fold: to approve the laws and
suggestions concerning the relations between peasants and
landowners; and to raise agricultural production. The Congress
was asked to present its members with a law passed by the
National Government on 22nd Farvardin.2 The bill's 22 articles
were concerned mainly with the rents payable to landowners:
what belonged to each, what percentage, of what nature, etc.
Each village was to have a council of 5, made up from local
villagers to regulate and administer the troubled relationship
between the two groups. If this local council found itself
unable to cope with the problems, the matter would be taken
before the Ministry of Agriculture, and if that body was
insufficient, finally before a committee composed of members of
the Ministries of Agriculture and the Interior, and of the
Court.
The resolution also intended to promote the interests of
1. fl^arbayjan 131, 1st Isfand, 1324 (20th February, 1946).
2. Ibid, 173, 26th Farvadin, 1325 (15th April, 1946).
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peasants, decreeing that, in the same instances, only one
seventh of production was required to be paid to the
landowners. A basic pre-tax rate of 20% was guaranteed to the
peasants in order to safeguard their livelihood in case of
national emergencies and such like.1
Pishavari, in his opening speech, asked the delegates to
become aware of the methods of land distribution which the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat were employing. Having expounded upon the
background of the conditions of the villages and gendarmerie
etc., he urged the peasants to unite, safeguarding their aims,
and to try to participate in political affairs. By so doing,
they could become a powerful force, instrumental in preventing
a return to the control of the central government.
PishavarT advised the peasants further to widen their
crop choices: it was to their advantage not to concentrate
totally upon wheat, the basic bread staple, but to also plant
the more profitable crops such as cotton, tobacco and sugar-
beet. He warned also of the disadvantages of using primitive
machinery and methods. In conjunction with this, he
recommended that the National Government should create a Bank
of Agriculture,2 which would buy the necessary modern
equipment and machinery and sell it to the peasants on an
instalment plan. The Bank should also extend loans in times
of emergency, with no interest rate and repayment schedule,
enabling the peasants to cope during periods of drought,
famine or floods and so forth.
In his closing speech, Pishavari gave high praise to the
peasants, declaring that they were the saviours of the National
Government since they had taken up arms and defended
1. Azarbayjan 173, 26th Farvardin, 1325 (15th April, 1946).
2. Ibid. 176 , 29th Farvardin, 1324 (18th April, 1945).
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Azerbaijan. The National Government thus intended to make
theirs the first priority in society.1 Unlike the central
government, which had made difficulties for Azerbaijan, there
would be no discrimination within the land distribution; this
applied also to nomads, who would be given lands and thus
encouraged to settle their differences similarly to the
peasants.2
This programme of land distribution and reform was
unique throughout the Middle East. Twenty years later when
Muhammad Riza Shah introduced a land reform, it was
nowhere near as comprehensive as that of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat,
for only this, for instance included legislation concerning
nomads, and Muhammad Riza Shah's measures, despite
promising freedom of pasture, did not in fact allow peasants
to have equal use of it with landowners.3 Pishavari declared
that Iranian peasants had both the right and the will to
divide land amongst themselves. If the Iranian government
wished to emulate this, it must take comparable steps
throughout Iran.*
Thus, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat' s measures succeeded in
freeing millions of peasants from slavery under the landowners
and from the feudalist system, affording them for the first time
a dignity in their relationship with the landowners consonant
with their stature as human beings.
Judicial Reform
Judicial proceedings before December 12th in Azerbaijan,
1. Azarbayjan 176, 29th Farvadin, 1324 (18th April, 1945).
2. Ibid.
3. For other comparisons, see details in Muhammad Riza Shah's Inqilab-i Safid,
Tehran, 1964, passim.
4. Zafar 286, 30th Khurdad, 1325 (20th June, 1946).
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as in many other provinces, were voluminous, and little of it
was ever adequately dealt with. This was partly due to an
insufficient number of lawyers, but many cases were also
brought far too late, and bribery flourished at all levels
throughout the judiciary.
As a consequence of the measures adopted after the
formation of the National Government,1 there was so little
litigation that the legal atmosphere, according to Dad,
resembled that of the Swiss Courts.2 The first act of the
National Government was an 'amnesty' on all pending cases
excluding serious crimes - murder, rape or theft etc. This
effectively reduced the bulk of court-business by 80%. Following
upon this came an act that shortened the criminal procedure,
and also incorporated the summary trial of criminals on a
month's trial period, which was subsequently extended to 3
months.3 In addition, various other reforms, including, for
example, insistence upon the presence of the accused at his
trial, were introduced. The crimes against persons and
property which remained in force became subject to very stiff
penalties, including capital punishment, a deterrent that very
effectively reduced the crime rate and increased civilian
security. This rather inhuman solution seemed necessary at the
time. Thus thefts, embezzlement, bribery and sexual
harassment seemed to fall drastically in number.* Two Fida'i
who had stolen arms, and two civilian thieves were executed
under this act, for example, and many thieves avoided
punishment by the surreptitious return of stolen goods, even
from long-forgotten crimes; a clerk was also executed for
accepting a bribe of 500 tumans.s The effect upon the level of
1. Dad, 16th Khurdad, 1324 (6th June, 1945).
2. Ibid.
3. Razm, supp. no., 2nd Day, 1324 (23rd December, 1945).
4. Dad, 16th Khurdad, 1324 (16th June, 1945).
5. Ibid.
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litigation brought about by these unprecedented legal reforms,
was the increased time available to the- courts for concentrated
attention to be given to serious crimes.
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat paid considerable attention not
only to adult crime but also to juvenile delinquency. A law
was passed1 whereby children below the age of 13 were not
held responsible for their misdemeanours, but still warnings
and advice were given to their parents, telling them to watch
closely their childrens' behaviour. Those between 13-18 who
were convicted, were sent to approved schools, where, however,
educational and sporting facilities were an integral feature,
and everything was done to rehabilitate and reform, although
a special institution for teaching purposes was also created.
The land reform programme2 introduced by the National
Government also affected the activity of the judiciary, since it
minimised disagreements between peasants and landowners,
being dealt with either by a tribunal of peasants, or by a
local committee of Firqa-yi Dimukrat members. Industrial
disputes between workers and employers were similarly
resolved by a council of workers.3
On 10th March, 1946, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat enacted a
bill with 5 articles, one of which regulated the use of drugs
and their peddling.* Drugs such as hashish, heroin and opium
were prohibited, and the third5 article also prohibited the
smuggling of such drugs into Azerbaijan, punishable rather
severely, perhaps, by death. By doing this, drug use was
drastically reduced. Addicts were advised to go to special
1. Rahbar 672, 23rd Isfand, 1324 (14th March, 1946).
2. Dad, 16th Khurdad, 1324 (6th June, 1945).
3. Ibid.
4. Rahbar 672, 23rd Isfand, 1324 (14th March, 1946).
5. Ibid.
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doctors working in certain places, through whom they could
obtain prescriptions.1 On the same day, a law forbidding all
forms of torture in Azerbaijan was passed, since the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat disagreed with such measures to help reform anybody,
since they would be far more likely to harden the criminal and
increase his resentment and resistance.2 This exemplifies the
short-term and rather hurriedly enforced penal code, which by
its nature and severity differed considerably from the Iranian
Law. Of course, the short-lived existance of the Azerbaijani
Government precludes long-term comparison.
Pishavari himself held a stern and severe attitude
towards criminal behaviour, for he believed that a falling
crime-rate could guarantee the improvement of society.3 It is
thus interesting that few appeals against sentence were ever
granted: the two Fida'i above failed in their appeal to
Fishavari for clemency, despite the serious need for Fida'i
members. *
With such judicial reforms, which were unique to
Azerbaijan, and unique also within Iranian history, the Firqa-
yi Dimukrat made a real mark upon democratic progress in the
judicial system. They simultaneously affected reform within the
procedure itself, bringing tangible and psychological
improvement, and a reduction in the actual rate of crime in
Azerbaijan. Their serious and stern attitude achieved much
success, and this success within the court system is most
noteworthy and laudable.
1. Rahbar 672, 23rd Isfand, 1324 (14th March, 1946).
2. Ibid.
3. Dad, 17th Khurdad, 1324 (7th June, 1945).
4. Ibid.
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Tax and Financial Reform
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat were faced with three initial
economic problems upon the establishment of the National
Government. The Government was faced with an immediate
financial crisis, for soon after the declaration of September
3rd, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat had acquired a Communist image
amongst the wealthy class in Azerbaijan. This group thus
began to take their money out of Azerbaijan, encouraged by the
central government.1 Tehran was anxious to force the National
Government into collapse, and further created economic
difficulties and disorder within the province through urging the
National Bank of Iran to forbid its provincial branches in the
North to pay out money, especially in Azerbaijan.2 The
National Government, in retaliation, prohibited the sale of
Azerbaijani-produced goods outside the province.3 The shortage
of money thus created was compounded by the paucity of tax
revenues brought in for the National Government. This
circumstance reflected the difficulties in raising taxes
traditionally experienced in Azerbaijan. In the past, tax
revenues had rarely been spent according to their true
purpose, to benefit the people; nor had it been distributed
fairly, the wealthy being able to bribe the tax officials and
leaving the poor doubly unfortunate, at the mercy of unethical
and ruthless officials who demanded from them enough tax to
cover the share of the rich.* There was thus great reluctance
amongst Azerbaijanis to pay tax revenues.
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat were not discouraged, however,
1. Pishavari, op. cit., p.13.
2. Hardum, spec, nos 46, 29th Bahman, 1324 (18th February, 1946), 50, 7th Isfand,
1324 (26th February, 1946); Rahbar 659, 30th Azar, 1324 (2nd December, 1945).
3. Rahbar 647, 14th Azar, 1324 (5th December, 1945), 650, 18th Azar, 1324 (9th
December, 1945).
4. Azarbayjan 112, 9th Bahman, 1324 (29th January, 1946).
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by this unhealthy situation. Such interference from Tehran had
been anticipated, and the Firqa focused their efforts first of
all upon resolving these economic problems, for they recognised
the importance of economic stability as a prerequisite for the
institution of any reforms.1
The first step taken to alleviate the financial crisis was
the issuing of Government bonds. Bonds had previously been
introduced in Tehran through the Millspaugh Mission; they had
failed dismally because of general and widespread distrust of
their security, in view of the nature of the central government.
Plshavarl, however, adopted the same system, and its success
in Azerbaijan underscores sharply the trust placed by
Azerbaijanis put in the Firqa-yi Dimukrat and National
Government.2
A second step took the form of public tax education.
Through the media and a series of conferences and public
meetings, the nature, purpose and importance of the tax system
was disseminated through Azerbaijan society. Representatives
of the various classes were invited to such meetings to learn
the benefits of taxes, and their necessity for the government's
public works and welfare programme.3 A short, intensive course
was also set up, to train trusted people for tax propaganda
activity, explaining the workings of the system and its
advantages to villagers and townspeople across the province,
and courteously requesting payment.1* Pishavari himself, stated
at a big public meeting: "If we do not receive enough taxes
from you, the people, we shall not be able to build schools,
universities, hospitals or factories. In the past, tax revenues
1. Azarbayjan .101, 24th Day, 1325 (14th January, 1947).
2. Dad, 2nd Mihr, 1325 (24th September, 1946).
3. Azarbayjan 112, 9th Bahman, 1324 (29th January, 1946).
4. Ibid.
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were indeed misappropriated. We promise, however, that the
money which you give to us will be properly spent upon the
welfare and benefit of Azerbaijan society".1 Concluding his
speech, Pishavari declared that everyone present should be a
good propagandist for the tax system amongst the population.2
Through this widespread propaganda for the tax system,
together with its manifestly well-spent revenues, the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat were able to develop the economic life of Azerbaijan,
simultaneously establishing trust among the people and gaining
the required income. The tax system introduced in Azerbaijan
by the National Government was in fact copied from that
instituted in Iran by Millspaugh, so that tax regulations were
the same both in Tehran and Tabriz. Plshavari's attack on the
Millspaugh Mission through Azhir,3 although mistakenly taken
as such, was not a denigration of the tax system itself, but
rather, on the unlimited authority given to the Mission by the
central government in Tehran. In one article, Pishavari said:
"We are friendly with America, and we want economic ties with
her. This does not mean, however, that we have to give
boundless power to one American. Any power, of any kind,
should be limited: we have to have economic freedom, in a
free country". * Millspaugh's tax system was adopted by the
National Government, indeed, and had a high degree of
success.
The economic situation of Azerbaijan was further
complicated by the complex attitude taken by the National
Government towards foreign trade. The Firqa-yi Dimukrat
initially did not favour foreign trade because it might lay
1. Azarbayjan 112, 9th Bahman, 1324 (29th January, 1946).
2. Ibid.
3. Of. Azhir nos 159-162, 30th Khurdad, 1st Tir, 4th Tir and 6th Tir, 1323 (20th,
22nd, 25th and 27th June, 1944).
4. Ibid. 161, 4th fir, 1323 (25th June, 1944).
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them open to the familiar charge of being a separatist
movement. They later came to the conclusion that outside trade
was a requisite partly for the import of certain essential
goods and also to appease Azerbaijani merchants who were
anxious to expand their trade abroad.1 It was a sensible and
profitable change of heart, for they managed to sell much of
the goods produced by Azerbaijan and gained foreign currency
and income in addition.2
Although the National Government had to overcome a
financial and economic crisis immediately upon its establishment,
a situation compounded by the antipathy of the central
government, it was able within a very short time to create a
stable economic foundation in Azerbaijan. The budget of the
town councils was raised from nothing to an adequate sum,
inflation was reduced by 40%,3 foreign trade was opened up,
factories built and production increased, and ma-ny economic
reforms, mentioned above, were instituted. The Azerbaijan
economy became so strong that 11 rials in the rest of Iran
were the equivalent of 10 rials in Azerbaijan. All of these
achievements were made primarily as a consequence of the close
and mutual relationship of trust between the people of
Azerbaijan and the Firqa-yi Dimukrat.
Education
The need for widespread and good education in Azerbaijan
was taken very seriously by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat. The rate
of illiteracy in the province was extremely high, and the
party's leaders recognised that in order to retain the gains
which they had made and to consolidate upon them, educated
1. Pishavari, op. cit., p.13.
2. Ibid.
3. Rahbar 647, 14th Azar, 1324 (5th December, 1945).
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people were required to fulfil the posts and tasks involved.1
Communication in all areas depended greatly upon education:
the media was an important tool of educating the masses
politically, and reading material would instil certain principles
within them, as well as stimulate and broaden their minds; in
this way they might become more aware and active in political
affairs. The Firqa-yi Dimukrat's insistence upon Azerbaijanis
being in control of their own future and government, demanded
educated people. The danger in requesting outside help through
an inner inability to hold one's own, lay in control eventually
being taken again from their own hands.2
There was, however, a shortage of both schools and
qualified teachers; many already teaching were incompetent,
and the education system itself badly needed reforming.3 The
Firqa-yi Dimukrat immediately mobilised their members and
supporters to remedy a situation in which only four schools
could be boasted of in Tabriz in 1936, for example.* The party
managed within a year to establish 500 public schools in many
night schools - attached to factories, clubs, etc. - over
Azerbaijan; through these, almost 300,000 Azerbaijanis were
educated.
It was proposed to solve the shortage of teachers by
opening a faculty of education within the University of
Tabriz.s
The essential problem inherent in the established system
of education in Azerbaijan rested upon the use of Persian as
the language of instruction. Upon beginning school, children
1. Iriitibir-i' Azar Nufrqlar va Maqalalarl, S.J. Pisnavari, Tabriz, 1980, pp.13-14.
2. Azarbayjan 124, 23rd Bahman, 1325 (12th February, 1947).
3. Rahbar 658, 29th Azar, 1324 (20th December, 1945).
4. Ibid. 661, 10th Isfand, 1324 (1st March, 1946).
5. A^arbayjan 96, 19th Day, 1324 (9th January, 1946).
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were immediately faced with learning in a language with which
they were unfamiliar, since it was not their mother tongue,
and was not spoken at home.1 The eighth article of the Firqa's
programme, concerning national education therefore stated that
Az_ari-Turkish was to be introduced immediately into all schools
as the official language.2
Language was an integral part of the Azerbaijani
national identity, and a matter of both pride and obstinacy.
These two attitudes resulted in large part from the suppression
of Azerbaijanis as a national group by the central government
through long years, matched by the even more ancient national
pride fostered by the people of Azerbaijan. Thus few
Azerbaijanis were willing to use any other language, even if
living outside Azerbaijan itself, for with it went also their
national culture.3 The Firqa-yi Dimukrat directed their
attention and activity towards freeing Azari-Turkish from the
inferior status accorded it by the central government. It was
to be restored to a position of pride and legitimacy throughout
Azerbaijan in all sectors of life.4 Thus PlshavarT put his
efforts into making Azari-Turkish the language also of
education. It was, he claimed a complete language, distinct
from any other, and it was spoken by the majority of the
population who did not speak Persian. Riza Shah had attempted
to remove all Turkish-speaking teachers and replace them with
teachers who were ignorant of it to prevent communication in
Azari between staff and students in the schools. Thereby, the
children would be forced to learn and to speak Persian. The
Firqa-yi Dimukrat opposed this policy fiercely. Pishavari
argued that despite the need to know Persian in order to
communicate with people outside Azerbaijan there was no
1. Personal interview with A. Purzad, September, 1982.
2. Appendix.
3. Azarbayjan 109, 4th Bahman, 1324 (24th January, 1946).
4. Ibid. 124, 23rd Bahman, 1324 (12th February, 1946).
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reason to prevent nations from promoting their own mother
tongue. To forbid a nation from speaking its own language is
to stunt its cultural development. This was recognised by the
United Nations, and is incorporated into the International Law
of Human Rights of 1929, which states in article 3 that: "Every
government has a duty to insure the rights of all nations to
use or educate their people in any language which they
choose".1
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat also attacked Riza Shah' s policy
of the 'Persianisation' of Azerbaijan through the enforced use
of Persian in the area of the media. They declared that such
a programme could be merely counter-productive and increase the
tension with Azerbaijan. National papers, printed in Persian
in actual fact had a very limited circulation in Azerbaijan
since few were eager to read in Persian. Even when Persian
papers were published in Azerbaijan itself - Khcjvar-i Naw,
Sitara-yi Azarbayjan in Tabriz, for example - their circulation
reached only 500. With the establishment of the National
Government and the subsequent publication of Azarbayjan and
Bani Sharq, the circulation of these rose to 5,000.2 Thus,
banning publication of books and papers in Azari-Turkisn in
order to enforce the learning of Persian would not have any
effect. This circumstance is reflected also in the theatre,
where before Riza Shah, Azari-Turkish had been spoken. Riza
Shah' s prohibition of the use of Turkish merely resulted in a
cessation of people attending the theatres.3
Education in itself was recognised as of vital importance
also, with regard to the autonomy and consolidation of
Azerbaijan. Here again, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat were faced with
a problem in the shortage of educated people to fill the top
1. Zafar, 20th Urdlbihisht, 1325 (10th May, 1946).
2. Ibid. 370, 15th Mihr, 1325 (7th October, 1946).
3. Azarbayjan 12,
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posts and lower echelons of the government process. The older
men suffered from two disadvantages: having grown accustomed
to corruption, sanctioned by the ruling authority, they found
it very difficult to get out of such ingrained habits, even
though most were willing to do so; simultaneously, their
methods and ideas were out-of-date and inappropriate for the
new situation. The need to educate people to take their place
was therefore a primary requisite. Similarly, there existed an
educated group who yet lacked the proper training and who
were thus also not capable of fulfilling the new jobs. The
Firqa-yi Dimukrat promptly embarked upon a programme to
train people according to the needs of society.
The Ministry of Education prepared an outline of a new,
improved education system to replace the old inadequate one.
The old system suffered from three major defects. Most of
the provincial schools were staffed with under- or non-qualified
teachers, since the only university in Iran, before the
establishment of the University of Tabriz, was that of Tehran-
With a strictly limited intake in proportion to the number of
applicants, most teachers did not receive any training, and
their knowledge was restricted to 6 years of primary school,
or at most, 3 years higher school. Furthermore, teachers'
salaries were so low that they were forced either to bribery or
to supplement their income through other means, with the net
result that few were devoted to their task. Finally, the actual
method of education was non-productive. Students were expected
only to exhibit powers of memory and rote-learning, and were
not taught to inquire analytically or to use their own minds,
a process which far from stimulating their intellectual curiosity
effectively suppressed it.1
An example of this situation, representative of that
1. Rahbar 658, 29th Azar, 1324 (20th December, 1945).
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throughout Iran, can be seen in Zanjan. The size of Belgium,
with a population of 500,000,1 Zanjan district was equipped
with only 20 schools, not all of these, even, operative, and
two high schools, for boys and girls. The buildings were
unsuitable and in bad condition - in an investigation carried
out by the Firqa-yi Dimukfat of a class, only two students out
of a total of twenty-two were healthy.2 A similar survey of
teachers revealed that their knowledge of grammar, spelling
and mathematics was extremely rudimentary.3 Following the
establishment of the National Government, Mr. Nava'i was
appointed Zanjan's educational director. In an interview with
Rahbar, Nava'i stated that the deficiency of the existing
education system was recognised but since term had already
started, it was not possible for reform to be instituted
immediately. Thus, the same books were continuing to be used,
but weekly meetings of staff and students were held to remind
the teachers not to demand unthinking rote-learning that
suppressed individual contributions, but . to teach students to
ask questions and analyse the material which they were
raising. The books should eventually be replaced, since their
contents dealt almost exclusively with the Shahs; and this was
neither right not healthy: they should discuss literature and
poetry, and the other national heroes of the country. Thus,
too, their feeling that the frontispiece pictures of the Shah,
who was then no more than a figure-head and should not be
made so much of in text books of history, should be removed
and replaced with others, such as Shaykh Muhammad
Khiyabani; no other democratic countries printed the King's
picture at the front of their text-books. New schools should be
built on emigre lands, in spacious and hygienic conditions,
and teachers should make regular health checks on the
students. *
1. Rahbar 658, 29th Azar, 1324 (20th December, 1945).
2. Ibid.; personal interview with Mr. Purzad, September 1982.
3. For more details, see Rahbar 658, 29th Azar, 1324 (20th December, 1945).
4. Ibid.
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In a speech in the education college, Pishavari declared
that "the world is based on science and education. If we want
to keep up with the progressive countries, we shall have to
keep up with the advance of education and science". He
therefore strongly urged teachers to take their jobs seriously,
learning to teach their students the right of freedom, and
patriotism.1 Allied with this concern, and in its practical
application, Pishavari was instrumental in establishing the
University of Tabriz. The University was opened with three
faculties: medicine, agriculture and education.2 In
Pishavarl's speech at the opening of the University, he
declared: "We are not opening a University for the sake of the
name. We are opening it because there is a desparate need for
doctors, for agricultural experts, and for teachers whom we
hope to employ in order to fill the present shortage".3 Thus
the Faculty of Education was seen as a vital constituent
element since they needed to train good teachers first who
would then teach the students." Pishavari finally urged the
prospective students of the University of Tabriz to take their
students seriously; he himself would be attached to its teaching
staff as a lecturer.'
The University of Tabriz became influential throughout
Azerbaijan, educating to a high standard many teachers. After
the fall of the National Government, Tehran tried very
forcefully to close the University down. This move was fiercely
resisted in Azerbaijan, however, and the central government
found itself unable to implement its decision. It was therefore
forced to compromise the policy through the prohibition of
Azerbaijanis as directors of the University, but sent men from
1. Azarbayjan 124, 23rd Bahman, 1324 (12th February, 1946).
2. Ibid. 96, 19th Day, 1324 (9th January, 1946).




Tehran, such as Dr. Diqhan, succeeded by Dr. S. Amin.1
Whatever the later events, the University was only the second
established in the whole of Iran, and its creation and
achievements were due to the efforts made tirelessly by the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat.
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat introduced free compulsory primary
schooling, and encouraged high school education through films
and conferences. Education colleges were opened to complement
the University of Tabriz. In the one year, the National
Government also brought down considerably the rate of
illiteracy. According to interviewees,2 if they had continued in
power, they would have introduced a modern system, using
their mother tongue and the best educational methods
comparable to all advanced countries, which would have been
unique in the Middle East, providing the best doctors,
scientists, teachers and professors to advise the rest of Iran.
With their collapse, however, the hopes of Azerbaijanis
vanished, and even now, 38 years later, there remains a 75%
illiteracy rate in Iran. Neither before nor since has Iran
possessed a government which has taken education or the
educational system so seriously, and it still waits in hope for
such a development.
Health
The standard of health care throughout Azerbaijan
medical facilities, the number of doctors per patient, the level
of treatment, hygiene, etc. - was extremely low, as in a
number of other areas where the Firqa-yi Dimukrat introduced
reforms. Malnutrition existed in both towns and villages,
exposing the people to a host of diseases, and making them
1. Personal interview with Col. Sharifi, March 1982.
2. Personal interviews with A. Purzad, Col. Sharifi, Or. Javid (Minister of Education
of Azerbaijan), August and September 1982.
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vulnerable to the simplest and least harmful to the point of
death. Facilities were available only in the large towns,
meaning that those sick in the countryside or small villages
were forced to travel, increasing the likelihood of death before
they could receive treatment. The infant mortality rate was
high, due to a lack of midwives, especially in the villages,
and vaccination facilities, while many fell victim to the , prevalent
trachoma that, without treatment, led to blindness. Hygiene was
almost non-existent, since villagers did not know of the
benefits of soap or baths, the necessity of washing food
before eating it, or of washing their hands before meals, etc.
Thus the mortality rate in general was very high, and reforms
were urgently needed.1
The dire situation of health care was recognised by the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat when they came to power, and they set about
ameliorating conditions throughout Azerbaijan. It was a
difficult task, due to the absence of doctors, nurses and
hospitals. Therefore, requests were made of medical personnel
in the rest of Iran for support and help; some came, but far
under the number required.2 A second step was the
establishment of training programmes: 3 months duration for
nurses and midwives, and 6 months for doctors' assistants;3
Iranian and Soviet doctors were employed to run these
courses.1" Hospitals were built as quickly as possible in the
towns, using confiscated and abandoned land as sites. A
Russian hospital, for example, was set up in Tabriz to give
treatment to the seriously ill.5 These measures, while good and
necessary, were still confined to towns and cities, for it
required far more effort, resources and time than the Firqa-yi
1. Eveling, S.G., 5th May, 1944 (891.00/3055) National Archives.
2. Personal interview with Or. Javid, August 1982.
3. Personal interview, Purzad, September 1982.
4. Personal interview, Col. Sharifi, March 1982.
5. Personal interview, Mr. Iskandari, August 1982.
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Dimukrat possessed, to provide a near adequate province-wide
health service immediately. The problem of the countryside was
temporarily resolved through the employment of mobile clinics
for the villages, each equipped with 1 doctor, two assistants,
two midwives, 3 nurses and one vaccinating official.1 These
clinics carried soap, dried milk, vitamin pills and gave
regular checks to the villagers. The emphasis was laid upon
self-help and health education, but those with severe illnesses
or diseases were hospitalised wherever possible. The long-term
programme, however, envisioned the establishment of hospitals
through the countryside and villages - but mobile clinics were
depended upon as a temporary stop-gap measure.
Health education was given by means of films showing
methods and standards of hygiene, instructing the populace
on the need for cleanliness, nutritious food, vaccinations etc.2
Soap was produced and sold at very low prices to encourage
and enable the people to use it.3 A regulation was instituted
whereby one afternoon a week was set aside for factory
workers to bathe, shave, and engage in sports - the carpet
factories, for example, went to the public baths on Mondays.4
By doing this, the National Government dramatically
improved health standards throughout Azerbaijan. 50 big
hospitals, with 700 beds were set up across the province and
thousands of mobile clinics sent out.5 In order to overcome the
shortage of drugs and tablets, medicines were imported from
neighbouring countries; later, they trained chemists to make up
their own drugs.5 With the opening of the University of
1. W. Doubless, A Strange Land and Kind People, New York, 1951, pp.43, 44.
2. Personal interview, Dr. Sabri Tabrizi, 1983.
3. Personal interview, Col. Iskandari, August 1982.
4. Personal interview, Dr. Sabri Tabrizi, 1983.
5. Sitara 353, 4th Mihr, 1324 (26th September, 1945).
6. Personal interview, Purzad, September 1982.
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Tabriz* the Firqa hoped to train doctors for the future.
Nevertheless, they were still able to bring down the mortality
rate considerably even within one year, but unfortunately, fate
did not give them enough time to fulfil their programme as
intended. However, free national health throughout Azerbaijan
was provided, and the measures and methods introduced in
Azerbaijan were unique in Iran, possibly even in the Middle
East.
Conclusion
Azerbaijan was a province rich in potential, for it
possessed fertile soil, mineral wealth, plentiful resources, and
a people eager for the potential to be fulfilled. Azerbaijan was
further important geographically and strategically, situated on
a good trade route between the Middle East and Europe. In its
recent history, this development had been seriously retarded
through the policies of Riza Shah, yet the Azerbaijanis
national identity and pride had not been suppressed, and the
province was ripe for a government which would seize the
potential offered and draw it out to its fullest possibilities.1
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat formed just such a National
Government, governed by democratic principles and fired with
a desire for national renewal in the face of violent opposition
from the central government in Tehran. It was strong-willed to
withstand this pressure and inwardly motivated to effect
reforms within Azerbaijan, to improve the province.
The Firqa was able to provide both a sense of dignity to
Azerbaijanis and the physical environment in which this life
could be lived at its fullest. All Azerbaijanis became equal
1. Rahbar 660, 661, 9th and 10th Isfand, 1324 (28th February and 1st March,
1946).
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before the law, and thereby women too were given, for the
first time in Iranian history, the right to vote, stand for the
Majlis, or even become Ministers. Azerbaijan society was
purified of a high rate of crime which had made the streets
unsafe, theft and burglary rampant, and the populace
frightened and insecure. A foreign observer announced to
Fishavari: "I was in the villages interviewing before your
declaration of September 30th, and people then had a slave
mentality. After the formation of the National Government, I
again interviewed many in the same places, and now the
peasants have become so full of pride".2
The achievements of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat were noted in
several unprejudiced sources. According to W. Douglas,3 the
Firqa during a single year effected many reforms unknown
throughout Iran. The land reform instituted uniquely considered
the mutual relationship of peasants and landowners, bribery
and corruption were eliminated to a large extent, shopkeepers
felt safe to leave their shops open, cars could be left
unlocked, mobile clinics toured the villages, free compulsory
education was introduced, there was practical application of
the Labour Law, and all in all a general public works
programme mobilised through the support of the people.
The American Consul in Tabriz noted that the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat effected in one year more reforms than all those
carried out in Iran before. * Many new roads and railway
lines were constructed, hostels for the destitute were built to
take them off the streets, financial help was extended to
prostitutes so that they would have no further need to practice
1. Azarbayjan 124, 23rd Bahman, 1324 (12th February, 1946).
2. Ibid.
3. W. Douglas, op. cit., p.43-4.
4. Elwell-Sutton, 30th December, 1946 (891.00/3046) National Archives.
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their profession, while others left Azerbaijan; institutions to
aid women and children were established, as well as Radio
Tabriz, and the University, and Azerbaijan became so safe that
people were free and unafraid to walk alone by night.1
These reports are corroborated by the accounts given by
non-sympathetic observers. When CAmid Nurl,2 the editor of Dad,
together with three other representatives of the central
government were sent by Qavam to Azerbaijan to confirm the
C —
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops after May 9th, 194-6, Amid
Nuri was unable to hide or conceal his amazement at the
reforms introduced by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat all over
Azerbaijan. Upon his return to Tehran, he devoted space in
Dad for one month, 29th May to 30th June, to articles about
Azerbaijan.
Thus the only real disappointment was the single year
permitted to the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, during which only a
limited form of progress could be made, and nowhere near the
full programme set out by the party be carried through, to the
great disadvantage of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani people.
1. Cf. Iran-i Ma, 8th Aban, 1326 (30th October, 1947).
2. Dad, 8th Khurdad, 1325 (29th May, 1946).
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CHAPTER 6
THE FALL OF THE FIRQA-YI DIMUKRAT
It is obvious that discussion of the failure of the Firqa-
yi Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan must be set in the context of foreign
intervention within Iran, for the presence of Russia and
Britain was a major factor, if not the principal one, in
Iranian politics from the beginning of the twentieth century.1
Despite this situation, insufficient work has been done to
establish either the extent or nature of internal circumstances,
in Iran and more particularly, within Azerbaijan. This being
so, we shall concentrate in this chapter upon internal events
and influences concerning the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan,
mentioning outside causes only where absolutely necessary, and
ask the reader to go to the innumerable books already
published for detailed analysis of this part of our subject.2
Azerbaijan was, at the end of WWII, spring 1945, a bone
of contention that thereby forced upon itself the attention of
foreign powers and of Tehran, and suffered accordingly.
America, Britain and the Soviet Union were faced at the end of
the war with a major problem in Iran, as a consequence of the
presence of both Soviet and British occupation forces in the
country. Disagreement over withdrawal of these became sharp,
and it was this conflict over Iran that marked the beginning
of the Cold War that ensued after 1945.3
1. Cf. D'Arcy oil concession, 1901.
2. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-73, Charlottesville, University Press of
Virginia, 1975; Partin, M.W., US-Iranian Relations 1945-7, North Texas State
University, 1977; Tabari, K., Iran's Policies towards the United States During the
Anglo-Russian Occupation 1941-1946, Columbia University, 1967 ; Kuniholm, The Origins of
the Cold War in the Middle East, Princeton, 1980.
3. Partin, op. cit., p.55.
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These difficulties were compounded by the relationships
that had evolved between the foreign powers and the various
factions in Iran, and their mutual antagonism. The central
government was traditionally pro-West, and accorded with the
latter's desire to see the Azerbaijan democratic movement
crushed.1 The Firqa-yi Dimukrat, however, resisted both the
central government and the presence of foreign powers in Iran,
but was supported (not as a puppet) by the USSR.
Iranian attitudes towards the presence of outside powers
in the country were more complex than simple approval or
disapproval. While the central government was pro-West, it
still wished for the removal of all foreign troops, particularly
so as to be able to crush the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan
as part of the attempt to re-establish their power in both
Tehran and the provinces.2
The Majlis, on the other hand, was split over the
propriety of a foreign presence, primarily Soviet. The
Conservatives within parliament argued for the immediate
withdrawal of Soviet troops in order to let Tehran regain its
governmental stature. The minority Communists, backed by
liberals, believed that as long as the Soviets retained their
presence in Azerbaijan, the central government might see their
way to at least a limited number of much-needed reforms; if
the USSR withdrew, it was almost certain that these reforms
would remain uninstituted, since the Firqa-yi Dimukrat would
then not be given a chance to establish itself.3
This latter situation did in fact obtain: Soviet troops
withdrew on March 2nd, 194-6, and the central government,
1. Tulsiram, The History of the Communist Movement in Iran, Bhopal (n.d.), p.105.
2. Partin, op. cit., p.55.
3. Eveling to Sec. of State Bevin, October 13th, 1945.
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backed by the West, succeeded in suppressing the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat, preventing the democratic movement from spreading
through Iran, and throughout the Middle East, the fear of the
West.1
In the spring of 1945, Azerbaijan was not an international
problem among the ranks of the Big Powers; it was more
seriously an internal issue facing the Iranian government's
foreign relations. The discussion of Iran at Yalta in February
19452 was delegated by Churchill, with the agreement of Stalin
and Roosevelt, to their respective foreign ministers, who were
felt to be capable of dealing with the issue.3 It was therefore
not considered by the leaders to be a major area of conflict.
Nevertheless, events soon escalated within Iran that drew the
Powers into hostility.
The first disturbances occurred with a rebellion of
tribesmen in • Riza'iyya during February /March 1945. Riza'iyya
was in the Soviet zone, and the central government requested
permission from the Soviet Union to send troops to crush the
rebellion. The Soviets agreed to one battalion from Tabriz, but
Tehran insisted that a regiment was necessary, and dispatched
one from Saqqiz. This was halted on the border of the Soviet
zone,* an act which angered Tehran, and worried the West
since it was in violation of Article 4 of the Tripartite Treaty
of 1942, which stated that: "The Soviet authorities cannot
prohibit the entry of Iranian troops into the Soviet zone for
internal administrative purposes".5
1. Kumaramangalam, M., Iran at the Crossroads, Bombay, 1946, Ch.7.
2. Farquhar to Bevin, April 18, 1946, p.3, [ E3499/5/34], PRO.
3. The main concern in the discussion was the Iranian bill refusing further oil
concessions during the war - supported by Eden, but opposed by Molotov. For more
details, see: Foreign Relations 1945, VIII, p.365 (Washington D.C. 1969).
4. Foreign Relations 1945, VIII, pp.365-6.
5. Kuniholm, op. cit., p.308.
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The Soviet military attache in Tehran announced that the
column had been halted because if large numbers of Iranian
troops entered the Soviet zones, clashes with Russian personnel
would inevitably occur. The Soviet Union considered the army,
police and gendarme units already in the Soviet zone sufficient
to deal with the rebellion.1
This explanation was not fully accepted either in Tehran
or in the West, and served, in fact, to intensify the problem.
The Soviet action served also to reinforce the belief of many
Iranians that their problems derived primarily from foreign
presence and intervention in Iran. This belief was expressed
so strongly that Muhammad Riza Shah sent a note to both
Soviet and British governments requesting notification of the
date of withdrawal of their troops.2
The official date set for the removal of all occupying
forces from Iran was in fact disputed by the protagonists.
Tehran believed that the six months alluded to in the
Tripartite Treaty were defined according to the defeat of
Germany as being the end of the war. The central government
insisted that since neither the Soviet Union nor Iran herself
had taken any part in the war against Japan, these six months
could not be thus defined according to the Japanese surrender.
It therefore demanded withdrawal of foreign troops by November
1945, not March 1946.3
The Article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty itself stated that
"all foreign forces should withdraw from Iran no later than six
months after the war with Germany and her associates had
1. K. Tabari, op. cit., p.203.
i
2. Partin, op. cit., p.57.
3. Feiss, Between War and Peace: Potsdam Conference, Princeton, 1960, p.302; Foreign
Relations 1945, VIII, p.371.
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ended1;1 This clause allowed for an interpretation defining the
end of the war as the Japanese surrender, and contributed
towards the confusion that existed and that was exploited by
the Soviet Union.
A formal request was thus made on May 19th, 194-5, by
Iran's Foreign Minister, SipahbudT, to the three Big Powers for
the immediate withdrawal of their troops from Iran.2 Britain
agreed to this request on two conditions: that the Soviets
withdraw simultaneously,3 and that British oil interests in
Iran would be safeguarded. The newly-appointed American
ambassador to Iran, Wallace Murray, informed Tehran that
American plans for withdrawal were underway, but that 3,500
American personnel would remain in Iran in order to protect
their military installations, and 1,500 of these would be placed
in Abadan to look after American oil plants and refineries
etc.
Iran was encouraged by this reply from the United States.
Prime Minister Sadr further approached Murray, asking for
American support to stop British and Russian interference in
Iran's internal affairs. Murray assured Sadr that Iran was
becoming a major international issue and it was therefore
appropriate that the Iranian issue should be discussed at the
Potsdam Conference on July 21, 1945.*
This promise was duly kept, and Iran was made the
subject of debate between the three Big Powers. Eden, the
British Foreign Minister,5 proposed an immediate withdrawal
from Tehran, and a gradual withdrawal from the provinces.®
1. Kuniholm, op. cit., p.143.
2. Farquhar to Bevin, April 18th, 1946, op. cit., p.3.
3. Ibid.
4. Foreign Relations 1945, VIII, p.372.
5. Kuniholm, op. cit., p.260.
6. Eden, The Reckoning, Boston, 1960, p.633.
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Stalin rejected the second half of the proposal, and the final
agreement reached called only for the immediate withdrawal of
troops from Tehran.1 The Potsdam Conference decided that the
Iranian issue should be further discussed at the Foreign
Ministers meeting in London in September, 194-5.
The United States gave re-assurances to Iran following the
end of the Potsdam Conference that she would continue using
her influence to ensure the rapid withdrawal of troops from
Iran, and that she respected Iran's independence and
integrity. The U.S. government also made suggestions to Tehran
concerning Iran's internal security: a rapprochement between
Conservatives and Liberals in .the country should be effected
in order to stabilise the Iranian post-war political situation,
and a Commission with members from Iran, Britain and the
Soviet Union set up to study their differences, and especially
Iran's internal situation and circumstances.2
Notice of American withdrawal was finally given to Iran
on July 28, 1945, by George Byrnes, Secretary of State, through
the U.S. ambassador in Tehran. The date proposed was
November 1, 1945, but this was a unilateral move by America,
for the Soviet Union and Britain both intended removal of their
forces only by March 2, 1946.3
This 'agreement to disagree', as it were, over the
withdrawal of Big Power troops from Iran soon turned into
sharper antagonism among the Big Three, as a result of
internal events within Iran during August/September, 1945-
The pressure against the democratic movement, particularly
1. Farquhar to Bevin, op. cit., p.4.
2. Foreign Relations 1945, VIII, pp.395-399.
3. Henry Roberts and Wilson, Britain and the U.S.: Problems and Co-operation, New
York, 1953, p.191; Farquhar to Bevin, op. cit., p.4.
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from the Tudeh Party, that ensued during this period was country¬
wide, but it was especially harsh in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan
was both exploited by the central government and neglected by
it, a combination policy designed, unintentionally, to
strengthen the Azerbaijani resolve. This resulted in the
establishment of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat Azarbayjan on September
3, 1945.1
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat was given support at this time by
the Soviet Union. The Soviets believed that an Azerbaijan
autonomous movement was a legitimate right under the
Constitution, and did not consider it therefore as an uprising
or rebellion against the central government in Tehran
Furthermore, the Soviets declared after the war their aim and
role of supporting all democratic movements against fascist
elements in national governments.2 In the case of Iran, the
USSR was doubly suspicious of the central government, since it
was both reactionary and pro-Western. Since the Soviets had a
border with Iran, which it was anxious to safeguard,3 the
Soviet regime played its cards to limit Iranian power by
backing the Firqa-yi Dimukrat. *
This development caused great concern in the West, as
well as the central government, as it was felt by Britain and
America that the Firqa-yi Dimukrat might be turned by the
Soviets from a mere interest group into a fully-fledged
movement.5 Thereby, the Soviet Union would be enabled to
infiltrate the central government, known to be pro-West,® and
1. See Chapter 4.
2. Eveling, S., American Consul in Tabriz, to George Byrnes, October 13, 1945.
3. Doenecke, J., "Iran's Role in Cold War Revisionism", Iranian Studies, Spring-
Summer, 1972, p.99.
4. Farquhar to Bevin, op. cit., p.2.
5. For more details, see ibid., pp.1-3.
6. Doenecke, op. cit., p.99.
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assume a position of influence. A similar process was suspected
also in the Soviet interest given to the Tudeh Party.1
Western propaganda thus began, claiming that the USSR
intended the annexation of Azerbaijan.2 This claim was
justified on the grounds that Firqa-yi Dimukrat leaders had
received training in the Soviet Union. The Firqa must thus be
a Soviet puppet, being used as the agent to annex
Azerbaijan.
Eveling' s statements denied that these claims were true, for
he regarded them as unfounded and ridiculous. Eveling
attended a large number of Firqa-yi Dimukrat meetings himself,
and clearly pointed out that in no way was the party seeking
annexation to the Soviet Union.3
The central government went even further in maligning the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat. It announced that Soviet military personnel
in mufti were leading the revolt in Azerbaijan. This claim was
completely unrealistic, however, since the Azaris could easily
be distinguished from Russians, nor were there that number of
Soviet troops in .Azerbaijan. Furthermore, it was denied by the
Iranian Army present in .Azerbaijan at the time, who had no
sympathies with the Firqa-yi Dimukrat. *
The true reason behind the Western propaganda lay in the
West's opposition to Soviet expansion in Iran and the Middle
East in the face of their own interests and anti-Communist
policies. This fear is reflected in Truman's statement that the
1. Ramazani, "The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's Republic", Studies
on the Soviet Union II (1971), p.458.
2. Seton-Watson, H., Neither War nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Postwar
World, New York, Praegar, 1969 , p.70.
3. Partin, op, cit., p.75.
4. Personal interviews with Cols. Sharifi and Javadiyan, March/April, 1982.
- 274 -
Soviet Union desired domination of at least a part of Iran, if
not all, and that this was part of her plan to control entirely
all the oilfields within the Middle East;1 and also in the
recognition that any kind of democratic movement in the Middle
East threatened their interests and must therefore be crushed
and prevented from spreading.2
The central government propaganda was motivated by three
factors. It was concerned that its pro-Western attitude should
continue, simultaneously with Western influence in Iran, and
thus demanded the suppression of the left element in Iran.3
Neither was the central government willing to share its power
in the provinces, nor to institute reforms.11 Lastly, because the
central government was not democratic, any democratic
movements within Iran presented a challenge to its authority
and power. Thus it was inherently opposed to the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat.
American concern over the Iranian situation continued with
the sustained active interest shown by the Soviet Union
particularly in Azerbaijan. At the Foreign Ministers'
Conference in London, September 1945,5 America declared that
she was withdrawing her forces from Iran starting on November
1st, 1945. It was her wish that due to the delicate situation
involving Iran herself and the Big Powers, that Britain and
the Soviet Union should remove their troops beginning from
January 1st, 1946,® in order to stabilise the area and the
growing conflict. Byrnes' proposal was rejected by both Bevin
1. H.S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols., New York, New America Library 19 , p.574.
2. Kumaramangalam, M., op. cit., pp.47ff.
3. Tulsiram, op. cit., p.106. See also Sapir Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran,
University of California, 1961, p.117.
4. Doenecke, op. cit., p.100.
5. Tabari, op. cit., p.189.
6. Farquhar to Bevin, op. cit., p.4.
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and Molotov, who nevertheless eventually agreed to a
withdrawal date of March 2, 1946.1
The situation in Azerbaijan rapidly deteriorated in the
period following the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Government
announcements proclaimed that the Soviets had introduced 12,000
additional troops into Bandar Pahlavi ( Anzali), an act which
seriously worried the West. The anxiety of the central
government, however, centred rather on the growth of the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat, and increased its resolve to crush the
movement. Tehran ordered troops to Azerbaijan, but the
Iranian army was halted at Qazvin by Soviet forces.3 The
Soviet commander announced that an attack on Azerbaijan was
an implicit attack on the Soviet Union herself, since Azerbaijan
was a Soviet-occupied zone. Haklml was sufficiently cautious
to order the Iranian troops to remain in QazvTn until he had
received an explanation from the Soviet attache in Tehran. A
formal note was sent to the attache on November 23, 1945,
requesting explanation of the incident.* The reply given stated
that the Soviet Union was attempting to maintain order in the
area: an increase of forces would escalate the disturbance, at
the same time as being unnecessary, since bloodshed would
ensue, and the USSR would be forced to bring more Soviet
troops into Azerbaijan to keep the balance. Thereby the
situation would only be worsened.5
The central government remained unconvinced by the Soviet
reply, and thus, to circumvent the military problem, made a
Q
request to George Byrnes through Husayn Ala', the Iranian
ambassador in Washington, for American intervention. Husayn
1. Farquhar to Bevin, op. cit., p.4.
2. New York Times, November 9, 1945.
3. Ibid., November 21, 1945; Farquhar to Bevin, op. cit., p.2.
4. Farquhar to Bevin, op. cit., p.2.
5. Ibid.
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'Ala ' declared to Byrnes that the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was not
an indigenous movement, but engineered and inspired by the
Soviet Union.1 It therefore posed a threat to Iran's
independence and integrity, and American influence was sought
to counter this development.
The reason behind this approach to the United States was
the unwillingness of the central government to negotiate
directly with the Azerbaijanis themselves. It was this refusal
that was primarily responsible for the magnification of Iran's
internal affairs into an international issue. For the first time,
therefore, at the beginning of 1946, the internationalisation of
the Azerbaijan problem was mooted within Iran: Humayunfar,
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, announced that if the
Azerbaijani movement could not be forestalled through
negotiations (i.e. with the Soviets), Iran was willing to
formulate a case to present before the U.N. Security Council.2
Early in 1946, a start was indeed made on just such a
formulation by the Shah and his government.3
This appeal to America bore fruit at the subsequent
Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Moscow in December 1945.
During the discussion concerning Iran, Byrnes intimated quite
forcefully to the Soviet Union that if she did not withdraw her
support for the Firqa—yi Dimukrat, America would feel obliged
to support the resolution, intended to be submitted to the U.N.,
proposed by Iran.
Stalin's reply indicated to Byrnes that while America could
be sure of Soviet withdrawal at a later date, a Soviet
presence in Azerbaijan was currently imperative in order to
protect her oil interests, since the central government was
1. 8. Kuniholm, op. cit., p.281.
2. Doenecke, op. cit., p.100.
3. Muhammad Riza Pahlavi, Mission for my Country, New York, 1961, pp.116-119.
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itself incapable of preventing sabotage. Her ultimate
withdrawal was dependent upon the attitude shown by Tehran
to the Soviet Union.1
The British also made a suggestion to avoid taking the
matter before the U.N. Security Council and thereby threatening
any other discussions by antagonising the USSR. On 16th
December, in Moscow, Bevin thus proposed a Tripartite
Commission2 composed of Britain, America and the Soviet Union.
The Commission would be responsible for examining the Iranian
problem and working towards its resolution. The American
response was positive,3 but the Soviet reaction was
unfavourable,* and the central government, under Hakimi,
was also not keen. Tehran feared that the Commission might
recommend a Provincial Council in which the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
might be represented. HakimT, while he realised the legitimacy
of such a Council under the Constitution, yet resisted the
participation of the Firqa and desired the crushing of the
movement. Iranian liberals further disapproved of the
establishment of a Commission of the Big Powers, because they
considered Azerbaijan to be an internal affair and foreign
powers to have no right to intervene therein.5 Nationalists,
too, rejected the proposal - Dr. Musaddiq, for example, stated
that a Commission might again divide Iran into two zones of
influence as in 1907.s Musaddiq made an alternative suggestion
that the Iranian government should make representations to the
1. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New York, 1947, pp.118-20.
2. The Commission was to deal with the improvement of relations between the Central
Government and the provinces by the establishment of provincial councils;
supervision of the first elections to the provincial councils; the use of minority




5. Ustuvan, op. cit., Vol.11, p.223.
6. Ibid., p.218.
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Soviet Union and to the Azerbaijanis to resolve the problem. He
urged that the pro-West HakimI government step down and a
neutral government be elected as the only means to effect the
necessary steps towards negotiations.1
Iran as a whole thus rejected this proposal, and favoured
taking the matter before the U.N., believing that the Soviet
injection of troops into Azerbaijan violated the Charter of the
United Nations. This indicates clearly that the central
government, backed by Iranian conservatives, was responsible
for internationalising the Azerbaijan war, due to their inherent
biases: in sharp contrast to the liberal belief, and wish, that
the issue was capable of internal resolution, the pro-West, anti-
Soviet and anti-Firqa—yi Dimukrat prevalence within the central
government caused the matter to be turned into an international
problem.
The Iranian government was pressured into accepting the
proposal of a tripartite commission by the British, who
indicated that if it was rejected, HakimI would be left to face
the Soviet Union alone.2 Haklml was able, however, to force a
modification of the proposal whereby the Commission should
discuss the issue with Iranian representatives in Iran itself,
primarily concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops according
to the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 and the ' Tehran Declaration of
1943.3 HakimI then made representations to the Soviet Union,
which were rejected with a refusal to participate in the
Commission: such a Commission, it was declared, was a threat
to Iran's sovereignty and integrity."
1. Razm, yr.l, no.267, p.988.
2. Fatimi, N.S., Oil Diplomacy Powderkeg in Iran, New York, 1954, p. 283.
3. Tabari, op. cit., p.230.
< —————
4. Ustuvan, Siyasat-i Muvazana-yi Manfi dar Maj1is— i Chahardahum, Teheran, Vol.11,
p.233.
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Western attitudes to the modifications demanded by the
Hakiml government were also divided: American opinion was
quite in favour of them, but the British disagreed, and
insisted that Bevin's model should stand, as it was.1
Internal opposition to the plan came from within the
Majlis. Dr. Musaddiq, for example, thanked the Soviet Union
for its refusal to participate, for if she had, the uniting of
the Big Powers would have brought an end to Iranian
sovereignty. The Powers should rather institute a democratic
government in Iran and respect her independence and integrity,
which they themselves guaranteed.2
As a result of these divisions and conflicts, Hakimi
decided to cancel the whole arrangement for a Commission.3
Tehran was then left with three options: negotiations with the
Azerbaijanis themselves, negotiations directly with the Soviet
Union, or recourse to the resolution of the problem through the
U.N.
The American ambassador, Murray, urged Hakiml to take
the first option, approaching the Firqa-yi Dimukrat with a
negotiating team made up of his most able members of Cabinet."
The second option was strongly supported by radicals,
liberals and nationalists - such as Musaddiq - in Iran, and
also to a lesser extent by Britain and America.5 The emphasis
here was laid on total efforts to reach direct negotiations with
the Soviet Union, but this did not foreclose final resort to the
U.N. for resolution of the problem.5
1. Razm, yr.6, no.1585, pp.2-4.
2. Ibid., yr.l, no.267, p.988.
3. Ibid.
4. Partin, op. cit., p.109.
5. K. Ustuvan, op. cit., pp.231-42.
6. Ibid.
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The majority opinion backed the internationalisation of the
problem through recourse to the U.N. Security Council. The
Shah, Conservative and pro-British deputies within the Majlis
backed this intention, with the result that HakTmT, while
himself preferring direct negotiations with both Azerbaijan and
the Soviet Union, was limited by his own government's
attitude. 1
Therefore, at the beginning of 194-6, the HakTmT government
officially adopted recourse to the United Nations.2 Thus Hasan
Taq'izada, the head of the Iranian delegation to the U.N.,
wrote a formal letter to the Secretary of the Security Council,
saying that the Soviet Union was interfering in the internal
affairs of Iran. The Azerbaijan affair thus threatened world
peace, and the Iranians therefore had made great attempts at
reaching negotiations with the Soviet government. Since these
had failed, she was now asking for the issue to be put on the
Security Council agenda.
On January 24th, 1946, Vyshinsky, the head of the Soviet
U.N. delegation, denied the allegations made by Iran against
the USSR. He asserted the Soviet view that Azerbaijan was
indeed an internal Iranian affair, and that therefore the
matter could and should be resolved through direct negotiations
with the people of Azerbaijan, and neither with herself or
through the U.N. According to the Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921
and the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, the Soviet Union had a
legitimate right to maintain troops in Iran. She could not at
present afford to withdraw forces because her interests were
threatened by the reactionary HakTmT government. Vyshinsky
concluded the speech with a comparison with British troops
maintained in Indonesia and Greece: if these remained, the
1. Tabari, op. cit., p.238.
2. Rahbar, no.678, 1st Farvadfn, 1325 (21st March, 1946).
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Soviet Union reserved the right to maintain troops in Iran.1
Taqizada replied on January 26th, claiming before the
Security Council that Iran's case was based on the true facts,
and should therefore be examined carefully and thoroughly by
the U.N.2
During this exchange within the U.N., a major change
occurred within the Iranian government. Pressure from general
reaction against Hakimi's policies, combined with opposition
inside the Cabinet, particularly from Dr. Musaddiq, weakened
Hakimi's power. Consequently, unable to resolve these
difficulties, he found himself forced to resign. On January
20th, he stated: "Now that I have succeeded in putting the
Iranian case before the Security Council, I am resigning".3
Hakimx' s resignation produced great surprise in the West.
It was thought that the Iranian affair might now be
withdrawn from the agenda of the Security Council. However,
Intizam> the Foreign Minister, announced that -Hak'imi's
resignation had been called for in order to make negotiations
with the Soviet Union easier. Nevertheless, if these failed, Iran
would return the issue to the U.N.*
The obvious successor to Hak'imi was Ahmad Qavam^ Qaviun
wxts—a ■ na-tive AzerbaiJ-aa, who ostensibly supported the need
for reforms, and who was a more acceptable figure to the
Soviet Union, with long political experience. Thus, he was
elected Prime Minister and formed the new Cabinet, on January
26th, 1946.5
1. For the Soviet point of view, see Doenecke, op. cit., pp.100-101.
2. For more details, see Rahbar, no.678, 1st Farvadin, 1325 (21st March, 1946).
3. New York Times, January 22, 1946.
4. Ibid.
5. Partesan, J.G., Soviet-American Confrontation: Post War Reconstruction and the
Origins of the Cold War, Baltimore, 1973, p.179.
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Qavam and the International Conflict
The premiership of Qavam, beginning on January 26th,
1946, reflected to a considerable extent his personal influence
and political outlook. In his earlier administration, of 1921,
his American leanings led to the unsuccessful Northern Oil
Concession attempt; and his lifelong encouragement of
American presence culminated in the Millspaugh financial
mission of 1944.1
Unsurprisingly, his pro-Western attitudes had external as
well as internal effects: the gradual reduction of Communist
influence aimed ultimately toward the removal of the Soviet
presence and thereby the collapse of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat. His
conciliatory tactics marked an unprecedented subtlety in
Iranian politics and Qavam operated successfully by deceit.
Qavam's consistent policy of 'positive equilibrium'2 was
mainly a concessional balance between East and West and he
recognised his main problem as being the Russian desire for a
concession in the North3 to balance Britain's right in the
South. His positive overtures to the USSR were intended to
discourage her support of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat and to call
her political bluff. The policy* worked and Stalin viewed
Qavam's premiership with apparent favour, which was
reflected in official Tudeh newspaper statements of approval for
Qavam's national policies.5
Indeed, the Tudeh was viewed as an internal threat
1. Iran-i Ma, no.494, 11th Farvardin, 1325 (31st March, 1946).
2. /?brahamian, Between Two Revolutions, Princeton, 1982, p.227. Wilber, D.N.,
Contemporary Iran, New York, Praegar, 1963, p.122.
3. Ooenecke, op. cit., p.98.
4. Ibrahimian, op. cit., p.228.
5. Rahbar no.845,
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corresponding to external (Russian) pressures and the lifting
of martial law in Tehran1 is understood to have been an
overture of appeasement since Tudeh meetings and cells had
been particularly affected by the restriction of the right of
assembly. More open conciliation followed in the legalising of
Tudeh's existence and the appointment of three leaders to key
cabinet posts.2 Finally the displacement of General Arfah and
various pro-British figures demonstrated Qavam's new 'neutral'
image.3
On the other hand, however, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was
distrustful of Qavam. Pishavari, both before and after
becoming leader, criticised the premier on the grounds of past
failures,4 but the movement were in an awkward position since
despite uncertainty about Qavam, he was preferred to Hakimi,
and their fear about his motives towards them was balanced by
the modest hope they held for his promise of direct negotiations
with the Soviet Union.
But no sooner had Qavam arrived in power, than the
issue was wrested from his control and forced to the attention
of the U.N. on 30th January, and the promised direct
negotiations with the USSR became an inescapable reality in the
resolution of the Security Council5 which demanded continuous
contact with the parties and reserved the right of intervention
to itself in the event of failure, maintaining the issue on the
agenda.® The Iranian delegation, headed by Qavam himself,7
1.Abrahimian, op. cit., p.229.
2. New York Times, 19th February, 1946.
3. Ibid., 17th February, 1946.
4. Azhir no.40, 28th Tir, 1322 ( 19th July, 1943 ); Azarbayjan, no.72, 15th
Day, 1324 (5th January, 1946).
5. New York Times, 31st January, 1946.
6. Fateai, op. cit., p.293.
7. New York Times, February 2, 1946; Iran-i Ma, no.468, 29th Bahman, 1324 (18th
February, 1946).
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was welcomed in Moscow on 29th Bahman, 1324 (18th February,
1946) but the meetings with Stalin and Molotov reached no firm
conclusions.
The linked issues of oil, Azerbaijan and troop withdrawal
demonstrated fundamental differences of approach, Molotov
demanding oil concessions and trying to avoid negotiations
about Azerbaijan by referring Qavam to Plsnavari and his
administration. Even his promised withdrawal date, March 2nd,
was qualified by a requirement of favourable actions on Iran's
part.1 In response, Qavam was obliged to reject Soviet demands
in order to maintain consistency with previous Iranian policy.2
Moderated Soviet proposals for a joint-stock company and
suggested reforms in Azerbaijan were intended as a conciliatory
package, and withdrawal was still promised, commencing on the
agreed date, March 2nd. Qavam replied very harshly,3 showing
a belligerent attitude towards Azerbaijan's linguistic demands
and insisting upon completion of the Soviet withdrawal by 2nd
March before any concession would be made - thus the Soviet
memorandum was effectively rejected.* The angered Russians,
on March 1st, answered uncompromisingly,5 withdrawing the
would remain to protect the Soviet's insecure Iranian
interests,5 which she saw as threatened, and she justified
herself in terms of the Irano-Russian Treaty of 1921.7
1. Dad, no.713, 26thFarvardin, 1325 (15th April, 1946).
2. Ibid., no.714, 27thFarvardin, 1325 (16th April, 1946 ).
3. For more details of the Molotov memorandum, see ibid.
4. Ibid., no.717, 30thFarvardin, 1325 (19th March, 1946).
5. Razm, yr.3, no.783, pp.2174—2201.
6. Rossow, R., "Red Tanks from a Moslem graveyard", in Lisagov and Higgins, Overture
in Heaven, New York, 1964, p.155; and Doenecke, op. cit., p.99.
7. See Chapter 1, p.45, f/n 2.
assistance earlier and stating that the Northern force
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A Russian announcement on March 2nd describing the
withdrawal only from the less problematic regions of Mashhad,
Shahrud, and Simnan1 angered Qavam, for whom the withdrawal
date was of supreme symbolic importance.
With no major successes gained in the fortnight of talks,
other than the appointment of Sadchikov as Russian
ambassador, a joint declaration was published on March 5th2
promising a later resumption of the talks, and upon his return
to Iran, Qavam confessed to the press his failure to move the
USSR on the issues important to the Iranian central
government.3
These direct negotiations drew widespread popular
support, but the approval of the bulk of the people proved not
to be an accurate reflection of the true efficacy of
international talks, and a number of political figures including
Musaddiq and the contributors to Jabha, considered talks with
Tabriz* to be a more acceptable and less dangerous alternative
solution.3 The failure of the Russian talks pressurised Qavam
into this second field of negotiations.
The situation which subsequently obtained, in which the
USSR failed to withdraw its troops by 2nd March, 1946, caused
a controversy which inspired a strong reaction from Iran and
the West, and ultimately contributed to the beginning of the
Cold War.
British reaction was strong because the importance to her
of Iranian interests,® and the traditional rivalry existing in
1. Iran-i Ha, no.478, 13th Isfand, 1324 (4th March, 1946).
2. Ibid., no.484, 20th Isfand, 1324 (11th March, 1946).
3. Ibid., no.488, 24th Isfand, 1324 (15th March, 1946).
4. Ibid., no.472, 6th Isfand, 1324 (25th February, 1946).
5. Jabha, no.87 , 26th Bahman, 1324 (15th March, 1946 ).
6. Iran-i Ma, no.374, 2nd Urdibihisht, 1324 (22nd April, 1945).
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Iran with Russian influence meant that Britain was opposed to
the Northern concessions although she would not have been
concerned if they had existed anywhere else in the world.1 Her
sole reason for the ultimate acceptance of the Russians'
concession was the hope of Soviet withdrawal and the promise
of the defence of her own rights.2 By November 194-5, Britain
was confident that her influence in the government and army
was secure.3 Britain's stance in reaction to the events of
March 1946 became gradually aligned to the United States, and
the U.K. ultimately relinquished her position as Superpower in
Iran.*
America's developing role was therefore diametrically
opposite to Britain. At the beginning of World War II, America
was unbiased to the point of neutrality5 and was acceptable as
an intermediary amongst the signatories of the Tripartite
Treaty. The increasing involvement of America brought about
a growing estrangement from the Soviet Union6 as America took
a firm stand over the non-interference clause of the Tehran
Declaration,7 and the active encouragement by the U.K. and
Iran to take a strong position8 was supported by American
1. Iran-i Ha, no.374, 2nd Urdibihisht, 1324 (22nd April, 1945).
2. Jabha, no.182, 30th Khurdad, 1325 (20th June, 1946).
3. Iran-i Ha, no.310, 17th Day, 1323 (7th January, 1945).
4. New York Times, 2nd March, 1946.
5. Ittila at, no.5997, 12th Isfand, 1324 (3rd March, 1946). Foreign Relations 1946,
VII, p.336.
6. For more details, see Thorpe, "Truman's Ultimatum to Stalin on the 1946
Azerbaijan Crisis: The Making of a Myth", Journal of Political Studies, vol.40,
1978, passim.
7. See C. Hull, Memoirs, New York, 1948, 2:156-157. Roosevelt, E. As He Saw It, New
York, 1946, p.193.
8. Regarding Iranian pressure, see: Goodrich and Simons, The UN and the Maintenance
of Peace and Security, Washington, 1962, pp.285-6; and New York Times, 3rd March,
1946. And for U.K. pressure see New York Times, 2nd March, 1946.
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suspicions that Russian non-co-operation might be significant
in future relations elsewhere. Iran seemed to be a test-case for
the developing Cold War.
A third significant party was the Central Iranian
Government which, inspired by Sayyid Ziya, set out to
discredit Soviet motives1 and depopularise the Firqa's image as
a true revolutionary movement.2 In its weakness, Iran looked
overseas for assistance and pressurised the Western bloc to
take an active part in resisting the Soviet influence.3
Lastly, the Tudeh Party itself activated its power to
countermand government propaganda, justifying Soviet action
with criticisms of an Iranian government seen by them as
undemocratic, and, acting as the self-styled national
mouthpiece of the USSR, pointed out the necessary preconditions
for the Soviet withdrawal,* and stated that the Soviet Union
needed to strengthen the growing democratic movements in Iran,
justifying its interference with reference to Britain's imperial
career and contemporaneous intervention in various
Mediterranean states.5
Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, Qavam returned from
Moscow having failed to achieve a successful withdrawal; but
despite the statement that negotiations would continue, Qavam
quickly went to Murray, the American ambassador, and extracted
statements of support in the event of an Iranian approach to
the U.N.8 Despite Soviet objections,7 on 18th March, 1946,
1. Rahbar, nos.564, 666 and 667, 14th, 16th and 17th Isfand, 1324 (5th, 6th and 7th
March, 1945).
2. Ibid.
3. New York Times, 3rd March, 1946; Rahbar, no.677, 29th Isfand, 1324 (20th March,
1946), no.663, 13th Isfand, 1324 (4th March, 1946).
4. Rahbar, no.666, 16th Isfand, 1324 (7th March, 1946).
5. Pravda, December 14, 1945, quoted in Axarbayjan, no.84, 20th Day, 1324 (10th
January, 1946).
6. Foreigh Relations 1946, pp.354-6.
7. Ibid., p.357.
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Ala' presented a formal note to the Security Council, which
appeared before the Council on 25th March,1 and which
declared that:
a) The Soviet failure to withdraw her troops after March
2nd, 1946, was a violation of the Tripartite Treaty of
1942.
b) Soviet intervention in Iran's internal affairs through
military presence and political agents (i.e. the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat and Kumala-yi Kurdistan) was a violation of the
Tripartite Treaty, the Tehran Declaration, and the
United Nations' Charter.
c) Iran urged the U.N. therefore to take immediate action
under Article 35 of the U.N. Charter, which states that
the Security Council is given authority to investigate any
conflict that might threaten international peace.2
Qavam had made supportive statements indirectly but the
extent of his complicity is uncertain3 and the timing was
unfortunate, with Sadchikov due to arrive on March 20th to
continue negotiations.* The surprised Soviets requested more
time, until 10th April, to prepare, and Sadchikov pressed to
conclude negotiations and by March 25th withdrawal was well
under way, with a six-week completion target.5
But the debate went ahead on the 26th and the Council
made its increasingly common East-West split, the latter
1. Lie, T., In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the UN, New York, McMillan, 1954,
p.76.
2. New York Times, 19th—20th March, 1946 for more details.
3. Dad, no.395, 7th Farvadin, 1325 (27th March, 1946).
4. New York Times, 21st March, 1946.
5. Rahbar, no.679, 8th Farvadin, 1325 (28th March, 1946).
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c —
suggesting that Ala' present the Iranian evidence and Gromyko
protesting that the latest agreement pre-empted the U.N.'s
interference.1 cAla' failed to produce evidence to support the
Russian claims and the Council maintained the issue on its
agenda,2 despite Russian claims that participation by a non-
Council-member was not competent.3 The French-proposed
commission* made no real improvement but supported the Soviet
postponement.s
Gromyko walked out on the 27th8 and c Ala' presented his
case.7 On 29th March the Council decreed that Iran and the
USSR should hold talks and report8 on 2nd April,' 1946.3 On
q —
that date, Ala' shocked everyone by withdrawing the
complaint and supporting the Soviet position, claiming that the
central government needed outside help in negotiations with the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat.10 The main activity of the Council was now
unnecessary but America wished to substantiate the Russian
withdrawal and the discussion was postponed until May 6th,
when the USSR and Iran would report on the state of the
withdrawal, and the U.N. would determine its future role.11
Qavam's attitude to the Russian negotiations was very
much coloured by his continual American leanings and before
opening negotiations with Moscow, he promised ambassador
1. Tabari, op, cit., p.265.
2. Ibid., p.276.
3. For theoretical implications, see Byrnes, op. cit., pp.126 and 304.
4. Partin, op. cit., p.143.
5. U.N. Security Council Journal, London, 1946, pp.385-6 and 399-400.
6. Rossow, R., "The Battle of Azerbaijan", MEJ, vol. 10, 1956 , p.23.
7. U.N. Security Council Journal, op. cit., pp.423-30.
8. Yearbook of the UN, 1946-47, p.331.
9. See also, U.N. Security Council Journal, op. cit., pp.433-44.
10. For a similar concept, see Abrahimian, op. cit., pp.172-4.
11. Yearbook of the UN, op. cit., p.332.
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Murray that any joint-stock company would be balanced by an
American concession in Baluchistan;1 this American friendship
was vital to the survival of a government which trusted the
USSR as little as its people did Britain, and the diplomatic
path was thus laid for the two treaties of 4th April, one of
which was a general diplomatic agreement, the other a
specifically concessional oil treaty,2 and Gromyko demanded, on
the 6th, that Iran be removed from the agenda.3 Stettinius, the
U.S. representative, urged the Council to wait until May 6th*
and Sadchikov replied in Tehran by pressurising Qavam to
withdraw the case, issuing veiled threats5 which Qavam took
very seriously,® consulting the U.S. military attache Jernigan,
who also leaned on him not to withdraw the complaint for
reasons of national prestige in the U.N.7
Qavam' s final submission to Russian pressure relieved him
both of the popular support for withdrawal of the issue and,
partially, of his fear that continued debate in the U.N. might
tempt Russia to leave a very healthy Firqa behind them when
they left. CAla' was instructed to withdraw the case,' to great
Western disappointment and obvious Soviet delight.
Now the Security Council was torn between the technical
resolution of the problem according to U.N. principles, and the
significant Anglo-American suspicion that Iran's withdrawal
was enforced.9 When CAla' privately confirmed this to
1. Dunya, yearly publication 29, p.369.
2. See Appendix.
3. U.N. Security Council Journal, op. cit., p.489.
4. New York Times, 8th, 13th and 17th April, 1946.
5. Ibid., 17th April, 1946.
6. See Chapter 1, p.45 f/n 2.
7. Foreign Relations, 1946, vol.VII, pp.416-18.
8. See Dunya, no.30, p.255.
9. New York Times, 16th April, 1946.
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Henderson, a Foreign Office secretary.1 American support was
sought for a proposal for the U.N. to supervise the 15th
Majlis elections in an attempt to prevent a Tudeh walkover,
and for an American statement that Qavam was working under
Soviet pressure in order to keep the issue alive and viable.2
Thus Article 33»3 which would have forced the dismissal of the
case, was declared inapplicable with Dutch and British
support, the latter party declaring the resolution of April 4th
to be still valid.
Soviet charges of Western bellicosity were answered with
claims of Russian intervention,* and on April 23rd the issue
was retained, at least until May 6th.5
Now Soviet wishes for a peaceful border and a smooth
beginning to the oil project led to her pressurizing Tehran to
conclude negotiations, and Qavam !s desire to bring a secure
peace and appease his people ensured his enthusiastic
response.
The variety of issues discussed was compounded by the
bifurcation between the internal and international aspects of
the crisis. But one clear and undeniable linch-pin in the whole
situation was Azerbaijan, and it shall constitute the principal
subject of the following section.
The Autonomous Movement of Azerbaijan
The problem of Azerbaijan was the corner-stone of
negotiations between the central government and the Soviet
1. Par-tin, op. cit., p.159.
2. Ibid., pp.159-60.
3. U.N. Security Council Journal, op. cit., pp.497-8.
4. Koenecke, op. cit., p.100.
5. U.N. Security Council Journal, op. cit., pp.521-32.
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Union in both a positive and negative way. The lack of
understanding and attention paid to its resolution, however,
elevated its negative elements at the same time as eclipsing
any positive features it might have possessed. It thereby
increased in magnitude and significance, and Azerbaijan and
the Firqa-yi Dimukrat suffered the consequences.
The wishes of both the Soviet Union and Iran were
fulfilled in the treaties concluded between the two countries:
Iran's desire for Soviet withdrawal was, on paper, guaranteed
by her agreement to a Soviet oil concession, for which purpose
the Soviets had primarily opened negotiations with Iran.
However, fulfilment of these treaties was in practical terms
dependent upon resolution of the disturbance in Azerbaijan,
since a stable situation there was the prerequisite for the
central government's ability to approve the oil treaty; while
a safe border was necessary to avoid the return of Soviet
military forces for 'defence' purposes.
Article 3 of the April 4th treaty laid down proposals
concerning Azerbaijan. These were in no way, however,
sufficient or adequate to deal with the problem. No practical
measures to implement the proposed peaceful negotiations or
reforms were specified, despite the condition that these should
be performed according to the Constitutional Law. Furthermore,
it contained no assurances from the Soviet Union that she
would support the democratic movement, a necessary factor,
since the Soviet aid was in reality the only surety for the
survival and establishment of such movements in Iran.
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat itself approved the treaty of April
4th, 1946, but had several reservations and apprehensions.1 It
did not want to lose Soviet sponsorship, and supported the
parallel oil treaty, so that despite its hesitancy over the
1. Azarbayjan, no.170, 22nd Farvardin, 1325 (11th April, 1946).
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Azerbaijan measures laid out in it, it raised no voice of
protest. Neither were the leaders sure about Qavam's
reconciliation policy, since they distrusted his motives and
purposes, but wished to avoid conflict with the central
government and further bloodshed; thus when Qavam announced
in a press interview1 that he was in the process of preparing
an invitation to an Azerbaijan delegation for talks, the Firqa-
yi Dimukrat accepted reluctantly in the hope that the
negotiations might prove successful in the long run.
Future events vindicated their pessimism, since Qavam's
promises were broken, nor could the Soviet Union support the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat due to international pressure. Therefore,
the central government, backed by the West, finally suppressed
the movement in December 1946.
While the Iranian case was being discussed at the U.N.,
Qavam was making efforts to settle the central government's
dispute with the Firqa-yi Dimukrat on a purely internal
basis. Qavam outlined a set of proposals which were already
approved by the Council of State in the absence of the Majlis,
which was in recess, on 22nd April, 1946:2
1. The National Parliament of Azerbaijan was to be
dissolved, and its ministers to become directors of various
departments, with their instructions coming from Tehran,
within the new Provincial Council.
2. The governor of Azerbaijan should be approved both by
the Provincial Council and the central government; and
the army chiefs and gendarmerie officers were to be
appointed by the central government.
1. Iran-i Ma, no.500, 19th Farvardin, 1325 (8th April, 1946 ).
2. Dad, no.720, 3rd Urdibihisht, 1325 (23rd April, 1946).
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3. The official language of Azerbaijan was to be Persian,
but official documents should also be written in Turkish,
and the first 5 years of primary education should be in
Turkish.
4. Part of the annual tax revenue received from Azerbaijan
would be spent on reforms in the province.
5. Freedom of activity should be granted to all democratic
movements and trade unions.
6. There should be no persecution or harassment of Firqa-yi
Dimukrat members.
7. The central government agreed to a system of proportional
representation for Azerbaijan, in the Majlis. Since the
elections had already been held, this proposal would be
given to the 15th Majlis for approval, and additional
M.P.s subsequently elected, to complete the necessary
number.
These- proposals were sent to Azerbaijan through
Ipakchiyan, the Azerbaijan representative in the 14th Majlis,
with an invitation to the Firqa-yi Dimukrat leaders to come to
Tehran for discussions over them. Pishavari thus led a
delegation, which arrived in Tehran on 29th April, 1946.
Before leaving, Pishavari gave a speech at Tabriz airport:
"The freedom which we have achieved is safeguarded by the
Fida' is and is inviolable. Azerbaijan will fight to the last
man to retain this freedom".1
Pishavari received an overwhelming welcome at Tehran
airport. Many reporters were present, and workers streamed
1. Azarbayjan, no.185, 9th Urdibihisht, 1325 ( 29th April, 1946).
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to meet his arrival, and the crush was so great that extra
security was provided by the gendarmes in order to ensure
general safety; the gendarmes were themselves attempting to
dissuade workers from entering the airport.1 This resulted in
an unfortunate incident whereby the gendarmes began firing,
killing two people, and injuring 8 others.2
Pishavari's welcomers paraded placards with slogans
demanding from the delegation efforts to secure the freedom not
only of Azerbaijan but of the whole of Iran. These carried
messages such as: "Be careful! Do not wreck the negotiations,
for the freedom of Iran depends on the outcome of your talks".3
These requests were supported with additional force by the
Tehran press, which further stressed the delegation's need
for a national vision rather than a narrow Azerbaijan one -
Iran was not only Azerbaijan - and if they did so, they would
receive the backing of progressives throughout Iran.*
Analysis of the press editorials of this time indicates
that the Iranian people as a whole favoured the system and
reforms instituted in Azerbaijan, and wished for their
implementation throughout Iran, in spite of the propaganda
campaign mounted by the central government against the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat. Kayhan, a non-political paper, urged
Pishavari to extend his activity beyond Azerbaijan: if Qavam
did not accede to this, Pishavari should return to Azerbaijan
and cut off any further negotiations.5
The Azerbaijan delegation met with a delegation appointed
1. Iran-i Ma, no.518, 9th Urdibihisht, 1325 (29th April, 1946).
2. Kayhan, no.943, 9th Urdibihisht, 1325 (29th April, 1946).
3. Azarbayjan, no. 199, 25th Urdibihisht, 1325 (15th May, 1946).
4. Jabha, no.144, 17th Urdibihisht, 1325 (7th May, 1946).
5. Kayhan, no.943, 9th Urdibihisht, 1325 (9th May, 1946).
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by Qavam.1 After several meetings, however, no agreement had
been reached: the Azerbaijan delegation was unable to accept
the proposals because most depended upon the approval of the
15th Majlis which was not yet in session and the delegation
could not trust its future consideration; and it also refused to
amalgamate the National Army of Azerbaijan with the Iranian
army as called for by Qavam.2 Pishavari resisted this fiercely
out of past experience of the brutality and crimes perpetrated
by the gendarmerie in Azerbaijan. The nascent democratic
movement would be crushed by the Iranian army and gendarmes
if neither were reformed.3
Although both parties were eager for a solution, with the
constant encouragement also of Sadchikov,* the negotiations
between Qavam and the Firqa-yi Dimukrat were ultimately
unsuccessful due to the uncompromising objection raised by
Riza Shah to the autonomous movement or to Soviet
influence in Iran.5 Thus, the delegation returned to
Azerbaijan after 15 days, on 13th May, but the way was left
open for continued diplomatic negotiations.
General disappointment over the failure of the talks was
widely felt throughout Iran. Qavam sensed this strongly and
was concerned to maintain his prestige with public opinion.
He thus declared that despite the apparent collapse of
negotiations, he himself was doing everything to ensure their
continuation. Qavam released a declaration® addressing itself
1. The former included: J. Pishavari, S. Padagan, Dr. Jahan Shahlu, F. Ibrahimi,
C. Shahin, M.S. Sayyid Hajjx; the latter: Lankarani, Farmanfarmayan, Ipakchiyan,
M. Sipari, Muzaffar Firuz.
2. Did, no.735, 22nd Urdlbihisht, 1325 (12th May, 1945).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. izarbayan, no. 199 , 25th Urdibihisht, 1325 (15th May, 1946); Dad, no.741, 29th
Urdibihisht, 1325 (19th May, 1946).
6. Dad, no.741, 29th Urdibihisht, 1325 (19th May, 1946).
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to the Azerbaijani people, in which having outlined the
differences between the two delegations, he emphasised the
continuation of talks: Qavam appealed to the Azerbaijan
delegation to make possible elections for the Majlis by creating
a stable condition in the province. Thereby, the newly elected
Majlis could approve the proposed oil treaty of April 4th,
1946, and at the same time elections for Azerbaijani M.P.s
could take place.1
Qavam played his cards so successfully, gaining the
support of the majority of Iranian progressives, the Tudeh and
even the Soviet Union (who declared Qavam to be a brilliant
politician), that his power and influence became rival to that
of Muhammad Ri'za Shah himself.2 Qavam was emboldened to
criticise the Shall's policy, but in reality there existed a
power struggle between them that was itself rooted in the fact
that Muhammad Riza Shah was pro-British, while. Qavam
supported the United States.3 ' Qavam, in order to increase his
power, arrested a number of pro-British politicians, including
Sayyid Ziya, and K. Rashti, Riza _Shah's personal assistant,
and a good friend of the British.*
Muhammad Riza Shah disapproved strongly of Qavam's
attitudes and manoeuvring for power, and mentioned his grave
reservations to Murray in Tehran . Qavam was also in conflict®
with Ala' in Washington, who was strongly in sympathy with
the American view and was an important figure in Iran's
international relations.
1. Dad, no.737, 25th Urdibihisht, 1325 (14th May, 1946).
2. Ibid., no.741, 29th Urdibihisht, 1325 (18th May, 1946).
3. Iran-i Ma, no.522, 15th Urdibihisht, 1325 (5th May, 1946).
4. Ibid., nos.522 and 523, 15th and 16th Urdibihisht, 1325 (5th and 6th May, 1946).
5. Papers of George Allen, op. cit., p.39.
6. New York Times, 25th—26th May, 1946.
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Despite the completed withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Iran by May 9th, 194-6, c Ala' subsequently sent a formal letter
on behalf of Tehran to the U.N. Secretary General, stating
that the requested report by Iran and the Soviets on the
withdrawal could not be made because Iran could still not
implement its authority over Azerbaijan as a result of Soviet
interference; conditions for the making of the report were thus
not available.1
— c —
Qavam was angered by Ala's unauthorised statement,
and immediately sent a telegram to the U.N. denying its
validity, and confirming the complete withdrawal of Soviet
forces.2 The Security Council ignored Qavam's telegram, and
retained the Iranian case on its agenda: the West was not in
fact satisfied with withdrawal. Her ultimate aim was the
suppression of all movements in Iran, particularly in
Azerbaijan, which were contrary to her interests, so withdrawal
could not therefore be for them the end of the matter.
Secondly, the contradiction between ' Ala' and Qavam made a
proper decision concerning the issue impossible.
For the above reason, Oavam ordered C Ala' not to attend
any further meetings of the U.N., although he was permitted
to remain as Iranian ambassador in Washington.3
Qava-m's real aim was the suppression of all democratic
movements within Iran, and especially the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
Azerbaijan. His enthusiasm for negotiations was merely a
front to buy popular support,'' for while publicly denying
bloodshed,5 Qavam was preparing the ground for an invasion
1. Iran-i Ma, no.537, 1st Khurdad, 1325 (22nd May, 1946).
2. New York Times, 21st May, 1946.
3. Iran-i Ma, no.537, 1st Khurdad, 1325 (22nd May, 1946).
4. Rahbar, no.743, 23rd Khurdad, 1325 (13th June, 1946).
5. Kayhan, no.960, 13th Urdibihisht, 1325 (3rd April, 1946).
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of Azerbaijan.1 For example, in the summer,2 Qavam assured
the American embassy in .Tehran that following the withdrawal
of Soviet troops, the Iranian army would be sent into
Azerbaijan to restore order and the authority of the central
government without delay.3 His pretence of negotiations had
nevertheless continued, and Qavam sent a delegation headed by
Muzaffar Firuz, his political assistant, to Tabriz. An agreement
was reached on 13th June, 1946, according to which the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat accepted the establishment of a Provincial
Council upon the dissolving of the National Parliament, and
gave the central government authority over Khamsa and its
capital Zanjan. In return, they gained the following
concessions:*
1. The Firqa-yi Dimukrat would be responsible for the
appointment of the governor, director of finance and other
directors, of Azerbaijan, whose recommendation would be
made to the Provincial Council, but whose approval would
come from Tehran .
2. The Provincial Council would have the authority of
inspection over all government officials.
3. 75% of the tax levied should belong to Azerbaijan, and
of the customs revenue given to Tehran, 25% would be
allocated to the University of Tabriz.
4. The division of land amongst the peasants was permitted,
but should be finally approved by the 15th Majlis.
5. The use of Turkish, as well as of other minority
1. Dunya, no.30, p.218.
2. Allen, op. cit., p.56.
3. Dunya, no.30, p.218.
4. Iran-i Ma,
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languages, was permitted, parallel with Persian, within
Azerbaijan, although not without; Azerbaijanis were
allowed the use of Azari-Turkish throughout their
education, but other minorities were restricted to the
first 5 years of primary school.
6. The central government promised to carry out the
necessary reforms in Azerbaijan, such as the railway
between Tabriz and jvliyana.
7. Azerbaijan would be given Takab and Sardasht in place
of the province of Khamsa.
8. Central government gave assurances that they would
introduce a new democratic electoral system, giving women
the vote, and based upon proportional representation,
although dependent on the Majlis' approval.
9. Town Council elections were to be held throughout Iran
subsequent to Majlis approval.
10. A commission composed of both central government and
Firqa representatives should be appointed, in consequence
of the inability to resolve the question of the Azerbaijan
army and the Fida'i, which would discuss a solution for
the problem.
11. The government promised a reform and re-naming of the
gendarmerie.
This treaty was signed in duplicate by Muzaffar Flruz
and Pis:havarT in Tabriz on 13th June, 19X6. Thereafter, the
National Parliament was turned into a local branch of the
central government, and the ministers became head of its
various departments. S, JavTd was appointed as governor of
Azerbaijan, but PishavarT himself was content to remain the
- 301 -
leader of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, without any official post.
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat switched policies following the
signing of the treaty: they believed Qavam truly to desire a
democratic government; it was their task to be the model for
the whole of Iran, and they should thus unite with all
progressive and democratic movements in order to free Iran
from its reactionary elements and establish a democratic
state.1
P'ishavari was himself optimistic over the treaty,
considering it to embody all the aims and wishes expressed in
the September 3rd declaration.2 His trust in QaVam was later
proved to be badly misplaced, as can also be seen from
proper analysis of the treaty itself.
The agreement, while admittedly giving a fair number of
concessions to the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, could not however stand
up for use as a model for democratic government in the whole
of Iran, since it was a narrow treaty made solely with the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan. Most of the concessions were
dependent, further, on approval by the 15th Majlis, the
elections for which had not yet been held, and the results of
which were an unknown factor.
The future of the National Army, and the Fida'i groups,
the main defenders of Azerbaijan, was given into the hands of
a somewhat undefined and therefore powerless commission,
which ultimately was incapable of reaching a decision that
favoured the Azerbaijani people: the National Army was finally
dissolved into the Iranian army, and the Fida'is into the
gendarmerie.
1. Iran-i Ma, no.562, 31st Khurdad, 1325 (21st June, 1946).
2. Azarbayjan, no.225, 25th Khurdad, 1325 (15th June, 1946), no.228, 28th Khurdad,
1325 ( 18th June, 1946 ).
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A major concession was made by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
over the gendarmerie. They foolishly agreed to a meaningless
changing of the gendarme's name to 'Nigahban', in spite of
their knowledge and past experience of an unreformed
gendarmerie. The American, Scnwartzkopf, also retained his
position as chief.1
Finally, the point concerning land division related only
to public land. No consideration was given to private land
which had already been redistributed among the peasants in
Azerbaijan. As a result of the treaty, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
were forced either to pay compensation or to restore this land
to the landowners, a policy calculated to be disastrous for the
peasants.
The most far-reaching consequence of the treaty was
perhaps the surrender of 'Khamsa and Zanjan- The Khamsa
people were hurt by the action of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, since
they had participated in the revolution against the central
government in Azerbaijan from its inception, and had before
that raised their own revolt in sympathy.2 At the start of the
talks between Tabriz and Tehran, they had urged Pishavari
that they resisted belonging to Tehran but rather wished to
belong with Azerbaijan: a declaration was issued following a
meeting of 50,000 in Zanjan which stated:3
Zanjan is the outlet of Azerbaijan to Iran. Khamsa
culturally, linguistically, and geographically is
bound to Azerbaijan, and it is therefore not fair to
exchange it with Takab and Sarda-sht, bearing in
mind also the large size of _Khamsa. We are
frightened of the consequences of central government
control, and fight to the last man to belong to
Azerbaijan.
1. For more details of Schwartzkopf, see Kuniholm, op. cit., p.344n.
2. Rahbar, no.647, 14th Azar, 1324 (5th December, 1945 ).
3. Azarbayjan, no.228, 28th Khurdad, 1325 (18th June, 1946).
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Pishavari sent a reply to this assuring the people of
Xharnsa that they had no cause for worry, since the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat would continue to support them: as long as the Firqa
existed, Khamsa and Zanjan would be under its protection.
Therefore, while the province had temporarily been given to
Tehran, it was merely' to allow Azerbaijan to reach a speedy
agreement with the central government and thus resolve their
differences.1 Yet again, when the central government and
army occupied JChamsa, the pessimism which had prevailed
despite PIshavarT's reassurances, was proved justified, for
much brutality ensued throughout the province.2
The treaty signed between Tehran and Azerbaijan was
followed by a rebellion in Khuzistan. This revolt was inspired
among the Khuzistani tribesmen by agents of the British in an
attempt to demonstrate to the central government that
concessions to democratic movements within Iran were dangerous
because they were infectious: once compromises were made to
Azerbaijan, other similar groups would immediately demand
the same rights and treatments.3 A Union of Khuzistani tribes
was formed under the British aegis, although surreptitious and
underground,1* which had two primary aims: to arm Arabs
against the Tudeh, and the workers' unions, and to secede
from Iran to Iraq if democracy should ultimately prevail in
Iran.5
The uprising of the Qashqa'i tribes in September 1946
was carried on the front pages of Iran's papers: army barracks
were entered and the soldiers disarmed, as well as the
1. Azarbayjan, no.229, 29th Khurdad, 1325 (19th June, 1946).
2. For more details, see Namvar, R., Ya Nama-yi Shahidan, Tehran, 1977, pp.16-25.
3. Kayhan, no.984, 25th Khurdad, 1325 (15th June, 1946).
4. Ibid., no.1007, 4th Shahrivar, 1325 (26th August, 1946).
5. Dad, no.835, 24th Shahrivar, 1325 (15th September, 1946).
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gendarmerie forces. Under British encouragement, the Qashqa'i
entered Isfahan, destroying its barracks and all the buildings
and organisation of the Tudeh, and proclaimed the autonomous
movement of Fars.1 The rebellion as a whole was engineered
by Col. Hijazi,2 an influential reactionary army officer, who
was acting in collusion with the old reactionary elements in
Iran, together, of course, with the British.3
During the revolt, no reaction came from Qavam or the
central government, who maintained a conspiracy of silence.
This was broken with the announcement of an autonomous
movement in Isfahan to which the government was forced to
respond. Qavam finally sent Muzaffar Firuz to Isfahan to
investigate the uprising. The leaders were summarily arrested,
but after great protest from the Ministry of War in Tehran,
Army officers and many others, they were freed after only a
few days," thus demonstrating the government's complicity. In
an attempt to disguise this fact, since acts of vandalism and
murder5 etc. were still being committed, Qavam further sent
Gen. Zahidl to Shlraz on the pretence of an additional
investigation into the affair.® Zahidi remained in Shiraz on
the pretext of the need for a governor of Fars, to keep order,
but his true function was to co-ordinate the rebellion itself.
It was possibly under Zahidi's instruction that Nasir Qashqa'i
sent a telegram to Qavam on 29th Shahrivar, saying that the
people in the South wanted the same rights as had been
granted to Azerbaijan: if these were not given, the South
1. Dad, no.833, 21st Shahrivar, 1325 (12th September, 1945).
2. Ibid., no.834, 22nd Shahrivar, 1325 ( 13th September, 1946).
3. Iran-i Ha, no.652, 21st Mihr, 1325 (13th October, 1946).
4. Dad, no.836, 25th Shahrivar, 1325 (16th September, 1946).
5. The crimes committed are listed in Iran-i Ma, no.664, 6th Aban, 1325 (28th
October, 1946).
6. Ibid., no.670, 13th Aban, 1325 (4th November, 1946).
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would revolt against the central government.1 A number of
demands were also included in the telegram, resembling those
of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, with the additional request for the
dismissal of Tudeh members from Qavam's Cabinet.2
Qavam wired two telegrams with an identical message to
Nasir Qashqa'T, asking him to send a representative to Tehran
for talks.3 Nasir Qashqa'T refused, since he claimed that
Qavam was employing a discriminatory policy that granted
rights to one group and denied them to another.* He therefore
demanded instead that a representative from Tehran come to
Shlraz.5
The connivance of Qavam and his government became
apparent, when the delegation was sent: it was composed of
those in league with the Union of KhuzistanT tribes, or actually
members of it, so that its bias was openly indicated; an
outcome in their favour was an obvious result. Following
apparent talks, the delegation therefore returned to Tehran
with demands from Nasir Qashqa'T that were identical to those
conceded in Azerbaijan.5
This was further confirmed by the continuation of
disturbances during the negotiations.7 Such acts had the
purpose of demonstrating to the Iranian people that concessions
to democratic movements such as those in Azerbaijan, resulted
only in instability in Iran, an unfavourable situation, and
gave Qavam justification for their suppression.
1. Dad, no.843. 2nd Mihr, 1325 (24th September, 1946).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., no.844, 3rd Mihr, 1325 (25th September, 1946).
4. Ibid-
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., no.847, 7th Mihr, 1325 (29th September, 1946).
7. Iran-i Ma, no.646, 14th Mihr, 1325 (6th October, 1946 ).
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Thus, the Khuzistan rebellion was a deliberate uprising
staged by the British in collusion with the Iranian reactionary
elements,1 in order to discredit the Azerbaijan movement in the
eyes of the Iranian public, thus dissuading them from
supporting such democratic demands. It was closely supervised
both by Qavam and by Muhammad Riza Shah himself,2 and did
not accord with the actual wishes and desires of the
Khuzistani people themselves. The tribes within Iran were
traditional instruments of the British and Tehran to instigate
government-planned uprisings,3 so that the participation of the
Qashqa'i clearly points to government involvement in the
'Khuzistan revolt.
Proof for the complicity of the central government in the
_Khuzistan rebellion lies in various sources." Belief in British
inspiration and guidance behind the Qashqa'i was widespread
in Iran.5 Qavam himself was unable to hide the fact, yet no
official condemnation was forthcoming from Tehran of such
involvement. It was nevertheless recognised openly by Muzaffar
Firuz upon his return to Tehran, when he announced to the
press that the uprising was engineered by Iranian traitors in
collusion with the British.6 The press also reported that arms,
ammunition and financial backing was flowing to Khuzistan
out of Tehran, believed to be supplied by reactionaries
within the capital.7 Finally, the almost immediate release of
the rebellion's instigators was in sharp contrast to the arrest
1. Jabha, no.255, 4th Mihr, 1325 (26th September, 1946).
2. Mardura, no.252, 27th Day, 1326 (17th January, 1948).
3. Dad, no.846, 5th Mihr, 1325 (27th September, 1946); Rahbar, no.808, 17th
Shahrivar, 1325 (8th September, 1946).
4. See Iran-i Ma, no.628, 24th Shahrivar, 1325 (15th September, 1946), 641, 8th Mihr,
1325 (8th September, 1946), 649, 17th Mihr, 1325 (9th October, 1946); Rahbar, no.808,
17th Shahrivar, 1325 (8th September, 1946).
5. Iran-i Ma, no.641, 8th Mihr , 1325 (8th September, 1946).
6. Ibid., no.628, 24th Shahrivar, 1325 (15th September, 1946).
7. Compare Iran-i Ma, no.649, 17th Mihr, 1325 (9th October, 1946).
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and imprisonment of two army pilots who attempted to attack
Nasir Qashqa'i's tent.1
Despite the efforts of Qavam and the government to hide
their conspiracy, their motives in employing a policy of
deterrence were seen through without difficulty by the majority
of interested Iranians. As a consequence, the JShuzistan
rebellion was not taken as a serious democratic movement, nor
did it discourage support for the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-i
Azarbayjan, or similar movements elsewhere in Iran. The only
common factor obtaining between Khuzistan and Azerbaijan was
foreign sponsorship:2 yet even here, however, a difference of
motive was clear, for while the British policy was essentially
negative and destructive, the support received from the Soviet
Union by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was at least positive, in that
it was leading to a better, democratic rule in Azerbaijan.
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat leaders were freedom lovers,
reformists, progressivists; old experienced politicians, with
good educations, who wanted democratic rights for Azerbaijan
and for the whole of Iran, instead of its exploitation.3
Azerbaijan had also been known for centuries as the seat of
popular uprisings in Iran, manifested in its primary role in
the Constitutional Revolution.
The tribal chiefs, on the other hand, were uneducated
men who sided with the landowners, the exploiters of the
peasants. Democracy threatened their power and rule, and they
were thus anxious to stamp out any indications of it when
they arose. Their interests coincided not with the local
population, but rather with the British outside, as evidenced
in 1924- under Shaykh Khazcal." JChuzistan had no background
1. Iran-i Ma, no.649, 17th Mihr, 1325 (9th October, 1946).
2. Jabha, no.258, 8th Mihr ( 1327 (30th September, 1948).
3. Ibid.
4. See Chapter 1, p.32.
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of democratic uprisings as had Azerbaijan.
Kayhan reported, for example: "The destruction and
killing in Khuzistan was not repeated even by 1% in
Azerbaijan",1 and Qiyam-i Iran stated: "The Azerbaijan
revolution, whatever it was, was based on humanity, and
wished to free millions of suppressed people. But in Fars,
nothing was created except destruction and murder".2
Despite this disparity between Khuzistan and Azerbaijan,
it was the Firqa-yi Dimukrat whose leaders were arrested,
imprisoned or executed, and its members harassed, while those
of Khuzistan were released, and the participants in the revolt
treated differentially after its failure.3
With the announcement of the elections for the 15th
Majlis made by the Shah on 14-th Mihr, Nasir Qashqa'i sent a
telegram to Qavam giving his guarantee that order would be
restored and maintained in Khuzistan if government gendarmes
were removed from the province.* Qashqa'i recognised that such
elections would be won by the reactionary elements in Iran,
thus obviating the need for continued "rebellion". Qavam had
indeed played his cards right.
Zahidi subsequently returned to Tehran with Qashqa'i's
demands. In the Cabinet discussion, Zahidi's approval of the
revolt was faced with much opposition among the majority of its
members, who were in favour of sending Iranian troops to
crush the uprising.5 Qavam, however, gave authority to
Zahidi, without Cabinet knowledge or approval, on 13th
1. Kayhan, no.1609, 23rd Murdad, 1327 (14th August, 1948).
2. Qiyam-i Iran, no.383, 31st Murdad, 1327 (22nd August, 1948).
3. Ibid.
4. Iran-i Ma, no.649, 17th Mihr, 1325 (9th October, 1946).
5. Ibid., no.658, 28th Mihr, 1325 (20th October, 1946).
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October, to re-open negotiations with Nasir Qashqa'I in order
to reach an agreement. Upon his return to ShTraz, ZahidI
published a proclamation in which Qashqa'I's demands were
conceded, justifying the revolt and describing it as an
uprising simply to gain national rights.1 The rebellion thereupon
ended peacefully, and the tribes dispersed.
Nasir Qashqa'I gave his explanation of the nature of the
revolt in a newspaper interview on 20th February, 194-7:
We started this rebellion to prevent the control of
government by _left-wing parties and to stop the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat from damaging Iran's independence
and integrity.2
Nasir Khan Qasbqa'I further admitted that the .Khuzistan
rebellion had been engineered by foreigners, and had
engendered destruction and violence through the province.
Despite their knowledge that it would be short-lived, it was a
good political manoeuvre which benefitted both Iranian
conservatives and foreign powers.3
The staging of the JChuzistan revolt in order to disaffect
people with the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was followed by further
steps in that direction taken by Qavam. On the advice of
Allen, the American ambassador to Tehran, Qavam set up the
Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran on June 29th, 1946, as a rival party to
Tudeh, whose power was increasing, and who were allied to the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat. *
The Hizb—i Dimukrat was the official government party,
around which Iranian reactionaries, such as Sayyid Ziya and
1. Dad, no.864, 26th Mihr, 1325 (18th October, 1946).
2. Aras, no.42, 1st Isfand, 1325 (20th February, 1947).
3. Ibid.
4. Edwards, A.C., "Persia Revisited", International Affairs, 23 (1947), pp.57-58.
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his followers, the Union of Rhuzistani tribes, and other
conservative right-wing elements gathered.1 The establishment
of Qavam's party was met with a worried reaction from the
progressive parties in Iran, and led to the formation of a
coalition between the Hizb-i Iran and the Tudeh.2
The strength of the Tudeh was dramatically demonstrated
to Qavam with the Abadan oil strike, inspired by the Tudeh.3
Qavam accordingly announced the establishment of a Coalition
Cabinet on August 1st, 1946, in which four members of the
two parties were appointed - three from the Tudeh, and one
from the Hizb-i Iran.* Qavam justified this step, saying that
"it makes it possible for all parties to participate in the
implementation of reforms in Iran".5
The truth lies, however, in Zabih's statement that
Qavam's purpose was the -weakening of the Tudeh opposition.4
The inclusion of Tudeh and Hizb-i Iran members in the
new Coalition Cabinet raised its prestige amongst the
population, among whom support for these parties ran high at
this time. This was indeed political skill by Qavam, who
thereby effectively removed their voice of criticism since
Tudeh members were now represented in the government.7 The
latter kept silent, therefore, and allowed time to pass for
Qavam to institute reforms throughout Iran. Therein lay their
greatest mistake, however, for their lack of opposition gave
Qavam the time to establish himself and the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i
1. Dad, no.781, 17th Tir, 1325 (8th July, 1946 ).
2. Foreign Relations 1946, 7: 505-506.
3. See Chapter 3.
4. Le Rougetel to Foreign Office 2/8/46. F.O. 371/Persia '46/34-52709.
5. Ramazani, op. cit., p.147.
6. Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (pp.111-112).
7. Rahbar, no.852, 10th Aban, 1325 (1st November, 1946).
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Iran. The Hizb-i Dimukrat ran a campaign of harassment
against the Tudeh, especially in the South.
For this reason, allied with the reaching of an agreement
between Qavam and Qashqa'I to consider the Khuzistan
rebellion as a revolutionary movement, and the setting up by
Qavam of an electoral commission composed entirely of Hizb-i
Dimukrat members, the 'Tudeh ministers withdrew from their
posts in protest and the Coalition Cabinet collapsed after only
75 days existence.1
The Tudeh stated that their alliance with Qavam had been
made in the hope of gaining democracy throughout Iran.
However, events had proved that Qavam in reality only desired
the suppression of democratic movements, and thus the Tudeh
were forced to end their co-operation in his Cabinet.2 In the
face of criticism that the Tudeh should never have participated
in the Cabinet, the party justified its involvement on the
ground that if they had not, Iran would have fragmented into
warring parties.3
The Cabinet collapse was unimportant for Qavam's
situation in fact, and even furthered his own interests. His
own Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran had consolidated, and was, with
the support of conservative, reactionary, and anti-Communist
elements, strong enough to oppose the Tudeh.* Qavam astutely
realised also, however, that his co-operation and conciliatory
policy towards the left-wing in Iran was drawing the
disapproval of his Western allies, and therefore welcomed the
break between them.5
1. Jabha, 21st November, 1946. -
2. Iran-i Ma, no.658, 28th Mihr, 1325 (20th October, 1946).
3. Rahbar, no.845, 1st Aban, 1325 (23rd October, 1946 ).
4. Jabha, 21st November, 1946.
5. New York Times, July 18th, 1946.
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Qavam was worried, however, over the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-
i Azarbayjan. The Firqa were the only force, with a National
Army and Fida'i groups, which possessed the capability of
overthrowing Qavam's government. Here again, nevertheless,
Qavam acted very astutely: Qavam approached the ambassador,
Allen, in August 194-6, informing him that his primary aim was
the suppression of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat in Azerbaijan. His
eagerness to achieve this goal was modified by his fear on the
other hand, that such an act would lead to immediate Soviet
intervention. He was therefore requesting an assurance from the
United States that she would take steps on Iran's behalf in the
event of such an occurrence. Allen replied indirectly, by
intimating that the case would be taken up by the U.N. if
events happened to make it necessary.1
Qavam therefore invited a delegation from Tabriz to
continue negotiations in Tehran, which arrived on 20th
August. The delegation was confined to accomodation on the
outskirts of Tehran by Qavam, in order to ensure their
isolation from unwelcome lobbyers. Qavam ignored the former
treaty signed between PTshavarT and Muzaffar FTruz,2 for his
object in inviting a further delegation was merely to employ
delaying tactics: negotiations would appease Azerbaijan over
the treaty, but Qavam would also be able to buy the time he
needed for the instigation of the _lhuzistani rebellion. This
would function as a weapon to wield against the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat in the autonomy propaganda war being waged by
Tehran.
At the same time as Qavam publicly avowed and
apparently pursued a conciliatory policy, he was reaching
agreement with the Shah, the Western Allies and internal
conservative elements in Iran to prepare for the invasion of
1. Allen, op. cit., p.59.
2. Azarbayjan, no.281, 1st Shahrivar, 1325 (23rd August, 1946).
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Azerbaijan by government troops. The Tabriz delegation
remained in Tehran for two months and finally left without
any conclusive agreements in hand, except over minor and
insignificant points, recognising the game being played with
them by Qavam, when he eventually became open with them:
Qavam threatened that Khuzistan was about to separate from
Iran if Azerbaijan did not give up its demands.1
The Firqa-yi Dimukrat were anxious not to provide Qavam
with any excuse to justify his suppression of the movement.
They therefore made great efforts to abide by the treaty of
13th June, 1946, as well as by the oral agreements reached by
the subsequent delegation.2 The Provincial Council agreed the
withdrawal of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat from Zanjan: it was begun
thereafter, and completed on 21st November, 1946. Resistance
arose on the last day from the local Fida'i, but subsided upon
their receipt of a message from Pxshavari urging them not to
fight.3 They also received a guarantee from Qavam that no
reprisals would be made if they surrendered.
However, on 23rd November, the Iranian Army, supported
by gendarmes and heavy arms, invaded Zanjan under the
command of Col. Hash inn.* The Firqa-yi Dimukrat and trade
union members were arrested and executed,5 so many people
were killed on the streets and roads, that many became
impassable; two hundred houses at least were ransacked and
their occupants fled.* At 1a.m., martial law was imposed in
Zanjan by the central government.7
1. Azarbayjan, no.306, 2nd Mihr , 1325 (24th September, 1946).
2. For more details, see Iran-i Ha, no.624, 19th Shahrivar, 1325 (10th September,
1946 ); Azarbayjan, no.355, 1st Azar, 1325 (22nd November, 1946).
3. Azarbayjan, no.361, 8th A£ar, 1325 (29th November, 1946).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Khandaniha, yr.7, no.52, p.
7. Azarbayjan, no.357, 4th Jzar, 1325 (25th November, 1946).
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The Firqa-yi Dimukrat sent complaints to Qavam,
protesting that only 300 gendarmes were to be brought into
Zanjan according to the treaty, not the Iranian army nor the
resulting bloodshed. Qavam's response came with a declaration
claiming that such a force had been necessary to control the
sabotage and public harassment pursued by the local Fida'is,
whily denying the scale of the crimes perpetrated.1 The
Tehran press also participated in the vilifying of the Firqa-
yi Dimukrat, portraying the democratic movement and central
government in reverse roles: the Firqa were executing patriotic
figures and were anti-monarchists, since they removed pictures
of the Shah throughout the province.2 All of this propaganda
was groundless, since in reality the Firqa-yi Dimukrat brought
about public welfare and security through Azerbaijan. Its
aim was to prepare the ground for the invasion of the whole
of Azerbaijan.
This is shown in the declaration made by Qavam on 22nd
November,3 where he said that security was a necessity for the
holding of Majlis elections. He therefore intended sending
troops to all provinces, including Azerbaijan, in order to
safeguard the free electoral procedure without pressure upon
the individual's choice. Qavam thus opened the way for similar
action to be taken in Azerbaijan as had been initiated in
Zanjap.
The effect of Qavam's declaration was, despite its
clarity, one of great amazement. The governor of Tabriz,
Javid, inquired of Qavam whether he was intending to send
forces also to Azerbaijan: Qavam's reply was a clear
affirmative.* This sparked off another telegram from the
1. Dad, no.897, 11th Azar, 1325 (2nd December, 1946 ).
2. Khandaniha, yr.7, no.29, 9th A^ar, 1325 (30th November, 1946); yr.7, no.33, 23rd
Azar, 1325 ( 14th December, 1946 ); Kayhan, no.1128, 27th Azar, 1325 (18th December,
1946).
3. Dad, no.889, 7th Azar, 1325 (22nd November, 1946 ).
4. Ibid., no.891, 4th Azar, 1325 (25th November, 1946).
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Provincial Council of Azerbaijan, indicating that since the
Azerbaijan army and gendarmes belonged to the armed forces
of Iran, there existed no grounds for a further influx of
troops; neither did, or should, a democratic country resort to
military safeguarding of elections. The entry of military forces
into Azerbaijan would be considered as an act of aggression:
they urged Qavam to instead send inspectors to supervise the
elections.1
Qavam ignored the request of the Provincial Council, but
made it clear in another telegram to Javid that the Provincial
Council possessed no authority to reject Qavam's proposal to
send troops into Azerbaijan, for it in no way violated the
treaty but was concerned solely with the supervision of
elections. Qavam concluded by threatening Javid with the
consequences if Azerbaijan refused entry to Iranian forces.2
This was followed by a letter in which Qavam urged Javid to
facilitate the entry of troops so that the elections might be
soon get underway.3 A similar telegram was received by Ghazi
Muhammad, the leader of the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Kurdistan, from
• •
Qavam. informing him of military supervision also in
Kurdistan. GhazI .Muhammad replied that Kurdistan's Provincial
Council was well capable of supervising elections in the
province, and had no need of extra, outside Iranian army
forces.*
Qavam's response to the appeals made both by Azerbaijan
and Kurdigtan was indeed in violation of the treaty of 13th
June, 194-6: Qavam was thereby repealing the authority given
to the Provincial Councils in the treaty. The pretext of
electoral supervision was a very thin disguise for Qavam's real
1. Dad, no.897, 11th Azar, 1325 (2nd December, 1946).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., no.895, 8th Azar, 1325 (29th November, 1946).
4. Ibid., no.896, 10th Azar, 1325 (1st December, 1946).
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intention to invade Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijan forces were
in themselves quite capable of performing the task without
additional help. The necessity for troops belonged rather to
the South, where the central government faced competition and
resistance, and where authority ultimately rested in the hands
of the British and the tribal chiefs, and outside the control of
Tehran - compared to the opposite situation in the North.1
In spite of Qavam's insistence on the need for free,
democratic elections, this, too, was made under false pretences.
In radio, press and newsreel interviews, Qavam claimed that
the elections must be won by the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran,2 so
that free elections would have been held in name only; nor
would it have been possible for such a short-lived,
government, party to have won in such elections.
Once Pishavarf realised Qavam's firm intention of
suppressing the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, he announced that
Azerbaijan would only be entered by Iranian forces over the
bodies of the Azerbaijan people.3 Thereafter, the whole of the
province mobilised itself - the National Army, Fida'i, and a
partisan group, Babak - as well as the Firqa-yi Dimukrat and
trade unions. The paper Azarbayjan played an important role
in the mobilisation, also informing the world of Azerbaijan's
response to Qavara's policy. Thus on 1st November, an article
was published under the title, "To be killed as a martyr is
better than life under dictatorial rule",* and another on the
following day saying, "Azerbaijanis are prepared to die rather
than to live under suppression".5 The military staff of the
army college in Tabriz also went on radio urging the Iranian
1. Dad, no.892, 5th Azar, 1325 (26th November, 1946).
2. Rahbar, no.874, 10th Apr, 1325 (1st December, 1946).
3. A^arbayjan, no.357, 5th Apr, 1325 (26th November, 1946).
4. Ibid., no.362, 10th Apr, 1325 (1st December, 1946).
5. Ibid., no.363, 11th Azar, 1325 (2nd December, 1946).
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army not to co-operate or participate in Qavam's plan for
-Azerbaijan.1
On 3rd November, a large meeting was held between
members of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat and trade unions to receive
permission from the movement's leaders to arm themselves.
Pishavarl declared that their intention was to gain democracy
not simply for Azerbaijan but over all Iran, by replacing the
reactionary central government in Tehran with a democratic
one.2 Plshavarl thus gained approval from many other
progressives throughout Iran, who gave Azerbaijan their
support.
Simultaneously, the committee overseeing the electoral
proceedings began preparations for the supervision of the 15th
Majlis elections, despite the mobilisation. Qavam, however,
declared their function to be illegal, since it was his decision
that it belonged to the Iranian army and not to the Azerbaijan
committee,3 although this, too, was an illegal act according to
the 13th June treaty.
Qavam announced the entry of Iranian forces into
Azerbaijan on 10th December, 1946: troops were moved from
Zanjan towards Miyana. * This advance was met by mobilisation
of Azerbaijani troops to the fortress of Qaflankuh.5
The Fida'i were able to push Qavam's forces back to
Zanjan, and Pishavari indeed encouraged the Fida'i groups to
march all the way to Tehran in order to overthrow the
1. Azarbayjan, no.368, 18th Azar, 1325 (9th December, 1946).
2. Ibid., no.366, 16th Azar, 1325 (7th December, 1946).
3. Dad, no.901, 18th Azar, 1325 (9th December, 1946).
4. New York Times, November 17th, 1946.




Qavam's policy towards Azerbaijan was carried out on the
basis of a systematic and carefully developed plan. Since Iran
had become an international issue, with Azerbaijan at its
centre, Qavam was dealing with external factors and influences
of which Azerbaijan had now become a part. British and
American interest was exhibited in a concern for the
suppression of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, and therefore supported
Qavam's view;2 on the other hand, Qavam was aware that the
Soviet Union would in an eventuality not back the Firqa.3 With
this knowledge, and because of it, Qavam drew up his course
of action as regarded Azerbaijan.
Qavam's assessment of the Soviet reaction was confirmed
by their response, which clearly indicated their acquiescence
in Tehran 's actions.
The Soviet military and political advisors to the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat withdrew from Azerbaijan three days before the
invasion, taking with them the heavy arms which the Soviet
Union had supplied to the movement, and leaving the National
Army solely with light weapons.* Furthermore, the Azerbaijan
military commanders received orders from the Soviets to retreat
from Qaflankuh to 'Tabriz.5 Pishavari himself was given
personal instructions not to resist, and urged together with all
those who were under threat of death to flee to the Soviet
Union.4 PishavarT was therefore compelled to leave Azerbaijan
for the USSR7 and was succeeded as leader of the Firqa-yi
1. Azarbayjan, no.369, 19th Azar, 1325 (10th December, 1946).
2. New York Times, November 30th, 1946.
3. Dad, no.905, 22nd A£ar, 1325 (23rd December, 1946 ).
4. Aras, no.77, 20th Farvardin, 1326 (9th April, 1947 ).
^
c- *
5. Personal interview, Col.S. and Gen.K., May/August, 1982. "?
6. Personal interview with leading figures of the contemporary Central Committee
of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, September, 1982.
7. Allen, op. cit., p.62.
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Dimukrat by Biriya 1
Consequently, despite the willingness of the Azerbaijanis
to fight, the Fida'is advance to Zanjan, and the wide support
of progressives throughout Iran, the result of the Soviet
instructions2 was to effect the dissolution of the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat's resistance, in complete confusion, on the orders of
army headquarters and the Firqa-yi Dimukrat leaders, a
retreat was thus begun.
Biriya subsequently declared the surrender of Azerbaijan
on 11th December, 1946.3 He followed this with a further
declaration the next day, urging the Azerbaijanis to lay down
their arms and allow the Iranian army to enter the province.*
Telegrams were sent by Javid and Shab istarl announcing
Azerbaijan's surrender to Muhammad Riza Shah and Qavam.6
This action foreclosed the options of the Azerbaijan public to
fight and continue resistance, and they were left to await the-
destiny of Azerbaijan at the hands of Tehran. 70,000 National
Army and Fida'i members, however, were recruited into the
Soviet armed forces, since they did not trust the intentions of
the Iranian army, and feared for their lives.6
The Iranian army entered Tabriz on 13th December.
Martial law was immediately proclaimed, and Gen. Hashim'i
announced the annulment of all previous and standing treaties
between Tabriz and .Tehran.7 Widespread brutality broke out,
with so much slaughter that the gutters ran with blood and
1. Rossow, op. cit., p.30.
2. Dbrahimian, op. cit., p.239.
3. Azarbayjan, no.371, 21st Azar, 1325 (12th December, 1946).
4. Ibid.
5. Dad, no.905, 22nd Azar, 1325 (13th December, 1946 ).
6. Rossow, op. cit., p.31.
7. Dad, no.909, 27th Azar, 1325 (18th December, 1946); Rossow, op. cit., p.31.
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the streets were filled with corpses:1 the military units'
behaviour resembled that of a foreign invading army. According
to eye-witnesses, Fida'i members were 'quartered' by horse
carriages, with medieval savagery, together with Firqa-yi
Dimukrat members and others.2 All Azerbaijan, town by town
and village by village, was occupied by Iranian forces, while
the carnage proceeded apace; throughout the province, more
than 20,000 civilians were killed, and many others injured.3
Even according to the records of the Iranian army, which
minimised the figures, 2,500 were executed, 8,000 imprisoned,
and 36,000 people expelled from Azerbaijan.* This minimisation
is found in Western sources also, including, for example,
Robert Rossow, who puts the number merely in hundreds.5 William
Douglas5 on the other hand, states that the behaviour of the
Iranian troops far exceeded the brutality of the Soviet forces,
while the brutality of the gendarmes and landowners in the
countryside was so bad that the hardship suffered by the
peasants was overwhelming: vast numbers were either killed or
died from starvation, as a result of the landowners'
harassment and exploitation of them.
Under these conditions, the survival of the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat was an impossibility, and it therefore dissolved. Some
of its members joined Tudeh committees; as a result, the Tudeh
adopted the partisan policy formerly employed by the Firqa,
instead of its own previous parliamentary approach.7 They
subsequently went underground until February 194-9, when the
1. Personal interview, A. Purzad, August 1982. Namvan, R., op. cit., pp.16-25.
Kishavarz, F., Man Muttaham Mikunam, Teheran, 1979, passim.
2. The many witnesses include: Mr. Naw bakht, Mr. Madani, Mr. Shamshlri. For more
details see footnote (l) ibid.
3. Kishavarz, op. cit., p.33.
4. Mardum, special no. for Martyrs, 14th 8ahman, 1327 (3rd February, 1949).
5. Rossow, op. cit., p.31.
6. W. Douglas, op. cit., p.45.
7. Personal interview with Col. Sharifi, March 1982. And see Mardum , 5th May, 1948.
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Shah's life was threatened and the Tudeh was finally-
outlawed. 1
1946 ended with the suppression of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-
i Azarbayjan and the Kurdistan rebellion, in Iran, and the
sympathetic Tudeh Party suffered much pressure from Qavam,
who appointed anti-communist governors in various important
provinces and encouraged direct suppression of organisation
and public expression.2 1947 opened, however, still with no
resolution of the proposed oil concession to the Soviets. In
Soviet eyes, elections for the 15th Majlis were of paramount
importance, in order for the ratification of the oil treaty made
on April 4th, 1946.3 Anxiety for elections within Iran itself
was also growing because Qavam's disguise was wearing thin,
and his unpopularity was increasing. As a result, Qavam
announced that elections would finally be held in Tehran from
January llth-17th, and in the provinces following that date.
Progressives and nationalists in Iran were concerned that
Qavam would make sure that the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran would
gain the majority, and therefore appealed to the Shah to wield
his influence to prevent such an event occurring.* Either
because of inability or unwillingness the Shah did nothing,
and the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran gained an overwhelming
majority in the elections, announced on February 21st, 1947.
Immediately upon the sitting of the 15th Majlis, however,
Qavam came under sharp criticism from Musaddiq and the
nationalists for even opening negotiations with the Soviets for
an oil concession while the bill prohibiting concessions, passed
by the 14th Majlis, was still in force.5 Qavam gave them no
1. Cuyler Young, T., "The Soviet Support of Current Iranian Policy", ME J, vol.6,
Spring 1952, no.2, p.140.
2. Jabha, 21st November, 1946-
3. New York Times, January 1st, 1947.
4. Ibid., January 13th, 1947.
5. Ibid., September 8th, 1947.
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satisfactory reply, and, in anger, he walked out of the Majlis
with 90 other sympathetic members.1 Nevertheless, Qavam won
a vote of confidence on October 5th, 194-7, with the support of
93 members out of 120.2
It was therefore obvious that the Soviet oil concession
would be rejected by the 15th Majlis, for the majority of M.P.s
were pro-Western and anti-Communist, and Qavam's leanings
towards America meant that the Truman Doctrine3 would be
applied to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. It was
thereby refused on October 22nd, 1947,* on the grounds that it
had originally been made under duress.5
Qavam suppressed the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, and the Hizb-i
Kumala-yi Kurdistan, and the Tudeh Party, and rejected the
Soviet oil concession all on the basis of Western support in the
face of aggression from the Soviet Union.5
The Azerbaijan democratic movement arose out of general
dissatisfaction with the central government's policies and the
regime in Tehran. It was fueled by the readiness of the
Azerbaijanis to fight for reforms after years of suppression,
and given the opportunity to develop through the presence of
Soviet forces sympathetic to democratic movements in Iran.
Following the oil treaty signed with the USSR, the localised
policy of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was universalised to extend
over the whole of Iran. By so doing, they received further
1. New York Times, September 29th, 1947.
2. Ibid., October 6th, 1947.
3. For more details, see: Kirkendall, R.S. (e d.), The Truman Period as a Research
Field: A Reappraisal, 1972, Columbia, 1974, pp.8, 11-75, 161-191; and Koenecke, op.
cit■, pp.101-2; and Kuniholm, op. cit.f, p.434ff.
4. New York Times, October 23rd, 1947.
5. Rossow, "Red Tanks", op. cit., p.171.
6. Koenecke, op. cit., p.100; Allen, op. cit., p.56.
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support and backing from other progressive parties in the
country, and together with others, formed the Freedom Front in
November, 1946.1 At the end of one year, the movement had
reached such strength as to be able to take over Tehran: it
refrained from doing so, however, as a consequence of Qavam's
conciliatory attitude. This was in all probability their greatest
mistake, for it gave time and occasion to Qavam to plan their
destruction.
The primary factor in the events that led to the collapse
of the Azerbaijan movement lay in the withdrawal of support
by the Soviet Union. Confusion still exists over the radical
alteration in Soviet policy: some observers2 believe that it was
a result of the promise of an oil concession, together with the
view that Azerbaijan should be the internal affair of Iran,
and opposition to the Firqa-yi Dimukrat from within Azerbaijan
itself. These reasons, however, do not do justice to the
complexity or truth of the issue. Two alternative explanations
can be seriously put forward: the threat made by the United
States3 to drop an atomic bomb* on the Soviet Union if she did
not withdraw her support from Azerbaijan, or from similar
movements in the rest of the world, a threat which
the Soviet Union at that time could not return.5 More likely,
is the suggestion that the Soviet Union, America and Britain
came to an agreement whereby Soviet influence was approved
1. Hizb-i Kumala-yi Kurdistan, Hizb-i Jangal, Hizb-i Susyalist, Hizb-i Tudeh, Hizb-i
Iran.
2. Including George Allen; cf. Papers of G.V. Allen, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Mo., USA, p.65.
3. For a more general account of U.S. pressure and its effect upon Soviet support,
see Rossow, "The Battle of Azerbaijan", MEJ, vol.10, 1956, passim; and Doenecke,
op. cit., passim.
WAkiat _ _ _ _
4. For more details of this threat, see N-aahat-i Milli-yi Azarbayjan Haqqinda, Tehran
1979, passim.
5. Rahbar, no.627, 19th Murdad, 1324 (10th August, 1945), no.630, 23rd Murdad, 1324
(14th August, 1945), no.635, 30th Murdad, 1324 (21st August, 1945), Shahrivar Special
No.l, 13th Shahrivar, 1324 (4th September, 1945).
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in China in return for withdrawal of support from the Firya
regime, Gen. Markos Vafiades1 in Greece, the Communist Party
of Italy, and other communist parties throughout the world.2
The Azerbaijan movement, while being democratic, modern
and progressive, achieving many reforms, thus fell victim to
international politics and intrigues and was sacrificed to
factors and interests external both to Azerbaijan itself and to
Iran.
Apart from those external factors enumerated above and
the opposition from central government, a further crucial
reason for failure was disunity amongst the progressive
movement generally and central leadership of the movement in
particular. The talk of unity did not translate into practice;
Qavam exploited this weakness and thus systematically
destroyed the threat in a manner similar to that employed in
the 1979 Revolution, according to certain critics.
1. Woodhane, C.H., The Story of Modern Greece, London, 1968; Campbell, J. and
Shenrard, P., Modern Greece, London, 1968.
2. Personal interview with Col. Sharifi, March 1982.
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CONCLUSION
One of the most important features of the period under
study is that Iranian policy was determined, and produced, by
an interaction between the country's internal troubles and her
external relations.
By the beginning of the twentieth century a popular
awareness was beginning to grow that the ruling classes were
'selling' Iran to foreign powers, particularly to Russia and
to Britain through oil concessions. The ruling Qajar dynasty
became increasingly weak and oppressive, and was almost
totally obedient to the great powers. But the oppression under
which peasants meantime suffered produced no more organised
reaction than a gradual trickle of migrants seeking work in
Russia.
But awareness also grew of the need for constitutional
reform, and, as the necessary pressure on the government could
not be brought by parties as we understand them, which had
not yet developed, the struggle was finally won by anjumans
which developed from dawras and were supported by the
Q —
Ulama, although a major part of the process took place in
.Azerbaijan. Part of the motive inspiring this movement was a
desire to bring Iran into line with contemporary Western
Europe.
After the First World War, these anjumans began to grow
into such parties as the Hizb-i Dimukrat and the Hizb-i
• •
Adalat, which rapidly developed popular political
mobilisation, but did not provide good conditions for forward-
looking leadership unlike that of Riza Shah.
At this stage, Iran was in very bad order, facing
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economic disaster. The country was plagued by foreign
intervention, for example the Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1919,
which faced much internal opposition, and the situation within
the country worsened to the state that numerous revolutionary
movements appeared but were negative and purely anti-
Imperialist and were too physically disparate to claim any
robustness; however, the way was prepared for the defeat of
the Qajar dynasty and the .restraint of British interference.
These disorders communicated to Britain a manifest
concern as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which
Iranian revolutionaries were hoping in part to emulate. The
1921 coup d'etat was the only hope for prevention and Riza
Khan, on his assumption of power, did bring some political
stability to Iran. However, the freedom given to parties and
unions was crushed, along with the independence and integrity
c — —
of the tribes and ulama, when the Shah realized the threat
which these same bodies could pose to his position.
Although Riza Shah's policies modernized Iran to a modest
extent, his tactics were inspired primarily by a need to set
against each other Great Britain and Russia. Initially he
turned to the USA with restricted success and he then resorted
to Germany.
The stability brought by Riza Shah is undeniable, but
was of a transient and baseless nature and in the long-term
damaged Iran's international position, to the extent that his
dictatorial rule culminated in the tragedy that was Iran's
experience during the Second World War.
The strength of Riza Shah' s dictatorial proclivities meant
that he insisted upon the continued presence in Iran of German
nationals, against the demands of the Allied Powers; this
effectively justified Anglo-Russian invasion and he was forced
to resign in favour of his son.
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The occupation had both negative and positive results.
On the positive side, Iran achieved her goal of freeing the
country from Riza Shah' s regime and enormous freedom was
suddenly granted to the political parties, trade unions and
religious elements; this encouragement to new political parties
came partly from occupying elements. The mushrooming of
political • parties came about partly due to this political
'indulgence' by the Allies and partly as a natural reaction to
the sudden end of the twenty years' oppressive rule by Riza
Shah. But more negatively, the war-time priorities and
problems caused by the Allies' presence were a hindrance to
the normal development of properly constituted institutions.
This poor constitutional situation was reflected in the 13th
Majlis whose elected composition after Riza Shah' s abdication
was almost identical to the body appointed by him during his
power. One new departure was the introduction of 'fractions',
discussion groups which were very like . parties in all but
name, for example, conservative, liberal and radical; these
fraksiyuns supported different foreign powers. These groups,
however, did not represent significant political growth
throughout Iran or the blossoming of many new parties, which
followed on the political hiatus which existed from 1925 until
194-1. Of the many new groups formed during this new period
of relative freedom of association, the most important was the
c —
Tudeh Party, which had its roots in the Hizb-i Adalat of
1916, but whose real founder was Taqi Arani, after whose
death in one of Riza Shah' s prisons, the party formed in
September 1941, assuming as their new leader Sulayman Muhsin
Iskandari in February 1942.
Although the party itself catered for minorities in various
dependent groups, it had an ambitious appetite for its allies,
trying to swallow each collaborating party into the Tudeh
itself, and achieving 'take-overs' of this sort by control of the
newspapers of the Anti-Fascist Society and Freedom Front of the
Press, for example, which directed its activities against "class
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reaction" and "royal dictatorship". By such manoeuvres,
support was won particularly in the North and the South-West,
amongst the intelligentsia and the urban working-class. As the
Tudeh Party grew both in support and in influence, Sayyid
Ziya drew together nervous merchants, tradesmen and mullas
to form the Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli, whose chief aim was the
eradication of the Tudeh. This campaign, waged partly as a
reaction to the fear of the landowners, condemned the Tudeh
Party with a charge of atheism. For example, Sayyid Ziya in
c — —
Ra d-i Imruz said of the Revolt in Isfahan, "... the Tudeh
Party is an enemy of private property, of Iran, and of
Islam".1 Alongside these two competing movements was a host
of smaller political groupings, some pro-Tudeh some supporters
of Irada-yi Milli, whilst others took an independent line. Thus
from 1941 Iran entered the age of partibazi, party-playing.
This atmosphere was repeated in the general community, where
party allegiance was determined largely by membership of
specific interest groups courted by particular parties. This new
political structure revealed two areas of conflict; an urban,
class-based one, and a more rural, ethnic discord.
During the reign of Riza Shah, all power had been in one
pair of hands; after his abdication, power was diffused in five
directions: court, Majlis, Cabinet, foreign embassies, and the
populace. The diverse nature of power left the new Shah with
little real power and, like his father twenty years before, he
realised the need to gain popularity before turning to crush
the people from a position of strength.
In deciding ultimate policy, Muhammad Riza Shah,
knowing the unpopularity of his father's dictatorship, took the
precaution of releasing all political prisoners, denying his
father's supporters his assistance and bringing about reforms,
improving theological opportunities and restoring land taken by
1. RaCd-i Imruz, 15-25 May, 1944.
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Ri'za Shah. He simultaneously curried the favour of the upper
classes, especially in Parliament.
In foreign policy, too, the Shah was careful and
determined to win the support of other powers. In return for
implicit and explicit signs of willingness to assist the Allied
War effort, he was rewarded by the Tripartite Treaty of 29th
January, 1942, which guaranteed the position of the monarch
and the integrity of the state, and an Allied policy of non¬
intervention in Iran. The instinctive fear of Britain and the
Soviet Union generated in the Shah by their considerable
contribution to Riza Shah's enforced abdication was
counterbalanced by the new monarch with the introduction of
a balancing third power, America. Muhammad Riza Shah
appreciated the necessity of a strong military force which he
would ultimately need to maintain his position, and he
therefore concluded an agreement with the USA to strengthen
and improve the armed forces. American involvement expanded
considerably as the result of the Tehran Declaration of 1st
December, 1943, signed by the USSR, the USA and Britain,
which afforded America the opportunity officially to defend the
Shah and Iran against the Soviet Union and Great Britain.
The practical effect of the Tripartite Treaty and the
Tehran Declaration was contrary to the theoretical
implications. The Allies' promises of non-interference in
internal affairs were broken, and as we have seen, the prime
ministers of the 13th Majlis were reluctant to challenge the
Allies at the cost of their position; a good example of this
being Suhaylf's premiership. The cost of occupation was such
that a vast amount of money needed to be printed to meet local
wages and a real threat of great inflation existed. Suhayli's
refusal to print the necessary money caused the rapid decline
in popular support which brought about his resignation in
July 1942.
- 330 -
He was replaced by Qavam> who was more acceptable to
the Allies, and who printed the required money and brought
back Millspaugh as economic adviser. The resulting inflation,
which caused widespread hostility, coupled as it was with
American support for the Shah, who opposed Qavara, caused the
latter's downfall in February, 1943.
The patent need for foreign approval was felt by Suhayll
who, upon replacing Qavam as Prime Minister, increased
Millspaugh's powers and undertook talks for an American
commercial agreement and Oil Concessions to the USA and Great
Britain. But despite successful foreign relations, Suhayli too
was saddled with a Shah who insisted upon personal control of
the armed forces, contrary to the Prime Minister's preferred
principle that the forces should be under civilian control.
An overall analysis of the course of the 13th Mailis
reveals that each Prime Minister tried to keep good relations
with foreign powers, with the public and with the Shah. But
the divergence of interest, amongst the Allies, for example,
made inclusive popularity impossible and the office of Prime
Minister resultingly changed hands frequently. The situation
was only worsened by the inability of deputies to reach
consensus. The relative strength of forces within society as
against organised political groups was a vital factor which
played a central part in the long and comprehensive elections
for the 14th Majlis. This difficulty can be appreciated when it
is realized that sixteen different parties existed at the
beginning of these elections which were unique in Iranian
history.
In the two years following these elections, most of the
parties either disappeared altogether, or amalgamated with the
Tudeh Party; six parties remained to function: the Tudeh, the
Hizb-i Hamrahan, the Hizb-i Iran, the Hizb-i cAdalat, the Hizb-
• • • •
i Ittihad-i Milli, and the Hizb-i Vatan; although many even of
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these were suppressed in 194-7-
The 14-th Majlis convened in March 1944, the Tudeh Party
taking eight seats and the Hizb-i Iran five. But with the
subsequent division into fractions, Britain was supported by
the Patriots and Democrats, the Soviet Union by the Tudeh
Party and Liberals, and America by Independents and" National
Unionists. Deputies were also influenced by local and class
considerations and the composition of the Majlis was such that
the Shah feared for his own power and suspected that he might
be at the mercy of his deputies. Despite the great freedom of
the elections, Musaddiq claimed that the system was corrupt
and needed reform; the Shah, however, refused fresh elections,
contributing to Musaddiq's later opinion that the Shah should
not interfere as if he were a cabinet minister. Throughout this
period, more energy was spent in the Majlis in in-fighting
than in solving critical national problems; in fact, during the
course of the 14th Majlis, there followed seven prime ministers.
The resignation of each was due to controversial foreign
policy or simply to inter-Majlis intrigues, for example, the
first Prime Minister of the 14th Majlis, being pro-West, was
denounced internally by the pro-Russian Liberal fraction, and
the withdrawal (externally) of Russian oil demands was bought
Q
at the cost of Sa id's resignation. The second Prime Minister,
Bayat, attempted to take a firm foreign-policy stand, by
cancelling the oil concessions and reducing Millspaugh's powers
over the economy, but was so weak that he was incapable of
quelling anti-government riots. At this point, his supporters in
the Majlis were divided, and after five months, Bayat fell from
power. His successor, Hakimi, who was politically unaffiliated,
lasted only two months, losing the support of the Liberals,
Individuals, Democrats and Patriots as each discovered that
their interests were unrepresented in the government.
In June, Sadr began his administration in a
parliamentary boycott over his blatantly pro-British cabinet.
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He went on to appoint Arfa to crush left-wing groups by
suppressing freedom of assembly and by banning certain Tudeh
publications. His premiership was ultimately weakened by the
Azerbaijan crisis and it became clear that the Parliament,
riddled with factionalism, could not escape internal disputes
long enough to solve either internal or external problems. When
the predominantly pro-Western parliament rejected PTshavarl's
credentials, the Azerbaijani people had a ready-made excuse
to rise against the central government; they had long suffered
under Ri'za Shah and discovered that their wishes remained
unfulfilled after his resignation.
Parliament was unthinking in its rejection of Plshavarl,
a move inspired eithher by Western pressure on the deputies to
stop a pro-Russian, or by deputies' fears that the domination
of radicals would thereafter threaten their own interests.
On Pishavari's return he collected the peasants, workers
and discontented and on 3rd September formed the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat. The squabbling Majlis failed to resolve the situation.
It was generally recognised within Iran that the
restlessness currently felt was due in large part to the
inflexible attitude shown by Prime Minister Sadr towards any
form of radicalism in the country. Sadr's policies thus
antagonised the liberal, radical and nationalist elements in
Iran, and Hakimi was elected as his successor in the hope that
his relatively neutralist and tolerant stance would improve the
situation.
Such a solution might possibly have borne fruit had it
not been for the crippling of Hakimi's policies by the
composition of his government. Divided within itself on the one
hand, the reactionary majority still held sufficient political
C
sway to annul Hakimi's personal tolerance. Even Husayn Ala',
■ Hakimfs main source of communication with America,
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disapproved his policies. Two major factors emerged out of
these circumstances: the control exercised over the country by
the ruling class, represented by the reactionary Majlis
deputies, was responsible for aggravating the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat, whose members came from the liberal, radical and
nationalist elements. The latter therefore took the opportunity
afforded by the occupation of Azerbaijan and the North by the
Red Army to revolt against the central government; Haklml
further showed himself not to be as neutral as had been
thought, by suddenly switching to the right and harassing the
Tudeh Party. Hakimi further aggravated the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat by describing it as anarchist and by claiming that
Turkish was not Azerbaijan's mother tongue, but was imposed
by the Mongols. He thus intensified the crisis by denying
Azerbaijanis' rights.
The activity of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat posed to Tehran
the difficult problem of foreign intervention in Iran, and
Iran's relations to the Big Powers. The Firqa-yi Dimukrat
openly claimed Soviet support for its activity (although the
USSR itself minimised such propaganda), but it was the Soviet
halting of the Iranian Army at Qazvin, November 20th, 194-5,
that offered a good excuse for the Iranian reactionaries to
show the outside world that the crisis over Azerbaijan was an
external affair, and to gain American support for its resolution
by the U.N. Security Council. The West played into Tehran's
hands by failing to solve the problem either at the Moscow
Conference or by Bevin's proposal of a tripartite commission,
for the United States and Britain both subsequently backed the
Iranian suggestion made towards United Nations' participation
in the issue.
The nationalist, radical, liberal and Communist elements
in Iran, on the other hand, sought to localise the Azerbaijan
issue, claiming that its resolution would be made simple
through direct negotiations with the people of Azerbaijan and/
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or the Soviet Union. This demand Hakimi was incapable of
fulfilling in view of the pressure exerted by his government
towards pro-Western policies, and it was this fact that
necessitated his ultimate resignation in favour of Qavarm
Qavam too, however, was found to be only an immediate
answer for the problem, for in the long term, he proved to be
pro-Western and against the democratic movement. He gave the
appearance of being in control of events, but faced serious
challenges from both right and left. His unorganised approach,
with its tendency to improvisation and its lack of planning,
differed greatly from the image presented, and Qavam thereby
disguised his true aims. Whilst trying to convince the populace
that he had acted with foresight and had led Iran through her
period of difficulty, he was in fact rewriting his actions to
suit present political needs, but always leaving his opponents just
enough freedom to accommodate their becoming his friends. The
multiplicity of images with which Qavam manoeuvred confused
politicians and foreign powers alike. Whilst on the one hand,
he seemed to try to weaken the monarchy, yet on the other his
principle of 'positive equilibrium' played the Soviet Union off
against Great Britain with the USA balancing between. He can
fairly be said to have favoured the maintenance of the status
quo rather than risk a social revolution which would
doubtless threaten his personal interests.
He was fortunate in that circumstances created
opportunities which he could exploit for the purposes of his
own plans. He specifically enjoyed three important advantages.
First, he could not be unseated from power by the Shah since
the parliament decreed that no further elections could be held
during the presence of foreign troops. Secondly, the USSR
trusted Qavam to negotiate fairly over the oil concessions. And
finally, America trusted Qavam to negotiate with the Soviets.
Of the problems facing Qavam, two sorts distinguished
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themselves: foreign policy and internal disturbances. He gave
his foreign problems immediate priority and realised the
Russian withdrawal from Iran by promising oil concessions in
the North; simultaneously, he placated American concern by
promising a similar agreement granting the USA concessions in
Baluchistan, and renewing the economic mission from the United
States. Meanwhile his internal policies were deliberately
conciliatory, and in order to win the confidence of the left-
wing radicals, he immediately stopped anti-Tudeh suppression,
re-introducing freedom of assembly. He engineered the arrest
of important right-wing politicians and pro-British
sympathisers, including Sayyid Ziya, Dawlatabadi, Dashti and
C
General Arfat;, he implicitly warned the Shah not to interfere,
and appointed as Chief of General Staff Razmara, who at that
time was supposed to be pro-Soviet.
During this period, Iran's main problem was not that of
the occupying forces but that of the crisis in Azerbaijan*
which was a cause of considerable worry to the Shah and
conservative forces, both in Iran and in Britain and America.
As the activities and support of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat grew in
scale, so did the fears of Tehran., London and Washington.
The governments of Sadr and Hakimi were unable to reach a
solution to the Azerbaijani problem, and failing to realise the
true extent of the movement, initiated very rough measures
against the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, destroying all possibility of
agreement between the two sides. With the formation of Fida'i
groups, the brutality of the gendarmerie was crushed in the
province and they were expelled. One by one, communities in
towns and villages assumed the line of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat
and formed supportive committees; in no time at all the Firqa-
yi Dimukrat had sprung up all over Azerbaijan, and as a
result of this support they had enough courage to convene the
first congress on 1st October, 1945, to plan for the future.
Although at first the movement had existed purely to
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campaign for the use of Turkish in schools and offices, for the
convening of the provincial councils promised by the
constitutional reforms of 1905, and for tax revenue raised in
Azerbaijan to be spent on development in the province, yet due
to the unthinking politics of the central government, their
policy changed to the formation of the National Government of
Azerbaijan on 12th December, 194-5 • The elections for the
National Government demonstrated the popularity of the Firqa-
yi Dimukrat, disproving the false accusations of central
government that it was no more than a "handful of
adventurers".
Although a popular prejudice attributes the election
results to Russian interference, yet a close analysis shows the
opposite - even the British Foreign Office noted that the
Russians exerted very little influence.1 In fact from the
beginning of the elections, intensifying fear had inspired
Tehran and the West to an increased propaganda effort
against Azerbaijan and the USSR. Regardless of this pressure,
the leaders of the movement in Azerbaijan displayed skill,
wisdom and experience in taking united action, by disarming
the local army and accepting its surrender in a duly-signed
truce, on December 14th, 1945. And latterly, in declaring the
wish for a pure and uncorrupted society, the National
Government invited genuine co-operators to remain, but advised
others to leave. At this announcement, many people, including
rich landowners and merchants, became nervous and, thinking
that the Communists were taking over, left hurriedly. To put
further pressure upon the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, the National Bank
of Iran prohibited credit and prevented withdrawal of money;
but even this tactic did not weaken the movement who were now
so solidly supported by the people, that they solved the
problem by the creation of new factories, the introduction of
a government bond scheme and the properly-enforced collection
1. F.O. 371/Persia 1943/34-35117.
- 337 -
of taxes. These, and many other reformative measures were
much-needed in the province. Due to distrust of the Iranian
army, a local army was formed. The purely defensive function
of this force was misunderstood by the central government, who
read it as a sign of impending separation. The newspaper,
Jabha, in viewing these reforms, praised the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat for "implementing extensive reforms in Azerbaijan and
strengthening progressive forces throughout Iran".
At this point the only solution appeared to lie in
negotiations between the Central Government and the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat leaders since it was purely an internal problem and
many nationalists, liberals and radicals urged negotiations.
But Hakimi, who was saddled with the conservatives, the pro-
British and the Shah, could do no more than bring the issue
before the United Nations, thus turning an internal dispute into
an international crisis and intensifying the Cold War between
East and West. Finally, consensus existed within Iran that the
only way to achieve the negotiations which were commonly
proferred was to replace the Prime Minister and Qavam became
the new Premier. Right from the start, Qavam played his cards
well; he knew that to act at all he needed the approval of all
three big powers, and that to reach that stage Russia would
have to withdraw her troops and her support, something that
she would not do unless her long-standing ambition of Northern
oil concessions was satisfied. As the deadline for withdrawal,
set at 2nd March, approached without any sign of a Russian
departure from Azerbaijan, Qavam immediately led a delegation
to Moscow to discuss the Red Army withdrawal, the oil
concessions, and the Azerbaijan problem. His failure to reach
actual agreement with the Soviet Union was immaterial; it did
however pave the way for negotiations within Iran, and the
replacement of Kavtaradze by Sadchikov as Soviet ambassador,
allowed the resumption of negotiations, and finally an
agreement was reached on 4-th April, promising oil concessions.
The Soviet Union was now to withdraw by 6th May, and Qavam
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in return promised an oil concession, though not before the
15th Majlis had . convened and approved it. But concerning
Azerbaijan, Russia viewed it as an internal Iranian affair for
Iran to solve alone. By this agreement, then, the Soviet Union
and Iran each fulfilled the wishes of the other, yet without the
resolution of the Azerbaijan problem.
Meantime, the Iranian problem had become a priority
issue in the Security Council of the U.N. and between 25th and
29th March, there took place a sharp conflict between East and
£ _
West concerning the presentation of the Iranian case. Ala',
who favoured its presentation, sought an opportunity to
condemn Russia for her failure to complete the withdrawal by
2nd March. But Gromyko wanted postponement since negotiations
between the USSR and Iran were well under way and the whole
Q —
situation was confused by the difference between Ala' and
Qavam. By 29th March, a compromise resolution was adopted,
calling for a full report by both sides by the 2nd April. But
after the agreement of 4-th April the situation was much
changed, and Gromyko demanded the permanent dismissal of the
case from the agenda. Qavam's similar request was refused by
the West, who suspected Soviet pressure and instead proposed
to keep the crisis on the agenda until 6th May at least.
After satisfying himself of Russian contentment with the
promise of a joint-stock company, he turned his attention to
the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, negotiating an agreement which was
welcomed by the public, particularly progressives, but which
was not as valuable as it seemed, depending as it did in
large part upon the approval of the 15th Majlis not yet in
session. However, the Firqa-yi Dimukrat were very determined
to end animosity between Azerbaijan and Tehran, and agreed
to the treaty, turning the National Government into a
provincial council. This resolution to the problem proved wrong
the fears of those who assumed that the movement intended
separation from the rest of Iran. Instead, the results of the
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National Government had been the welcome ones of building
schools, hospitals and a University, and generally raising the
standard of living.
After the signing of the agreement, Firqa-yi Dimukrat
policy changed, so that the slogan now read "Democratic
liberty not only for Azerbaijan but for the whole of Iran", and
the movement realised widespread support throughout Iran. In
parallel with this agreement, Qavam seemed to favour the left-
wing, but because of his fears of the fast-growing Tudeh
Party, he formed the Democrat Party of Iran, which would
represent his interests in the elections for the 15th Majlis.
This party ultimately became a refuge not only for
conservatives but also for all who feared Communism. As the
Tudeh Party and Iran Party continued to grow in strength,
Qavam silenced them by forming a coalition with them in
August so that he could execute his own plans. It was a
serious mistake on the part of these two parties to enter the
coalition, as by so doing they removed their own platform from
which to criticise the government. This self-imposed
vulnerability proved fatal when the apparent left-turn of
Qavam attracted the stern attention of the Shah, Great Britain
and the tribal leaders, whose interests seemed to be
threatened. It may have been this pressure upon Qavam which
forced him to choose a move to the right-wing, and once again
he re-imposed oppression against the Tudeh Party, appointing
anti-Communist governors of the more restless provinces, and
released Sayyid Ziya, Kashan! and others of that general
persuasion.
The main cause of Qavam's nervousness was the Firqa-yi
Dimukrat, and the premier realised he had to end its influence
as subtly and diplomatically as he could. With his failure to
implement the agreement which had been reached between the
sides, Qavam faced much criticism. He therefore invited the
Azerbaijani delegation to come to Tehran to make another
- 340 -
agreement to enforce the original one and kept them there,
while reaching no substantial conclusion, but merely placating
; S-< s
the representatives with a few verbal provinces; eventually,
the delegation returned to Azerbaijan hoping for a continuation
of negotiations. Qavam's delaying tactics appear to have been
intentional in order that he might carry through his own
policies.
At this stage, however, the rising of Southern tribes who
wanted the same concessions as were given to Azerbaijan, gave
Qavam a useful weapon. He threatened Azerbaijan, saying that
if she did not give up her own claims, _Khuzistan might
separate altogether from Iran. In truth the case of the
southern tribes was in no respect comparable with that of the
Azerbaijan crisis, but was politically manipulated by Britain,
Qavam and the conservative forces within Iran to pressurize
Azerbaijan.
Progressives, and particularly the Tudeh Party, were
angered that Qavam described as a "democratic movement
seeking its rights" an uprising which was violent and claimed
many army lives. Finally, when Qavam appointed solely from
the Democratic Party of Iran a Supervisory Council for the
elections to the 15th Majlis, the Tudeh Party angrily withdrew
from the coalition, unwittingly removing its problematic
presence from Qavam, precisely as he wished.
Furthermore, Qavam reduced the problems cause by the
Tudeh's influence upon all the Trades Unions, by creating the
Central Syndicate of Iranian Craftsmen, Farmers and Workers
to counterbalance the influence of the former movement; this
very artificial creation was of limited effectiveness and as the
populace realized that it was a puppet movement created to
suit Qavam's plans, the movement faded away altogether.
Meanwhile, by the treaty of 4th April, signed with the
- 341 -
Soviet Union, Qavam had silenced the Russians who avoided
interfering in Iranian internal affairs because she had had the
granting of her wishes promised by the Central Government.
Simultaneously, however, by breaking with the extreme left,
Qavam pleased the West, the Conservatives and the Shah. After
ensuring Western support, then, the prime minister prepared to
send his troops into Azerbaijan and Kurdistan on the pretext
of supervising the elections to the 15th Majlis. Qavam's hostile
attitude towards the revolutionary movements within Iran's
more troublesome provinces outweighed the influence of the
many figures who urged him to avoid this course of action,
and when he made his intenion public, Azerbaijan immediately
mobilised against the force, on the understandable principle
that no truly democratic country uses troops to supervise its
elections. The Firqa-yi Dimukrat leaders called upon the
premier to send a supervisory group instead, but continued
military preparations since they had learned from their
experience following the April 23rd Treaty, by which Zanjan
was handed back amid serious army disorders and looting. The
action of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat was in opposition to what they
well knew was effectively an invasion force, but Qavam was
confident of foreign support and the non-interference of the USSR,
and on 10th December ordered military action.
With the steady advance of the Iranian force and the
readiness of the Azerbaijani people to support their patently
capable and strong army and Fida'i groups, suddenly the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat ordered surrender, under pressure from the
Soviet Union, and to the total confusion of much of the
population. The subsequent invasion of Azerbaijan and the days
of violence and slaughter which ensued constitute arguably one
of the most shameful incidents in recent history. Many Firqa-
yi Dimukrat fled to the USSR, and the decision to surrender
ended all hope that Azerbaijan could be a prosperous province
as it had been for the previous year. Commentators should not,
however, be unduly harsh upon the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, since
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they were bound to Soviet advice and their need for foreign
support precluded their disobedience and political independence.
Turning to a more comprehensive, national perspective, a
clear problem exists: why, when the Firqa-yi Dimukrat enjoyed
significant national support, did they not unite with other
progressives to effect a coup d'etat in Tehran? Part of the
answer lies in the circumstances of Azerbaijan itself. Not only
was that province the main beneficiary of the provincial
fervour and autonomous zeal of the Firqa-yi Dimukrat, but
there conveniently existed the very power vacuum which the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat was in a perfect position to fill. Soviet
help, too, is noteworthy. The territorial arrangement was such
that Azerbaijan was the Iranian province most accessible to
Soviet protection and the indeterminacy of the border made
Soviet involvement natural.
However, more general reasons exist for the failure of the
progressive movements in the country to overthrow what they
viewed as a repressive and reactionary Central Government.
The recourse by such movements as the Azerbaijan National
Government to foreign support meant that nationwide
co-operation was unfortunately foregone and there was
insufficient progressive co-operation to seize the crucial
opportunity granted by the resignation of Riza Shah. Therefore
the Firqa-yi Dimukrat are not totally guiltless for the
maintenance in Iran of some kind of unwelcome administration,
although the geographic and logistical factors enumerated above
cannot be ignored. Foreign interest in Iran must not be
ignored altogether. The country was strategically and
economically very important indeed to Britain, America and the
Soviet Union, and none of these powers wanted either of the
others to have an undue advantage. The suppression of the
Firqa-yi Dimukrat movement was due in large part to the fears
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of the big powers that serious repercussions would be felt
throughout the Middle East because of the influence enjoyed by
the movement throughout Iran. The diversity of Soviet interests
worldwide meant that she could not give the concentrated
attention which would have been necessary to prevent the
defeat of the National Government of Azerbaijan.
The apparent aim of the Azerbaijanis to carry out into
Iran the success enjoyed within the province was prevented by
the suppression not only of the autonomous movement but also
of the Tudeh and Iran Parties and the Trade Union movement.
The tactical success enjoyed by Qavam in successfully
suppressing the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan and the Hizb-
i Kumala-yi Kurdistan, continued to favour him in the 15th
Majlis elections. Despite losing the support of the left wing
and Iranian progressives, Qavam controlled the Supervisory
Electoral Council in Tehran and the Democratic Party of Iran
won the election holding all twelve Tehran seats, and eighty
altogether. Its membership which included both the very rich
and the underprivileged poor, was represented by an
overwhelming majority in the Majlis and this factor, combined
with strong Western pressure made the rejection, of Soviet oil
concessions, in the forthcoming debate, a foregone conclusion,
and left the USSR powerless to object.
Although the Shah had been only a figurehead during the
period 1941-47, he gained much power in 1948 by his
manipulation of the political situation and by his military
strength. An attempt on his life in the following year gave him
an excuse to crush all threats to his position, and the Tudeh
Party, along with Musaddiq and Qavam, disappeared from
political importance. A constitutional assembly created a
Senate, half of which was to be appointed by the Shah and he
was given absolute power to dissolve Parliament, ordering fresh
elections.
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1941-1947 was a period of political liberty in Iran, but
opportunities were wasted by the lack of cohesion amongst the
progressive elements of political society. When power was
assumed once more by the Shah, a unique chance to win real






The following is extracted from the statement of
Mr. Kavtaradze, Soviet Deputy-Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
made at a press conference in Teheran, October 24-, 1944:
For reasons of expediency and the attraction of oil
deposits, the USSR intends to obtain concessions in Azerbaijan,
Gilan and Mazandaran, and parts of Simnan and Khurasan,
north of Q'Uchan.
The territorial definition of the concessions would be
determined by the workable areas of already established oil
deposits.
The Iranian government would receive tonnage royalties
plus a share of the profits and compensation for tax exemption,
with an agreed minimum concession payment.
Iran would also benefit from reduced prices for oil-based
products. In exchange, she would provide technical control,
and assessment of the financial arrangements.
Upon the expiration of the concession, Iran would be
given ownership of all the enterprises, with no demand for
compensation. Thousands of Iranian workers and peasants
would be employed, particularly those engaged in transporting
war supplies from Iran to the Soviet Union, who would be
supervised by the Soviets.
Subsidiary industry would grow in response to the need
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for workers' accommodation, workshops, roads etc., as well as
the vast expansion of the building-materials industry. A
beneficial side-effect of the geological research involved would
be the extraction of related minerals.
A special fund would be set up for health and sanitary
facilities of the workers engaged in the concession.
Intellectuals, too, would find opportunities to apply their
expertise.
Connected to the oil development would be that of water
■v
supplies, connected with irrigation, which would benefit the
public welfare of these districts.
The local agricultural resources would be utilised
extensively, and developed because the stable wages would
create a demand for agricultural and industrial products to the
advantage of trade and the local transport industry.
The Soviets' interest in the oil concession would be
realised in the possession of heavy technical equipment, and
was prepared to give Iran the considerable economic
advantages mentioned above.
The USSR anticipated the acceptance of the Iranian
government and immediate negotiations over the matter.
The Prime Minister promised assistance to the Deputy-
Commissar. The postponement until the end of the war was
considered tantamount to refusal. The Soviets did not approve
of this: SaCFd appeared to be bringing about worsening
relations between the two countries. The Iranian government
gave no convincing reason for their decision, despite the
weighty arguments in favour of the proposed economic link.
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The Deputy-Commissar believed that the strong
relationships between the Soviet Union and Iran, which
survived the war, would overcome these difficulties, and
appealed for the assistance of the Iranian press to help to
bring the matter about.
When asked whether the concessions were considered
before the Government Commission visited northern Iran, and
whether the postponement was also prior to the visit,
Kavtaradze replied:
After the return of the Government Commission from
northern Iran, the negative reply of the Iranian government
was received. The USSR received the Commissar's report before
the meeting with Sacrd, and was instructed to begin the
negotiations. Various meetings were held with the Prime
Minister. When rumours circulated to the effect that the
concession would be refused, the Prime Minister was asked
openly what his intentions were. At that point, the
postponement until after the war was decided upon; this




THE LIFE OF JACFAR PlSHAVARl
A proper understanding of the nature of the role played
by the Firqa-yi Dimukrat in Azerbaijan can only be gained
through the context of the background and character of its
leader - Ja°far Pishavari'1
Pishavari was born in 1894 in Khalkhal, Azerbaijan. His
parents both held extreme radical views. As a result of the
unease that these circles created in the eyes of the
government, the family moved to the Caucasus when Pishavari
was twelve. Upon starting school, PTshavarT without delay
obtained a job as a servant on the school premises, in line
with his belief that those with the opportunity to study should
not exploit it by not supporting themselves at the same time.
On finishing his studies, he then joined the school as a
member of staff.
Throughout this period, PlshavarT exhibited a strong
intellectual bent, spending most of his time until the age of
20 reading history, literature and philosophy in the library.
It was these interests that formed the background for his
involvement in politics. This surfaced forcefully with the
outbreak of WWI and the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Pishavari
supported the revolutionaries out of a sincere belief that the
oppressive exploitationary Czarist regime ought to be
overthrown, as well as from a patriotic feeling that socialist
revolutionary rule would benefit Iran, for the Czar had
1. This brief biography is drown from many sources, but in particular we have made
use of a series of autobiographical articles published in Azhir, 1943—A, and of the
parliamentary proceedings of the Majlis, 1944.
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systematically abused Iranians since the 1907 agreement Russia
had entered into with Britain, under which Iran was to be
divided equally into the two respective spheres of influence of
each.1 His assessment proved later to be correct, in the light
of the February 1921 Treaty made between the Soviet Union and
Iran.2
Pishavari's political career in Iran began with the
publication of pamphlets reflecting deep socialist tendencies.
He was subsequently given a post as editor of the newspaper
Hurriyat (Liberty), which came out in support of the workers.
This was followed by the paper Azhir (Alarm) in the 1940s, the
most radical and outspoken journal of its time. Pishavari
remained a consistent supporter of the working class all his
life, and a prominent fighter for their rights. It was an
attitude clearly reflected in the emphasis upon justice and
welfare for workers made in all his writings.
With the rise of the Gilan movement in the early 20's,3
Pishavari began to take an active role in its struggle. When
it attempted to extend its activities beyond Gilan, in the hope
of overthrowing the central government, Pishavari himself
moved to Tehran. When the movement collapsed in 1922,
Pishavari transferred his efforts towards establishing a trades
union movement in Iran. He contributed a large majority of the
articles in the official organ, Haqiqat (Truth). The trades
union movement witnessed a spectacular growth from its small
beginnings, and by 1923 had a membership of around 7,000.
When Riza Shah came to power in 1925, however, it was one of
the movements destined to be banned by the new ruler. Its
leaders were arrested on Riza Shah's orders, and its top
1. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, New York, 1920, pp.xxiv-xxviii.
2. For more details, see Ramazani, R., The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941: A
Developing Nation in World Affairs, Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia,
1964, pp.139-167, 186-192.
3. Zabih, S., The Communist Movement in Iran, California U.P., 1966.
- 351 -
echelon was destroyed four times in all. Consequently,
Pishavari and various other leaders switched their centre of
activities to Europe, from where they attempted to smuggle
literature back into Iran for dissemination. Eventually, they
were arrested in 1929 by Riza Shah and imprisoned1 for their
radical politics and their involvement with the trades union
movement.
Pishavari and his colleagues continued their outspoken
criticism of the regime even in the face of abuse and torture.
Their firm resolve and unity were sufficient to prevent savage
treatment by the warders, however. Then, after eight years,
the group was joined in the Palace prison by Arani and the
'53', who were arrested in 1937. Their presence proved to be
a great encouragement to Pishavari and his colleagues, for
although the '53' were inexperienced, they were still proof of
the continuing resistance to the central government. Pishavari,
too, was an inspiration and symbol of patient endurance to
Arani and the '53'.
In 1939, Pishavari was released by Riza Shah and exiled
to Kashan, where he was forbidden any social contact. He was
rearrested, however, in 1940, but regained his freedom a year
later as a result of the general amnesty granted with the
invasion and occupation of Iran by the Allied Powers. Soon
afterwards, he resumed publication of Azhir.2
Pishavari never entertained personal opportunism for
furtherance of his political career.3 In 1941 he was encouraged
1. For a full account of Pishavari's imprisonment, see Pishavari, S.J., Yaddasht-
ha-yi Zindan, Teheran, n.d., passim.
2. Azhir was published during 1943-4 as an independent paper. Its two aims were:
a) to lend support to the working class, and b) to create a free, democratic and
independent Iran. It was against all reactionaries and was influential among
'freedom-lovers'. Cf. Yaddashthi-yi Zindan (My Memoirs in Prison), Teheran, for
Pishavari's prison experiences.
3. Azhir, year 1, no. 96, 27th Azar, 1322 (18th December, 1943).
- 352 -
by many to stand as candidate for Tehran in the elections to
the 13th Majlis, but he declined the opportunity. The Tudeh
similarly asked for his candidacy in Ardabil (Azerbaijan) and
were refused on the grounds that he was neither ready nor
willing. He did, however, accept nomination for the 14th
Majlis by the Tudeh and Freedom Front, for Azerbaijan* in
1943.1 In the confusion that surrounded the elections, neither
the credentials of Pishavari nor those of Khu'i were accepted.
Pishavar! had been elected on the Freedom Front ticket,
gaining over 15,000 votes. In his programme, he emphasised
the primary need for adherence to the Constitutional Law. With
respect to internal policy, Pishavari urged free education for
all; the guarantee of individual and public rights; reform of
both civil and police courts; nationalisation, reform of the
army; the election of provincial and town councils, and fair
and free elections. His foreign policy advocated friendly
relations with all Iran's neighbours, especially the USSR, as
well as with Britain.
Judging from his intentions, Pishavari represented a very
progressive stand. It was due mainly to this that the Majlis
first prevaricated in confirmation of his seat, and later
refused his credentials. The challenge which Pishavari
presented to Sayyid Ziya's position within the Majlis was the
prime cause of this refusal, for there was nothing in his own
career which could render him an object of suspicion: he had
been imprisoned without charge for 10 years by Riza Shah; he
possessed no political record by which he could be
incriminated, and could not be accused of having obtained his
election by bribery, since he was far from rich. Indeed, there
was no doubt about his personal character, good behaviour or
capability in the minds of many members of the Majlis.2
1. Azhir, year 1, no.93, 20th Azar, 1322 (11th December, 1943).
2. Dad, no. 29, 24th Azar, 1321, (15th November, 1942).
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With this firm rejection, Pishavari' turned again to
Azerbaijan, and declared that since he had been refused
acceptance to the Majlis, he would enter politics in some other
way.1 In an article in Azhlr he said that he knew that the
votes which he had received in Azerbaijan indicated the
people's determination to obtain political redress for their
neglected cause. He was therefore himself, in response to the
trust which they had placed in him, to defend their rights by
whatever means were at his disposal. His fulfilment of this
promise is substantiated by the activities and events described
in Chapter 4. In the National Government which was eventually
formed, Pishavari was elected Prime Minister, December 12th,
1945 - December 12th, 1946. During this time, he effected a
large measure of reform within Azerbaijan- While he was in
Tabiriz he continued the publication of Azhir, through which
he communicated with the people. His main aim was to prevent
the tyranny of the central government over Azerbaijan, end
its dictatorial rule,2 and establish democratic rights in the
province according to the dictates of the Constitutional Law.
Pishavari insisted upon the Azerbaijani culture and
language being made available to all her people. This
dependence upon Azerbaijan autonomy was not, he repeatedly
stressed, to be at the expense of the independence, freedom
and integrity of Iran.
However, as a result of international pressure3 in
December 1946, Pishavari was forced into exile in the Soviet
Union, which was an appropriate, although misunderstood,
place of exile, since "He was the friend of the Soviet Union,
not its servant"." He later requested from the Soviet
1. Azhir, year 2, no. 167, 20th Tir, 1323 (11th July, 1944), 168, 22nd Tir, 1323
(13th July, 1944).
2. Ibid., year 1, no.91, 15th Azar, 1322 (6th December, 1943).
3. See Chapter 6.
4. Lajavardi, Politics and Labour in Iran, 1941-49, Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford University,
1981.
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government permission to return to Azerbaijan to resume the
struggle for autonomy. Immediately after this request, however,
Plshavari was killed in an automobile accident.1 It is still
unclear whether his death was deliberately brought about or
accidental; future events may possibly shed some light on the
circumstances of the death of a man whose whole life was
directed towards the defending and upholding of .Azerbaijan
rights, and whose memory will always be held dear by
Azerbaijanis.
1. See, personal interview with Mr. A. Shuja i, 1982; H. Lajavardi, op. cit., p.300.
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APPENDIX C
PROGRAMME OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF AZERBAIJAN
The National Government of Azerbaijan recognised that the
dream of autonomy also constituted the solution to Azerbaijan'5
problems. It therefore adopted as its immediate goals the
following programme:
1. The first step in consolidating an autonomous existence
was the world-wide publication of information on the
autonomous status of Azerbaijan. The democratic National
Government was to be set up after the appropriate
negotiations, to maintain the integrity of Iran. Nothing
should be allowed to stand in the way of obtaining this
principal objective.
2. The initial electoral procedure leading to this was
elections to the Anjumans, which would have control over
the local authorities.
3. In the towns, elections for the Anjumans should be held
immediately on the basis of broad democracy to give the
correct direction to their work in improving municipal
administration.
A. Peace and order would be maintained and supervised by
Bakhshdars and Farmandars appointed from democratic,
honest citizens.
5- The old corruption in the Police Force and gendarmerie
was to be purged by removal of the officials involved.
They would be replaced by patriotic freedom supporters,
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who would perform their duties in accordance with
Azerbaijani interests.
6. A study was to be initiated into the Azerbaijan budget:
a national budget would subsequently be drawn up and
presented to the approval of the Majlis. This would serve
in the interests of the development of the country.
7. A "popular guard", made up from the detachments in
towns and villages should be set up to defend
Azerbaijan's autonomy, its parliament and the future of
the National Government.
8. The educational system was to be reformed in a double
aspect. First, Turkish was to be the official language in
schools; secondly, free education would be provided for
children of school age, in a general campaign against
illiteracy. A National University was to be established
for further education purposes.
9. Trade and industry would be encouraged; order was to
be brought to factories and mills. New factories would
stimulate a new consumer industry and trade would thus
increase.
10. Roads and communications (telegraph, telephone and
postal services) would be urgently repaired in view of
their state of inefficiency.
11. New laws would resolve the conflict between the peasants
and landowners.
12. A scheme aimed at reducing unemployment would distribute
land belonging to the state and to absent landowners who
were vilifying Azerbaijan autonomy to the peasants. The
credit functions of the Agricultural Bank would be
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strengthened so that peasants could buy land at moderate
prices from those landowners who wished to sell
property.
13. Further anti-unemployment measures would encourage the
expansion of handicrafts, and the extension of industry
and road-construction, as well as the development of
trade and agriculture.
14. A bill improving the material welfare of workers would
be introduced in the Majlis, plus compulsory insurance
for workers and office-employees.
15- Health insurance would be guaranteed, with free care for
the needy, and organised, concentrated campaigns
against epidemics.
16. Private property was to be respected, and the National
Government would encourage private enterprise to improve
the economy.
17. There was to be complete freedom of conscience and
religion.
18. All nationals - Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians and others
- had identical rights and duties while resident in
Azerbaijan.
19. Recognition of the central government meant that all
measures which did not limit an autonomous existence
would be obeyed, at all times preserving the popular
rights and demands as expressed by the Popular Assembly
and the national parliament of Iranian Azerbaijan.
- 358 -
APPENDIX D
GENERAL DIPLOMATIC TREATY OF 4th APRIL, 1946
BETWEEN IRAN AND USSR1
The negotiations begun by Qavam in Moscow and carried
through by Sadchikov in Tehran, have reached agreement on
the following points:
1. Withdrawal of the remaining Soviet forces from Iran
would commence on March 24th and would be completed in
six weeks.
2. A treaty should be concluded between the two countries
concerning the proposed joint-stock oil company and its
structure, which should be given to the Majlis for its
approval over seven months, in order to circumvent the
standing prohibition upon oil concessions.
3. The Soviet Union would leave the Iranian government to
deal with the Azerbaijan problem and fulfil their wishes
by peaceful means as far as was possible for Qavam
under the Constitutional Law, since Azerbaijan was an
entirely internal Iranian affair.
TREATY ON JOINT-STOCK OIL COMPANY, 4th APRIL, 1946
BETWEEN IRAN AND USSR2
1. The treaty mentioned previously should last for 50 years,
during the first half of which, the Soviets would own
1. P. Humayunfar, La Crise Azerbaijan, Paris, n.d., p.114.
2. Rahbar, no.688, 20th Farvadin, 1325 (7th April, 1946).
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51% and Iran 49% of the oil company, and in the latter
half, 50% would be owned by each.
2. The concessions would cover the areas of Azerbaijan.
Gilan, Mazandaran, parts of Simnan and of northern
Khurasan, north of Quchan.
3. Iran would contribute capital in the form of territory;
the Soviet Union would pay all the expenditure, salaries,
overhead costs, etc. The profit would be divided
according to the input of each partner.
4. Security would be the responsibility of the Iranians.
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